" UL v. Carteret, Old Bridge 1984

- Transcript of proceedings

- Cover letter to clerk

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ARTHUR SUTTON, CSR SUPERVISOR 929-2040

Bir Enteret

DATE August 8, 1984

NAME OF CASE URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER

NEW BRUNSWICK, et al,

Vs.

BOROUGH OF CARTERET, et al,

DOCKET NUMBER C-4122-73

7/2/84

Clerk of Superior Court Ocean County Courthouse Toms River, N. J. 08753

Dear Sir:

Enclosed you will find carbon copy of transcript of proceedings taken in the above entitled cause on the date set forth above. The original of this transcript has been forwarded to the person who ordered same. This transcript is not for purposes of appeal. Please file in accordance with the appropriate Rule.

DATE OF TRANSCRIPT

A copy of this letter is going forward to the parties listed below to constitute the notice of the filing.

Very truly yours,

Caroline Wolgast, CSR

cc Supervisor of Court Reporters Henry A. Hill, Esq.

CR 106 REV

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1 2		SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION: OCEAN COUNTY DOCKET NO. C-4122-73
3	URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER NEW BRUNSWICK, et al,	:
4 5	Plaintiffs,	: Civil Action : TRANSCRIPT OF
6 7	Vs. BOROUGH OF CARTERET, et al,	PROCEEDINGS:
8	Defendants.	
9		July 2, 1984
11	BEFORE:	
12 13	HONORABLE EUGENE D. SERPENTELLI, J.S.C. APPEARANCES:	
14 15	BRUCE GELBER, ESQ. Attorney for Urban League	
16	THOMAS NORMAN, ESQ. Attorney for Old Bridge Township Flanning Board	
17 18	JEROME J. CONVERY, 1380. Attorney for Old Bridge Lownship	
19	HENRY A. HILL, ESQ. Attorney for Olympia Work	
20 21	STEVART M. HUTT, ESO. Attorney for Woodhaven all lave and Brunswick Manor Assoc.	
22 23		CAROLINE WOLGAST, CSR
24		Official Court Reporter

point of clarification.

Its fair share is set at twenty-four fourteen and paragraph three speaks to some credits. Does that reduce the twenty-four fourteen?

MR. GELBER: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.

And the twenty-four fourteen is arrived at through the straight application of the so-called Lerman Report of April 2, '84?

MR. GELBER: Not exactly, Your Honor.

The twenty-four fourteen was a figure agreed upon by settlement, by compromise. It is derived largely from the consensus report prepared by Ms. Lerman with certain minor modification by Carl Hintz.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GELBER: I believe, Your Monor --

THE COURT: Is that clear from paragraph

two? It appears as though, from paragraph one,

that you have followed the -- for regional

purposes, you followed the report, but paragraph

two, then you have not exactly followed the

original need or fair share allocation. You have

done something --

MR. GELBER: That is correct.

THE COURT: -- that one might gain the impression that the report generates that number, and that's not necessarily vital, but I think it should be clear that it doesn't.

MR. CONVERY: May it please the Court,

I have no objection to the stipulation in the
judgment indicating in paragraph two that the
number is twenty-four fourteen housing units
as per report of Carl Mintz, which is in fact
the exact number that he had reached based upon
his calculations.

THE COURT: All right.

I think it might be useful also to indicate that the plaintiffs' expert, Miss Lerman, filed a report finding that the fair share number was whatever it is and that the Urban League methodology, if applied in its totality, would have created a fair share number of whatever that was.

Now, these were given to me over the phone and they were close at some point in time, but I think it might just be useful for the purposes of setting forth the stipulation.

