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1 and then the Commissioners would undoubtedly like
2 to ask some questions also. You may proceed.

3 MAYOR ALEGONIZIO: We have a film that we would
4 like to show.

5 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: That is here and ready to
6 go.

7 MAYOR ALEGONIZIO: Fine. Gentlemen, let me
8 open by saying, in very blunt words, that our
9 nation is not prepared to save its cities and the
10 cities are not in a position to save themselves.
11 I believe Americans support equality for all and
12 the elimination of poverty, but I also believe
13 that they would vote the cities out of existence,
14 if they could.

15 Most Americans -- and most New Jerseyans --
16 still do not understand that the problems of race,
17 poverty and the cities are inseparable. The
18 difficulty of life in the cities is just not
19 understood and I often despair of achieving real
20 support for our problems until it is understood.

21 As a first step, we must do away with myths --
22 myths which make understanding impossible. And
23 among the cruelest of these myths are those which
24 say that America is an urban nation; that America
25 is concerned with saving its cities; and that the

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1 achievement of local political power by Negroes
2 will cure poverty. In fact, we are a suburban nation
3 and a suburban state and will be more so in the
4 future.

5 Redistricting, for example, was supposed to
6 help the cities, but instead it has simply shifted
7 more power to the suburbs, for that is where the
8 growth is. Indeed, the first thing redistricting did
9 for Newark was to cost it a congressman.

10 Furthermore, it is a delusion to presume that
11 the self-interest of most Americans link them with
12 the needs of the poor in our cities. For, in
13 truth, rising expectations are not only a part of
14 ghetto life, but a part of American life and it is
15 a difficult thing to convince hard-working, hard-
16 driving men and women that they must get rich more
17 slowly in order to help the poor.

18 As for the belief that the poor, the black or
19 anybody else can eliminate poverty by achieving
20 local political power, that is absolute nonsense.
21 Equally absurd is the image of a local so-called
22 power structure with a vested interest in continuing
23 poverty. The phrase "power structure" came into
24 being as the result of one or two studies of
25 American communities -- studies which have long since

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1 been discarded as oversimplifications by most
2 researchers and urbanists.

3 First of all, the phrase has no real meaning
4 for we live in a pluralist society, where various
5 groups exercise different degrees of power in
6 different situations.

7 I think, for example, that Mr. Lilley,
8 president of one of our most important corporations,
9 will testify that he has rarely, if ever, taken
10 part in governmental decisions affecting our city.
11 I dare say that Timmy Still, who happens to be the
12 president of the United Community Corporation,
13 has more to say about my decisions, especially
14 in the area of race and community relations, than
15 any ten businessmen in the city.

16 Nevertheless, pluralism does not have the
17 same popular ring as "power structure." It is a
18 nice, simple-minded phrase that now seems a firm
19 part of the mythology of our cities.

20 Now, Gentlemen, city governments did not
21 create poverty, do not have an interest in seeing
22 it continued and are largely without the tools to
23 attack it successfully. Anyone who argues otherwise
24 is either ignorant about the real conditions in
25 American cities or interested in protecting a

1 special interest of their own by feeding city
2 governments to the lions.

3 Now let us turn to realities. The first
4 reality to face in regard to rioting in our cities
5 is that rioting has acquired a kind of legitimacy
6 among many people who should know better. It is
7 a turn in American life that must be rebuffed
8 and rebuffed sharply. Rioting may be understood,
9 but it must never be justified. Rioting must be
10 placed beyond the boundaries of American life and
11 everyone -- black and white -- must get that
12 perfectly clear.

13 There are plenty of reasons and plenty of
14 room for real protest in American life, but there
15 must be no room -- not an inch -- for violence
16 and rioting. I have heard otherwise sensible
17 people in Newark talk about the need to kill if
18 policemen enter their house to search it or cart
19 off their television set. Well, I think they are
20 absolutely wrong.

21 If a policeman enters your house and kicks
22 in your television set while hunting for weapons,
23 you don't shoot him, you have him arrested and you
24 go to court. That is what courts and the law
25 are for.

The easiest sounding approach is often the one with the greatest dangers for democracy.

Indeed, we are living in a time when we are confronted by many persons bent on using democracy in order to destroy democracy. That is what is implicit in contending citizens have the right to fire on policemen or anybody else.

It is only when myths have been swept away and the nation comes to understand that riots will not be tolerated that America can think again of the legitimate interest that the nation has in seeing to the survival of our cities and those who live there.

It is clear to me that a staggering effort -- a Marshall Plan -- if you want to call it that, is indeed necessary if you are to do the things that have to be done. It is needed in housing, education, employment, crime control, health programs and in stabilizing the tax rate.

In Newark, for example, we need five hundred million dollars just to catch up on deferred capital improvements in public works and schools. Our housing problem is equally difficult, despite the fact we have the nation's fifth largest urban renewal program, bigger than

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1 such giant cities as Pittsburgh and Detroit.

2 I am sure you Gentlemen are not aware of
3 that statistic, just as I am sure that some of
4 you do not realize that Newark has the largest
5 per capita public housing program in the entire
6 nation.

7 Nevertheless, let us note right now that a
8 Marshall Plan for the cities is not going to
9 happen -- not right now. The money is not
10 available and I blame not the Vietnam War but
11 ignorance and indifference for it. I believe
12 the President is right. The country can afford
13 both these great commitments but it just isn't
14 convinced it must get rich more slowly.

15 The model cities appropriation now before
16 congress is probably as much as we can expect.
17 With funding near the level requested by the
18 President, I am prepared to say it is a fair start.

19 The announcement of investment in central
20 cities by our insurance companies is another
21 fair start, although many details need to be
22 cleared up before that program really begins to
23 help.

24 Now let us turn to what our State Government
25 has done to help us.

1 First of all, it is clear to me that no
 2 matter how we berate the Federal Government for
 3 its failures, the failures of our State Governments
 4 have been far worse. All our State Governments
 5 have been bad, but few have been as backward
 6 as New Jersey.

7 I do not say this to belittle the very
 8 fine efforts of Governor Hughes. I am stating
 9 it as an historical fact.

10 New Jersey, for example, was 50th among
 11 our States in aid to local municipalities before
 12 it imposed a State sales tax. Now we have the
 13 tax and it is still 50th.

14 That, Gentlemen, tells the story of how
 15 far behind this State is in helping to solve
 16 the problems of the sixties.

17 Let us review for a moment a few of our
 18 own experiences. We urged for five years the
 19 passage of the State middle income housing bill,
 20 which passed with such fanfare most recently.
 21 It barely made it out of committee, and now that
 22 it has finally passed, we are asked to hail those
 23 who passed it as far-seeing.

24 We submitted changes in the State formula
 25 for school aid more than three years ago and two

1 years ago led a march on Trenton of more than
2 2,000 citizens from Newark to support it. No
3 action has as yet resulted.

4 We fought for an income-producing package
5 of programs year after year -- the latest fight
6 taking place just this past January -- and still
7 nothing has come of it.

8 Just one modest item in the package --
9 doubling our bonded capacity -- would produce
10 the greatest school building spurt in the history
11 of Newark. This action would not cost the State
12 one additional cent, and still we cannot get any
13 action.

14 I am sure that you are all aware that I
15 feel so strongly on this subject that I am now
16 standing apart from my own political party in
17 protest. It is hard, it is difficult, it is
18 damaging, but it must be done if I am to continue
19 to believe in myself and my city. The Governor
20 has tried. No man can take that away from him.

21 I have fought him for not taking a stronger
22 hand with the legislature and with his various
23 appointees, but I believe in his sincerity.
24 His appointments, for example, of Commissioners
25 Narberger and Ylvisaker are two of the most

1 enlightened steps taken in Trenton in many years.

2 Nevertheless, if we are skeptical about the
3 State's new-found interest in our city, I hope
4 that you will please bear with me. Few men are
5 as eloquent about urban problems as Commissioner
6 Ylvisaker, but I for one will wait and see if
7 Paul survives in Trenton before accepting the
8 State as a truly concerned partner.

9 So there it is. I believe we are faced
10 with an almost impossible job, but it is an
11 impossible job that we must work at every day,
12 so that perhaps tomorrow it might be less
13 impossible.

14 I believe in our ultimate success. If I
15 did not, I would certainly get out of my job.

16 I believe our city, our state, our nation
17 and our democracy are being tested as they never
18 have been tested before. I know that in the end
19 we will survive and we will perhaps survive
20 stronger and better than before.

21 Now let me touch for a moment on the
22 rioting in Newark itself before we move on to
23 questions.

24 Our riot cost Newark ten million dollars
25 in damages, twenty-three dead from gunfire and a

1 legacy of fear, separatism and suspicion.

2 Our disorder began on a Wednesday as a
3 serious but controllable incident. It reopened
4 on Thursday night and went out of control early
5 Friday morning. At that point police restraint,
6 which had been the policy, was no longer an
7 option. We had tried our best to contain the
8 disorders and to refrain from the application of
9 drastic and killing force, but by 2:20 Friday
10 morning it was clear that the State Police and the
11 National Guard were needed. One of the more
12 discouraging aspects of our riot was how closely
13 it followed the classic pattern of rioting as
14 outlined in many books and most particularly
15 in the FBI Manual regarding riots and crowd
16 control. It is not so hard to understand. The
17 material was there in the form of problems in
18 housing, education and the effects of generations
19 of neglect and bigotry.

20 The atmosphere was right, because of mistakes,
21 because of misunderstandings and because of the
22 insanity of a few misguided fools who believe
23 riots are a healthy exercise for America.

24 And the light -- the match -- was struck
25 by a routine arrest, followed by a rash and

1 unwise "rally" the following day.

2 Underneath it all, people who were not being
3 reached -- the bitter and the alienated -- acted
4 as we should have known they were going to act.
5 Left out of the mainstream of American life --
6 cut off, forgotten -- they shouted, they jumped,
7 they ran and they looted. They acted, in short,
8 to attract attention. They acted to tell us
9 they wanted and needed help.

10 Now, I do not justify their actions. I
11 never will. But I can certainly understand it,
12 and I want to respond to that call for help so
13 that other lifetimes perhaps will not be as empty
14 as those of Mrs. Toto, Mrs. Moran, whose husbands
15 were killed during the riots, and certainly the
16 children of Mrs. Spelman, who also was killed.
17 Thank you.

18 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Thank you, Mayor.

19 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, would you like to
20 show the film at this time or is it preferable
21 to show it at the end?

22 MR. MALAFRONTTE: I think there will be a
23 more appropriate time following some of the
24 questions.

25 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, would you tell us

1 how long you have been the Mayor of the City of
2 Newark?

3 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I have been Mayor five
4 years July 1, 1967.

5 MR. JAFFE: I wonder if you could just very
6 briefly describe the responsibilities of mayor in
7 the Newark form of government.

8 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Well, I think very simply
9 we could perhaps compare it to -- well, as an
10 administrative officer of the city, certainly to
11 do those things which we have the authority to do
12 under State law and by actions of the City Council.
13 I think we can compare, perhaps on a lesser degree,
14 my responsibilities such as to the President as it
15 compares itself to the Congress. Your Municipal
16 Council passes the resolutions and the ordinances
17 and the monies, appropriates the funds to be
18 spent, and the mayor, of course, is directed to
19 do those things that have to be done in that
20 respect.

21 MR. DRISCOLL: In other words, you are the
22 chief executive officer of the City of Newark.

23 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: That is correct, Governor.

24 MR. JAFFE: And it is basically a strong
25 executive form of government?

1 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Yes, it is.

2 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, I wonder if you
3 might briefly describe for the members of the
4 Commission some of the programs that were
5 instituted under your administration as mayor for
6 the disadvantaged persons in the city.

7 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I would rather have Mr.
8 Malafronte do that because he is the expert in
9 my administration, particularly in that field.

10 MR. JAFFE: We are just interested in a
11 very general description of it.

12 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Well, I think, first of
13 all, we ought to make it perfectly clear that we
14 got twice as much money as any city our size from
15 the Federal Government, I think somewhere upward
16 of \$50,000,000, so certainly we have done very
17 well. We have a number of programs moving and
18 going which we think are very helpful. Now, Mr.
19 Malafronte can outline them in detail, exactly
20 what they are.

21 MR. JAFFE: I think we would be anxious to
22 hear of those from Mr. Malafronte.

23 MR. MALAFRONTI: I can do it very briefly
24 for you in two minutes. As to urban renewal,
25 there was a big urban renewal underway in Newark

1 when this administration took office. I think
2 the emphasis was on getting things done, having
3 a good deal of announcements, and so forth and so
4 on, earmarking of funds. But I don't think there
5 was a great deal of flow of funds or construction.

6 I think the first emphasis was the mayor
7 came out of the housing sub-committee in the
8 House of Representatives -- in fact, he was a
9 charter member of that committee. There was no
10 housing sub-committee when the mayor arrived in
11 Congress and he was one of the first members
12 appointed; a ranking democrat when he left. So
13 he had the good fortune to know a good many
14 people in urban renewal and the emphasis has been
15 pretty much up until the last year or two on
16 getting the things which were announced in the
17 fifties. As to public housing, there was a long
18 freeze on high-rise projects. It seems that
19 again we were in the process of building a
20 couple of the projects when the mayor was elected.
21 Following that it was a matter of attempting to
22 convince the City Council to go to low-rise.
23 It has been a four or five year fight but I think
24 it has been won now. The emphasis was again on
25 getting developers like Mr. Barker to produce

1 cooperative low-rise type of housing and
2 convincing the FHA to loosen its purse strings.
3 That has been a long and a bitter fight. I
4 won't go over it. I think many of you know
5 about it. The mayor has been a frequent critic
6 of the FHA, as most mayors are. The problem is,
7 the city has done a good job in getting urban
8 renewal funds and clearing land but the point at
9 which the private sector is supposed to take over,
10 which is the construction of buildings, there has
11 been a lag. And we have bent our efforts to
12 eliminating or attempting to eliminate that lag.
13 There have been extensive urban renewal projects.
14 In anti-poverty, the bill was three years old --
15 we had entered the field somewhat earlier with
16 the manpower training programs going heavily
17 with the labor department. As of February there
18 were twenty-two million dollars committed in
19 manpower and training programs in Newark, either
20 through the State Employment Service, through
21 the Newark Skill Center, through the Neighborhood
22 Youth Corps, through Title 5, welfare work
23 experience programs, through a whole range of
24 work experience programs.

25 In fact, I would think that is one of our

strong suits, the number of manpower and training programs in Newark. As to whether they are reaching all the people -- ridiculous. I don't think any program exists which can reach all the people.

But I think the city, by and large, with the help of the Anti-Poverty Agency and others has done a fair enough job, better than most, in terms of manpower training programs. And the Anti-Poverty or Community Action, with the mayor's decision three years ago to permit a private non-profit corporation, divorced from city government, anyway, to operate it, things went along I think well enough for a year but, as Mr. Lofton surely knows, he himself joining the agency about a year ago, the relationship between the City Council, the Mayor, certain community groups and others in the Anti-Poverty, has been a difficult one. The agency has done a number of good things, Headstart, Legal Services, and so on. The year 'round Headstart and Legal Services have probably been the best of the Anti-Poverty Program so far. That program has been somewhat chaotic, as is the case of most community action agencies in big cities. The Neighborhood Youth Corps, Legal Services, the year 'round Headstart are probably

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1 the three most effective of those programs.

2 We had a high TB rate so we set up a special
3 TB program through H. E. W. We had a very high
4 VD rate so we have set up a special VD program
5 through H. E. W. The maternity and infant child
6 care rate was very high when we took office so we
7 drove for a maternity and infant child care
8 project, which is \$5,000,000 over three years.
9 It has been very effective. All three of those
10 programs have been very effective in terms of
11 attacking the health problems of the city. The
12 regional types of facilities like medical schools,
13 junior colleges and colleges, there is great
14 emphasis on that. The battle for Rutgers, NCE
15 and then for the junior college and for the
16 medical school being difficult and our effort now
17 to develop some sort of a multi-purpose center,
18 the point being that our conception of Newark is
19 as a sub-center, major sub-center to the New York
20 Metropolitan Area. If you don't center regional
21 facilities in Newark, Newark has very little reason
22 to survive. So we have put up a rather bitter
23 battle for most of these facilities. That has been
24 the sense of our drive in terms of programs.

25 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I might add also, we were

1 the first city in the nation to receive funds
2 under the Anti-Poverty Act for the Neighborhood
3 Youth Corps, which has been used throughout the
4 nation as a model for other cities.

5 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, I wonder if you
6 would like to share with us an opinion as to how
7 effective you think the general Federal programs
8 and Federal finance programs have been in
9 reaching the problem.

