

1 MR. GIBBONS: Mark the recommendations
2 as Exhibit C-49.

3 (Document marked Exhibit C-49 in evidence.)

4 A My education was all through the Boston public
5 school system, graduated from high school up there and
6 attended Wentworth Institute for two years and left to enter
7 the service. That's my public school education. You want
8 **G E O R G E C. C A M P B E L L, Sworn.**

9 **EXAMINATION BY MR. FORTUNATO:**

10 Q Are you a resident of Plainfield?

11 A Yes, I am.

12 Q How long have you been a resident of Plainfield?

13 A Since the latter part of 1948.

14 Q Your present occupation?

15 A I am a captain of police, City of Plainfield,
16 commanding officer of the uniformed division.

17 Q How long have you held that position?

18 A Since February of 1966.

19 Q Did you rise up through the ranks?

20 A Yes, sir.

21 Q When did you come on the Plainfield police
22 force?

23 A In March of 1949.

24 Q Where had you been before that?

25 A I was born and brought up in Boston, Massa-
chusetts, and joined the Navy up there and made my home in

1 Plainfield when I finished my Naval service in 1948.

2 Q Can you fill us in on your educational
3 background?

4 A My education was all through the Boston public
5 school system, graduated from high school up there and
6 attended Wentworth Institute for two years and left to enter
7 the service. That's my public school education. You want
8 the police education?

9 Q Yes.

10 A I attended the Northwestern University Traffic
11 Institute, took courses in management, administration and
12 training.

13 Q Have you had any other courses?

14 A I was trying to get them in order. I have taken
15 some short courses at Rutgers University, New York University
16 and this past year I was awarded a scholarship to Michigan
17 State University, National Institute of Police and Community
18 Relations.

19 I am a certified instructor in police training
20 commission and school director.

21 Q When did you take this course in police and
22 community relations?

23 A In the Spring of this year.

24 Q Before the July riot, I take it?

25 A Yes, sir.

1 Q Do you have some views as to the events which
2 led up to the Plainfield riot?

3 A Which led up to it?

4 Q Yes. Were there any triggering incidents,
5 for example?

6 A I think I would like to get this entered in the
7 record.

8 I was on vacation at the time that the series of
9 disorders occurred in the city and was called back on Satur-
10 day, July 15, late in the evening. That's when I came back
11 and took over my duties and continued on duty throughout the
12 remainder of the period.

13 What had happened immediately before, I was aware
14 and very much concerned about the Newark situation. I felt
15 that this might possibly have some effect or affect the City
16 of Plainfield.

17 Q When did you go on vacation?

18 A About ten days before the riot, right around
19 the first part of July.

20 Q Before you had gone on vacation was there any
21 discussion about these photographs of Mrs. Brown being
22 passed around the neighborhood or any discussion as to
23 the alleged beating of Mrs. Brown?

24 A No, Sir. I don't recall the exact date. Are
25 you referring to Mary Brown?

1 Q That's correct.

2 A I don't know what the date of her arrest was.

3 I don't recall it right now but I know I wasn't on duty when
4 that occurred. I was on vacation.

5 Q How about the arrest of a seven year old boy?

6 A A seven year old boy?

7 Q Yes. Was there such an arrest of a child of
8 seven years old?

9 A Several years ago there was an event like that.

10 Q That's a long time ago?

11 A Three or four years ago, or three years ago.

12 There was an incident involving a seven year old boy down on
13 the west end, if that's the one you are referring to.

14 Q I am not certain. Some of these things are what
15 we have heard concerning possible triggering incidents and I
16 wanted to test your knowledge of them.

17 A I am kind of unprepared for the facts on this.
18 As I recall the incident, it was an incident involving a
19 seven year old boy and some other youngsters where there had
20 been several thousand dollars damage done to one of the local
21 schools and I believe -- just bear with me.

22 I am just trusting to memory right now. It seems to
23 me there was a colored officer or a detective accompanied by
24 a man in uniform who went down to this youngster's home to
25 talk to this boy. He was involved in this thing and his

1 brother, I believe, was involved in it.

2 There was nobody home or there were no adults in the
3 house when they got there. There was an older boy, maybe
4 11, 12, 13 years old.

5 I believe this youngster was brought down to the
6 Juvenile Bureau and interviewed down there. Their parents
7 were called. I believe the mother was away shopping and the
8 father was working or something like this.

9 They were contacted shortly after they were brought
10 in to the police station and I remember there was quite a
11 bit of discussion after this event as to whether this was
12 proper or not.

13 There was a conference held with everybody involved.
14 To my recollection I believe it was settled to the mutual
15 satisfaction of everybody involved.

16 Q You don't then consider that incident as having
17 any connection with the riot in July?

18 A Plainfield's riot?

19 Q Yes.

20 A By no means.

21 Q Are there any incidents which triggered the
22 Plainfield riot?

23 A In my opinion, no, sir, and I have done a lot
24 of searching and checking, because I was away on vacation, to
25 see if there was anything and I could find nothing.

1 Q In your opinion, what caused the Plainfield riot?

2 A Well, I have been asked this question before by
3 many commissions and I really have looked long and hard and
4 I failed to come up with any reasons why.

5 Q Can you tell us what you did when you were
6 called back from your vacation? I take it you then took
7 command of the police operations?

8 A I returned to duty on Saturday evening, July
9 15, somewhere around 11 o'clock at night. There had been a
10 series of disorders going on in the city.

11 I took charge of the field forces and the operations
12 in the street. Without going into too much detail I will
13 just talk in generalities, if it is all right with the
14 committee.

15 Q Go ahead, yes.

16 A There was a series of events going on in the
17 city. There were five bombings occurring in the west end of
18 the city. There had been one premise broken into and looted.
19 Most of the activity was directed against properties Saturday
20 evening.

21 Q Were these properties all in the Negro ghetto
22 area?

23 A All in the west end of the city, primarily
24 along Plainfield Avenue, Liberty Street, Third Street,
25 Fourth Street, extending out to Clinton Avenue, roughly

1 between Central Avenue and Clinton Avenue, Third Street,
2 Fourth Street, Second Street, that area.

3 Q Is that area for the most part populated by
4 Negroes?

5 A That is about 80%. You are probably familiar
6 by now with the area that we sealed off in there and in
7 fact, I just came across a report the planning director had
8 issued on the model cities program and it pretty much
9 coincides with the area where the disorders took place and
10 the area that we had sealed off and their breakdowns show
11 as of July an 80% colored occupancy of this area.

12 May I continue?

13 MR. GIBBONS: Go ahead.

14 THE WITNESS: Now going back to Saturday,
15 this area was pretty heavily saturated with
16 the policemen. We had called in outside towns
17 for assistance, neighboring towns, rather. We
18 called all the men that we could get a hold of
19 and we doubled the teams up, sometimes two or
20 three men in a radio car and we saturated this
21 whole area, quieting things down.

22 Just skipping over a lot of the details,
23 we managed to bring this place back to some
24 semblance of order and had it fairly well under
25 control or I would say under control by about

1 three o'clock Sunday morning.

2 The number of arrests I believe by three
3 or four o'clock Sunday morning was in the neigh-
4 berhood of 40 or 50 people having been arrested
5 for various offenses.

6 There were no injuries to any policemen
7 on Saturday evening. There was one fireman that
8 had been burned when a Molotov cocktail was
9 thrown at one of the fire trucks that was
10 answering an alarm.

11 There were no crowds roaming the streets.
12 The tactics on Saturday evening were mainly hit
13 and run type of operation, small groups. The
14 information we were getting from the people in
15 the area was that men in automobiles and they
16 had very skimpy descriptions of these cars and
17 those cars involved, the descriptions had been
18 broadcast.

19 There was a pretty good rainstorm Saturday
20 night which contributed to kind of quelling
21 things and quieting things down.

22 However, when the rain stopped there was
23 a slight buildup but by then we had enough men
24 in there and we just loaded the area with
25 policemen and the place was brought under

1 control.

2 Sunday morning we had a situation now
3 involving relief and reassignment of men. Some
4 of the men come daybreak had worked 16 and 18
5 out of the past 24 hours.

6 So after an evaluation of the area, which
7 Lieutenant Hennessey and I had made, I recommended
8 to the chief that we relieve about two-thirds
9 of our force and release all of the out of town
10 men.