MR. HUTT: Don't you think you ought to

say Mrs. Lerman's number, too? 1 THE COURT: That's what I said, the 2 Urban League methodology, which I meant the 3 Lerman number. MR. HUTT: Oh, I thought you meant Mallach. 5 THE COURT: I did, Mallach, too. 6 In other words, I want --7 8 MR. HUTT: Three numbers? 9 THE COURT: Right. As I understand, the Lerman number was somewhere around twenty-seven 10 hundred. 11 MR. GELBER: That's correct, Your Honor. 12 The number, as indicated by Miss Lerman, was 13 twenty-seven eighty-two. 14 MR. HUTT: Twenty-seven eighty-two? 15 MR. GELBER: That's correct. 16 THE COURT: And Mallach was --17 MR. GELBER: Without financial need, 18 Mallach's number was twenty-six forty-five. 19 With the financial need factor, it was thirty-five 20 thirty-eight. 21 THE COURT: What's Old Bridge median 22 income? 23 MR. CONVERY: It's less. 24 THE COURT: Then something is wrong. If 25

it's less than the median, that number should go down.

MR. GELBER: From Mr. Mallach's number?

THE COURT: You're saying with the median,
the number went up?

MR. GELBER: No, Your Honor, with the inclusion in overall present need and a factor for financial need.

THE COURT: Oh, financial need?

MR. GELBER: That's correct.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. Both of his numbers include a factor for --

MR. GELBER: That is correct. He has modified his approach to include that factor.

THE COURT: Okay.

understanding that the builders have some concern about the procedure that's laid out in the agreement and, just for a record, I want to explain that the stipulation was entered into only between the Urban Learns and the township and it is based on that stipulation that we ask the order to be entered. It is my understanding that the township fully intends to involve both developers in the revision process. In fact, it

would be my position that it would be quite silly not to involve them during the initial forty-five-day period.

It is also my understanding that nothing in this agreement precludes that involvement and, based on that, we have essentially allowed, through the agreement, the township to try to reach an agreement during the initial forty-fiveday period without participation of the master. If that is unsatisfactory, then I fully expect the master will be appointed and the proposed revisions will be submitted to the Court within the ninety-day period.

different than if the Court were to find the ordinance noncompliant and order ordinance revision. Obviously, any plaintiff would have full input into the revision process, so I don't see any problem with that.

MR. GELBER: Judge, the other side of the coin, of course, is that at any time the township can reach a settlement with any one of the parties, nothing in this agreement precludes that or requires it. I think it would be in the township's interest to try to satisfy all the

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parties. I don't believe we could in any way prevent the township from reaching settlement with one or another of the parties.

So again I don't believe this order interferes with the normal course of events.

MR. CONVERY: May it please the Court, Your Honor, I'd like to amplify that.

First of all, as you know, it was set down for trial today on the heart of this order, and certainly we were only dealing with the Urban League when we were negotiating fair share number and when we were discussing the question of whether or not there was compliance. So I think Old Bridge has proceeded in good faith with the Urban League who was going to be the adversary today at trial. It is not the intention of the Township of Old Bridge to preclude discussions with the builders who have filed lawsuits. In fact, I agree that it would make no sense not to discuss ordinance revisions with those builders, but I also believe that, as Your Honor has said, if there had been a finding of noncompliance, certainly I would hope that Your Honor would have given Old Bridge an opportunity to revise its ordinance. I think

forty-five days is reasonable. I think that if
no agreement can be reached within forty-five
days, that at that point the Urban League -- it
says right in the order, in the stipulation and
the judgment -- shall ask that the master be
appointed. I think this is perfectly reasonable.

It provides a ninety-day period of time and I'm
representing to the Court, although I don't
believe the builders at this point are a party
to the order and the judgment that is being
entered, I'm representing that certainly Old

Bridge would be foolish not to discuss ordinance revisions with those builders where there is,
in fact, litigation pending.

THE COURT: Certainly Old Bridge wants to avoid further litigation and will proceed in good faith knowing that at some later time, if these ordinance revisions are unsatisfactory, certainly the builders are going to come forward and ask for relief.