10 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Well, I have to assume
11 they haven't been that successful that they can't
12 be improved upon, certainly, because we have had
13 a riot. I am convinced that there is certainly
14 a group of people within the core center of our
15 city that we haven't reached.

16 MR. JAFFE: Would you care to estimate what
17 you think this group is?

18 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: As to what?

19 MR. JAFFE: In numbers.

20 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Well, I don't think anyone
21 really knows but I think Newark has about eight
22 percent unemployment rate presently, which is far
23 above the national average. And I think if you
24 took that right down into the core area of the
25 so-called ghetto you would find it is more like

1 35 or 40 percent.

2 MR. JAFFE: In unemployment?

3 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Yes.

4 MR. MALAFRONTE: Our manpower office
5 estimates that 33 percent of the youth in the
6 core of the city are unemployed, which is typical
7 of most cities.

8 MR. GIBBONS: What age spread do you
9 include in that?

10 MR. MALAFRONTE: Sixteen, twenty, twenty-
11 one.

12 MR. DRISCOLL: When you use the word "core,"
13 you mean the central city?

14 MR. MALAFRONTE: Not entirely the central
15 ward. This is the west ward, part of the south
16 ward, the top of the east ward.

17 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: It is spreading out. I
18 think, too, it is significant to point out that
19 we do have a very high dropout rate in our
20 schools.

21 MR. JAFFE: Would you care to tell us
22 generally what the figure is, if you recall?

23 MR. MALAFRONTE: About a third of the
24 students in grades 8 to 12, I believe.

25 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, do you think that

1 there is a relationship between the failure of
2 some of these programs to effectively reach the
3 core group that you have just referred to and the
4 riot that occurred this summer?

5 MAYOR ABBONIZIO: Well, I believe that an
6 honest effort has been made to reach every
7 individual in the community but I think that we
8 have failed. When I say "we," I think society in
9 general. I think that the mayor has failed. I
10 think that Negroes in high governmental positions
11 have failed. I think everyone has failed. We
12 like to believe that we have a real sense of
13 communication between myself and our community.
14 We have maintained an open door policy for five
15 years since I have been mayor. We allow
16 individual citizens or groups to come in and talk
17 to their mayor and tell us of their problems and
18 we try to help them solve them. I am not a
19 miracle man. I do whatever I possibly can.

20 But somehow there is a group out there that
21 hasn't been reached; it hasn't been reached by
22 the mayor's office and it hasn't been reached by
23 our United Community Corporation, which is the
24 community agency for these programs.

25 MR. THREATT: I think you have to recognize

1 that in all riot type of situations the history
2 so far in the United States is that there has
3 emerged a new group which was not previously
4 reached, despite the intensity or the density of
5 Federal programming or city programming. And I
6 think we in Newark had that same type of situation
7 prevailing, where despite the efforts of the
8 Federal programs, those which are directly
9 funded to the city and those under the United
10 Community Corporation, we had this new group
11 emerging, this entirely new leadership that
12 emerged during the riot. And I think that group
13 is a group that we have been trying to reach
14 since the riot. It is a very difficult group to
15 reach. It is caught up in some of the new concepts
16 of youth and the new concepts in terms of the
17 white power structure, those who believe that
18 Whitey basically has to go.

19
20 So that is the group that we have been
21 trying to reach. And I don't think that that
22 group could have been reached by the type of
23 Federal programming that we had before.

24 MR. MALAFRONTI: I would like to add something.
25 It is important to understand that in Newark, as
in most cities, this is a dynamic situation.

1 People say, "If you have 8 percent unemployment,
2 why don't you go in there and form a pool of the
3 unemployed and get them all working," and so forth,
4 and that we can go forward and reach these
5 unreachable people. Well, it isn't the same
6 8 percent month after month or year after year.
7 It is a dynamic thing. We are not dealing with
8 a pool, we are dealing with a river. The 8
9 percent is a changing thing. More than 30
10 percent of the students who enter Newark schools
11 every year are from outside of Newark, have come
12 here from the south, by and large. So we are
13 dealing with a constant, dynamic flow. Let's
14 reach the unreachable. We may reach the
15 unreachable this year. That doesn't mean that
16 we have reached the unreachable forever. It is
17 a constant, continuing problem.

8 As unemployed persons become trained and
9 enter the job market in Newark, that has not
10 necessarily reduced the unemployment rate,
11 although the rate is down from 12 percent in
12 1960 to around 8 percent now.

3 But the fact remains that we are dealing
4 with a flow of persons. I think it is important
5 to remember that we are in a dynamic situation,

1 not a static one. There isn't a pool of persons
2 who can be attacked and solved. This is not the
3 way it happens. And you don't deal with twelve
4 year olds because the next year they are thirteen
5 and fourteen and fifteen and sixteen and others
6 are ten, eleven and twelve years old and then we
7 have to reach them. It is a continuing constant
8 thing.

9 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, with your permission,
10 I wonder if I might just ask Mr. Threatt a question
11 in view of his last statement. As I recall, you
12 mentioned that in terms of the post-riot analysis
13 you were attempting to reach the people who had
14 not been reached before and attempting to identify
15 them and to reach them. I wonder if you would
16 care to comment on who these people are, who
17 you have identified as the group that hasn't been
18 reached, either by name or in general.

19 MR. THREATT: I think I used the word
20 "trying" which I think is the best word I can
21 use in this instance. What we have attempted
22 to do is through my own staff being out in the
23 community and talking to young people as well as
24 older persons and attempting to get some feel as
25 to who they consider now the new leadership or

1 who they consider the leadership people. As you
2 perhaps know from the many words of testimony
3 that this committee has perhaps received to date,
4 involved in the riot were people between roughly
5 the ages of 13 and 19. This is consistent with
6 what you have heard from other people. At least
7 this is my feeling, that this was the large group
8 that was involved in the riot. Now, as Mr.
9 Malafronte, my colleague, indicated, it is
10 difficult to identify and quantify this group
11 because they move. Now, we have identified
12 some people to say that, "This guy is a leader
13 of a group in the Hayes Homes," or this guy
14 happens to be a leader but may not have but two
15 followers. You recognize this but this is
16 important to us in general consideration. And
17 these are the type of people that we are
18 identifying. I don't have their names today.
19 At some time we might well give you some names
20 of people that we consider now to be some of the
21 new leadership.

22 MR. JAFFE: Well, I think the Commission
23 would be interested in having those names, with
24 a view towards having the opportunity to chat
25 with these people and see what their views are.

1 (Discussion off the record.)

2
3 LARRIE STALKS

4 NORMAN H. SCHIFF, Sworn.

5 MR. THREATT: May I make just one comment.
6 You recognize, and I know you recognize, that the
7 minute you ask young people to come down before
8 your committee here in this atmosphere, the chances
9 are they are not coming.

10 MR. JAFFE: I am sure, Mr. Threatt, we can
11 work out a procedure --

12 MR. THREATT: Of going out to see them?

13 MR. JAFFE: -- that is less suspicious.
14 I am sure we could go to see them or we could have
15 particular people see them under circumstances
16 which I would hope would be more conducive to
17 their chatting with us. So we would be happy to
18 hear about it and we will try to work out some
19 arrangements.

20 MR. SCHIFF: I think in your overall
21 consideration of the facts that exist in the City
22 of Newark, the testimony that you will hear and
23 have heard, that you will be falling into serious
24 error in believing that you can identify a
25 particular hard core group, a particular segment

1 of the population, attacking this hard core group
2 or segment of population with some kind of
3 curative programs and therefore eliminate the
4 possibility of riot, for in reality there is no
5 hard core group. There is a group of people who
6 can arouse others, who can play on the emotions
7 and the frustrations of people and thereby arouse
8 them to take action that they would otherwise
9 not take.

10 I think some of the points the mayor made
11 in his presentation are quite significant, that
12 in essence there really are no priorities. In
13 these commissions we are looking for priorities
14 sometimes, but there really are no priorities
15 because the priorities, if there are any priorities,
16 they are all parallel priorities, and I think you
17 will have to look at the situation in that vein.
18 When people migrate from the south, minorities,
19 and come to the City of Newark and are placed in
20 public housing structures without intensive social
21 case work orientation and without being taught
22 some of the fundamentals of how to live and get
23 along in the city and take care of their own
24 personal needs, these people really are cast adrift
25 on society and we really have done nothing for

1 people. Merely to have a temporary kind of
 2 programming for dropouts and then not to follow
 3 this person to make sure he is secure in life is to
 4 do maybe even a further injustice to that
 5 individual. Once you raise a person from ignorance
 6 or deprivation to dignity and then you leave him
 7 adrift without opportunity for equality, either in
 8 education or employment, that individual, realizing
 9 that he has dignity and realizing that he is free
 10 and equal to every man, is prone to react in a
 11 violent manner, as would anyone here in this room
 12 who is educated, who is taught what life is and
 13 who is faced with the problem of what it is to be
 14 discriminated against by a great segment of
 15 society. And I think really that is the situation
 16 in Newark and in many other places throughout the
 17 country, because all the Rap Browns and all the
 18 Stokely Carmichaels in the world could not
 19 exercise one person to violence if in a sense
 20 there wasn't a major group of people who had
 21 suffered centuries of deprivation, who could be
 22 exploited in that manner. And I think that is
 23 really the situation in Newark. The civil rights
 24 leaders in the City of Newark, each one during
 25 the past number of years as this country has

1 moved toward higher degrees of militancy also
 2 raise their voices in tones of higher militancy,
 3 and it wasn't a Wilbur Parker incident at the
 4 Board of Education or the medical school; it would
 5 have been any other issue in these times because
 6 each civil rights leader in order to maintain his
 7 own leadership in the community would rise to
 8 higher tones of militancy because the times called
 9 for it and because in a sense the people were
 10 demanding it. And so you have that kind of
 11 situation, where you have a large mass of people
 12 congregate in an area with very, very little
 13 attention paid to it by government on all levels.
 14 In fact, the cities of America that paid most
 15 attention to the problem were New Haven, Detroit
 16 and Newark, who were constantly in Washington
 17 getting Federal funds, constantly at the door of
 18 their State Governments trying to get more funds,
 19 because they knew the problem, they paid attention
 20 to it and they tried to do something about it.

21 But I think we have to think very clearly
 22 what we mean when we talk about trying to cure
 23 this problem. On one hand, suppose you pour all
 24 the millions of dollars into the great cities,
 25 let's say, of New Jersey. Suppose you build all

1 the new buildings and all the new schools. Will
2 that solve the problem? I personally think not,
3 because what we might be doing is establishing a
4 black ghetto with a white perimeter. And maybe
5 Commissioner Marberger's idea of how to really
6 desegregate the school system has a lot of merit.
7 And we have to also think of this in terms of
8 housing because it is a truism that in Newark,
9 which has close to a 50 percent Negro population,
0 that in Hillside two blocks away there might be
1 one Negro family, and surrounding the area there
2 are other communities where there are very few
3 Negroes living. And I think when we think in
4 terms of public housing projects and affording
5 people an opportunity where to live, that we have
6 to think not only of the central city. That is
7 not the only place where minority groups and low
8 economic groups should be forced to live because
9 this is the only place in which public housing
0 money would be made available. It very well may
1 be that in consideration of the location of groups
2 and how you attack problems that it is impossible
3 sometimes to attack problems en masse. How could
4 you provide intensive social case work services
5 for the hundreds of thousands of Negro families

1 that live in Newark, clustered together in ghettos,
2 which cannot be eliminated overnight? It may only
3 be that by spreading the population and by giving
4 Negroes an opportunity to live anywhere they want
5 to and making it easy for them to live, by
6 supplemental progress in housing, whether it be
7 in Short Hills or in Hillside or any other place,
8 that in this way groups can be really integrated
9 in terms of our society and we would be in a
10 position then to approach families as a family
11 unit and treat with them as a family unit as the
12 social case work agencies in this country have
13 done for hundreds of years.

14 When the immigrants first came over here
15 in the 1800's and in the early 1900's, ethnic
16 groups had social case work agencies such to their
17 own who served the people and stayed with the
18 people until they were on an equal footing with
19 other people in American life, and I think that
20 we have to think of this in terms of the Negro
1 community also.

2 MR. JAPPE: Mr. Schiff, does the city
3 administration have general figures on the
4 immigration to the city by southern Negroes, the
5 percentages and the numbers?

1 MR. SCHIFF: Well, I know we do have some
2 statistics.

3 MR. MALAFRONTI: As I say, 30 percent of our
4 students each year are from the south.

5 MR. JAFFE: I wonder if we could get those
6 figures.

7 MR. MALAFRONTI: We have a good deal of
8 material based on a small sample which was used
9 in conjunction with Rutgers, which indicates that
10 the migration of Negroes from the south is less
11 than probably ten years ago and it has been
12 gradually closing down although still very
13 significant. In the last three or four years
14 particularly there has been a dropoff.

15 MR. JAFFE: Are there any types of
16 specific programs that the city now runs to
17 alleviate the problem of the southern Negro?

18 MR. MALAFRONTI: All the programs bear on
19 that, but if you are talking about a welcome
20 center for persons coming up from the south, the
21 answer is no.

22 MR. SCHIFF: In the public housing projects
23 they have a very limited program. Mr. Danzig I
24 think informed us it received -- he tried to get
25 additional funds -- a very small amount of money,

1 but they set up some kind of agency in the public
2 housing projects to try to teach people how to
3 accommodate themselves and how to live in the
4 public housing projects and how to get around the
5 city, but it was very, very small. And, quite
6 frankly, I would say it was negligible.

7 MR. MALAFRONTI: I would like to provide
8 the Commission with a taped interview of a
9 program in which Mr. Lofton and myself both
10 gave lengthy testimony on NBC radio with a rioter.
11 It is a rather extraordinary interview and quite
12 revealing. I think it is important that you have
13 that. I do have a tape. It is again a classic
14 situation of a man reached by NBC who confesses
15 to his role in the rioting. It was quite a
16 severe role, where he describes dumping, beating,
17 kicking and stomping an elderly white man, and
18 so forth. It is a fascinating case study, a man
19 up from South Carolina, who talks in terms of the
20 indignities heaped upon him in South Carolina
21 and he was coming up here to kill, really, all
22 full of the need to kill or strike back at
23 somebody. He wasn't about to take in Newark what
24 he took in South Carolina.

5 MR. DRISCOLL: You mean that is why he came?

1 MR. MALAFRONTI: He came to get away from
2 South Carolina, moved up into Newark, but he
3 talked in terms of the indignities. He couldn't
4 kill anybody in South Carolina but he sure as hell
5 was going to kill somebody in Newark.

6 MAYOR ALDONIZIO: I believe our statistics
7 also establish that at least 30 percent of the
8 people on the welfare rolls of Newark have become
9 residents of our city within the last five years.

10 MR. GIBBONS: Do you have such statistics?

11 MRS. STALKE: The record on the welfare
12 rolls will indicate, as has been pointed out,
13 that there has been a decline in terms of the
14 migration. However, basically the percentages
15 are largely developed and crystalized in this area.
16 I might say that proof of what can take place,
17 what you recently witnessed with the school system,
18 you build an addition to a school a year ago and
19 this year you find that perhaps in that school you
20 have two thousand more kids but you don't know
1 they are there because nobody bothers to start
2 registering for school until September, and then
3 there you have the problem of having overloading
4 of classrooms. This isn't talked about nearly
5 enough because in many instances there is just a

1 frustration about the fact that there are going to
2 be double sessions but, nevertheless, you know
3 this is what happens.

4 MR. MALAFRONTI: This bears on the mobility
5 of the population. One of the reasons very
6 popularly stated for the great mobility of the
7 underclass or lowerclass in Newark is urban renewal,
8 but I think it is far deeper than that. George
9 Sternleaf points to the fact that Newark has a
10 declining market for slum properties. That is
11 essential with new construction, with urban renewal.
12 We are leaving behind the rotten core. And that
13 as a result of the high vacancy rate, even in the
14 slums, there is a good deal of mobility because a
15 family can move from slum to slum rather quickly,
16 especially if he gets behind in his rent, and
17 so forth. Sternleaf's thesis, widely believed by
18 everyone and finally proved by the Rutgers study,
19 was that the higher the vacancy rate in the slums,
20 the greater the mobility of the population. A
21 good deal of the mobility can be attributable not
22 alone to the urban renewal process because, the
23 truth is, clearance is not proceeding at that
24 quickly a rate to account for the extreme mobility
25 within the city limits. A good deal of the

1 nobility is accounted for by families who get a
2 little better job, who are stuck in a slum
3 building, who then move to what they consider to
4 be a better building although it, too, may not be
5 a standard building, or those moving from the
6 worst slum to the next worst, and so forth, so the
7 mobility. For instance, in the south ward the
8 Negroes who are achieving a kind of middle-class
9 status has been extraordinary, the south ward being
10 the receiving ward for Negroes who are "making it"
11 and moving out that way. So the mobility is
12 again part of the achievement of Negroes as they
13 come to a somewhat better standard of living in
14 American life and the extremely high vacancy rate
15 throughout the city in terms of units. Nobility
16 is a major factor in planning in Newark, difficult
17 to control, difficult to handle.