11 The area was quiet. There was some evi-
12 dence of what had gone on the evening before.
13 There were no crowds in the streets or any of
14 this type of thing.

15 There was a buildup of traffic through the
16 area but this was people going to church. There
17 is a large church right adjacent to where the
18 disorders took place.

19 Sunday morning, because of the traffic
20 flow or traffic patterns in that area, a lot of
21 this traffic was funneled down one or two of
22 those streets where we had had the trouble the
23 night before.

24 However, other than just the normal looking
25 as the people passed through the area, there was

1 no sightseers or crowds or anything on the
2 streets.

3 I met with the mayor and Lieutenant
4 Hennessey and I upon his orders contacted all of
5 the licensed premises in the city and passed on
6 to them the mayor's orders that they were not to
7 open on Sunday afternoon or Sunday evening at
8 all and that they were to accept this as his
9 orders and to check with the department at seven
10 or eight o'clock on Monday before they reopened or
11 tried to reopen for business.

12 I left for home about 1:30 myself or arrived
13 at my home about 1:30, after driving through this
14 area on the way home.

15 About 5:30 or a quarter to 6 I was awakened.

16 MR. LEUCHTER: Is this p.m.?

17 THE WITNESS: 5:30 or a quarter to 6 Sunday
18 afternoon I was awakened and ordered back to
19 duty on receipt of a phone call from the watch
20 commander who in turn had been given the infor-
21 mation by the chief of police.

22 I returned to duty, arriving about ten
23 minutes to six, and had a briefing with -- as I
24 recall, the chief was present, the mayor, several
25 members of the common council, two or three of

1 my patrol supervisory officers had come in and
2 I had a quick briefing with this group as to just
3 what had been going on and what the situation
4 was.

5 It seemed that some time Sunday afternoon,
6 after four o'clock, a large group numbering in
7 the neighborhood of 300 people had tried to
8 hold a meeting in the Greenbrook Park area.
9 That is one of the Union County park systems.
10 There was a group of about 300 people who had
11 been meeting or had tried to hold a meeting in
12 Greenbrook Park and the party apparently got
13 out of hand, became a little too big and came
14 of some concern to the Union County Park Police
15 Chief and he had ordered the park cleared.

16 This group left the park, came back into
17 the area where we had the disorders and there was
18 a rather rapid and spontaneous build-up of attacks
19 that had been occurring since 4 o'clock, until
20 I returned at 6 or ten minutes of 6.

21 There had been a series of attacks upon
22 people, primarily directed against the white
23 people, who were in the area or passing through
24 it. There had been some rather serious injuries
25 with widespread looting going on according to the

1 reports I was getting, that I got from the
2 officers.

3 There had been numerous fires. There had
4 been many attacks upon the fire apparatus.
5 I was informed that shortly before I arrived the
6 fire department had refused to go in and answer
7 any calls in there because of the tempo and the
8 type of attacks being directed against their
9 personnel.

10 One interesting note, the last alarm they
11 answered in there was an engine company that
12 was responding to a fire that had been set in
13 a tavern on Plainfield Avenue and as this engine
14 company rounded the corner from Third Street
15 into Plainfield Avenue, some of the debris and
16 the articles that had been taken out of the
17 tavern during the looting, there was a large
18 empty beer barrel and this was heaved through
19 the windshield of the fire apparatus as it came
20 around the corner, injuring the driver and the
21 officer in charge.

22 My first move was to check the perimeter
23 and what was being done to keep people out of
24 this area. It was obvious that the disorders on
25 Sunday afternoon were now directed against people

1 rather than against property, or against people
2 and property, and they had started to form a
3 type of containment, blocking off some key inter-
4 sections into the area.

5 I was advised that a call for assistance
6 had been made to all the surrounding towns again.
7 All four men were recalled. We now started
8 posting the men, building up a perimeter roughly
9 along Central Avenue, Madison Avenue, West
10 Front Street, on the easterly side, the key
11 intersections along West Front Street, the key
12 intersections along West 7th Street, out as far
13 west as we could go and the towns to our west had
14 taken up positions along the westerly side and
15 were trying to keep people out of this area.

16 Now all the time these attacks were con-
17 tinuing upon people and the radio cars were
18 answering calls, going in, making arrests where
19 possible, effecting rescues of people who had
20 been injured or called for assistance.

21 However, they reported that there was a
22 rather large and hostile mob on the Plainfield
23 Avenue or in the Plainfield Avenue area. Again
24 my immediate concern was to keep people out of
25 this area so we concentrated on sealing the area

1 off. It was also apparent that there was some
2 attempt being made by some of this group to
3 break out of this area and come into the
4 business area.

5 I gave orders that this side of the
6 perimeter was to be strenghtened, that we were
7 not going to let this group come out of there
8 and we would try and hold them in where they
9 were.

10 I formed a task force of about 15 or 20
11 men and took these men out into the field right
12 on the easterly side of the perimeter and
13 shortly after we got there we met one group
14 coming up West Second Street who were obviously
15 trying to get into the business area. They
16 came no closer than a block to our group, saw us
17 lined up across the street, turned around and
18 dissipated, went back into the area.

19 So I took some of these men and kind of
20 spread them again along these streets rather
21 thinly or in a rather thin line and decided that
22 we better clear the business area, went back
23 into the business area.

24 We have loudspeakers on our radio cars and
25 we went down and broadcast all through the streets

1 in the business area that we wanted the streets
2 cleared, urging these people to return to their
3 homes. We called into headquarters and asked that
4 all the neighboring towns be advised to give us
5 some cooperation by blocking off the main roads
6 into the city. These would be the main access
7 points from other areas.

8 Within a few moments we had the main
9 business area pretty well cleared of people,
10 Sunday strollers and window-shoppers and so
11 forth, dropped some men off at the key inter-
12 sections downtown, maybe one or two men at
13 each corner, pretty much dissipated the group
14 I brought out, went back into headquarters,
15 formed another group of the men that were coming
16 in on the recall.

17 We had pretty much got our line established
18 now as far as containment and my first objective
19 with this group of 18 men was to go back into
20 the heart of the riot area primarily in that
21 Plainfield Avenue section and try to bring it
22 back under control and regain some order down
23 there. Throughout Saturday night. They appeared

24 At about a quarter of 8 or 20 minutes after
25 8, we were formed up in front of the building

1 and I had briefed the crew as to what we were
2 going to do. Our first mission was the call into
3 the area to investigate a call of a policeman
4 being attacked. This was of some concern to
5 the two sergeants who were with me and myself
6 because we had nobody posted in there on foot.

7 However, we couldn't disregard the call
8 because of it coming in from several courses.
9 Interestingly enough, one of the cars that was
10 posted about 2 blocks away from this area heard
11 the call and stopped and interviewed a man they
12 only knew and identified as a colored minister,
13 who was walking out of this area, and asked him
14 if he saw anything going on in this area and
15 were there any policemen in there and he answered
16 No.

17 They called in and said that they had no
18 information, that this man was just in there
19 and there was nothing to his knowledge to the
20 call.

21 The other thing that was bothering me was
22 that we had been experiencing a series of false
23 alarms throughout Saturday night. They appeared
24 to be diversionary type of calls where they would
25 try to sucker the group or whatever forces we had

1 off to areas where there was in fact no cause.

2 I gave an order that no single group would
3 go in and answer the call that this task force
4 which I had would go in and investigate the call.
5 We have examined the tapes.

6 From the time the call was received until
7 we were rolling and answering the call was a
8 period of about two to two and a half minutes
9 and by then we had penetrated the perimeter
10 and were into the area.

11 The incident on Fourth Street, Plainfield
12 Avenue, down Plainfield Avenue, at the corner
13 of Plainfield Avenue and 2nd Street, found
14 Patrolman John Gleason lying on his back in the
15 street. It was obvious that this man had suffered
16 a severe and rather brutal beating. He was alive.
17 I bent over and tried to talk to him.

18 However, it was obvious and I knew he
19 wouldn't make it. I thought he would die right
20 in the street. We called for an ambulance. He
21 couldn't be moved. His condition was such that
22 he could not be picked up bodily and taken out
23 in the wagon that we had so we called in for an
24 ambulance.