IR. HILL: Your Honor, I'd like -- there has been a basic error creeping into this record from the beginning. Olympia 4 York filed their suit on February 14, 1984, the second lawsuit they filed. Urban League never got Old Bridge

remanded and it wasn't until they got permission from this Court to add Old Bridge in April of 1984, that Old Bridge became a party to the Urban League case. If anyone is a tag-along plaintiff in this suit, it's Urban League and not O&Y Old Bridge.

So either because of a misconception as to the dates by this Court or a sense of urgency, we got into the position where we weren't participating in fair share. I think that was error. It crept in before we objected to it.

That was Your Honor's ruling.

Nowever, we see this process going on and on and on. Counsel has been very conscious of what the error has been. We made a point of filing this suit. When we filed this suit, nobody else was suing Old Bridge and nobody had the right to sue Old Bridge under the Mount Laurel count, but because they had a prior case and because they wanted to join it with the prior case, somehow we got froze out of the process and I think that was incorrect law and there was no reason for that, but that was Your Honor's will and we didn't care that much about fair share and region because that's not where this

case is at. However --

THE COURT: So what's the point?

MR. HILL: The point is that paragraph five of the Court's order is entirely unacceptable to -- of the proposed order is entirely unacceptable to Olympia & York. The point is that paragraph five advocates a procedure between Urban League and Old Bridge under which they're going to revise Old Bridge Township's ordinances.

Now, my client has spent about half a million dollars reviewing the old ordinance.

We have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars understanding the water system, the sewer system.

THE COURT: We are still not getting the point. This Court is going to be occupied in a few minutes.

MR. HILL: The point, Your onor --

THE COURT: What's your problem?

MR. HILL: The point, four monor, is that
we don't think that anyone at a is competent
to handle the ordinance provision review process
with Old Bridge. We watche other settlements
of Urban League where there have not been builderplaintiffs and we don't believe that their
counsel and their experts truly understand the

building process to have allowed the kinds of settlements that they have proposed to this

Court in other cases in the Urban League case.

We don't intend for that to happen to Old Bridge where my client, for one, owns twenty-five percent of vacant developable land. I mean, this is not learning time for them. This is the way my client makes its living and we intend, we desire, to participate fully in the ordinance review process.

resulting from the prior motions of which Your
Honor said that we were fully entitled to
participate in the compliance section. Paragraph
five of this order is an undisguised attempt
between two parties -- and if there is a tagalong plaintiff in this suit, it's not Olympia &
York -- under which two parties are trying to
shut Olympia & York out of the ordinance
development process, the ordinance review process.
We'd like to participate. We understand that
ordinance better. We participated in writing
parts of it or reviewing parts of it. Old Bridge
has hundreds of pages of --

THE COURT: In the interest of time, what

do you call --

MR. HILL: We object to paragraph five.

THE COURT: I got that --

MR. HILL: We think it's an attempt to usurp our right in the case.

THE COURT: I got that impression. What do you call participation? You know, I don't perceive that any plaintiff, regardless of whether they were first, last or in the middle, under Nount Laurel has the right to dictate the ordinance revision process and it certainly is not going to be permitted in this court --

MR. HILL: But why --

THE COURT: Let me finish -- and I don't believe that kind of aggressiveness is either in the interest of the orderly revision process or in the interest of your client.

However, you can approach it as you see fit. As I read Mount Laurel, this municipality is given basically two options: One is to be given the right to revise within the ninety-day period without a master. If the Court sees fit, that a master be appointed and assist in the revision process and in that setting seek the input of all those who might be in a position to

contribute to the fair share which would obviously include Olympia & York and obviously include Mr. Hutt's client. But the decision as to how this ordinance is going to be amended, at least at this stage, is not plaintiff's, it's going to be Old Bridge. They're going to have to pay the fiddler if they're not right and Mount Laurel doesn't go nearly as far as you are suggesting. Plaintiff has no right to rewrite this ordinance for Old Bridge, Old Bridge has that right. If they do it wrong, then somebody is going to do it for them and that's what's hanging over their head.

So I see no leverage as of the type that you are indicating at this posture.