18 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, just one more question
19 in this area. I wonder if you yourself or any one
20 of the members of your staff would have an
21 approximation for us in a percentage term as to
22 the amount of funds that have been spent, federal,
23 state or local, in terms of the need vis-a-vis
24 the disadvantaged people in the city and the problem
25 of acclimating them to city life. In other words,

1 what I am driving at, if the need is 100 percent,
2 if you totaled up the total amount of funds that
3 have been spent, how much of that need do you think
4 you have met?

5 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I think, first of all, it
6 is difficult to arrive at. I can only speak in
7 one area. I indicated to you that we presently
8 have a \$51,000,000 school construction program
9 in effect, which is just to build some new schools,
10 but we need \$200,000,000 more to rehabilitate
11 and do away with some of the other schools that
12 are presently in existence. There was no school
13 construction in the city of Newark for a period
14 of 25 years. What were those dates?

15 MR. MALAPROTE: In the thirties and forties
16 there was no school construction in Newark at all.

17 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: So as a result we find
18 ourselves in a very difficult situation, plus the
19 fact that in Newark, with the declining population,
20 we find that we have somewhere between 18,000 and
21 20,000 more school children today than we had ten
22 years ago. Now, we have doubled the amount of
23 money that we are spending on education from 1962
24 to '67 and yet, I have to say very frankly and
25 honestly, we are still not reaching the problem.

1 So it is very difficult really to estimate the
2 amounts of money that are needed in a city like
3 Newark to really do this job on a 100 percent
4 basis.

5 MR. THREATT: May I point out one other thing.
6 I think your first reference was to type of
7 programs that we have had that are designed
8 basically to bring about some better understanding
9 on the part of these persons who are the in-migrants
10 in terms of the competency of urban living. I
11 think Mr. Schiff alluded to the fact that we have
12 only a limited program per se in that area in
13 housing, a very limited program. To further
14 elaborate on what the Mayor said, I think the
15 problem in terms of the young people in our city
16 is compounded by the fact that about 40 percent
17 of the Negro population in the City of Newark is
18 under the age of 14, I believe. Forty percent of
19 the Negro population is under the age of 14.

0 MR. MALAFRONTI: Sixty percent under 21.

1 MR. THREATT: Sixty percent under 21, which is
2 a very large figure.

3 MR. MALAFRONTI: It is an exact reverse of
4 the white situation.

5 MR. THREATT: So this further explains the

1 problem we have in terms of the school. The
2 other part of the explanation is the fact that it
3 is a pretty accepted figure that the Negro
4 population is somewhat larger than that of the
5 white population. The Rutgers census, which may
6 or may not be valid because it hasn't been
7 finalized yet, is about 51 percent Negro and about
8 9 to 10 percent Puerto Rican in the City of Newark,
9 so that further explains our tremendous problem in
10 the area of education with regard to the non-whites.

11 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, the Commission has
12 heard testimony that in the summer of 1965 there
13 was a meeting at the Newarker Restaurant at which
14 the governor officiated --

15 MAYOR ABONIZIO: What restaurant?

16 MR. JAFFE: The Newarker Restaurant, at which
17 the governor officiated and at which I think
18 Colonel Kelly of the State Police and yourself
19 were present, and some other big city mayors were
20 present, to discuss the general problem of possible
1 civil disturbances in cities, in Newark, and to
2 lay out a procedure for the use of State facilities
3 if local police weren't able to handle it. That is
4 my recollection. Is that correct?

5 MR. THREATT: Yes.

1 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Yes, I believe that happened,
2 but I don't think anything of any worthwhile nature
3 came out of it excepting that in case we had
4 difficulty we would call upon the State for help.
5 But the fact remains that we in the City of Newark
6 feel that we have a problem which has become
7 somewhat emotional, because if people want a
8 signal light at a certain street corner, we can't
9 put that street light up or that traffic light up
10 until we get permission from the State. We can't
11 put up a stop street sign. We can do it illegally
12 and probably get away with it but actually we must
13 go to the State for permission for these kinds of
14 things, and these things present to us very severe
15 problems.

16 We have people out there picketing and
17 demonstrating because they want a traffic light
18 and they just don't understand that a city is a
19 creature of the State and we can only do that which
20 the State allows us to do.

21 MR. THREATT: I was present at that meeting
22 together with Mr. Malafronte and Mr. Schiff and the
23 Mayor; the Governor assured us at that meeting that
24 if we had such problems involving traffic lights
25 that he would facilitate them right away, and we

1 had a problem about a week later and I think,
2 according to TV, they are still waiting for the
3 light.

4 MR. JAFFE: Was there also discussion at this
5 meeting as to the procedure to be employed in case
6 of a civil disturbance?

7 MR. THREATT: There were no detailed procedures
8 discussed at that particular meeting. Is your
9 recollection the same?

0 MR. MALAFRONTE: There were general discussions,
1 "But you got to call me and then I will check
2 with the Attorney General and then we will
3 probably have the State Police move in," and so
4 forth, this type of thing.

5 MR. JAFFE: Was that meeting ever formalized
6 in terms of a memorandum to the city?

7 MAYOR ABONIZIO: Not to my knowledge.

8 MR. THREATT: It was supposed to be a very
9 quiet meeting. In fact, the governor indicated
0 that the persons who came there had come to discuss
1 propositions -- in other words, the meeting was
2 never formalized.

3 MAYOR ABONIZIO: I said very emphatically
4 that nothing of any concrete nature came out of
5 the meeting except just general conversation as to

1 who he would call in case we needed help and in
2 order to stem a riot, but nothing was done to
3 prevent a riot.

4 MR. THREATT: This happened in the wake of the
5 Watts situation. This happened right after that.

6 MR. MALAFRONTI: There was also some talk of
7 National Guard movements or having maneuvers or
8 something which would have National Guard units
9 in or close to the cities.

10 MR. JAFFE: Were there any specific instructions
11 from the state administration to the city
12 administration as to the procedure to be employed
13 in case of a civil disturbance in the community?
14 Prior to the riot in Newark in 1967 have there
15 ever been any instructions received?

16 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: No. I believe that our
17 director of police, who will be here a little bit
18 later, would be more informed of that. But I
19 believe he and Colonel Kelly's office had a
20 couple of meetings and they --

1 MR. JAFFE: With your police director?

2 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Yes.

3 MR. MALAFRONTI: If I may add, it seems to me
4 the Department of Community Affairs or several
5 representatives of the Department of Community

1 Affairs prior to our problem, when we knew the
 2 city was in trouble in terms of the possibility
 3 of riot, mumbled on about how you are going to
 4 have to check with us regarding -- there seemed
 5 to be some confusion even amongst State people
 6 as to precisely who was going to do what and at
 7 which point, but we never doubted that when we
 8 got in trouble we were going to call up the
 9 governor and he would say on the phone, "Well, we
 10 got to get Bills," and that would be it.

11 MR. JAFFE: Just to bring the matter up to
 12 the spring of 1967 and the early summer of 1967,
 13 was there a time during that period of time when
 14 the city administration either sensed or had some
 15 information that there might be a civil disturbance
 16 in Newark that summer?

17 MAYOR ADEONIZIO: Well, we were always
 18 concerned about the possibilities. We hadn't had
 19 one for the first four years that I was mayor.
 20 Perhaps we were a little bit overconfident. But I
 21 think that we can certainly establish the fact
 22 that there were many outside influences and
 23 individuals within our community ten weeks prior
 24 to the riot. They made appearances at various
 25 public meetings and expressed themselves rather

1 vehemently and certainly we feel that these people
2 contributed to the overall situation.

3 MR. JAFFE: Would your police director be
4 familiar with the people and the situation that
5 you are referring to?

6 MR. MALAPRONTE: We can testify to the facts
7 of what was going on in the community. In fact,
8 I would say we are probably in a better position
9 than the police director.

10 MR. SCHIFF: Doug Eldridge, the reporter
11 for the Newark News, wrote an article, which I'm
12 sure you have, in which he indicated that it was
13 his impression it was about ten weeks before the
14 riot occurred that the Black Liberation Front
15 moved in on South Orange Avenue and he walked in
16 to try to cover the story and he was asked to
17 leave or was forced to leave, indicating that the
18 group did not want any white reporters around,
19 and also during that ten week period at any public
20 meeting there seemed to be a higher degree of
21 militancy in terms of calling for bloodshed, riots,
22 violence, and also a lot of infusion of the
23 philosophy of the black power movement injected
24 into most of the public meetings, at every
25 opportunity where there was a public platform

available.

MR. JAFFE: Was there feeling then as a result of this in the city administration that this summer could be a summer in which a major civil disturbance could occur as opposed to the other summers in which they did not occur? Was this a factor that was present this year that was not present the year prior?

MR. SCHIFF: It was a little more angry this year.

MR. MALAFRONTI: There were those who thought there was going to be a riot and those who didn't.

MR. THREATT: I think last summer we had several instances in which there was a lot of literature passed out, literature in terms of how to construct a Molotov cocktail, in Bamberger's, and so forth. We were somewhat concerned but we weren't concerned to the same degree that our concern permeated this year largely because, as Mr. Schiff has described, the community was somewhat more climatized this year -- not to riot -- I don't think there is any such thing as climatizing the community to riot -- but rather I think there were a lot of angry feelings permeating the community this year.

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There was the first meeting that we had on the
 med school, I think at which Mr. Lofton spoke
 although he was in another capacity -- he wears
 so many hats I have a difficult time with him --
 but at the city hall it was in February where we
 had some discussion there. Surely the April
 picketing at the meat market in which a group
 demonstrated for the first time that they could
 close a business down. In the meantime there were
 also some arrests made by the police there, some
 17 people were arrested at Mac's Meat Market,
 which has a title, "Your Southern Store Up North."
 As I indicated to another commission, the arrest
 was made by a police officer who had previously
 been involved in another arrest, another civil
 rights arrest with Negroes. This added somewhat
 to some of the feelings. Around May 18th we had
 the real advent of the Black Liberation Party,
 Black Liberation Front, with their first meeting,
 which was held on South Orange Avenue. Colonel
 Hassan had entered the scene somewhat earlier,
 did provide some charisma in terms of, you know,
 his uniforms, self-styled approach. He provided
 some charisma, I think. He moved into the blight
 hearings in May, which were somewhat rocky, which

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1 all of you know about, you have heard much
2 testimony about, beginning May 27th, the Board of
3 Education hearings on May 28th. The first blight
4 hearings were characterized by egg throwing and
5 the breaking of the machine, the stenographic
6 machine, by Colonel Hassen's captain. Also the
7 destruction of some of the physical records by
8 Colonel Hassen. All of this created the climate
9 that preceded the riot in our city. As I said,
10 unfortunately the Board of Education meetings and
11 the blight hearing meetings were continuous.
12 There were just meetings after meetings after
13 meetings and this had the effect of sort of
14 whipping it up, a little bit more than any
15 community has normally been subjected to as such,
16 this type of whipping it up.

17 MR. JAFFE: That raises a question which I
18 am interested in, of the mayor.

19 MR. THREATT: May I finish first?

20 MR. JAFFE: I'm sorry.

21 MR. THREATT: Just whipping it up. And then
22 around July we had the South Orange Avenue incident--
23 I mean the 14th Street incident, in which an
24 East Orange police officer was involved and a
25 Newark police officer was involved and, as I

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1 indicated, both police officers allege that
2 something took place that shouldn't have taken
3 place and I went to so many of these hearings, and
4 one side of the story is that the East Orange
5 police officer beat people when they were on the
6 ground handcuffed. And if you listen to the
7 East Orange police, they say the Newark police
8 beat people when they were on the ground handcuffed.
9 Anyway, there were 14 people arrested at this
10 particular time. The police officer involved in
11 that arrest was an officer by the name of
12 Martinez, one of the officers involved. His name
13 is sort of a pretty famous name in the Negro
14 community. And I only mention this because it
15 has some significance because when we got to the
16 riot, one of the hues and cries was that Martinez
17 was there. This was about four days later.
18 Actually this happened on Friday night and the
19 riot occurred, as you know, first on Wednesday
20 night, so they said Martinez was in this, so we
21 had a constant whipping up of the community and
22 then the ill-advised -- and I say "ill-advised"
23 in the same tone in which the mayor used it --
24 demonstration in front of the police headquarters
25 on that --

1 MR. MALAFRONTI: The film is of that
2 demonstration.

3 MR. THREATT: The demonstration in front of
4 the police headquarters. I think no organization
5 or anybody in his right mind would feel that a
6 demonstration at that time of the day was the
7 appropriate thing to do.

8 Now, I also have to tell you I am one who
9 was supposed to have started the riot.

10 MR. LOFTON: You mean the demonstration at
11 the Fourth Precinct?

12 MR. THREATT: In front of the Fourth Precinct
13 the day after the first night incident. I think
14 even though we very wisely attempted to tone
15 things down -- I think you gentlemen surely in
16 your wisdom would think that we were wise, although
17 the mayor had an increased police force available,
18 and so forth, in trying to at least tone down the
19 thing. We tried to play it the way that all of
20 the experts or so-called experts would play it
21 in terms of toning the incident down and yet
22 getting ready. You know, like making ready for
23 war in time of peace. We were really ready for an
24 incident, as best we could be, the next night.
25 But we had this demonstration in front of the

1 Fourth Precinct that afternoon, and I did go up
2 at about 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
3 We didn't even know about the demonstration.
4 We had been meeting all day long with business
5 leaders, community leaders, and so forth, in the
6 mayor's office. And we learned late in the
7 afternoon about this demonstration. And one of
8 the decisions that had been reached in the course
9 of our meeting, which we felt had some significance,
10 was that before this commission was impaneled
11 the mayor had indicated that he would impanel a
12 blue ribbon commission to investigate the incident
13 of the police misconduct, the alleged previous
14 misconduct in the John Smith case. Also he
15 indicated that all efforts would be made to
16 elevate a Negro to the level of captain in order
17 that we would have a Negro captain, and this was
18 the message that I took to this group.

19 As I said, I am the person who in some
20 instances have been accused of starting the riot,
21 but I assure you I didn't. I assure you it
22 started the night before. That is basically the
23 climate. JAFFE: What were some of the things

24 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Threatt, you mentioned the
25 Black Liberation Front. I wonder if you could tell

1 us, if you know, some of the leaders of that
2 organization and its function and what they did
3 in the period prior to the riot.

4 MR. THREATT: I think the leaders of the
5 Black Liberation Front were, as you know, Colonel
6 Hassan. Ray Osborne I believe is his correct name.

7 MR. JAFFE: Is he a native Newarker, do
8 you know?

9 MR. THREATT: He is from Washington, D. C.,
10 as best as we can gather.

11 MR. MALAPRONTE: Just to clarify that,
12 the Black Liberation Center was established prior
13 to the arrival of the Colonel by three persons
14 essentially.

15 MR. THREATT: I was going to get to that.
16 We had Clinton Hobson Bey, who was the head of the
17 Black Liberation Center when it was first
18 established. I never could exactly determine his
19 role but Phil Hutchins was originally involved.

0 MR. MALAPRONTE: Hutchins, Clinton Hobson
1 Bey and Fullilove, but I think Hutchins was
2 probably the leading actor.

3 MR. JAFFE: What were some of the things
4 they did primarily in Newark in the ten weeks
5 prior to the riot?

1 MR. MALAFRONTI: The center didn't do much
2 except exist and the colonel came on the scene
3 shortly thereafter. The bar alongside of the
4 center was more active than the center.

5 MR. JAFFE: How many people were members of
6 it?

7 MR. MALAFRONTI: Young people moving in and
8 out of the bar and the center.

9 MR. THREATT: As I indicated, Colonel Hassan
10 has charisma and I think what he was able to do
11 was to forge a coalition in an area which had been
12 forged before, both established political leaders
13 and dissident political leaders at that particular
14 time, as well as civil rights groups and others.
15 They had several issues; welded them into one
16 issue around which they could sort of forge this
17 coalition. That was the medical school. The
18 first meeting was labeled, "We Ain't Going To
19 Move." That is what the meeting was labeled, the
20 meeting which was held I believe on May 21st,
21 and that was the "We Ain't Going To Move" meeting.
22 So this is what they were able to do. I think
23 the colonel's army, as best as I can gather, had
24 about three members. This is the most that I saw
25 at any one time. There were some other privates

1 at a meeting that I saw but I never could ascertain
 2 how many there were. But as a general rule it was
 3 a three man army, but they were able to take this
 4 three man army and to polarize these other groups
 5 that were somewhat leaderless. When I say
 6 "leaderless," they all had personal axes to grind
 7 and as a result of having personal axes to grind
 8 no one person could really get them together.
 9 I think Colonel Hassan did that. I think he
 10 polarized this group with his own charisma. I
 11 think he was able to do that and do it very
 12 effectively, so that was his army. His army was
 13 really the army of a lot of groups that he had
 14 been able to forge together.