25 I have a force of about 16 men with me now.

1 We were mounted in two radio cars and a wagon.
2 The attitude that I saw on the way in, the
3 obvious hostility of some of the people in the
4 surrounding areas and the large crowd that fled
5 as we approached the area where the officer was
6 assaulted was of some concern to me.

7 When I saw what happened to him my concern
8 now shifted to the men that were with me and
9 I ordered them to form a ring around the area
10 so we could keep this officer protected and
11 protect ourselves until we could get the ambulance
12 in.

13 The place where the officer was assaulted
14 is right at the corner of Plainfield Avenue
15 and West 2nd Street. There is a railroad that
16 crosses this intersection just south of the
17 intersection and on the other side of the railroad
18 is another street with another intersection.

19 One of the sergeants that was with me, he
20 took a detail under the bridge and this large
21 crowd that had fled upon our approach were on
22 either side of the railroad bank, on the other side
23 of where we were.

24 He told me that he was a little bit con-
25 cerned about the attitude there. The crowd seemed

1 to be hostile to our presence. However, our
2 appearance at this point he said was keeping them
3 back.

4 As we were loading Patrolman Gleason in
5 the ambulance, Lieutenant Hennessey, who had
6 a squad of detectives out in another small task
7 unit, had been coming in to assist us on this
8 call. He radioed for assistance when he was
9 about a block away from us.

10 A I It is a rather long city block along the
11 six street railroad. His small group had come upon a car-
12 bearing load of people coming out underneath the bridge
13 and they and they were loaded up with meat, sides of beef,
14 from the et cetera, that they had apparently taken from

15 a store. He grabbed this group and needed some
16 help in effecting the arrest and bringing them in.
17 the city before. Now I had the wagon with me, so he called
18 and said that we were ready to move and to please
19 after come up and give him a hand. So I immediately
20 moved my group out up to Hennessey's assistance.
21 We assisted him in effecting that arrest, looked
22 at the equipment we had.

23 We were pretty much out of tires. Out of
24 the three vehicles I had with me, there was
25 9 tires that were completely gone, mainly from

1 running through the debris on the streets to
2 there in effecting the rescue of Officer
3 Gleason, so we ordered the unit back to head-
4 quarters to re-equip and it was shortly after
5 I got back to headquarters that I was informed
6 that Patrolman Gleason had died moments after
7 he was admitted to Muhlenberg Hospital.

8 Q Had you prior to this time requested any
9 assistance from the State Police?

10 A I had been informed when I had come in there at
11 six o'clock -- I think I have told you that I had this
12 briefing with the Mayor and the Chief and the other people
13 and they told me then that assistance had been requested
14 from the Governor for the State Police.

15 Q Do you know about what time they arrived?

16 A The first State Police units were arriving in
17 the city between 8:30 and a quarter to 9. I recall that
18 when we came back to headquarters to re-equip this group
19 after going in to get Patrolman Gleason, the first units
20 were pulling in to the parking lot across the street at
21 just about the same time we pulled back in to re-equip this
22 mobile force that I had.

23 This now kept me occupied because I had to meet with
24 the State Police group.

25 Q Can you describe in effect the chain of command

1 after the State Police arrive?

2 A As I recall the first units to arrive, and they
3 arrived within moments of one another, there was a force of
4 12 State Police cars and I think all told there were twenty-
5 four troopers. Their ranking superior officer in the first
6 unit to arrive I believe was a sergeant, a staff sergeant
7 or master sergeant or I guess it was a staff sergeant.

8 I met with them and we had a quick briefing and he
9 informed us that his commanding officer was due to arrive
10 shortly.

11 I think the next ranking officer in was a lieutenant.
12 However, I was anxious to get some men out in the street and
13 told him that as quickly as possible I would like to get
14 some of these troops committed to the street so that I could
15 relieve some of my men who were on the perimeter and form up
16 this task force and go back into the area.

17 So the first units that we went out with, this is what
18 we did, we went down into the business area and relieved
19 all of the local uniformed Plainfield police officers and
20 replaced them with State Police, established a moving patrol
21 in the business area with State Police, shifted some of my
22 own men around, received word that additional State Police had
23 arrived and come back to headquarters.

24 Captain Gerkin from the State Police, who was the
25 officer in charge or who was to act as the officer in charge

1 of this group, and then had a briefing as to what policies
2 and procedures we were going to follow from then on. I don't
3 recall the exact words in our discussion but there was an
4 agreement that State Police would be used or the orders
5 he had were that State Police would be used to take up the
6 perimeter, relieving local Plainfield police officers and
7 that as other forces arrived or if other forces were needed,
8 then we would establish patrols back in the area.

9 I accompanied the second State Police detail out on
10 the street and as we approached the area a report had been
11 received that some gunfire had broken out at Central and
12 Second. Lt. Hennessey radioed it in.

13 Now the details as to what took place at Central and
14 Second I think Hennessey can fill in on these but I will
15 quickly go on and finish up what part I played in this, if
16 you want.

17 Q Surely. In this connection there are certain
18 things that have occurred.

19 For example, the 36-hour truce, so-called, the release
20 of the 12 prisoners and the search, I would like you to
21 indicate, if you can, as you are doing this narrative, what
22 part the Plainfield police played in, A, the decision as to
23 whether these people would be released, and B, as to whether
24 there would be a search.

25 A Do you want me to continue with this chronology or

1 do you have these facts?

2 I don't want to bore the Committee with this.

3 Q I think we have a good part of the chronology.

4 I would almost prefer to direct the questions now to a little
5 bit --

6 A May I quickly just bring out a couple of things?
7 The timing and appearance of these things has some bearing
8 on later events.

9 Q Surely.

10 A At approximately 10 o'clock or 10:30 on Sunday
11 evening, semi-automatic weapon fire was experienced by this
12 group that I brought out and we were pinned down at the
13 corner of Central and Second.

14 Now this affected my decisions in the field and it
15 affected the decisions of the State Police. We were now faced
16 with semi-automatic weapons fire and now a firm policy of
17 sealing this area off was adopted and this is what we started
18 to do.

19 We got a State Police group established, a local
20 police group, a mixed group along Central Avenue. We were
21 under fire for over an hour and a half before we managed
22 to drive this group back.

23 Now getting along in the evening, around 11 o'clock or
24 11:30, I was informed while I was on the line at Central
25 Avenue that the National Guard units had arrived and that my

1 presence was required at the armory in order to have a briefing
2 with the National Guard officers. I left the line, went to
3 The National Guard Armory and while I was in a briefing
4 session with their officers -- there were a couple of
5 lieutenants, a major, a captain -- these men were totally
6 unfamiliar with what was going on in the city, what we were
7 up against. They had just come out of Newark.

8 I received word that the group that I had left on
9 Central Avenue were pinned down in front of the firehouse
10 by automatic weapons fire. The first mission of the National
11 Guard units that I came out of the National Guard Armory
12 with was to go down and relieve and bring some relief in to
13 this group that was pinned down in front of the firehouse.

14 Now Lt. Hennessey was in that group. I had left him
15 in the street there with a detail. Rather quickly, the only
16 way we secured that area and managed to gain control of it
17 was by the use of an armed personnel carrier and a squad
18 of about 10 to 12 riflemen that went in behind this APC unit
19 down New Street and drove out this group of riflemen that were
20 hidden in the hedge rose and some low one-story buildings,
21 in back yards, et cetera, down in that area.

22 Once this occurred we now moved from Central Avenue
23 where we established our line up to New Street and kept this
24 as our perimeter right on through until Monday morning at
25 daybreak. Arrests were going on all through the night, Monday

1 night. People were being arrested as they would come out that
2 had been engaged or were seen engaging in looting.

3 Those that came out with obviously stolen property
4 in their possession, a couple of missions had gone in, some
5 of the radio cars had gone in to rescue a man that had been
6 shot and took him out of the back door of his home.

7 I was aware of all of these things in the field
8 because I was in contact with all of the units by radio.

9 MR. JAFFE: Do you mean Monday morning
10 or Monday night?

11 THE WITNESS: We are talking about
12 Sunday morning going into Monday morning.

13 MR. LEUCHTER: The manyou just referred
14 to, rescuing a man who had been shot, are you
15 talking about a Negro resident of the community
16 or a policeman?