Now, having said that, I repeat that I would expect that proposed revisions would be submitted to you. I would expect that you would have the right to submit to the Township of Old Bridge any revisions that you would propose, any suggestions with respect to amendment of ordinance which would remove cost-generating features and, if necessary, create affirmative devices. But I think we have got to keep in perspective where the revision process lies.

Mr. Hutt.

MR. HUTT: Your Honor, I think it is more
a matter of semantics than anybody's overreaching.
What they have said and what you said does not
exactly comport to what paragraph five does say.
I think it is probably more inadvertence on
their part.

As I read paragraph two, it reads the same way you did. To tell you the truth, I thought the twenty-four fourteen was Mrs. Lerman's number. I'm glad we straightened that out.

I think, by the same token, paragraph five has to be straightened out.

Paragraph five really is not part of this order and motion either in the stipulation or in the order because the only thing they're entitled to settle without the participation of Mr. Hill's client and my client is the fair share number and lack of compliance. Paragraph five goes past that. Paragraph five now comes up with they're now saying to the Court this is the fair share number and we lon't comply.

Now, we start getting into the second stage proceeding and in the last proceeding that we had in this matter, you had ruled that Olympia &

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York and Woodhaven Village had the right to participate and be part of the ordinance revision process. The problem with the way paragraph five is, number one, it doesn't mention that. I mean, it's nice, all these oral representations and everything else, which I appreciate, but we have to act a little bit more lawyerlike and get the representations in writing. That's number one.

Number two is the way it's written, it says those two parties can agree. Now, the way they explain oh, yes, we can mention it, we can buzz in their ear, we discuss with them, but it doesn't make us an equal party. Now, for argument sake let's say that the Urban League and the town agree to what the ordinance should be and let's assume we don't warre. The way this paragraph five is writed. met's what it's going to be. I don't think that is the intent. The way the law is, Your Moor, it is submitted to you for final approval. I at it always there, but the point is it's one thing to get a draft of a paper that's submitted sack and forth and it's another thing to be an equal partner in a room. Frankly, I think in the scope of this, I

will agree with Mr. Hill on one thing, that this is not a new situation as you have in most of your Mount Laurel cases. This application of both my clients has been very extensive, extremely extensive. There's a lot of background. You are talking about a lot of land. You're never going to get anything done in forty-five days, that's for sure, not that we wouldn't want it done tomorrow or yesterday, but being realistic, it's not going to happen in forty-five days.

The second problem is this: The only way it's really going to happen is we're all equal partners sitting in a room to try to hammer this out to either submit it to the Court for its approval without a master or to submit it to a master at that point in time for his or her consideration for your recommendation.

to be and that's not the way it's going to be in any case, as far as I'm concerned. I don't see that the Urban League has a veto power over what Old Bridge is going to do either and to the extent that this provision might imply that, that is equally inaccurate. It is true that they

are going to try to agree between them and, if not, they are given the power to request a master. That's what is going to trigger the master and I think that's the reason why the paragraph is in as it is, but no plaintiff in an Urban League case has a veto power over the revision process and no plaintiff can say that the revision will not be enacted unless I agree. That's what you are implying and that's what Mr. Hill is implying and that's not the law of the case.

MR. HUTT: I am not implying that, Your
Honor. What I am trying to say is that we be
equal partners. The language talks about the
two of them agree. It doesn't talk about
anybody else agreeing than the two of them agree.
It is only subject to our review and I submit
that we all have to agree to submit something
to you, not just the two our them.

if the two of them reach an agreement, then
there not be a request for a master. That's
what that paragraph is really aiming at. If they
agree, then there will be submission and you are
open to be heard and if you are knocked down
by their agreement, I think it would be appropriate

agreement reached between the Urban League and Old Bridge is not only not binding on the Court, but is not binding on the parties. It is clearly not binding on the Court, but also indicate that regardless of the agreement, even if all of the plaintiffs should agree, that Carla Lerman is still going to be appointed to review it, review the revision, notwithstanding the agreement of all the plaintiffs. That has been my procedure in every one of the Urban League cases.