15 MR. MALAFRONTI: Also the rather dramatic
 16 and violent actions at these meetings were eye
 17 openers for a community which essentially was non-
 18 I don't want to say "non-violent" but for a
 19 community which had not seen that type of
 20 behavior before. He was something else again.

21 MRS. STALKS: I think Mr. Malafronte pointed
 22 out something that possibly hadn't been witnessed
 23 in our fair city prior. I was born in the City of
 24 Newark and I have lived here all of my life and I
 25 am sure certain, if not all, of the gentlemen have

gone through the preliminaries and several through
the full structure of what are considered political
leaders, will understand what I am talking about
because Mr. Threatt here had indicated there were
those that came forth as political leaders and
today we are witnessing so much about political
leaders and I am hard put to understand a lot of it
but from what I have learned, if you are a
political leader, whether you are elected once
every four years, somebody elects somebody and as
a result of the votes you receive, then you become
a leader, and then in this way do you serve. I
would just like to talk about the City of Newark,
because throughout the atmosphere of what was
considered the riot stage there was an awful lot
of talk about Negroes are being kept out of
government, and I just have to reflect for a
moment so that you might view what was prior, let's
say, to the Addonizio administration. And one of
the key things that I think a lot of people talked
about when they gave expression to what they felt
should happen, they were saying, "You know, we
are not a part, we don't share." But I can
remember very, very clearly prior to the Addonizio
administration, something like five years ago, the

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1 City of Newark had one plain-clothes man and I do
2 remember ten were made in one shot; one Negro
3 plain-clothes man but ten were made immediately
4 after the election of Addonizio. I know that the
5 City of Newark had never had a director of welfare
6 before. One was made under Addonizio. The City
7 of Newark never had a Negro director of human
8 rights. The City of Newark never had an executive
9 secretary of the central planning board. The City
10 of Newark never had a Negro fire dispatcher or a
11 chief. The City of Newark never had a Negro
12 principal in the Board of Education. The City of
13 Newark certainly never had a director of the
14 department of health and welfare, which serves
15 our three agencies.

16 MR. MALAFRONTI: Shall we ever forget budget
17 time?

18 MRS. STALKS: And, of course, we don't want
19 to forget that because throughout the Parker-
20 Callaghan fight, I don't know that anyone even knew
1 that Mayor Addonizio had reached out and brought
2 Wilbur Parker in as the first Negro budget
3 officer of the City of Newark, and I believe there
4 is only one in the nation. So when you put the
5 whole thing together and put it on the table,

1 certainly as we all can see it in terms of sharing
 2 governments and then moving towards getting into
 3 the mainstream or being part of things, you are
 4 hard put to understand how some of these things
 5 are projected in the light that they are. And
 6 when they talk about who is the leader, their
 7 leader, you have to wonder who is talking. But I
 8 would suggest that we look very, very closely into
 9 the dialogue of some of the people that are speaking
 0 to some of these problems. I think it is
 1 excellent and well that the Commission is
 2 cataloguing all of this, and I am sorry to report
 3 that I am not one of the theorists or one of the
 4 sociologists or those who have catalogued all of
 5 this that we have before us and say that I knew
 6 there was going to be a riot the next day, because
 7 having worked in municipal government for some
 8 years, you know, I was very happy to be a part
 9 and play a role in where we thought we were going
 0 in terms of moving towards not only curing some
 1 of the ills but certainly making for a better day
 2 for all citizens. But to get to it, as they say,
 3 if we are going to talk about not only what has
 4 happened on the eastern seaboard but in all big
 5 cities, I want to share with you a little

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1 conversation I had. I went to Watts last year,
2 I spent four days there, and I talked with some of
3 my sisters and brothers with regard to their
4 feeling about what had happened and what they felt
5 were some of the causes and I guess this is the
6 kind of thing that has finally not only made
7 America sit up but Commissions be created and men
8 of high stature decide to concern themselves
9 about what we can do. And I do think it is
10 wonderful that we are all being able to share in
11 this but their story was, although they came up
12 with the usual frustrations and the unemployment,
13 a certain amount of bias, but theirs dealt largely
14 with their transportation problem and the money
15 that was involved in going back and forth. And
16 I don't know if I am being consistent here but
17 the whole gamut of it really in a sense becomes
18 even startling to those that you know sit with it
19 every day, but think about who does speak to the
20 man in the street, you know, who talks to that
1 guy. Anybody that tells you that he has got it,
2 you know, and, "I can talk to him," look at him
3 twice. And I say this is why I always take a
4 real hard look at the guy that screams "Uncle
5 Tom," because it is the guy that screams "Uncle

1 Tom" who is really the Uncle Tom after all, you
2 see, because when there is a job to be done, no
3 matter what happens after the riots, you know,
4 you still have to see about people getting housing
5 and you still have to see about people getting
6 jobs, and in terms of picking up the pieces, it
7 is a real difficult thing and a hard job. But we
8 do have a problem because when we think of our
9 work experience training program, an appeal that
10 was made not too long ago, we were refunded, but
11 hopefully we will get the additional monies that
12 will provide for that 90 days in between when a
13 man goes into a work training program and then
14 he has to come off the welfare rolls. You know,
15 the money is just not enough in terms of what the
16 State can do, in terms of what Washington can do.
17 when Here again I would suggest that if there is
18 any urging that can be done, that there can be
19 that kind of -- I won't use the word "pressure"
20 but a kind of plea for there to be some attention
21 in this area of more money because this is where
22 it is sorely needed. But I would suggest finally
23 that no matter what the Commission does that they
24 remember there is another portion of what you call
25 the black community, another portion that does

1 serve the citizens and another portion that has
2 a role to play, and this is the portion of the
3 community that you don't hear too much from. But
4 apparently they are the portion of the community
5 that are responsible for holding the pillars of
6 the citadel that keep cities going. Now, you
7 might call him -- I guess he is referred to today
8 as the middle-class Negro or perhaps just one
9 that is not jumping up and down, but I do believe
10 that he does share something in our society and
11 whatever directives or decisions are being made,
12 that something be crystalized around his thought
13 and his effort as he continues to play a role in
14 the community. I don't know that we will be able
15 to solve what happened to the man on this broadcast
16 where I listened to Mr. Lofton and Mr. Malafrente
17 when he spelled out or spilled over with what was
18 hidden within him. You know, when you listen to
19 the program and you hear a man talk about what
20 he has that is instilled in him, this hate for the
1 white man, it is a real revelation when he says,
2 "I just wanted to kill somebody." You say,
3 "Whatever happened to him in South Carolina must
4 have brought with it the kind of memories for him
5 that will never be dispelled, so I guess we are

1 going to have to spread out far and wide in order
2 to, if nothing else, subside some of these
3 anxieties. But here in our cities, if we get some
4 funds, I hope we will be able to do better.

5 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, just two quick
6 questions before we take a little break. Mr.
7 Threstt referred to the fact that some of the
8 tension that built up in the city was a result of
9 the medical school controversy and the Board of
10 Education controversy. I wonder if you would
11 like to give us an opinion as to whether you
12 think those two matters were precipitating
13 factors or factors in the civil disturbances that
14 did occur in Newark in July.

15 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Well, certainly I think
16 that they were used by certain political dissidents
17 and others from the outside to try to create the
18 climate for a riot. I think the record will
19 clearly show that many of the people that spoke
20 in opposition to the medical school, the fact
21 that we were trying to declare that area
22 blighted, were individuals who had been cast
23 aside by this administration for various reasons,
24 and some of them in their remarks used very
25 strong language about blood running in the streets,

1 and so forth. That is all documented. It was
 2 a public hearing. That certainly can be available
 3 to this Commission. And in the Board of Education
 4 meeting it was actually the same people but I
 5 think the unique thing about it was that for the
 6 first time, to my knowledge, and I have been in
 7 public life for 20 years, I have represented the
 8 vast bulk of the Negro voters in the City of
 9 Newark all of that time, that we saw a coming
 10 together of many, many groups on these two
 11 particular issues. This was not so in the past.

12 However, in the same breath I must confess
 13 that the decision that I made in both areas I
 14 thought were good decisions, good for the city.
 15 There is no one that can convince me that the
 16 medical school is bad for the City of Newark.

17 Secondly, we had a great many Negroes who
 18 were very much a part of trying to bring this
 19 medical school into Newark, many Negro doctors,
 20 citizens of certainly outstanding reputation that
 21 had joined with us in various meetings that we had
 22 with the Board of Trustees of the medical school
 23 in trying to bring this about.

24 I think, too, that what we were interested
 25 in was trying to stem this constant action of the

1 so-called white power structure, if you want to
 2 call it that, moving out of the central city to
 3 the suburbs, as they were trying to do with the
 4 medical school, bring it into Madison, where we
 5 felt it would not serve a purpose as far as the
 6 State of New Jersey is concerned and certainly
 7 not as far as Newark was concerned. And we have
 8 to say very frankly and honestly that the kind of
 9 opposition we have witnessed with the Board of
 10 Trustees of that school was one of where they had
 11 no real concern for the City of Newark, and
 12 actually although it was never said outright we
 13 came away with the feeling that the reason they
 14 didn't want to come to Newark is that they did
 15 not want to put this very fine new medical school
 16 in the middle of a so-called black ghetto.

7 It never was said in so many words but
 8 certainly that was the feeling that all of us
 9 walked away with, and so much so that we asked
 0 them to go into what was called the Fairmount
 1 urban renewal project, which was some twenty-three
 2 and a half acres, I believe, or thirty-three acres,
 3 and they absolutely refused and we said, "Well,
 4 where do you want to go?" And they came back in
 5 another meeting and they went exactly right across

1 the street from where this urban renewal project
 2 ended. And I just can't for the life of me see
 3 the difference between moving it into forty-six
 4 acres over here or thirty-three and a half acres
 5 right next door to it; that plus the fact that
 6 they wanted a commitment from us for one hundred
 7 fifty acres, which we thought was certainly way
 8 out of line.

9 MR. JAFFE: Would that one hundred fifty
 10 acres have been right in central city?

11 MAYOR ADELPHI: It would be adjacent to
 12 where the forty-six acres is presently, which is
 13 bounded by Bergen Street and I think Littleton
 14 Avenue.

15 MR. JAFFE: Right in the core of the city,
 16 then.

17 MAYOR ADELPHI: It is part of the central
 18 ward of Newark, which is certainly the central
 19 city and which is, incidentally, a very bad slum
 20 area. We have the statistics on that. I don't
 21 believe there is a home in that area that is not
 22 within half a block of a tavern or a junkyard of
 23 some kind. And all of these things made it very
 24 difficult.

25 Now, we went to the governor and asked the

1 governor to intercede with the Board of Trustees
2 of the New Jersey Medical & Dental School,
3 indicating to him that we thought that their demands
4 were way out of line, one hundred fifty acres.
5 Newark could hardly afford to do that. But in
6 order to bring that medical school here I had to
7 certainly consent to do all of these things,
8 hopefully that along the line perhaps with the
9 advent of a new governor--and that is certainly
10 not casting any aspersions on the present governor
11 because I recognize this is his last term by law--
12 or the advent of a new legislature who in effect
13 would appropriate the funds for the medical school,
14 that some changes could eventually be made. Now,
15 I'm sure my thinking was right because the
16 governor's office has since been injected into
17 this matter through Mr. Elvisaker's office and
18 there have been a great deal of changes made,
19 changes which we originally demanded at the very
20 beginning, and that is that they are now going to
21 take a great portion of the so-called Fairmount
22 urban renewal project. Now, all of these things
23 plus the fact that it would bring \$50,000,000
24 worth of construction to my city, it would create
25 some \$15,000,000 in jobs, and I am told that

1 statistics establish the fact that for every
2 professional in a medical school there are three
3 non-professional jobs, so it meant work for a lot
4 of people in our city, plus the fact that it
5 would bring to our community, our City Hospital,
6 probably the finest medical care of any city in
7 the nation. And we thought all of these factors
8 were important.

9 But we have political opponents like any
10 political figure, and these individuals knew
11 that they could create an emotional issue here
12 and they stirred it up pretty good, but in spite
13 of that we still standfast in our judgment. We
14 intend to move forward with this medical school.
15 I think that the climate is far different now
16 because there have been some changes made and there
17 will be alongside of the medical school some
18 housing, and so forth, which we intended from the
19 very inception because our model cities application
20 before the Federal Government clearly points out
21 that there will be housing adjacent to the medical
22 school.

23 Now, the Wilbur Parker-Callaghan situation
24 was one which I felt was clearly a political
25 appointment. The present secretary to the Board

1 of Education is a former deputy mayor of the City
2 of Newark, many years ago. I have a high regard
3 for Wilbur Parker, so much so that I literally
4 begged him to come to the City of Newark to take
5 the position as budget director. Several years
6 prior to that I tried to move him to a higher
7 position as finance director of our city.
8 Unfortunately the City Council did not accept
9 my recommendation and it was impossible for me to
0 do it. But I don't believe that Wilbur Parker
1 would make a good secretary to the Board of
2 Education, and this is no reflection on his
3 qualifications but rather on the kind of individual
4 that he is personally. He is not a politician.
5 He doesn't understand the ways of politics,
6 perhaps, and I just feel that someone has to be
7 there who understands that way of life. It is
8 not to say that the political figures are going
9 to do anything wrong but there are certain
0 incidents or things that come up that require an
1 understanding of the political facts of life.
2 And if anyone tries to rule that out, I have to
3 tell you very frankly that politics is in every
4 sphere of activity in the United States of
5 America. Having served in the Congress of the

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1 United States, I am very well aware of it. You
2 can point to a church, whether it is the
3 archdiocese of Newark or any place else, there is
4 so much politics within the church structures of
5 this country as there is in business, as there is
6 in the telephone company, and this is a simple
7 fact of life. And anyone who tries to run away
8 from it just isn't being realistic. I can't be
9 any more candid about my feelings.

10 MR. JAFFE: We are going to have a recess.

11 MR. SCHIFF: I wanted to ask one thing for
12 this part of the record because I think it is
13 important that you have a comprehension of the
14 blight hearing. I will make it very short and to
15 the point. At the blight hearing on the medical
16 school the city council chamber was not crowded
17 overwhelmingly. Nobody was sitting in the
18 balcony. Now, who comprised the audience? It is
19 interesting. You had the same groups. You had
20 Tom Hayden's little group, Derek Winans' little
21 group, a group that follows Earl Harris, a group
22 that follows George Richardson, and the same
23 people were there. There were hardly any people
24 from the neighborhood there, maybe about 10 or 12,
25 at most 15 people who live there. The surveys

1 that the city took and I think that the WCC took
 2 indicated that most of the people in the area were
 3 in favor of the medical school and wanted to move.
 4 But I think it is important to realize that there
 5 was no great mass of people running down to
 6 protest on the medical school, in terms of the
 7 public hearing, now. At the Board of Education
 8 there were a large number of people but you have
 9 to understand that at the Board of Education
 10 historically there always are large numbers
 1 because the Newark Teachers Union and the Newark
 2 Teachers Association are always fighting and
 3 always have items on the agenda and they have a
 4 large group of their own individual constituencies
 5 interested in what is present there.

6 MR. MALAPRONTE: If I may give the figures
 7 just before we go to recess, there were 80
 8 speakers at the blight hearings; 8 were from the
 9 affected area. 4 of the 8 were Honey Ward's
 0 district leaders. Furthermore, 25 persons were
 1 either Board of Trustee members or staff members
 2 of the Anti-Poverty Agency, which had voted in
 3 February over the recommendation of their own
 4 committee to oppose the medical school.

5 MAYOR ABBONIZIO: I would like to point out

1 also that I am the elected mayor of the City of
 2 Newark and I think that I have a responsibility
 3 to make these kinds of decisions, and I think we
 4 ought to point out very strongly that five years
 5 ago we had an overwhelming victory in the City of
 6 Newark, much to the dismay of a lot of people,
 7 and last year we still had a great victory and in
 8 both elections we received more votes in the
 9 Negro voting precincts than any other candidate
 10 and last year we had two Negro opponents.