17 THE WITNESS: No. This was a police team
18 that went in to rescue a man that had been shot
19 in his home and it was his place of business
20 combined, a cleaning establishment.

21 MR. LEUCHTER: He was a Negro?

22 THE WITNESS: No. He was an Italian man.
23 This is the type of activity that was going on.

24 Now the sound of gunfire all night long
25 in this area was rather obvious. It was constant,

1 it was discernible and recognizable as semi-
2 automatic weapons fire accompanied by other types
3 of gunfire going on.

4 We had no carbines in the department at
5 the time this series of events took place. A
6 quick emergency meeting with the Mayor and the
7 governing body and they gave me an okay to get
8 what I wanted wherever I could and they quickly
9 allowed us to go out and make emergency pur-
10 chases of carbines and weapons in order to
11 bolster our weaponry that we had to combat what
12 we were now up against.

13 Quite frankly, we had held this group off
14 with shotguns and 38 caliber service pistols.
15 This is all we had when we first met this group.
16 body. To proceed rather quickly into it, Monday
17 about daybreak it was our intention to go in
18 there and re-establish patrols in there and take
19 this area back. I felt that during the evening
20 we had sealed it off, there was nobody else
21 in there but daybreak would afford us the
22 opportunity to at least go in and see what was
23 going on.

24 Some time early Monday morning -- inci-
25 dentally, Colonel Kelly had arrived from the

1 State Police and his staff and we had established
2 a command post in the building, in police head-
3 quarters. We received orders that we were not
4 to go in and patrol this area. We were to hold
5 to a line of containment, not letting anybody
6 in or out except those that lived in the area
7 who wanted to return home or let out people
8 who had been trapped in the area who did not
9 live in there and obviously were not involved in
10 the thing but we could let them out and let them
11 get out of it.

12 So we shifted to a straight containment
13 and seal-off policy.

14 MR. GIBSONS: Who gave those orders?

15 THE WITNESS: I couldn't put a name on any-
16 body. I know that Colonel Kelly and his staff
17 were present and the orders were transmitted
18 down through this chain. When they came in under
19 these conditions, of course, the control of the
20 riot area shifted to State Police.

21 Who physically gave you your orders? Who told you?

22 A I couldn't put a name on the person. I would
23 assume because of my position in there that it was conveyed
24 to me by Colonel Kelly or his aid, Major Olaff. I was in the
25 command of the Plainfield operational units and they were in

1 command of the State Police units.

2 However, we had a pretty close-knit organization.

3 There was no problem ever in our experience down there of
4 any disagreement or argument. It was a smoothly knit thing
5 and it just functioned perfectly.

6 The mission was the thing that decided who was going
7 to run the show in the street and this is the way we operated.

8 Now we did go in Monday and run what we called missions
9 in there. The Governor's proclamation had been issued some
10 time Monday, early Monday. We now had this state of
11 emergency, but we had calls in there that required answering
12 and we did answer them in spite of some agreement that
13 had been worked out apparently somewhere else.

14 For instance, we had a call that there was a family
15 composed of a woman with five or six children that hadn't
16 been seen since early the night before. A neighbor had seen
17 some men around the area with guns and heard some gunfire
18 and nobody had seen this family. This was one of our first
19 runs into this area, checked to see if this family was all
20 right, they were, and out.

21 I went in on a reconnaissance mission with Detective
22 Kitzler, who is outside here waiting to come in. My driver
23 and another trooper were there and we went in to check some
24 of the area to see what the conditions were. We had pretty
25 good run of the streets in there. We didn't run into any

1 crowds or any people on the streets, went in and out of
2 several areas that had been looted.

3 I suggested at two or three places the owners be
4 notified to come down and secure their premises. I can
5 remember vividly one tobacco warehouse that both the back
6 and front door had been kicked in and there must have been
7 \$10,000 or \$20,000 worth of stock still in this place laying
8 around and asked that the owner be notified to come down and
9 secure the premises, either that or we would post some
10 security in the building.

11 The owner didn't want to come in. We weren't allowed in
12 there to patrol. We had to walk away and leave it. We picked
13 up several hundred rounds of ammunition on this little
14 reconnaissance trip we made in there.

15 We found what appeared to be distribution points,
16 mainly in front of the taverns where this ammunition was being
17 distributed.

18 MR. GIBBONS: In what form did you pick
19 it up?

20 THE WITNESS: Some of it we picked up in
21 single round and some we picked up in boxes, the
22 50-round boxes, cardboard, small cardboard boxes.

23 MR. LAUCHTER: Right out on the street?

24 THE WITNESS: Laying out in the street.

25 I recall in front of a tavern called Moonfaces--

1 this was the popular term for it, Muhlenberg
2 Cafe is the proper name for it -- we picked up
3 several hundred rounds right out on the sidewalk
4 in front of this place in cardboard boxes.

5 MR. GIBBONS: What type of ammunition?

6 THE WITNESS: Thirty-caliber, M-1 ammu-
7 nition. We come back in and we met and showed this
8 to our people and it was our concern and we
9 wanted to go back into this area and patrol it.

10 However, we couldn't so we had to do
11 what we were told. Now this type of an
12 operation continued all day Monday, through
13 Monday night, Tuesday, Wednesday.

14 Late Monday night, early Tuesday morning,
15 we received information that I had to make some
16 provisions to allow people back into the
17 perimeter or through the perimeter and learned
18 that these were 12 people that had been released
19 from the county jail.

20 In fact, I had to detach two or three of
21 people to the men and send them down in cars to the county
22 jail to pick these people up and bring them back.

23 Now these people were people that had
24 been arrested over Sunday night -- Excuse me--
25 over Saturday night, Sunday morning. The people

1 also were brought back to the perimeter at about
2 4 o'clock, I believe it was, on Tuesday morning
3 and released at Central Avenue and 4th Street and
4 allowed to go back into the area.

5 I asked some questions as to who they were,
6 why they were released and what was going on.

7 I was informed that these people had been released
8 on their own recognizance and that a truce had
9 been declared and these people were going back
10 in and as part of the truce, for their release
11 we were supposed to get the carbines back.

12 I cannot give you any information about
13 the meeting. No member of the Plainfield Police
14 Department was contacted or consulted. We were
15 not invited to, we were ^{not} informed of it until
16 it was all a matter of fact and completed.

17 My only knowledge of this was what I have
18 since learned and what I saw in the newspapers
19 released the following day.

20 Q I take it you then made provision for these 12
21 people to go back into the area that had been sealed off?

22 A Provisions to this extent, that I had to supply
23 a couple of men to go down to Elizabeth to assist in bringing
24 these 12 people back from the county jail.

25 If my memory serves me right, I believe the sheriff

1 also assisted in this from the county end of it. There was
2 some requirement that we could not send a marked police car
3 down to get these people. It had to be an unmarked car.

4 Well, in any event, they were brought back to the
5 perimeter and released at the corner of Central Avenue and
6 4th Street and I sent word out to the perimeter guard that
7 these 12 people were to be released back into the area and
8 would pass through. They were.

9 Q Did there come a period of time when the truce
10 was off?

11 A Well, we continued this operation through
12 Tuesday. I don't know whether I could be criticized for
13 giving personal opinions into this thing but I am going to
14 say it.

15 I personally didn't feel that any negotiations or any
16 promise for the return of these weapons was going to be
17 honored. My views were shared by the Detective Commander, who
18 I was depending upon for his background.

19 I don't have any right to speak for Colonel Kelly or
20 the other ranking officers of the State Police but let me tell
21 you this: Tuesday night we started a planning session to
22 mount a large scale search operation starting at about noon-
23 time or 1 o'clock on Wednesday. This planning session for
24 this search was composed of Colonel Kelly of the State Police,
25 Major Olaff, his operations officer, Major Novak of the

1 National Guard, I believe Colonel Sharp of the National
2 Guard, their operations and training officer, was there,
3 Lt. Hennessey of my department and myself.

4 We spent from about 11 o'clock Tuesday evening right
5 through to 7 o'clock Wednesday morning finishing our plans
6 for a search operation for these weapons on Wednesday after-
7 noon. We finished at about 7 o'clock in the morning.