Mow, her function in that regard is not going to be the same as a master. It will merely be an expert reporting her review of the ordinance.

The comment was made that the Urban League has settled some cases with revisions that perhaps builders would not have agreed to and I understand that their orientation may cause them to feel in their judgment that something is appropriate that other builders may not and that's specifically why Mrs. Lerman has been appointed in every case that's been settled, so that they will look at the ordinance from the

standpoint of its realities in producing Mount

Laurel housing and that's what she is in the

process of doing in the four or five other

municipalities.

Does that resolve the problem?

MR. HILL: Yes, Your Honor, but there is an issue of law which I don't understand. Your Honor has stated that there is a motion for summary judgment pending which would be heard on the sixth and assuming that this settlement wasn't taking place and assuming that that ordinance were invalidated at that time because those affidavits have not been opposed, would the result be any different from what we are discussing here?

In other words, how many times does a plaintiff have to be overruled as a matter of law, have ordinances declared not in compliance before they're entitled to a master and the process, their remedial process cutlined in Mount Laurel II? What I don't understand is Your Monor seems to have created a second and maybe a third chance before the Mount Laurel II remedial process begins to take hold and I don't understand the law that authorizes that.

THE COURT: You mean because Old Bridge was involved in the original case and their ordinance was found noncompliant? Is that what you're saying?

MR. HILL: Yes, or even if this were the first case and instead of this stipulation, unless the stipulation of noncompliance buys them something that they wouldn't have, if Your Honor declared contested this Friday that their ordinances were not compliant, based on the motion for summary judgment, would they be in a different position as a matter of law? That's what I don't understand.

It is my understanding, reading the case, that once ordinances are declared noncompliant, the whole remedial process takes place. The master comes in and the town no longer has the leeway that it injured before.

THE COURT: So what's your question?

MR. HILL: My question is how come Old Bridge is getting that leeway after they're agreeing that their ordinance is noncompliant?

THE COURT: What leeway?

MR. HILL: Why isn't a master being appointed today?

THE COURT: Because the opinion gives me the authority not to appoint a master expressly, that I exercise that judgment. It's that simple.

MR. HILL: All right.

THE COURT: I thought maybe I didn't understand your question.

All right, anything else?

MR. NORMAN: Your Honor, on the motion for summary judgment scheduled for Friday, I assume now it's mooted out?

THE COURT: It's moot.

All right, let us amend the stipulation then to make it clear that what the Lerman number is, the Mallach number is and the Hintz number and that the credits are against the 2,414 fair share as agreed to by the parties.

MR. HILL: Your Monor, one question on the credits. It is my understanding that under the fair share methodology, the period of time is -- there is this language that the following units builder rebabilitated since 1980, we understand that the period of time begins in 1982 when people can have credit for units; that units already occupied are not eligible as a credit against indigenous or prospective need if

they were occupied after 1982. Why are we in this case going back to 1980? What number is Old Bridge being allowed by way of additional credits for units built and occupied between 1980 and 1982 and what is the Urban League's justification for departure from the methodology on giving additional credits to Old Bridge as a result -- by using the 1983 instead of 1982 number?

THE COURT: Why do you say it's 1982?

MR. HILL: That is my understanding of the credit period of time.

THE COURT: Why? Who's ever ruled on that or who's even said it?

MR. HILL: Well, my understanding was they used the numbers, the employment growth between 1972 and 1982 and that the period under consideration was always 1972 to 1982. I have seen Mr. Mallach explain to Princeton at a public meeting, for instance, the things that they did and that's why I draw the analogy and he was speaking for the Court. He understands, I assume, the process better than me. He was talking about housing in the '70s and they said do we get credit for that, will Judge Serpentelli

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give us credit for that. He would say I don't think so, I think so, and he'd explain the way the methodology worked.

THE COURT: Did you say -- I think you said he was speaking for the Court?