11 MR. DRISCOLL: The minutes of these meetings
 12 are available?

13 MR. SCHIFF: Yes, they are, and also the
 14 contents of what the speakers said. It is very
 15 interesting to note at the blight hearings on the
 16 medical school that most of them were not
 17 speaking really to the issue but were talking
 18 about the general frustrations and deprivations
 19 of Negroes.

20 MR. MALAFRONTI: We have nine volumes.

21 MR. JAFFE: Could you make them available?

22 MR. MALAFRONTI: Yes.

23 MAYOR ABIGNIZIO: What I am trying to point
 24 out is I think if anybody represents the Negro
 25 community per se, it is the fellow who got the

1 most votes in the election. And we do have a ⁷¹ lot
2 of self-appointed Negro leaders, you know, who
3 think perhaps that they won the election.
4 Fortunately for me they did not. And it is a
5 fact that they just don't want to face it.

6 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Let's take a ten minute
7 break.

8 (Short recess.)

9 MR. JAFFE: I would like to mark the film
10 as a Commission exhibit. We don't have a print
11 of it that we can mark in evidence. I wonder,
12 Mr. Mayor, if either you or one of your staff
13 before you show the film could tell us when it
14 was taken, who took it and under what circumstances
15 it was taken.

16 (Marked Commission Exhibit 16.)

17 MR. MALAFRONTE: This is a film which we
18 think is interesting, showing how things begin,
19 how innocuously it looks and how dangerous an
20 innocuous situation can become very rapidly.
21 It is also interesting because it would show you
22 or give you a little bit of the feel of the way
23 it was in front of the Fourth Precinct on July
24 13th. This is the situation and setting for you
25 on July 12th after the arrest of the cab driver,

1 and subsequent serious incident involving breaking
 2 in of some stores and some six or seven or eight
 3 arrests that night, but the most serious incidents
 4 Newark had ever had but it was quite short of a
 5 riot. We spent the day on Thursday meeting with
 6 various groups attempting truly to help them
 7 establish some demands on us that we could meet,
 8 although there were many of us who felt it was
 9 futile and that we had a serious situation on
 0 our hands. Late that Thursday afternoon we
 1 became aware of anonymous fliers in the city
 2 calling for a rally at the Fourth Precinct.
 3 They simply said, "Stop Police Brutality, Come
 4 Tonight," and so forth and so on. We later
 5 found out that the leaflets although distributed
 6 anonymously and printed anonymously were in fact
 7 printed by our anti-poverty agency. The film is
 8 of the Fourth Precinct early in the evening of
 9 the 14th. It was filmed by WCBS local television,
 0 by one of three or four camera units which were
 1 there before the picketing began. What you will
 2 see is the precinct -- these are sketches because
 3 I don't think you are going to see a cohesive
 4 piece of film which indicates, you know, 60 or 80
 5 or 90 minutes. These are cuts as the day developed.

1 I think you will get a sense of what happened in
2 front of the precinct on that evening. It is a
3 very rare film in our opinion and that I don't
4 think ever before have you seen the filming of
5 the beginning of a riot.

6 MR. MEYNER: You said the 14th, did you not?

7 MR. MALAFRONTI: This is the evening of the
8 13th, the beginning of the Newark riots.

9 MR. JAFFE: Was this film obtained from
10 WCBS?

11 MR. MALAFRONTI: Yes, it was. This film
12 was obtained from WCBS local television. If you
13 would like to make a print of it, of course you
14 may, but this is our only print.

15 MR. SCHIFF: Parenthetically, the networks
16 were called by certain people in advance and
17 told this was going to take place at the Fourth
18 Precinct.

19 MR. MALAFRONTI: As we go along I will try
20 to identify some of the persons quickly for you.
21 I think most interesting, you have heard a great
22 deal about various police charges and I think you
23 will be interested to --

24 MR. JAFFE: What is the name of the man at
25 WCBS from whom you obtained the film? Do you know?

MR. MALAFRONTI: Yes, I do. Lee Hannah.

MR. JAFFE: Mr. Schiff just said that WCBS was informed.

MR. SCHIFF: Obviously, because they were there.

MR. JAFFE: Would he be the man who might have that information?

MR. MALAFRONTI: I think that everyone was aware as a result of the UPI news stories on Thursday morning that Newark was going to have a riot that night.

(Showing of film.)

MR. MALAFRONTI: This is the Hayes Home across the street from the Fourth Precinct. We tried to put them in sequence. That is the Fourth Precinct. As you see, nothing happening. This is early on the 14th. We pieced this together from many films so it may not all be in sequence but we tried to get as cohesive a piece of film as we could. It was a difficult job. This is Melvin Higgins of our Anti-Poverty Agency, with the green shirt, who began to direct traffic. I want to show you that the television cameras were there quite early; as you see, they filmed nothing. This is the beginning of the

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1 picketing again. You see Mr. Higgins and several
 2 other members now, Roundtree, and some others of
 3 our local group. Mr. Roundtree was then a
 4 community organizer for Area Board 2. You see,
 5 the children at first were involved, and as there
 6 were no picketers they took the children who were
 7 handy. The picketing started out with children
 8 because they were handy. These are a little out
 9 of sequence. These are most of our local workers.
 10 I mean anti-poverty workers.

11 MAYOR ADONIZIO: Which is separate and
 12 apart from the city administration.

13 MR. MALAFRONTI: Mr. Kennedy, who was one of
 14 the prime movers in this little rally, who when
 15 interviewed -- the TV interviewer said,
 16 "Don't you think this might cause a riot?"
 17 He said, "I think you are wrong. We have got a
 18 riot in the city already." That television
 19 interview with him is quite interesting and
 20 available to you.

21 MRS. STALKS: The signs were already made.

22 MR. MALAFRONTI: They were made at the
 23 poverty agencies, yes. This is Jessie Allen.
 24 All of these people are identifiable, most of them,
 25 as either workers or members or Board of Trustees

of local boards of the United Community Corporation.

Mr. Higgins, a member of the Newark Community Project and also an employee of Area Board 3.

The gathering of the crowd. This took some time, beginning somewhat before 7:00 o'clock and continuing through to about 7:30. This is during a series of talks or speeches, of which several were held during that time. Again most of the persons from anti-poverty, Jessie Allen and a couple of other persons.

MR. THREATT: That is me there. That is that ill-fated picture.

MR. BRISCOLL: Where are you?

MR. THREATT: In the black suit.

MR. MALAFRONTI: I think we will move in on this in a little while. The speaker is Mr. Allen, Anti-Poverty workers. Mr. Kennedy. Andy Washington is CORE, and so forth. Mr. Allen is doing the speaking now. This is a detective from the intelligence unit attempting to persuade the crowd to move. You see, it is rather casual.

We are now beginning some rock throwing and some other objects are beginning to go against the building, which caused people to move back across the street. This happened also on the

1 previous night and as some things began to go
2 against the precinct the crowd split up. What
3 apparently splits a civil rights crowd is the
4 rock throwing. People began to move away from
5 the building. This is typical of the previous
6 night. Here again are the rocks, and so on,
7 beginning to strike the building. This is a
8 detective.

9 Now watch the woman. This is after there
10 has been a series of rocks; she will now break
11 every window in the precinct down below with a
12 stick. The crowd has backed away because the
13 stones are coming across and banging against the
14 building. You see her breaking the window.
15 Garbage cans, stones, rocks, and so forth,
16 continued for quite some time. This is a little
17 out of sequence. The police are already out of
18 the picture. The big police charge which is
19 supposed to have terrorized the crowd is coming
20 up. I think you will be interested in seeing it.

21 A good deal of rock throwing. Here is the
22 charge. It looks a good deal less brutal there,
23 doesn't it? The "charge" was policemen coming
24 out of the precinct.

25 MR. DRISCOLL: They came out of the back.

1 MR. MALAFRONTI: Back door. I mean, the
2 vision of a bunch of armed bandits charging out
3 the front door and flailing away with their sticks
4 is a popular one but it doesn't appear to be so.

5 This is after the police have now come out.
6 Broken windows in the police cars, and so forth.
7 The police checking the broken windows in the
8 cars which are alongside of the precinct. What
9 happened here is there were a series of movements
10 back and forth, the crowd moving back and the
11 police moving away. As you see, it was not
12 exactly a band of brutal men charging into a
13 crowd. You see the debris, and so forth.

14 Very casual in many ways. As the night went on
15 the crowds or group which had moved began to
16 spill over, as they did the previous night,
17 into neighboring areas. There you see the type
18 of attack, the business which had gone on at
19 the precinct. She did not seem to mind at all
20 and the police are not brutalizing her on the
21 way through. So you see some of the confusion
22 and how quickly this type of thing develops.

23 Again this is across the street from the
24 precinct, with the police attempting to convince
25 people to move. Here is another one of the

1 moves down the street to clear the area. This
2 is an arrest of one person. This is Mr. Black
3 of the Anti-Poverty Agency, who was a very
4 vocal person. One of the fire bombs. The
5 attempted arrest of someone they thought had
6 thrown the fire bomb.

7 This, of course, is the project across
8 the street. You see the stones, rocks and
9 whatever here. Here is the arrival of police
10 re-enforcements as the day went on. Of course,
11 we recognized that we were going to have the
12 same type of spillover as the previous night.
13 That ambulance was for a policeman who was
14 struck by a rock. This is the same fire bomb,
15 a little out of sequence, burning about a block
16 from the precinct. The first job of the police
17 was to secure the street front which they had
18 permitted for use of the demonstration earlier.
19 That, Gentlemen, is the beginning of the Newark
20 riot.

21
22 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Well, Gentlemen, while
23 the machine is being taken away, Mr. Jaffe had
24 some additional questions but I think it is
25 important that we throw this open for any
questions from the Commissioners at this stage.

1 So who wants to be first?

2 MR. LOFTON: I have a couple of questions.
3 I might as well go in backward order. With
4 respect to the film that you showed, did I
5 understand you to say for the purposes of the
6 record that this film was a piecing together
7 of film clips that had been taken of the
8 incidents?

9 MR. MALAFRONTI: No. This is every inch
10 of film shot in front of the Fourth Precinct,
11 which we cut out of the thousands of feet of
12 film which were available. It shows every inch
13 of film filmed in front of the Fourth Precinct
14 that night by WCBS-TV. Piecing together meant
15 taking every piece or every shot which had been
16 taken in front of the Fourth Precinct that night.
17 This is every bit of film available, either that
18 had been shown on television or which was so-called
19 outtakes, which is pieces which were cut and
20 about to be discarded. This is all the film they
21 shot there that night. It is not edited.

22 MR. LOFTON: You identified Mr. Black in
23 the film as a member of the Anti-Poverty Agency.

24 MR. MALAFRONTI: Human Rights Commission.

25 MR. LOFTON: Human Rights Commission. This

1 is a city agency, is it not?

2 MR. MALAPRONTE: Mr. Black was there from the
3 Newark Human Rights Commission, yes. He is
4 chairman of that commission.

5 MR. LOFTON: Now, some of the charges, as I
6 understand it, via the newspaper, with respect
7 to the actions of the police on the 13th in
8 terms of things that you alluded to in terms
9 of the police charging out of the precinct and
10 doing "brutal things" to the people that were in
11 the area were made by Mr. Black, is that not
12 correct?

13 MR. MALAPRONTE: He has not made that
14 charge to us but I have seen his comments often
15 enough.

16 MR. LOFTON: In the newspaper?

17 MR. MALAPRONTE: I think he has been
18 talking about a whole series of events through
19 the riots, yes. That film was not to indicate
20 the lack of brutality or brutality. That was
21 the film of the way the riot started.

22 MAYOR ADONIZIS: In my conversation with
23 him for several hours, at least, during the
24 beginning and as the riot progressed, I don't
25 think he gave me any information that he saw any

1 police brutality whatsoever.

2 MR. MALAFRONTI: We are not showing this
3 film to absolve or indict anyone involved in
4 police brutality. We are simply producing it
5 as an interesting documentary of how riots
6 begin, how casual they appear and how disorganized
7 and sporadic the action is involved in the
8 beginning of a riot. It is not offered to
9 protect against charges of police brutality or
10 to indict anyone who has made the charges, who
11 might have made them under the pressure of the
12 moment without proper regard for the facts.

13 MR. LOFTON: The reason why I asked this
14 question is because of the fact in the narration
15 you indicated that there have been certain charges
16 made as to certain actions on the part of the
17 police and that this film did not reflect that
18 sort of thing, which was really in my judgment
19 introduced to counteract the charges that had
20 been made as they related to police conduct
21 on that day. Am I correct in that?

22 MR. MALAFRONTI: Yes. It is introduced
23 particularly to do away with the charge that
24 there was a well organized and brutal police
25 charge into a crowd of rioters. What we saw was

1 in fact some policemen spilling rather quietly
2 out of the back door into a street which was
3 already cleared of rocks, garbage and everything
4 else being thrown. He did introduce that to
5 make clear that that just wasn't a police story
6 or city administration story but was the fact
7 as reflected in the filming of the events at
8 that time.

9 I think it is very easy to talk in terms
10 of crowds as if there was in fact a large cohesive
11 mass of persons who had been moved on by an
12 organized police charge. As you see, reality
13 is always quite a bit --

14 MR. SCHIFF: Wasn't there another police
15 movement outside? That showed the police movement
16 when they were coming out and forming in
17 front of the precinct. But I remember seeing
18 on one of the television networks another police
19 movement after they had broken into three or four
20 stores when they came out the front entrance.

21 MR. MALAFRONTI: No. They were in front
22 of the precinct. They moved out from that
23 position in various sweeps. People kept coming
24 back -- were moving back and forth in the area.

25 MR. THREATT: Let me introduce one thing

1 for the record with regard to Chairman Black,
 2 who is the chairman of the Human Rights Commission.
 3 I might say that these charges which Mr. Black
 4 has made, and I am not addressing myself to the
 5 validity of them as such -- I would be one of
 6 the last to state that there were not any
 7 instances of police brutality, I would be the
 8 last to make such a statement, and that would be
 9 a ridiculous statement to make, but I want to
 10 say this: Mr. Black has not officially turned
 11 over to me as the executive director of the
 12 Human Rights Commission such charges that have
 13 been made in the newspaper. I want to make
 14 that statement for the record. However, he did
 15 indicate to me that he had turned over such
 16 charges to the Newark Legal Services, that he
 17 had given them the information, and I recall at
 18 the point that I testified before the President's
 19 Commission on Civil Disturbance in Washington,
 20 D. C., I had information which I had been able to
 21 obtain only from the Legal Services. So I say
 22 Mr. Black has not made these charges directly
 23 to me as the staff person. I am not saying they
 24 do not exist. I am just making this clear for
 25 the record.

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MR. LOFTON: There is another question I wanted to ask Mr. Schiff. If I understood his statement, he indicated that insofar as the planning board hearings were concerned that there were a minuscule number of persons that participated in those hearings. Is that correct?

MR. SCHIFF: No. I said the City Hall chambers were not crowded overwhelmingly. On the main floor all the seats were taken and there were people standing around the back, but the balcony was empty. And to also indicate that there were several groups that I recognized in the audience such as a group which is very close to George Richardson, a group close to Earl Harris, a group that follows Tom Hayden and a group that is around Derek Winans. I saw these groups. But I have been in the City Council chambers on many, many occasions where the balcony had been full and there has been standing room only outside, et cetera, so I was just merely contrasting the number of people who participated to what has happened on other occasions.

MR. LOFTON: Insofar as the number of persons that you indicate and the instances, are you

1 relating that to the daylight hours in which
2 the planning board hearings were held?

3 MR. SCHIFF: No. I was talking about the
4 evening session.

5 MR. MALAPROTE: The hearings were, of
6 course, extended to a number of hearings. In
7 some there were more persons and others were
8 less, and some were down to six or seven persons.
9 Others were quite a good deal more.