8 Now this was done in fairly tight security areas. It
9 was in our command post. At 8 o'clock in the morning one
10 of the State Police lieutenants came into the command post
11 and informed us that he had just heard it announced on the
12 local radio station that we were going to search at noontime.

13 Well, needless to say, this was quite disheartening to
14 all of us. Quite frankly, the first thing we did, we were
15 tired and rather beat and we all started looking at one
16 another. This was the first thing that occurred.

17 The decision was made, we had made the plans and we
18 were going to go ahead with it in spite of the announcement.
19 We felt this was going to negate anything we were after.

20 However, we could continue it. The logistical portion
21 of it had already been put in operation as some of the units
22 were being called up. This now meant a total recall of all
23 my department in order to assist the large-scale National
24 Guard call-up of additional troops, the rather heavy turnout
25 of State Troopers. At 1 o'clock we started this operation.

1 Colonel Kelly had insisted that no uniformed Plainfield
2 police officers would be on this search team. He did request
3 from my department six men to act as eyes for each of the
4 search units. When I say eyes, I should explain it. We
5 would be the directors. In other words, these troopers
6 and National Guardsmen for the most part knew not where
7 they were going. They didn't know the streets or any of
8 the areas. Six men of the department were selected based on
9 their knowledge of the area and past knowledge of what had
10 been going on and those with some knowledge of what
11 possibly to expect in there.

12 Lt. Hennessey was one, Lt. McCogen from the Detective
13 Bureau, four or five other members of the Detective Bureau
14 and myself. We were all spaced on this search unit.

15 I was in the second group. Lt. Hennessey was in the
16 first group and we were waiting to move out from the armory
17 when we received word back over the radio that all units
18 were to hold. I was not there.

19 Lt. Hennessey is prepared to testify as to what took
20 place down there.

21 Briefly, as the units tried to enter the area that we
22 intended to search, it was stopped by Mr. Paul Ylvisaker, the
23 head of the Department of Community Affairs. Lt. Hennessey
24 can tell you what took place from there.

25 I think perhaps I should quit here and let you explore

1 it with questions.

2 Q You have statistics, do you not, of the breakdown
3 of people arrested from Plainfield and the percent that
4 had previous records?

5 A Yes.

6 Q You can make these available to our staff?

7 A I can read them into the record now if you so
8 desire.

9 Q Do you have an extra copy?

10 A No, I don't. This is an interim report.

11 MR. GIBBONS: Let's hear them.

12 THE WITNESS: This is an interim report
13 that was prepared just for the period from
14 July 16 to July 29 inclusive. There were 148
15 people arrested either by Plainfield Police
16 Department independently or in cooperation with
17 and in conjunction with the State Police.

18 We have these further broken down as to
19 type of arrest. Do you want that?

20 MR. LEUCHTER: Yes.

21 THE WITNESS: There were 13 people arrested
22 for carrying concealed weapons, 29 people arrested
23 for breaking, entering and larceny or looting.

24 There were 18 people charged with receiving
25 or possession of stolen property. There were six

1 had been people charged with assault or atrocious
2 assault and battery. There were two people
3 charged with arson. There were 50 people
4 arrested for disorderly persons, curfew, drunk,
5 minor violations.

6 Q Can you tell us the percentage from Plainfield
7 of those?

8 A If I could finish this statistical report, there
9 were 46 people injured during this period. Fourteen people
10 were injured by guns, five of the fourteen were policemen.
11 Eight people were injured by knife or by club. Five were
12 injured by physical force. Nineteen were injured by glass,
13 burns or other means.

14 There was one death, Patrolman John Gleason. There
15 were approximately 67 properties reported damaged or burned
16 or looted to the department.

17 Our estimates to date total \$300,000 in actual reported
18 losses by victims.

19 Q This is through property damage and looting?

20 A Right. We confiscated a total of 67 weapons. When
21 I say "We", again we are talking about State Police and local
22 police or other policemen that were in there assisting us.

23 There were 14 hand guns confiscated, 20 shotguns and
24 rifles, 26 knives, clubs, brassknuckles, et cetera and at
25 this writing, of the 67 weapons, 7 of the 46 rifles or carbines

1 had been recovered.

2 MR. GIBBONS: They have been clearly
3 identified as among the ones from Middlesex?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. This figure on the
5 number of weapons confiscated, of course, only
6 pertains to the period that I have in this
7 report.

8 However, for your information ten of these
9 carbines have been recovered to this date.

10 MR. LAUCHER: Three more than at the time
11 of this report?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes.

13 Now there were over 250 rounds of ammunition
14 excluding the M-1 ammunition, the 30-caliber
15 ammunition that had been recovered or picked up
16 in the streets, or seized and taken away from
17 people.

18 The damage to public property, Central
19 Fire Headquarters was extensively damaged by
20 bullets and rifle fire, windows were shot out
21 and bullet holes in ceilings, walls and doors.

22 There were six pieces of fire apparatus
23 that were damaged to some extent, from broken
24 windshields and /or headlights to dented hoods,
25 doors, fire damage, bullet holes, warning lights

1 smashed, broken windshields, et cetera.

2 The two police cars had been damaged.

3 There was over 50 feet of fire hose damaged. This
4 had been axed or cut with a knife while the
5 firemen were fighting fires.

6 There were 67 street lights and traffic
7 lights damaged within the riot area. Many of
8 these were damaged beyond repair. There were
9 eight fireboxes damaged.

10 I would like to just say something off the
11 record if I could.

12 Q Surely.

13 (Discussion off the record.)

14 MR. GIBBONS: What else does your report
15 cover?

16 THE WITNESS: It covers briefly the looting,
17 a brief announcement as to the complaints against
18 the State Police or National Guard or other.

19 MR. FORTUNATO: We could mark it into
20 evidence and we will have the entire report in
21 the record.

22 Do you mind having our marking on it?

23 THE WITNESS: No, except that I just want
24 to state that I have been using this for my
25 purposes to testify. Actually it is a copy of a

1 statistical report that was prepared for Major
2 Galassi of the State Police.

3 Q By Detective Willens?

4 A Yes. I believe this had been supplied to the
5 Committee before.

6 MR. GIBBONS: I have just one question with
7 respect to your testimony.

8 At the time the decision was made to plan
9 this search what information did the police have
10 about the location of the rifles?

11 THE WITNESS: Lt. Hennessey can give you
12 more detail about it but generally, the infor-
13 mation he had, the intelligence he had was that
14 these rifles were in the riot area. We had
15 about six or seven locations pegged or pretty
16 good indications where they would be found.
17 There were strong indications that the bulk of
18 them would be found in the West End Project area.

19 A lot of this information was coming
20 from informants. People in the area or that we
21 get information from were calling us or calling
22 the officers they would deal with and feed this
23 information in. It was based on good intelligence
24 and it was a procedure that normally we would have
25 acted upon under any other conditions.

1 MR. GIBBONS: Has it been borne out by
2 the location where you recovered the ten rifles
3 that had been recovered?

4 THE WITNESS: It has been borne out not only
5 by where they were found but by what took place
6 Monday when we were not allowed to go in there.

7 We did receive information that Monday
8 when the patrol didn't come back in, the rifles
9 were actually further distributed on the open
10 street, Plainfield Avenue, and in the project
11 area during the daylight hours.

12 This information was coming in with such
13 accuracy and with such reliability that I formed
14 another mission -- this is prior to Wednesday
15 now -- and I sent a combined group in there,
16 State Police and local police, a search team
17 right into that block and they recovered and
18 we have since identified positively the cartons
19 which were recovered behind the tavern which
20 contained the carbines that were stolen from the
21 factory.

22 We have positively identified the ammunition
23 boxes, the big boxes that held the rounds of
24 30-caliber ammunition. This in turn was positively
25 identified as being stolen from the factory.

1 This plus the information we were getting
2 as to where these guns were led us -- and I
3 believe it would lead any person to believe that
4 what we were going after we were going to find.

5 MR. GIBBONS: Without disclosing any
6 information that might prejudice either further
7 police investigation or the prosecution with
8 respect to the ten that you have recovered,
9 can you tell us were they recovered in the area
10 in question?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. About half a block
12 from the corner of Plainfield Avenue and Fourth
13 Street is a place called Evergreen Cemetery and
14 we found -- I could stand corrected on this but
15 I believe there were four or five recovered in
16 this cemetery. They had been hid in the cemetery
17 or tossed over the fence apparently when they
18 heard that we were coming down to search.