10 MR. LOFTON: Another question I would
11 like to ask. I don't know whether it is properly
12 addressable to Director Spina, whom I understand
13 is scheduled to appear before the Commission,
14 but I was interested insofar as what orders were
15 given to the police as they related to the
16 suppression of the riot once it began. Because
17 there has been some testimony in terms of the
18 restraint exercised by the police in the pre-
19 riot stages. In one of the Life Magazine
20 articles it depicts a picture of -- and
21 unidentifiable in the picture is a Newark
22 policeman shooting a looter as he is fleeing from
23 the premises, and I believe that individual's
24 name is Billy Furr, as it was characterized in the
25 article. And I would like to know whether or not

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and apologized for its account, its original
publication of the Life Magazine pictures without
of police brutality. The also following the
stander, and it was quite a shocking incident
and so on, and had been shot down as an innocent
Mr. Furt was innocently straying his girlfriend,
front-page story with many eyewitnesses of how
a story of the murder of Billy Furt and it was a
aware that the Afro-American had previously printed
the dramatic photos of his death, we should be
Furt shooting, in which the magazine produced
interestingly enough in the case of the Billy
necessarily to apprehend the felon. By the way,
and the police are to use whatever force
order to shoot looters. Looking in a felony
investigation, Mayor, indicates there was no
MR. MALAPROFIT: I think our own staff
what he might --
can't speak for Director Spina. I don't know
was never any such order given. However, I
MAYOR WIDOMITZ: As far as I know, there
police officer.
jeopardizing the life of that particular
police director to shoot looters who were not
there was any order given by the mayor or by the

1 account of the killing of Billy Furr. I think
2 the pictures, while serving various uses,
3 depending upon the point of view, truly indicate
4 that Mr. Furr was in the act of committing a
5 felony.

6 MR. DRISCOLL: Mr. Chairman, may I at
7 this point ask a question. Mr. Mayor, we have
8 heard some testimony to the effect that it was
9 the administration's policy to refrain from
10 use of firearms in the hope that this matter
11 could be dampened. Was there such a policy
12 initially?

13 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Well, I think there was
14 a policy of restraint. I don't know whether
15 it would apply specifically to firearms. But I
16 think that all along the line over a period of
17 many weeks the police department and Director
18 Spina were well aware of the fact that they
19 should be very careful in the way they approached
20 any situation because of the possibilities of
21 creating a riot.

22 MR. MALAFRONTI: It is true that no shots
23 were fired the first night and no shots were
24 fired on the second night until early in the
25 morning of Friday.

1 MR. THREATT: I might point out that on
 2 the instructions of the mayor on the evening of
 3 the 13th, which was Thursday -- I think I have
 4 the date right -- on the 13th I did meet with
 5 all of the police captains of all of the precincts
 6 in the city in Director Spina's office and
 7 cautioned them all in terms of the exercise of
 8 reasonable restraint and care that afternoon
 9 because we didn't want to precipitate any more
 10 serious incident or disturbance than we had
 11 on our hands, and I did talk to them at length
 12 about the civil rights ramifications of their
 13 action that day and asked them to convey this
 14 to their men. I did this at the direction of
 15 the mayor and I did meet with all the precinct
 16 captains. So I would say this indicates that
 17 there was, at least from the top administrative
 18 level on the part of the mayor, every effort
 19 made to convey to the police officers what we
 20 thought was reasonable, right and just in terms
 21 of their behavior. And I assure you that in that
 22 meeting I did not advocate the shooting of anyone
 23 at that particular time.

24 MRS. STALKS: I think that was evidenced
 25 when Colonel Hassan decided he felt like

1 destroying the tape at the blight hearing.

2 Rather than arrest him, you know, he was very
3 carefully escorted out.

4 MR. MALAFRONTI: There was no clear order
5 not to fire but certainly everyone had been
6 instructed to be as careful as possible. And
7 the first evening we attempted to contain --
8 on the second evening, too -- contain the area
9 of involvement, keep the crowds small, have
10 small groups of police moving quickly among the
11 people, keep the people moving, keep the groups
12 small and let it play itself out, which had
13 worked successfully on Wednesday evening and
14 which we had hoped would be successful on
15 Thursday evening. We thought it was successful
16 up until around midnight of the 13th or going
17 into the morning, Friday morning. The incident
18 rate had fallen off quite a bit; Director Spina
19 felt safe enough to leave the Fourth Precinct
20 and come to police headquarters to the main point
21 of communication to indicate that he thought we
22 might possibly turn the corner again. You do
23 understand that the Newark police, 1400 men
24 strong, is larger than the State Police, and
25 that we felt that the business of mobilizing the

1 State Police and the National Guard would take
2 some time, and although there had been some
3 preliminary conversation, we were still hopeful
4 of avoiding that. By midnight Director Spina
5 was hopeful that we had in some manner contained
6 the thing. The crowds had not formed in large
7 numbers. It was sweeping streets, moving small
8 groups. There was no gunfire as yet, so we were
9 still hopeful.

10 It was somewhere around midnight when
11 the area of containment began to get larger
12 and we had simultaneous reports of activity in
13 far out areas, quite outside the area of
14 containment.

15 **MAYOR ABBONIZIO:** There was shooting in
16 various parts of the city.

17 **MR. MALAFRONTÉ:** In the north ward, the
18 top of the east ward, far out in the west ward.
19 Particularly troublesome to us was the break at
20 Sears & Roebuck, in which some 20 odd guns were
21 stolen and the gunfire began directed against
22 the police.

23 **MR. GIBBONS:** If you can do so without
24 prejudicing pending investigations, can you tell
25 us whether or not any progress has been made in

1 identifying snipers?

2 MAYOR ABONIZIO: I would rather let
3 Director Spina answer that although I don't
4 believe so.

5 MR. SCHIFF: I think he had better respond
6 to that. I think there are really two cases
7 in which they are trying at the present time
8 to substantiate cases. Two people are presently
9 being held and being accused of being snipers.

10 MR. MALAFRONTI: With all due respect,
11 we have to accept the fact that Mr. Lofton is
12 deeply involved as an attorney as well as a
13 member of the Commission. He represents many
14 of the persons who may have been involved or
15 who have been arrested, so I think there are
16 some matters that we could not quite freely
17 bring before you.

18
19 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Any other questions by a
20 Commissioner?

21 MR. LOFTON: I have a couple more. With
22 respect to the night of July 12th concerning the
23 activities of the persons that were involved in
24 the incident after the arrest of the cab driver --
25 and I address this question to Mr. Threatt --
has any investigation been made on the part of

1 the Human Rights Commission with respect to
2 persons who may have been present on that occasion
3 with respect to their relating what they observed
4 insofar as the police conduct on that night?

5 MR. DRISCOLL: Mr. Chairman, doesn't this
6 involve a pending case? If it does, it seems to
7 me that --

8 MR. MALAFRONTIS: It involves Mr. Smith's
9 case, who Mr. Lofton is the attorney for.

10 MR. LOFTON: Well, the line of my
11 questioning was not with respect to Mr. Smith,
12 as far as it related to Mr. Smith directly.
13 My question insofar as the police conduct --

14 MAYOR ANTONIZIO: It is a well-known fact
15 that Mr. Lofton is representing many of the
16 individuals who have been involved in this
17 situation and we just don't feel that we can
18 testify as to all of the facts and make these
19 facts available to Mr. Lofton, who is their
20 lawyer. I just think at this point there has to
21 be some decision made about the propriety of
22 Mr. Lofton's serving on this Commission with
23 respect to those matters, whether we say it here
24 in front of him or we say it for the record later
25 on. Those records are available to him as a

1 member of this Commission.

2 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Mr. Jaffe has something
3 on this which I hope is useful, Mr. Mayor.

4 MR. JAFFE: If I could backtrack a minute
5 on some questions --

6 MR. LOFTON: Well, if I might, I would just
7 want to make one thing clear --

8 MR. DRISCOLL: I think it is part of the
9 res ipso loquitur, as I remember my Latin.

10 MR. WACHENFELD: You are right.

11 MR. DRISCOLL: And I think it is objectionable

12 MR. WACHENFELD: It speaks for itself.

13 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: It is objectionable to us,
14 certainly. I hope I have made that clear.

15 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: I don't have a lawyer's
16 training and the training in Latin; I just have
17 to be a practical man here.

18 MR. WACHENFELD: I want to say that these
19 Gentlemen are entitled to protect their own
20 interests and the city's interest and if they
21 don't want to answer any questions that are
22 asked by anybody, they have a right to exert
23 that prerogative.

24 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: I was going to say the
25 same thing. If it is a question you don't feel

1 you should answer, feel perfectly free to indicate
2 that.

3 MAYOR ABONIZIO: Excepting that the
4 record will not be entirely clear then. I don't
5 think that then you people will have all of the
6 facts where you can determine --

7 MR. MEYNER: This is a problem we can
8 decide in executive session.

9 MR. LOFTON: If I might, Mr. Chairman,
10 for the purposes of the record, I just want to
11 make clear that the purpose of my inquiry was
12 not to elicit facts as they related to Mr. Smith.
13 The purpose of the question I was about to ask
14 was with respect to the police misconduct as it
15 related to the crowd in terms of anonymity
16 I don't mean in terms of individuals. In addition
17 to that, I would also like to make it clear that
18 insofar as my representation of the persons
19 arrested during the course of the recent
20 unfortunate hostilities, that that representation
21 limits itself to the representation of Mr. Smith
22 and no other person arrested during the course of
23 these hostilities.

24 MR. MEYNER: Will the Mayor and his staff
25 furnish to this committee the names and addresses

1 of all anti-poverty workers identified with the
2 disturbances that preceded the riot?

3 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Yes. We will make them
4 available to you, at least as far as our
5 information is concerned.

6 MR. MEYNER: You have done some investigating
7 and I think you can indicate to us the people
8 you believed were involved in making signs or in
9 agitating the crowds, so that we might look into
10 that.

11 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Fine.

12 MR. DRISCOLL: In the normal course of
13 events, Mr. Mayor, are these people fingerprinted?

14 MR. MALAFRONTI: Before they take jobs?

15 MR. DRISCOLL: Yes.

16 MR. MALAFRONTI: No.

17 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I think you ought to know
18 that as far as the Federal monies are concerned
19 and in these poverty programs there are individuals
20 who have been employed -- and it is perfectly
21 legal -- who have certainly some kind of record.
22 This I know because we have them right within
23 the City of Newark in various anti-poverty
24 programs. This is allowable under the law.

25 MR. MEYNER: This is part of the rehabilitation

1 program.

2 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Yes.

3 MR. MALAFRONTI: We have a large number of
4 persons, particularly in the Youth Corps, for
5 instance, with prior police records and we
6 attempt, in fact, in many cases to find these
7 people.

8 MR. MEYNER: Will you tell us your
9 relationship with the poverty program prior to
10 the riots. How much did you know about the
11 various programs and how much consultation
12 was there before these programs were implemented?

13 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: First of all, may I say
14 in all sincerity that we gave our blessing to
15 the formation of the United Community Corporation,
16 which is our community effort in the poverty
17 field. Representations made to me were made by
18 Monsignor Deoling, Rabbi Prinz and Dean Heckel
19 of the Rutgers Law School, and others, all
20 people certainly of outstanding reputation,
21 whom I believe to be very sincere in their
22 desire to do something worthwhile for the city.
23 As a result of that initial meeting I urged the
24 City Council to appropriate \$15,000. I urged
25 the Board of Education to donate a like sum of

1 money to this effort. The social agencies of the
 2 city then contributed a like amount, and they had
 3 a \$45,000 beginning. Now, anyone can be a
 4 member of the United Community Corporation.
 5 I think you have to be 15 years of age and a
 6 resident of the city -- or not even a resident
 7 of the city because they did have some people
 8 on their board who didn't even live in the
 9 City of Newark.

10 MR. WACHENFELD: Who makes the appointment?

11 MAYOR ABONIZIO: Anyone just attends the
 12 meeting and fills out an application.

13 MR. MALAFRONTI: A Board of Trustees is
 14 elected by the general membership.

15 MAYOR ABONIZIO: Anyone can be a member.
 16 Now, what has happened in the City of Newark is
 17 that all of the dissidents, all of the people
 18 who are in political disfavor, have generated
 19 toward this organization to use it as a
 20 mechanism to gain some political power or some
 21 position where they could be heard, because many
 22 times you will read in the press that someone
 23 is making a statement and then they will identify
 24 that person as holding a particular position
 25 in the United Community Corporation. We have

1 had a very difficult time with this agency over
2 a period of several years. We attended some
3 meetings, made some speeches to them, indicated
4 what we thought their role should be and, very
5 frankly, they became involved in every public
6 issue that comes up within the city. I have made
7 my objections known to people in Washington,
8 I have said it before the United States Commission
9 on Civil Disorders. So this is nothing new.
10 We have tried in every way to be cooperative.
11 I don't think there is any instance where the
12 United Community Corporation has come to our
13 office asking for help, financially or otherwise,
14 where we have not responded. The City Council
15 has not looked upon it in the same fashion.
16 There is a great deal of opposition certainly
17 stemming from those people. We have tried to
18 work with this group because we think it is
19 important to the city. We think it is important
20 for the people that we are trying to help.

21
22 Most recently they took action where they
23 took several hundreds of thousands of dollars
24 away from a senior citizens program which the
25 city has sponsored through their agency and took
this money and turned it over to these area

1 boards that were created by them, for programs
2 which they knew nothing about and which never
3 really came into being. And most recently they
4 had to turn back some \$700,000 to the Federal
5 Government because part of the money was never
6 utilized.

7 There are no programs that came forth
8 from the area boards. And the rest of the money
9 came from programs that they had submitted but
10 which were not approved because of the type of
11 programs or the make-up of them when they were
12 submitted to the Federal Government. We urged
13 them, and we had a long, bitter struggle with
14 them about taking this money away from an
15 ongoing program that was very successful. As a
16 result we have had to appeal to Washington and
17 just recently we were given \$125,000, I believe,
18 to formulate an adult basic education program
19 amongst our senior citizens. But in spite of
20 that, many of the staff members of this agency
21 have been let go -- I think there was some 17
22 or 18 in number -- and over 112 senior citizens
23 now find themselves unemployed where they were
24 making some \$30 or \$40 a week on a part time
25 basis working in these various programs that we

1 had set up.

2 So all along the line we have had a
3 difficult problem with this agency. We have
4 never been given the privilege of even the
5 appointment of one individual to any position.
6 Anyone that works in this agency certainly is
7 not through my recommendation. As a matter of
8 fact, many people who I felt were qualified for
9 positions, whose names I submitted, were never
10 even interviewed for jobs.

11 And I find generally that the policy has
12 been to employ all of those people who are just
13 politically opposed to this administration,
14 and we find ourselves in the position of where
15 the city, having fostered this thing initially,
16 certainly with good will and good intentions,
17 now finds itself in a position where people are
18 being paid through Federal funds to fight this
19 administration.

20 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: I would like to return
21 to Mr. Jaffe's line of questioning now.

22 MR. MEYNER: Director Spina or somebody
23 from the police department will be available
24 either to this Commission or the investigators --

25 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: He is tied up at a

1 meeting.

2 MR. MEYNER: -- so we might find out what
3 planning there was and how the police were called
4 in and what action they took? I don't know
5 whether we need it through the Commission but I
6 certainly think our investigators would want --

7 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: There was an arrest of
8 one individual that works for the United
9 Community Corporation.

10 MR. SCHIFF: I think you also should know,
11 Governor, because you have asked really a very
12 critical question, that the area boards of the
13 Community Action Program as distinguished from
14 the social program of the poverty program where
15 there was an ongoing program, the Community
16 Action Program ostensibly was to try to get
17 people involved in the community but a Willie
18 Wright, for instance, who is now in Czechoslovakia
19 or North Vietnam -- I don't know where he is --
20 he was elected by two votes to be chairman of
21 Area Board 2. Now Willie Wright has a new title.
22 He now is chairman of Area Board 2 and now he
23 doesn't represent merely 102 people who may have
24 voted in the election -- and he was successful
25 by two votes -- he now represents the whole area

1 and his job in his opinion is to fight the
2 power structure, and I refer to what the mayor
3 said, by spreading the message that if, for
4 instance, the Negro community can obtain the
5 power structure, that that will solve the problems
6 in the city and the problems of the ghetto area.
7 But this has been the problem in all of the
8 community action agencies which have become,
9 in a sense, the political activists in terms of
10 protesting at all of the meetings, at ceters,
11 all of the public hearings, however legitimate
12 the protest may be.

13 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Mr. Jaffe.

14 MR. JAFFE: We just have a few things.

15 I know the mayor wants to leave at 12:30.

16 MAYOR ABDONIZIO: I have all day.

17 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: I want Mr. Jaffe to
18 in the City of Newark for the pro-riot plan?
resume his line.

19 MR. JAFFE: We will have lots of

20 opportunities to get the expression of views.

21 I have just a few general questions.

22 MR. MALAPRONTE: I would like to make

23 some comments before we break up.

24 MR. JAFFE: I wonder if I can ask a few

25 questions of the mayor, which are very general,

1 so we can have it for the basis of our record
2 recognizing that we will have many more
3 opportunities to talk to the members of the
4 city administration. In fact, as we discussed
5 yesterday, we hope to establish a liaison with
6 the city and we hope these people will be
7 available and, as suggested yesterday, Mr.
8 Malafronte would be a conduit to enable us to
9 go out and talk to people in the fire department
10 and in the various welfare departments, and so
11 forth, for statistics and also for availability
12 before the Commission. We would appreciate that.
13 But I would like to ask you a few general
14 questions for the record. In terms of the
15 pre-riot situation in Newark that occurred,
16 could you just tell me who had the responsibility
17 in the City of Newark for the pre-riot plan?
18 Was this a police department function or was it
19 a function of some other agency?