19 Some of the information we were getting
20 from the people said look in the cemetery and
21 it was one of the first places we searched and
22 we came up with four or five of them in there.

23 MR. JAFFE: When was the cemetery searched?

24 THE WITNESS: Wednesday afternoon and
25 Thursday.

1 MR. JAFFE: That was after the other
2 search had been called off, is that right, or
3 was it during that time?

4 THE WITNESS: The other search was not called
5 off completely. It was not carried out to the
6 extent that we had intended.

7 Let me put it that way. A token search
8 was made of the west end project and the results
9 were negative.

10 MR. JAFFE: Was the cemetery search
11 subsequent to that?

12 THE WITNESS: Either subsequent or at
13 about the same time. I recall that during that
14 afternoon the men were coming back in and on
15 into Thursday. Once we got in there on Wednesday,
16 we went back in and started patrols back into
17 the area and started the searches.

18 MR. JAFFE: You said before that you did
19 not think that the negotiations could produce
20 the weapons.

21 Could you tell us why?

22 THE WITNESS: I recognized a lot of the
23 people that they had released and frankly I
24 didn't have this much faith in them. I knew who
25 they were and was familiar with them as to what

1 type of person they were. Many of these people
2 had been arrested and had prior records with
3 this department, plus when I found out who they
4 had been dealing with over at the City Hall
5 I didn't believe it.

6 MR. LEUCHTER: Do you mean specifically
7 Cathcart, for example?

8 THE WITNESS: Cathcart and the other
9 man who we have positively identified that he is
10 now who we suspected, they were dealing with
11 that night.

12 Let me put it this way: Nobody came and
13 said what kind of a guy is this fellow? If they
14 had I think that quite frankly, Hennessey would
15 have gave them a story and perhaps it would have
16 changed their mind.

17 MR. LEUCHTER: Who was the other fellow
18 that you say you are positive now?

19 THE WITNESS: I am going to have to be very
20 careful here because we have some current
21 investigations going on.

22 MR. GIBBONS: Don't reveal anything that
23 would prejudice any investigation.

24 MR. LEUCHTER: There were two people
25 who openly negotiated with Colonel Kelly

1 and so forth. That is not secret, is it?

2 THE WITNESS: We can give the name of
3 these two because I believe that Linwood Cathcart
4 is one and this is public knowledge. The other
5 man, the name has not been made public yet
6 and I would ask that it not be put into the
7 record at this point for very good reasons.

8 I would gladly tell this Commission but
9 I won't tell it on the record.

10
11 BY MR. JAFFE:

12 Q You said on Tuesday evening there was a planning
13 session regarding the search which you attended and Colonel
14 Kelly attended?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Could you tell us who called that meeting?

17 A This planning session?

18 Q Yes.

19 A This session was called by Colonel Kelly, Major
20 Olaff, Lt. Hennessey and myself.

21 Q Who had the responsibility as far as you were
22 concerned for planning the search?

23 A Colonel Kelly technically was still in command.

24 Q What kind of ammunition was found that had been
25 spent? For example, there had been firing at firehouses and

1 there had been sniper fire throughout the area.

2 What kind of ammunition was that generally?

3 A This was one of the first things we went to look
4 for at daybreak and we recovered -- and I could have brought
5 some of them with me but I didn't know just what it was --
6 I have these in my possession in my office and they are
7 spent 30-caliber ammunition.

8 We dug some of this out of the walls of the firehouse
9 and have identified it as 30-caliber for the most part.
10 There were other weapons used. Incidentally, there were
11 two firehouses. I don't think I mentioned that. The other
12 firehouse was shot at too. We had to send an APC down to
13 relieve that unit. Both of these houses had been brought
14 under fire by 30-caliber M-1 weapons.

15 Q What caliber does the carbine use?

16 A Thirty-caliber.

17 Q Would the same kind of bullet work in the carbine
18 as well as in the M-1?

19 A I think the M-1 -- well, I don't know whether
20 it is exactly the same. This M-1 designation may be incorrect.
21 For the record I should clarify it. These were 30-caliber
22 carbines that were stolen. I was in the Navy. I wasn't in
23 the Army.

24 Q The reason I am asking you this --

25 A I believe the M-1 is a slightly different weapon.

1 Q I think it is a little bit different. That is
2 my recollection. You said you found M-1 or 30-caliber M-1
3 designations on the street. Isn't that also the kind of
4 weapon that the National Guard uses? What kind of boxes
5 were they in?

6 The question I am driving at is this: Could this
7 ammunition have been National Guard ammunition?

8 A No, sir, without any fair contradiction.

9 Q Could you tell me why?

10 A None of our groups were in these areas where we
11 found this ammunition.

12 Q No National Guard groups were in there?

13 A No, sir.

14 Q You described the kind of a box that it was
15 found in in front of the tavern. Could you just describe
16 that a little bit more, what kind of a box it was, if you
17 remember?

18 A It was a small gray box, roughly about 4 inches
19 long, about two inches high, an inch and a half wide.

20 Q Did it have any markings on it?

21 A Yes. It was identified as 30-caliber ammunition.
22 It had some foreign markings on it. I believe the language
23 was in German, some of it, with corresponding English
24 designations. I have taken some of this ammunition and
25 submitted it to the firearms experts in the Federal Bureau

1 of investigation who I am friendly with, and they have
2 identified this as to source, distributor and so forth, just
3 to make positive identification.

4 MR. GIBBONS: What did that show?

5 THE WITNESS: None of the ammunition
6 under fire that we recovered on the streets was any
7 there was ammunition that was issued or could possibly
8 fire from have been issued to any law enforcement or
9 Monday night National Guard units.

10 MR. GIBBONS: Did they determine to
11 the Nation when it was issued?

12 THE WITNESS: They traced it back to
13 Major New distributors in this country, one in the New
14 York area and one in the Chicago area, and these
15 was. No people deal exclusively with private outlets,
16 combat and sporting goods stores, factory such as Middlesex
17 and the Machine Company.

18 Well, that incidentally, he keeps quite a stock of
19 it. With ammunition up there for test purposes and most
20 trigger. Of this ammunition that had been stolen was his
21 that's test ammunition.

22
23 BY MR. JAFFE:

24 Q Captain, do you have any opinion or, on the
25 other hand, information, as to whether or not there was any

1 concerted action during the riot by any groups in terms
2 of firing, in terms of organization?

3 A With the firing we have information that this
4 had been rather disjointed and disorganized at first. However,
5 there were teams, rifle teams, that actually were acting
6 under directions and were acting with leaders. Later
7 there was a little more sophistication. We had experienced
8 fire from this area, sniper fire continuing on through
9 Monday night and Tuesday night.

10 An interesting observation was made by Major Novak of
11 the National Guard and myself. We found, as I have already
12 told you, several single rounds lying around in areas.
13 Major Novak is a kind of a mustang type of an individual and
14 he kept looking at it and finally it dawned on him what it
15 was. He had seen this in green troops, that in the heat of
16 combat sometimes they would take a carbine, once you charge
17 it and they fire it and reach up and charge it again.

18 Well, that kicks out one live round every time you do
19 it. With a carbine you just have to keep pulling the
20 trigger. He said he had seen this before.

21 That's just an interesting observation but he felt
22 that this accounted for the many single rounds that we found
23 lying around.

24 MR. LEUCHTER: Dropped unintentionally,

25 kicked out?

1 THE WITNESS: Yes. They fire it, charge it,
2 fire it and charge it.

3 Q Do you have any basis, without disclosing it
4 if you don't feel it is appropriate, for stating that there
5 was some concerted action among these rifle teams?

6 A I think Lt. Hennessey can give you factual
7 information on that. I would yield to him. He got good
8 intelligence, names of people who saw some of these things.

9 Q Could you tell me or tell the Commission who had
10 the responsibility or who is the person who call the Sunday
11 meeting off or who stopped the Sunday meeting in the park
12 because of the lack of a permit?

13 A The person who was in charge in the park and
14 in effect did cancel this meeting was Chief Everett Dobson
15 of the Union County Park Police.