21 MAYOR ABONIZIO: This is a police
22 department function.

23 MR. MALAFRONTI: You are talking riot plan
24 for what?

25 MR. JAFFE: I will rephrase the question.
I am talking about in terms of pre-riot planning

1 in terms of how to handle the riot physically,
2 in terms of law enforcement policy.

3 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: That is what I thought
4 you meant.

5 MR. JAFFE: And that responsibility was
6 the responsibility of the police?

7 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: The police department.

8 MR. THREATT: I think we should add one
9 thing to this. We did have in effect in the
10 City of Newark a plan implemented for the
11 handling of incidents which might have precipitated
12 a riot, which was not just a police department
13 plan. This was a plan in which the law
14 department was involved, the Human Rights
15 Commission was involved and the police department
16 was involved, which might have been a prelude
17 to any riot plan. What I mean is, this was a
18 plan as to how best to handle the arrests and
19 other things that might lead to a riot.

20 MR. JAFFE: Would that be available to the
21 Commission?

22 MR. SCHIFF: Yes.

23 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: We can make that available.

24 MR. JAFFE: I think we can get the general
25 view of that when we talk to Mr. Threatt and we

1 get the plan and we talk to the police director.

2 MR. KALAFRONTE: The point is, we tried
3 to avoid the appearance of riot planning, and
4 that was part of the planning.

5 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: It had to do, of course,
6 with the constant charges of police brutality
7 that were always leveled whenever there was an
8 arrest made of any nature, and as a result of
9 the great deal of pressure last year or the
10 year before, I believe --

11 MR. SCHIFF: 1965.

12 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: -- we came out with
13 this program and, to our surprise, the police
14 brutality charges have since come to such a
15 point where we don't find ourselves constantly
16 harassed by that kind of situation. May I
17 say, too, that prior to the election last year
18 we took a very strong stand against the
19 creation of a police review board, which was
20 a very controversial issue, not only in Newark
21 but in many cities throughout the country,
22 and in spite of being opposed to a police
23 review board we did win the election and, as I
24 indicated to you, received a substantial vote
25 from the Negro community. And I think that that

1 is impertent because it is my judgment that
2 these charges of police brutality are not
3 always what they appear to be on the surface.

4 MR. MALAFRONTI: This would take another
5 session.

6 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, when the riot first
7 developed, which I gather was on Wednesday
8 evening -- is that right?

9 MR. MALAFRONTI: The riot began on
10 Thursday. Wednesday was the incident --

11 MR. THREATT: I think we are talking
12 about sort of synonymous things. I think the
13 riot began, for all intents and purposes, on
14 Wednesday night.

15 MR. JAFFE: Now, was the prime
16 responsibility at that point in terms of the
17 law enforcement problem the responsibility of the
18 police department?

19 MAYOR ABDONIZIO: Yes.

20 MR. JAFFE: In terms of containing that
21 incident and in terms of containing the
22 population?

23 MAYOR ABDONIZIO: Yes. Director Spina
24 was at the Fourth Precinct that night.

25 MR. JAFFE: On Wednesday evening?

1 MAYOR ABONIZIO: Yes, and I did talk
2 with him later. Within a few hours time the
3 situation had leveled off.

4 MR. JAFFE: Were there any specific
5 instructions that you recall that you gave him
6 in terms of containing the riot, either relating
7 to the use of firearms or relating to the
8 general problem of containing the incident?

9 MAYOR ABONIZIO: No. I think the
10 general policy of the city in conjunction with
11 our Newark Human Rights Executive Director and
12 others was that we would use as much restraint
13 as possible in the handling of any situation.
14 I think there was restraint used that night
15 and well into the second night.

16 MR. THREATT: I think I should point out,
17 Mr. Jaffe, on the first night I was called to
18 the precinct by the director of police shortly
19 after he arrived and I did get there and in fact
20 I was involved in several conferences, one with
21 Commissioner Lofton, who at that time was
22 representing the Anti-Poverty Agency, and on
23 that night there was an agreement that we
24 exercise restraint. I have to be very careful
25 what I say. I realize that there has been some

1 question raised about the area -- but there were
2 complaints by this group, and we did address
3 ourselves to these complaints. On this night
4 Director Spina, myself and Mr. Lofton, and
5 others, did address ourselves to these complaints
6 in an attempt to correct them as best we could
7 on that particular night, and I don't think
8 we did have any serious incident. The police
9 were restrained at that point. And I think
10 that the incident proceeded on through the night
11 uneventfully. In fact, several people who were
12 arrested, little girls, et cetera, I did make
13 arrangements for Mr. Lofton and others to go up
14 to arrange for their release immediately. Now,
15 some that were being held, we didn't bother to
16 charge them, and so forth. We took all the
17 precautions necessary.

18 MR. NALAPRONTE: Wednesday night was a
19 police matter entirely. Thursday night it was a
20 police matter until it reached more serious
21 proportions, at which time the mayor and staff
22 did go to police headquarters to assume direct
23 control of the operation.

24 MR. JAFFE: That was my next question,
25 Mayor. You went to police headquarters, as I

1 understand Mr. Malafrente, the following evening?

2 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Correct.

3 MR. JAFFE: On Thursday.

4 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Right.

5 MR. SCHIFF: The mayor made the judgment
6 after receiving reports from the police director,
7 who was in direct communication with him.

8 MR. JAFFE: Now, I wonder, Mr. Mayor,
9 if you would comment before the Commission on
10 when you made the decision to call the governor
11 and the reasons for that decision.

12 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Well, I was at police
13 headquarters --

14 MR. JAFFE: And this is Thursday
15 evening?

16 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Sometime after 8:00
17 o'clock in the evening.

18 MR. JAFFE: July 14th, is that correct?

19 MR. MALAFRENTE: The 13th.

20 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: And, of course, we had
21 a police radio in operation --

22 MR. JAFFE: Excuse me. Is that the 13th
23 or 14th?

24 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: The 13th.

25 MR. MALAFRENTE: July 13th was Thursday

1 night. Shortly after the film you saw we
2 assembled at police headquarters.

3 MR. JAFFE: That was approximately 8:00
4 p.m., sir?

5 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Yes.

6 MR. JAFFE: Would you tell us what
7 happened.

8 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I was in constant
9 touch with the police director by telephone.

10 MR. MALAFRONTE: The police director
11 was at the Fourth Precinct. We were at
12 headquarters.

13 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: At some point in the
14 evening, and I don't remember the time, the
15 director and I talked and he just in effect
16 told me that the situation was getting out of
17 hand, and up until this point the police had
18 not left the precinct. And he told me he
19 thought that we better send them out there to
20 start moving the crowd and dispersing the
21 people because it was reaching serious
22 proportions. I concurred in his judgment. And
23 we sent the police out there, and then shortly
24 thereafter there were numerous instances that
25 were coming over the police radio about looting

1 and breaking of windows, and so forth and so on.

2 MR. JAFFE: Was this basically the
3 beginning of the looting phase of the riot,
4 Thursday evening?

5 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Yes. Well, there was
6 some slight looting on Wednesday night. I
7 think there were five or six stores that were
8 broken into that were immediately adjacent
9 to the precinct or the precinct area. Sometime
10 after 12:00 o'clock, again in constant
11 communication with the police director, we felt
12 that the situation was pretty well in hand.
13 As a matter of fact, Director Spina felt very
14 confident that all of this was leveling off.
15 There were less calls on the police radio of
16 incidents and police responding to calls, and
17 so forth, and we all started to breathe a little
18 bit easier, and then it appeared to us that all
19 of a sudden there was sporadic shooting and
20 reports from various parts of the city.

21 MR. JAFFE: Was this the beginning of
22 the sniping phase?

23 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Yes.

24 MR. JAFFE: About 12:00 o'clock Thursday
25 evening?

1 MAYOR ADICHIZIO: Right. And we found them
2 as far down in the south ward as Sears & Roebuck
3 and up in the north ward on Oriental Street,
4 I believe it is, off Broadway, so it was spread
5 out far from the central ward area. And, of
6 course, the constant fire now that was taking
7 place, reports coming in, recognizing, too,
8 that a great many policemen perhaps were a
9 little bit excited about all that was taking
10 place, and up until this time no policeman had
11 fired a gun, because the reports over the radio
12 were, you know, "Give us permission to shoot,"
13 and so forth and so on.

14 MR. JAFFE: Was that a result of an order
15 by the police director not to fire?

16 MAYOR ADICHIZIO: I don't believe the
17 police director gave such an order. I don't
18 believe anyone did. I think it was just a
19 policeman's judgment in respect to --

20 MR. JAFFE: This was not the kind of
21 circumstance --

22 MAYOR ADICHIZIO: In what we considered
23 a restraining position on the part of the police.
24 I think some of them might have taken that
25 restraint to mean that they couldn't fire. I

1 think this was a judgment they made by themselves.
2 But, at any rate, I imagine it was sometime after
3 1:00 o'clock in the morning, and the situation
4 was growing worse and becoming more serious,
5 that I talked to Director Spina again and it
6 was my belief that our police could not handle
7 the situation any longer. And I, very frankly,
8 tried to convince the director that he should
9 get in touch with the State Police and the
10 governor's office to call in the National Guard.
11 He still felt, very frankly, that he could do
12 the job. I was of another opinion and it was
13 my decision actually, finally convincing him
14 that this is what ought to be done, and I
15 immediately telephoned the governor and asked
16 for their assistance.

17 MR. MALAPRONTE: That was at 2:20 Friday
18 morning.

19 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: And they arrived in
20 Newark I think somewhere around 5:30.

21 MR. JAFFE: Was there a liaison -- I
22 assume Director Spina would be more appropriate --
23 but there was a liaison, as I understand it,
24 set up between the Newark City Police
25 Department and the State Police when they

1 came in.

2 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Not an entirely
3 satisfactory one on our part.

4 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, would you like
5 to comment for us on the effectiveness of
6 the kind of planning and kind of liaison
7 that was established in terms of containing
8 the riot.

9 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Of course, I would
10 rather have Director Spina comment on that
11 because he was directly involved. I was at
12 the armory on Roseville Avenue with the
13 governor and State Police constantly for
14 practically the four or five days, outside
15 of the time that I was out around the city.
16 Director Spina was operating either out of
17 his own car or else out of police headquarters
18 or the Fourth Precinct. And I think he was
19 very unhappy about the kind of communication
20 that existed between his department and the
21 State Police and National Guard. However,
22 we did have several meetings where we had to
23 call people in actually to attend those
24 meetings to make decisions. Sometimes it was
25 very difficult to get a decision.

1 MR. JAFFE: Were you in constant
2 communication with the governor at this
3 period of time? I mean during this period
4 of time that the State Police and the National
5 Guard were here.

6 MAYOR ADEONIZIO: Except when the
7 governor would disappear for several hours
8 at a time and I couldn't find out where he
9 was.

10 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, just an opinion
11 question if you feel that it is a proper
12 question. Do you feel that there is room
13 for improvement or there is room for
14 recommendation for this commission in talking
15 about the type of liaison that can be
16 established?

17 MAYOR ADEONIZIO: Well, I think there is
18 serious question about who should be in charge
19 in a situation like this because our State
20 Police come into Newark with Colonel Kelly,
21 who is certainly not as totally familiar with
22 our city as our own police department, and
23 they make certain decisions as to how they
24 think the situation ought to be handled. We
25 think somewhat differently sometimes. And I

1 think that they ought to pay more attention
2 to the local people. We know the city. We
3 know every street in the city. Our police
4 department knows every street in the city.
5 We didn't agree wholeheartedly with the
6 deployment of people and the methods used by
7 the State Police or the National Guard, which
8 was under I think the direction of the State
9 Police, because they had no arresting powers.
10 If they had to arrest somebody, they had to
11 call the State Police.

12 MR. JAFFE: Would it be your view,
13 Mr. Mayor, that if a civil disturbance arrived
14 at the point -- well, let me ask it in two
15 phases --

16 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I have never, in
17 recent years, at least, or in the past ever
18 attended a meeting where any plan was ever
19 submitted to us as to how anything would
20 operate in the event of a riot. The only
21 meeting we had was down at the Newark Airport
22 at the Newarker Restaurant where there was
23 just general discussion about what we would
24 do in the event of a riot, and that was to
25 call Trenton for help.

1 MR. JAFFE: I have sort of a three-part
2 question in this area. No. 1, do you think
3 in your opinion that the primary responsibility
4 for containing a civil disturbance is a
5 local police problem?

6 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I think initially
7 it is a local police problem but I think
8 once you request aid from higher authority,
9 I certainly think there ought to be some kind
10 of liaison and relationship between both
11 parties so that you are in agreement with
12 what the plans are.

13 MR. JAFFE: I gather it is your view,
14 sir, that one of the things that the Commission
15 could look into would be the type of liaison
16 and the type of pre-planning --

17 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Very definitely.

18 MR. JAFFE: -- that should go into
19 this thing prior to it occurring.

20 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I don't want to be
21 critical particularly but there was an
22 incident where a fireman was killed, shot in
23 the back. Director Caulfield -- and he can
24 testify to this, he attended the meeting --
25 came to the Newark Armory and sought me out

1 and indicated to me the situation, said in
2 effect that something has to be done or we
3 are going to find ourselves in a situation
4 where the firemen would not respond to calls.
5 I asked for a meeting with the Governor and
6 Colonel Kelly and Director Spina; had some
7 difficulty in getting everybody together.
8 And we finally managed to do it and Director
9 Caulfield was there. He explained the
10 situation and I asked specifically for some
11 National Guardsmen or some people certainly
12 with guns or weapons because the fire
13 department is not armed to specifically ride
14 these engines to these calls.

15 There were numerous incidents of where
16 firemen were under fire. One firehouse was
17 under constant fire up at Springfield Avenue
18 and Hunterdon Street. And I assumed from
19 that discussion, which took probably an hour,
20 that we would get this kind of help. About
21 two hours later Director Caulfield came back
22 to the armory and told me that they hadn't
23 done anything yet. I immediately asked for
24 the Governor and Colonel Kelly again and
25 Director Spina and we had another meeting.

1 And, very frankly, I had to say to the Governor
2 and to Colonel Kelly, "Well, now, are you
3 going to give us these people or not? I
4 would like to know because if you don't do
5 it, we are going to put our policemen on
6 there."

7 And then as a result of that ultimatum,
8 you might call it, we finally did get some
9 National Guardsmen to ride the fire trucks
10 to help protect these firemen.

11 MR. JAFFE: Would it be your view,
12 Mr. Mayor -- and again it may be a question
13 more properly directed to the police director --
14 would it be your view that if State aid is
15 called in to contain a civil disturbance that
16 the basic command structure and the basic
17 person in charge ought to be a local official,
18 local police director, or do you feel it ought
19 to be bifurcated?

20 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I am not concerned
21 so much with who is in charge except I think
22 it would be well to confer with the local
23 police director constantly and the mayor of
24 the city, who I would recognize as the person
25 who is more informed about what is going on.

1 You know, during the whole course of this
2 thing, and I don't want to be particularly
3 critical, but I was sort of left out of a lot
4 of things that were going on and this is my
5 city and I have to stay here after all these
6 people pull out. And they were meeting
7 constantly with individuals, who they may
8 very well have considered so-called political
9 leaders or civil rights leaders, or whatever,
10 and this runs true to the governor, all of his
11 aides and Mr. Ylvisaker and others; I wasn't
12 privy to those meetings, knew nothing about
13 what was going on, and I might have shed some
14 enlightenment upon some things that might have
15 helped in the decisions that were made.

16 MR. JAFFE: Would you have an opinion
17 as to whether or not State Police, National
18 Guard or Federal troops ought to be the first
19 group to come in after the local police have
20 a problem and can't contain it? Do you feel
21 that there is any one of those agencies that
22 is better suited to handle the problem?

23
24 MR. MALAFRONTI: For clarification,
25 are you saying are there better trained persons
or --

1 MR. JAFFE: No. One of the things
2 that the Commission is interested in is trying
3 to ascertain what is the best force that might
4 be available to aid local authorities.

5 MR. SCHIFF: You mean in terms of
6 present ability?

7 MR. JAFFE: That's right.

8 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: The truth very simply
9 is that nowhere along the line has any group
10 had any kind of training to handle riots.
11 Now, in the future, I don't know. It depends
12 on what kind of training is given to various
13 levels of law enforcement but certainly I
14 think it ought to be done in such a way that
15 every level of law enforcement knows exactly
16 what is going on, and this was not the case in
17 Newark.

18 MR. MEYNER: May I say this, Mayor:
19 If before we wind up there is anything you
20 want to tell us off the record so that we
21 might be led into a certain direction or
22 investigate in a certain direction, I think
23 you ought to be afforded that privilege.
24

25 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: He will be.

 MR. DRISCOLL: I think Mr. Jaffe's question,

1 however, has to do with the order of priority,
2 whether in your judgment as the chief executive
3 of New Jersey's most important city the first
4 group to be called in should be the State
5 Police, followed, if necessary, and hopefully
6 not necessary, by the National Guard or --

7 ~~Guard~~ MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I would have to say
8 it would be the State Police because they would be
9 the ones that would be most readily available.
10 I think it would take some time to assemble
11 the National Guard, as it did in this instance
12 where it took us three hours to get the help.

13 MR. JAFFE: In reading some of the
14 things that Cyrus Vance said in Detroit, he
15 seemed to feel that the presence of federally
16 trained troops were far more effective, and
17 I don't mean to prejudge at all, but we were
18 interested in your views as to what you thought,
19 and the governor very aptly put it much
20 better than I did, on the order of priority.
21 But I think you have answered it.

22 ~~that~~ MR. MALAFRONTTE: The priority should
23 be to the best trained troops. And in Detroit
24 it was very simple. A standard military unit
25 serving professionally was better trained than

1 National Guardsmen pulled out of their clerks'
2 jobs at Prudential as the people in Newark
3 were. A friend of mine was working on a
4 newspaper shift one evening; the next night
5 he was wearing a National Guard uniform and
6 was firing shots in Newark. If the National
7 Guard or State Police were better trained
8 for riot control, they would be the best unit.
9 If the Newark Police were better trained
10 for riot control, they would be the best unit.
11 It is a matter of who has the most effective
12 training at a given time and a given situation.
13

14 MR. WACHENFELD: Who determines that?

15 MR. MALAFRONTE: Well, there has been
16 allegations of various types of police
17 no riot training because riots are not part
18 misconduct during the rioting. I wonder if
19 of American life.

20 MR. WACHENFELD: Who determines which
21 department and/or other governmental agencies
22 is the best trained unit?

23 MR. MALAFRONTE: The amount of training
24 that goes into the unit.

25 MR. DRISCOLL: The governor has to make
that decision.

MAYOR ADDONIZIO: May I say, too, that
it was our judgment that the more force we
could bring into our community to show strength,

1 that the quicker this thing would end, and
 2 we had great difficulty convincing Colonel
 3 Kelly and General Cantwell of the National
 4 Guard about this because they kept keeping
 5 people in reserve some 50 miles away, or
 6 something else, and I wanted them in the city.
 7 And we also had a great deal of argument
 8 about using these personnel carriers, not
 9 so much to shoot, or anything like that,
 10 but just because they indicate strength, and
 11 we wanted them out on the street. And they
 12 were a very important factor once they made
 13 the decision to put them out there.

14 MR. JAFFE: Mr. Mayor, there have been
 15 allegations of various types of police
 16 misconduct during the rioting. I wonder if
 17 you would care to tell us if the police
 18 department and/or other governmental agencies
 19 are conducting an investigation of some of
 20 these allegations.

21 MR. SCHIFF: In the first place, there
 22 is presently litigation pending on this whole
 23 aspect and the law department is conducting
 24 an investigation. We have asked the police
 25 department for an investigation of, for

1 instance, all of the deaths which occurred
2 in the course of the riots, all the incidents
3 in which complaints were received. And I
4 think Director Spina could probably respond
5 to that. But we have also asked for our own
6 investigation. We are gathering this
7 information and we will make it available
8 to you.

9 MR. JAFFE: Fine. That would be very
10 helpful. Mr. Mayor, I think one other really
11 general question is, I wonder if you might
12 want to give us an opinion or your judgment
13 as to what you think is the present attitude
14 of large portions of the white community
15 in Newark towards the riot and the so-called
16 polarization of views that has occurred as
17 a result of the riot. Also what you think
18 we can do about it. I know it is a tough
19 question but we would just like your general
20 views in that area.

21 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: I think it is one of
22 anger. I think that they are very much
23 disturbed. We know of several meetings that
24 have taken place in our community by white
25 groups that had overflow crowds, so much so

1 that they had to hold it on two nights instead
2 of one, mainly fostered by the John Birch Society.
3 And we hear many stories about the white
4 community arming themselves for the future.
5 They were arming themselves for that very
6 night of the riot in certain areas of the city.

7 I don't think that we have any concrete
8 information about anyone that really has a
9 weapon or anything like that, but these are
10 the kind of things that are circulating
11 through the community.

12 And I think that the most recent action
13 by the City Council in which they first
14 turned down the request of the police
15 department for a canine corps and then about
16 400 or 500 irate white citizens showed up
17 at City Hall at the subsequent meeting of
18 the City Council and they reversed their
19 position and voted for the canine corps; I
20 think this is an indication. This is the
21 first time in my five years as mayor that I
22 saw 400 or 500 white citizens come to City
23 Hall on any issue. So I would think that this
24 is an indication of their feeling and what
25 the mood of the community is.

1 MR. JAFFE: Do you have any thoughts,
2 Mr. Mayor, as to the kind of areas that one
3 can move, whether it be the Commission or
4 the State Government, in trying to ameliorate
5 these polarizations?

6 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: If I had the answer
7 to that, I would be a genius. I think all
8 public officials ought to express themselves
9 with some restraint, and so forth, and
10 perhaps many other people, either white or
11 black, because I think many of the statements
12 that are made by individuals cause situations.

13 MR. SCHIFF: I think Governor Driscoll's
14 question about regionalization is not an
15 issue which should be lost or really passed
16 by. It has been a dream of a lot of people
17 for a long time but on a different level now.
18 It has been on a service level, you know,
19 duplication of government. But now it has
20 a sociological implication. The only way you
21 are really going to cure the problems of
22 poverty, of education, of housing, is to do it
23 on a regional basis. To do this really you
24 need regional government. And you can allow
25 power structures, in a sense, and governmental

1 structures to be segregated structures by
2 themselves and pour monies into large cities
3 like Newark or like Paterson or like Camden
4 and allow these cities to become black ghettos,
5 because that is not the answer to the problem.
6 To establish understanding, the white
7 community has to change the attitude where a
8 white person tolerated a Negro but never
9 understood his place in America, so you are
10 talking about a philosophical proposition
11 and one which a person has to accept as a
12 matter of his own conviction about the kind
13 of society in America, whether it is a
14 separate society, whether an integrated
15 society. What does a "melting pot" really
16 mean? It concerns every parent, whether
17 they will live next door to Negroes, whether
18 their kids will play with Negro children,
19 whether they will go to school with Negro
20 children. I don't think any Negro mother
21 wants her child to go to an all Negro school,
22 you see, and I don't think any white parent,
23 who believes in what America really is, wants
24 his child to go to an all white school.
25

I think the only way that government

1 can move in a positive direction, and maybe
2 it won't be in our generation because of the
3 implanted, let's say, in a sense, prejudices
4 on both sides of the calendar, but the point
5 is to plan for future generations we have
6 to start building a regional society where
7 you have a school system that is truly a
8 regional school system, where you have a
9 housing program that is truly a regional
10 housing program and when government can deal
11 with problems on a broad spectrum and taking
12 into concern the needs of all of its
13 population and not just focusing on one
14 particular group.

15 MR. THREATT: Mr. Jaffe, I also think
16 that the white community of America and of
17 Newark and of New Jersey has to address
18 itself once again to the equalitarian concepts
19 of the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood
20 of government. I think the situation that the
21 mayor described is most unfortunate, that we
22 have basically on any issue only two camps in
23 our city, literally two camps, one white and
24 one black. I think if there are members of
25 the black community who feel and share some

1 concerns in terms of protection, they should
2 speak out. I think if there are members of
3 the white community who feel and share some
4 of the concerns that I have about dogs, they
5 should speak out. I think this is a
6 challenge that we have to meet. And I think
7 until the white community is willing to
8 meet this challenge and share some of the
9 burdens of power with the Negro community,
10 we will, regretfully, not have seen the last
11 of unfortunate disturbances in the cities
12 of our country and the cities of the northern
13 area particularly.

14 MR. MALAFRONTE: Riots are not new in
15 American life. There has been a great deal
16 of literature on riots. This is the FBI
17 manual; quite an interesting document. What
18 happened in Newark is really classic in terms
19 of riot and conditions and causes.

20 MR. JAFFE: Would you like to give us
21 that copy?

22 MR. MALAFRONTE: I would like to see
23 you get copies from the FBI. This is our
24 only copy. I think each member of the
25 Commission might read this. It speaks of

1 behavior and the crowd and how much it gets
2 involved, and so forth. This may save you
3 a good deal of grief.

4 MR. MEYNER: Did the police department
5 have that prior to the riot?

6 MR. MALAFRANTE: They did, yes. When
7 you get through with this business of who
8 hit who and what happened and who pushed what,
9 you get down to basic sociological questions,
10 and when we talk about whether we want an
11 assimilated society or whether we want a
12 separate society, these are questions which
13 have been in American society for years.
14 In every argument there are persons on various
15 sides. We say we need to bring Negroes out
16 of the cities and out into the suburbs. Well,
17 that is one view, not held by all and
18 certainly not held by all Negroes, often who
19 look at this as a plot to disturb Negro
20 voting strength and power, so there is no
21 clear consensus on that. And then we talk
22 about wanting an integrated society. Not
23 everybody wants an integrated society nor is
24 there a consensus that this is the right thing
25 to do. Do you assimilate everybody in America

1 or do you permit groups to go their own way
2 and share their own ethnic concerns and to
3 develop ethnic pride, and so forth? These
4 are not simple questions to be resolved.
5 Like we all ought to spread everybody out.
6 Maybe we should. We think generally that is
7 necessary. The city government feels in terms
8 of Newark that there needs to be a restructuring
9 of Essex County society, and so forth and so on.
10 That is not a view shared by every person.
11 In American society in race relations one of
12 the classic questions has always been, to
13 what extent do you move to assimilate various
14 groups? Do you want to assimilate Poles,
15 Irishmen, German, Negro, Jews into some sort
16 of an homogenized blend or do you want the
17 groups to go their own way, in a sense, have
18 coming together as an individual group, and
19 so on? These are questions which are the
20 classic questions in sociological literature
21 about race relations or ethnic relations
22 or whatever. Not only American society;
23 world society. Be wary of presuppositions,
24 that you presume everybody wants to be
25 homogenized. Not everybody does. And I am

1 not at all sure it is the right thing to do.
2 The whole business of race pride is important,
3 what to do about it, how to insure that race
4 pride does not become overly divisive. These
5 are major questions which have been troubling
6 American society since the beginning of this
7 country. We we are not discovering -- what
8 is happening is we are all coming up to date
9 on problems which recur in cycles, what to
10 do about homogenizing the culturally different.
11 There is no easy answer to that.

12 MR. JAFFE: I just have one last question.
13 You paint, as I recall listening to your
14 statement before, a picture, a very foreboding
15 picture I think of the central cities in our
16 country generally, that certain basic reforms
17 and certain basic attitudes are going to have
18 to change. In your best judgment as the mayor
19 of the biggest city in this state, do you feel
20 that if we don't have these type of changes
21 and have them soon that we are in for a
22 continuation of the type of civil disturbances
23 we had this last summer?

24 MAYOR ADDONIZIO: Well, I hope not but
25 I think that it could readily happen. I think

1 that the State Government of New Jersey and
2 all the other State Governments, perhaps,
3 and I think the Federal Government, in spite
4 of monies that are being spent now, we are
5 not solving the problems. We are not reaching
6 certain people. And I think that some
7 programs have to be devised that would certainly
8 reach down into the so-called ghetto and
9 reach these people who are ready prey for any
10 rabble rousers that might come along because
11 they are not sharing in the fruits of
12 society. That is what it is all about. I
13 don't think a Negro is any different than
14 an Italian or a Jew or anybody else. I think
15 basically what he wants is just part of what
16 he sees around him.

17 It is very difficult for a Negro who
18 may be lucky enough to have a television set
19 to see all that goes on in America and then
20 find that he is not part of it, that he
21 doesn't have a job, for example. I think
22 it becomes very frustrating to him and as a
23 result he will go to any means to attain some
24 of these things that you and I just accept
25 as perhaps a part of life.

1 MR. JAFFE: I have no further questions.

2 MR. DRISCOLL: Mr. Chairman, I have a
3 question. When we were discussing the flow
4 of people into the city from the south, and
5 my understanding is that we are going to
6 get those figures, and apparently there is
7 a disproportionate number of young people
8 that suddenly show up for school, in that
9 discussion it was indicated that perhaps we
10 did not have sufficiently extensive social
11 case work. Now, would you care to elaborate
12 on that?

13 MR. SCHIFF: Yes. If you take people
14 who come from a very, very deprived area,
15 who in a sense are the forerunner of
16 generations of people who were slaves, who
17 were thrust on society without any program,
18 without any guidance and without any agency
19 to take care of them, and if they grow up
20 in a certain kind of environment with a
21 certain lack of social responsibility, maybe
22 even a lack of the concept of organized
23 family life, grows up and becomes inbreded
24 within the group, and you take this group
25 and then you move them to a new atmosphere

1 with the promise that here they can gain,
2 uplift their economic standing, and not
3 provide them with intensive case work services
4 where social workers teach people how to live
5 and how to adjust to society, are doing a
6 disservice. I will give you an example on
7 a very small scale of what they did in the
8 State of Israel when they first threw the
9 Jews out of the caves of Morocco where the
10 Jews had been hiding for years and they were
11 living like animals. They didn't know what
12 a utensil was and thought, for instance,
13 that a toilet bowl was a drinking fountain,
14 had no concept of morality, of what it meant
15 to steal or to cheat. When they took these
16 people out, before they would move them into
17 a housing project, they would first spend
18 weeks and weeks and months with the family
19 teaching them the rudimentary facts of life,
20 cleanliness, sanitation, family, shopping,
21 all of the things so they could become
22 acclimated to society, and then when they
23 were finally moved into a housing development
24 the social case work service continued and
25 the social case workers moved right into the

1 development with them and stayed with the
2 family, and the husband was placed on a job
3 and they worked with the family so that they
4 were able to just take care of their own
5 personal needs and to get along in society.
6 For a person that doesn't know how to buy
7 properly in a supermarket, for a person that
8 doesn't know, for instance, how to get
9 unemployment compensation, who is merely
10 thrust out into the street and is faced with
11 this big bureaucracy or this big thing called
12 government and nobody holding him by the
13 hand and saying, "We are interested in you,
14 we care for you, we are concerned about you,
15 we are going to help you," when you have
16 no one doing that for an individual, then
17 that individual, because of ignorance,
18 because of neglect, because of illiteracy,
19 because of society, whatever cause you may
20 ascribe to it, not only then does not know
21 which way to pattern his life but becomes
22 a very angry individual, an individual who
23 can be very easily aroused. And then with
24 the advent of television and the materialistic
25 affluent society in which we live coming in,

1 these people then become the have-nots and
2 so I think it is extremely important, and I
3 think it was Roy Wilkins' nephew, Roger
4 Wilkins, who made the comment early in the
5 situation in this country that one of the
6 first things that we have to do is to teach
7 people from all walks of life how to live,
8 because the poor of Appalachia, the white
9 poor are no different than the poor Negroes
10 of the south. And in the rioting in Detroit
11 there were many white looters, too, who were
12 involved, who had come to Detroit in order
13 to try to find their way, but there was no
14 agency even there to receive them and to
15 help these people.

16 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: I think we have reached
17 the point where I should close this meeting.
18 As I have told you, Mr. Mayor, we meet half
19 days. We are the kind of Commission that
20 tries to have a majority at every meeting and
21 the way we do that is by telling them ahead of
22 time. You may want to appear again. We may
23 want to hear you again. You have offered to
24 give us a lot of help, which we will need and
25 we will call on you for it. We certainly

1 appreciate your time and that of your
2 associates; it has been helpful to us. There
3 is one last thing, Mr. Mayor, either on or
4 off the record, as you wish it. Is there
5 anything you want to say at the conclusion
6 of this meeting? And if you want to be off
7 the record, just say so and that is the way
8 it will be.

9
10 (Discussion off the record.)

11 MR. DRISCOLL: I want to put on the
12 record that one of the considerations that
13 we should have in mind is the question of
14 massive fire.

15 CHAIRMAN LILLEY: Again thank you very
16 much. 10-16-67

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