16 I feel in all fairness to him though that it wasn't
17 just the fact that no permit was present that this was
18 called off. He called this off because of the apparent
19 attitude of this large group and the fact that there was some
20 dissension among themselves. It was a meeting within a
21 meeting and it became quite a concern to him that he was going
22 to have a situation right in his park.

23 Q Was that decision made in conjunction with the
24 Plainfield Police Department in any way or was it his own
25 decision?

1 Q And he consulted us?

2 Q Yes.

3 A I can only go by what I have learned since
4 then. No. He had ordered this park cleared himself.

5 Q Do you think -- and this is just your opinion
6 based on what happened -- if that really had been permitted
7 do you think that tempers might have cooled and the
8 situation be channeled other than into the riot which
9 eventually occurred?

10 A Of course, this is Monday morning quarterbacking.

11 Q I realize that.

12 A Based on what he told me as to what was going
13 on down in there I don't think it would have had any effect
14 whatsoever because there was a strong militant group that
15 had invaded this meeting. If it was called for good
16 intentions at first, it was now destroyed by this group
17 that moved in and started a meeting within a meeting.
18 They were actually arguing and fighting amongst themselves.
19 There was a fight apparently for who was going to be
20 the spokesman for this group going on in there. Mind you,
21 this park normally is pretty well attended on Sunday after-
22 noon by a lot of families and it bordered on a lot of nice
23 residential areas in there and his concern was not only the
24 park itself but the people who might want to use it plus the
25 areas surrounding the park. I have talked to Chief Dobson about

1 this and he can speak for himself but I thought I would
2 just give it to the Commission.

3 Q Is it pretty clear from Monday morning
4 on, there was no more rioting or looting in the city?

5 A No, sir. A lot of looting went on after Monday.

6 Q When did that cease?

7 MR. LEUCHTER: In the sealed-off area?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

9 Q When did that looting cease?

10 A Apparently when they cleaned the places out.

11 I don't mean to be facetious but they just cleaned it out
12 until there was nothing left. What they didn't lug away
13 they threw out in the street.

14 Q Do you know when that was?

15 A I don't think there was much looting going on in
16 there much after Monday evening or Tuesday morning. We were
17 making arrests at the perimeter right on through this period.

18 Q Would you say then that by Tuesday morning or
19 so, some time Tuesday, the riot had effectively run its course?

20 A This would be a pretty fair assumption, yes.

21 MR. LEUCHTER: The looting, not the shooting?

22 THE WITNESS: The looting. There was
23 sporadic and sniper type of activity going on in
24 there, mainly in the evening hours, Monday night
25 and Tuesday night.

1 Q Would you have a figure, Captain, of the number
2 of fires that were set during the riot or is that in your
3 report? If it is that will be fine.

4 A I just grabbed this on the way out this morning.
5 I had a report that Fire Chief Donovan had sent over to me.
6 I don't see why this cannot be supplied to the Committee.

7 Q We would like a copy of that too.

8 A All right. It gives a breakdown of all of the
9 type of injuries and so forth. This is his damage reports
10 and personal injury. I don't recall the exact number of
11 fire alarms that were answered in there.

12 However, he has a breakdown of this. If the Committee
13 wishes it I can ask him for it when I go back.

14 Q We would appreciate it, and have him send it to
15 us.

16 A All right.

17 Q One last question is this: Could you give us an
18 estimate of the number of people in the community who you
19 think participated in the riot in any sense, in the rioting
20 or the looting phase of it just from your observation?

21 A It is my opinion that of the ten thousand-some-
22 odd people in this area that we had to seal off, at the most
23 maybe three to four hundred people all told took part in some
24 manner or form in much of this rioting.
25

1 The hard core, the ones that were doing most of it
2 down there, I think maybe we are talking about 30 or 40
3 criminals, past criminal records, parolees, probationers,
4 those who were well known to us as the ones you would most
5 likely expect trouble from.

6 I don't mind telling this Commission right now I
7 felt very sorry for many people down in that area. There
8 are an awful lot of decent people who live in that area and
9 they were actually living in fear down there. Our records I
10 think will show that some of these people called in pleading
11 for us to come down in there.

12 MR. LEUCHTER: Captain Campbell, you appear
13 to be an admirable police officer. You are
14 certainly impressive and your narrative is well
15 done.

16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

17 MR. LEUCHTER: My colleagues on the
18 Commission might differ with me perhaps if I
19 ask you questions that perhaps more properly
20 belong in the sociological field rather than
21 in the conduct of the riot field but it seems
22 to me that police officers as the rest of us
23 don't experience a riot very often in their
24 lifetime and most of your work therefore is in
25 the years in between riots. Did you feel before

1 you went on vacation the first of July that
2 you knew the Negro community of Plainfield
3 Pretty well?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

5 MR. LAUCHTER: Have your feelings changed?
6 That is, do you still feel that you know them
7 very well or were there a lot of surprises for
8 you?

9 Was there any way that you had any idea
10 of this deep-seated feeling in the community?
11 Were any Negro members of the police force ever
12 able to communicate to you as their superior
13 officer any great hostility on the part of the
14 Negro community?

15 THE WITNESS: There was no problem at all
16 with communications with the Negro members of
17 the department. I felt that we had problems down
18 in that area that were not unique. I did feel
19 that it was not the ones that we would possibly
20 have this kind of trouble from and this was not
21 a surprise. It was a shock, frankly, that we
22 had a riot of this type; that there was a hard
23 core group down there that no amount of effort
24 on our part, and I wasn't trying to be a defeatist
25 about this, that no amount of effort on our part

1 was going to accomplish anything.

2 We had been engaged in possibly two years
3 prior to this, the Mayor prior to Mayor Hatfield,
4 Mayor Maddox, had instituted a program of I
5 guess you would call it an ad hoc committee type
6 of meeting at which department heads or division
7 heads within a department would meet monthly
8 with representatives of the community, neighbor-
9 hood house, Community Relations Commission
10 representatives, representatives of the NAACP, and
11 it would be a discussion where we would exchange
12 views.

13 There was an open type of thing, "Well,
14 this is what is bothering us" and we would try
15 to explain our position or listen to it and take
16 steps to correct the situation.

17 I did feel, after several of these meetings,
18 that we were not getting a true feedback from
19 this community, very frankly. The complaints
20 seemed to be repetitious. Many of them were an
21 allegation, no facts.

22 In spite of repeated requests for facts,
23 names, times in the areas where the police
24 department was accused, we were never able to get
25 this information. There was an open and a frank

1 request for this, "You bring this in to me and
2 I guarantee you that if what you say is true it
3 is going to be corrected."

4 It was always just this allegation,
5 allegation and allegation without facts.

6 MR. LEUCHTER: Were these brutality
7 allegations or harassment allegations, would
8 you say?

9 THE WITNESS: Well, this word "brutality"
10 within two years took on a new context. Brutality
11 as far as I was concerned a couple of years
12 ago meant physical brutality. I say without fear
13 of contradiction that this is not the case in
14 the City of Plainfield. We just do not stand
15 for it.

16 The officers beneath me and the officers
17 that were above me, we never stood for this in
18 this department. We had complaints and some of
19 them resulted in formal charges against the
20 officers but invariably these arose out of
21 arrests that the officers were involved in where
22 some degree of force was used by the officers
23 and they were now counter-charged with assault
24 and battery and so forth.

25 Now this word "brutality" came to include

1 attitude.

2 I recall one, I don't remember just where
3 but this is the type of thing where they told
4 me that one of the officers was over-polite to
5 somebody and frankly I just didn't know which
6 way to turn. Last week they were curt and
7 disrespectful and now you brief the man and
8 you suggest this and now you are getting a
9 complaint that he was over-polite.

10 I think what they were trying to say was
11 there was this condescending attitude. However,
12 the man that they singled out for it, this had
13 been this man's attitude for some 15 years in
14 this department and he had always been looked
15 upon as a good officer and a good relationship
16 and this was only one instance.

17 My own feelings as far as the nature and
18 the type of people and the type of attitudes in
19 that area, talking about the area where the
20 riots occurred, for the most part were very good.

21 As I said before, we had a hard core group
22 down there, older teen-agers, young adults.
23 They were always the targets of some police
24 action because they were involved in something.
25 The people from the area that lived down in there

1 would call and say "Can you do something about
2 this group that is hanging around in front of
3 the store or in front of my stoop?" and we would
4 send a radio car down and move them.

5 Now two weeks from that, two weeks after
6 that we would now get a complaint at this ad
7 hoc committee that the men down there were not
8 cognizant of the conditions down there, that
9 these people had no place to go, that they had
10 to sit on the street.

11 I would argue, and I never get such
12 satisfaction, I would say "Well, here are people
13 who live in this area. They are complaining about
14 the attitude and the actions of the people that
15 you are now in asking us to defend or to look the
16 other way" and it was this type of thing.

17 MR. LEUCHTER: You mean residents of the
18 community were complaining about groups on the
19 street?

20 THE WITNESS: Noisy, disorderly groups in
21 this area.

22 Now this wasn't just immediately preceding
23 the riot. This had been going on for years down
24 there. The kids have a wonderful, nice little
25 playground down in that area and it was fine.

1 Then the older kids would want to use
2 it and they would be battling amongst them-
3 selves, "Well, the little kids are in our
4 way." We didn't want to get dragged into this
5 type of discussions. It is no place for a
6 policeman. It is a very volatile situation.

7 No matter what you do, either the younger
8 kids are going to turn around and accuse the
9 police department of chasing them or the older
10 group is going to turn around and accuse the
11 police department of chasing them, so we used
12 to try to meet with them and reason with them
13 and say we will try our best.

14 The men used to stop there and talk to
15 the kids. In fact, one time one of the patrolmen,
16 a sergeant couldn't find him and he had gone
17 in there and was playing basketball with one of
18 these groups and they had to gently chide him
19 for it, although I agreed with what his objective
20 was.

21 He really got into this involvement with
22 some of the kids down there.

23 MR. LEUCHTER: So there was no way that you
24 could possibly have envisioned that the malice
25 and hatred and emotions were so deep that something

1 such as happened with Patrolman Gleason could
2 have happened?

3 THE WITNESS: No, sir. One of the things
4 that was said that was brought out after, and
5 I have since heard and seen in some of the
6 releases, was that there was some objection to
7 the operations in the activity in our vice
8 details in this area, cleaning up some of the
9 gambling and other related activities that were
10 going on.

11 We had concentrated rather heavily in
12 this area for the past year and a half because
13 there was a problem in there. We never in all
14 of the time we made any arrests or raids in
15 there in connection with gambling, never
16 experienced any trouble, not once.

17 None of the people that were arrested or
18 took part in the riot were any of these people
19 but still, after the riots this was pointed out
20 as one of the areas that we had been harassing.

21 MR. LEUCHTER: Was Patrolman Gleason a member
22 of the vice squad?

23 THE WITNESS: No, sir.

24 MR. LEUCHTER: It didn't get into the
25 earlier testimony. Did you ever determine why

1 he was in there by himself at that particular
2 time, how it happened that he got caught in
3 there?

4 THE WITNESS: I could tell you but I would
5 have to go off the record because it bears on
6 an investigation. I might tell you something
7 though. A lot of people have asked about John
8 Gleason and this I think we can enter into the
9 record to partially explain why.

10 This boy or this man was the son of a
11 retired police lieutenant of our department.
12 He had served some 34 years, his father.

13 This young fellow grew up in a police
14 family. He was never one to shirk his duties.
15 He was not a forceful officer. He wouldn't go
16 out of his way to seek-out--well, what I am
17 trying to say is that he was not the dig, dig,
18 dig type of guy that went out and was always
19 looking for something, but he was the type of
20 officer who when he saw a violation of the law
21 that he would act. He would not step aside. He
22 would not back away from trouble.

23 Many people challenged Patrolman Gleason.
24 He had several scrapes in effecting arrests but
25 he was forceful. I have since heard some of the

1 people down there who were interviewed and
2 some of this was made public in the newspapers,
3 that I heard one person describe that they had
4 nothing personal against Patrolman Gleason but
5 all of their hatred and pent-up emotions against
6 the police department were taken out and he was
7 there and it mattered not whether it was Patrol-
8 man Gleason or myself or any other officer who
9 was there, that he would probably have got the
10 same thing, and this was almost unbelievable.

11 MR. LEUCHTER: Captain, first
12 of all, would you suggest that it would be helpful
13 to you to have more Negroes on the force?

14 THE WITNESS: On our police department?

15 MR. LEUCHTER: Yes.

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

17 MR. LEUCHTER: It would be helpful?

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 MR. LEUCHTER: There are two ways, of
20 course, as you well know, to do something. There
21 is the on-the-record way which says "Look, we
22 have let it be known that we want more Negroes"
23 and there is the real hard digging where the
24 right people go into the Negro community and
25 really ferret them out. Do you feel that really

1 every effort is being made that could possibly
2 be made to get some more qualified Negroes on
3 the force or is it more of a perfunctory attempt?

4 THE WITNESS: No, we have not made every
5 effort. We have not made every effort I think
6 that is possible to conduct recruiting,
7 whether it is for white or Negro officers, to
8 the extent it should be done, mainly because
9 of personal limitations. This has been a terrific
10 thing.

11 How it is rather hard to weigh this at
12 the time when you have other activities going on
13 and take men away from this knowing full well
14 that if it is successful it is going to overcome
15 the problem but it has just been a matter of
16 pressure and we have taken part in extensive
17 recruiting campaigns using all of the news media,
18 visits, appearances before all civic clubs and
19 things of this nature.

20 MR. LEUCHTER: Do Negroes belong to civic
21 clubs?

22 THE WITNESS: Yes. We were never at a loss
23 for applicants. I was training personnel officer
24 for two years prior to my present position and
25 I was actively engaged in the recruiting of

1 of personnel. We were never at a loss for Negro
2 applicants.

3 Frequently your applicant list would be
4 composed of approximately 40 to 50 percent
5 Negro. The rate of success here is where there
6 is a sharp drop. Our experience has been much
7 the same as you see throughout the country.

8 About 10 percent of those that apply
9 eventually get on. I was pressured for a while
10 or it was suggested that we lower our standards
11 and frankly I was violently opposed to this and
12 made it known that I was opposed to any lowering
13 of any standards whatsoever for men in police
14 work.

15 MR. LAUCHTER: You are not really permitted
16 to by law, are you?

17 THE WITNESS: There are certain areas,
18 educational standards, for one. There was a
19 move to lower it from a four-year high school
20 which I feel should be greater now, to down to a
21 two-year high school level. I was opposed to
22 this and made it known. There was even a sug-
23 gestion that we overlook minor criminal records
24 and I was violently opposed to this.

25 MR. LAUCHTER: May I ask a couple of kind

1 of demographical questions?

2 You may not have the specific answer
3 but you told us that in the area that was
4 sealed off it was about 80 percent Negro and
5 20 percent white. I think the Mayor told us
6 that Plainfield's Negro population was somewhere
7 between 20 and 30 percent or 33 percent, somewhere
8 in that area, which would indicate that there
9 is possibly 10 to 15 thousand Negroes in
10 Plainfield out of the 49,000.

11 Do you have that figure?

12 THE WITNESS: In 1967 the population--
13 and this is a planning survey -- there were
14 49,000 people estimated in the City of Plainfield.
15 The non-whites city-wide were 13,720 or roughly
16 28 percent.

17 MR. LEUCHTER: Now of that 13,000 how
18 many would you say lived in the sealed-off area
19 and how many live on a more integrated basis
20 throughout the rest of the city?

21 THE WITNESS: There's probably seven to
22 eight thousand in the area that we sealed off.


23 MR. LEUCHTER: Which would leave another
24 five to six thousand who are out into reasonably
25 integrated areas?

1 THE WITNESS: In the target area there is
2 roughly 10,000 people. Of this, close to 8,000
3 of them are Negro or non-white. There are a lot
4 of Puerto Ricans in that area too and I think
5 for these purposes they were classified as non-
6 white.

7 * * *

8
9 C E R T I F I C A T E

10 I, DOMINICK ANNUNZIATA, a Certified Short-
11 hand Reporter of the State of New Jersey, do
12 hereby certify that the foregoing transcript
13 is a true record of the proceedings and testi-
14 mony as taken stenographically by me at the
15 time and place indicated.

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20 

21 DOMINICK ANNUNZIATA
22 CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

23
24 DATED: November 16, 1967
25