MR. HILL: He was being asked in the township meeting whether -- he was being asked by the town whether he thought you, Your Honor, would give them credit for certain units that were constructed during a certain period of time and he, based on many hours meeting with you, gave his opinion. He was not speaking for the Court. He gave his opinion on how the methodology would have treated that and it was my understanding that that methodology would not have gone back to units that were built and occupied in 1980, for instance.

THE COURT: Well, first of all, you said so many things, I don't know what to answer, but, first of all, Mr. Mallach and I have never spent many hours together; secondly, obviously he doesn't speak for the Court; thirdly, I don't know where he gets his ideas with respect to credits; fourthly, the so-called Lerman Report contains no language with respect to credits;

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fifthly, I have never ruled on the issue of credits; sixthly, if there is such a word, '72 to '82 is totally irrelevant. The '72 to '82 decade that you are referring to deals with sole job projections and that decade is now outdated because the '83 figures are now in and the '82 figures were chosen because in 1972 the manner in which jobs were counted was changed so that they couldn't go back before '72 in order to get an accurate count and so they used the most -or they used the figures available from '72 on and it so happened that '82 was the last published figures when the Urban League started to prepare the report. Now the '83 figures are available and I don't know whether the experts are going to use eleven years, whether they're going to use an updated decade or whatever they're going to use.

With regard to the issue of credits specifically, I have never ruled on the question and I don't intend to rule on it in this case.

I will say that I perceive of the present need as existing prior to 1982 and prospective need starting in 1980 and going to 1990 for the purposes of calculating that need.

Now, that doesn't make any difference as to where the credits are applied. The fair share is still there and the important element, as I see it, at least with respect to what is involved in this case, is that these units are price-controlled units to the extent that they will remain Mount Laurel units and one could perhaps make an argument that you could go back as far as Mount Laurel I for credits.

On the other hand, there is an argument to be made that you should at least start in 1980. I have never heard anybody say '82, so I think the credits are entirely appropriate.

MR. HILL: I don't understand what public policy -- and I don't know if I have a right to ask this, but I don't understand what public policy interest is served by giving credits for units that are today occupied, have been occupied since 1980, are not available for indigenous need, for prospective need.

What we are talking about are the people who are unsheltered. Why give credit for units that are occupied?

THE COURT: In about two weeks you'11 read the reason. I expressly addressed that in my

opinion which is about to be filed and there is a strong public policy to reward those communities which have at least made some effort at Mount Laurel compliance and that's precisely the reason for giving credit in the opinion itself.

MR. HILL: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I have not read it.

THE COURT: Mount Laurel II expresses that viewpoint.

MR. GELBER: Judge, if I may, just to clarify the record.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GELBER: For the purposes of settlement, the Urban League and Old Bridge applied the criteria with respect to credits that are set forth in Mr. Mallach's report of November 1983 that is submitted into evidence in the original Urban League case. To answer Mr. Hill's question, the justification for allowing the credit for units that come into occupancy after 1980 is based on the fact that present need is drawn -- figures for present need are drawn from the 1980 census. So, therefore, it is warranted to provide a credit for

units that come on board since 1980 that meet other criteria that are set forth in the report because these units can be seen as a direct reduction of units that show up in the 1980 census as present need. I believe the 1972 to 1982 figures that you were referring to, Judge, just indicated -- relate to one of the factors in the formula, not to the determination of need or credit. Full discussion of that is set forth in Mr. Mallach's report.

If I may also just state, for the purposes of settlement, the criteria applied to Mr. Mallach's report were applied in this case fairly strictly so that the township, during the course of settlement discussions, sought credit for a substantial number of additional units and the agreement was reached that they would waive their right to seek credit for those additional units in return for a settlement as to the overall fair share number.

MR. CONVERY: Your Honor, may I respond?

THE COURT: Yes, just a minute.

MR. CONVERY: On behalf of Old Bridge,
I'd just very briefly like to say that, first
of all, I don't think Mr. Hill is a party to this

part of the case. There is no consolidated order regarding O&Y regarding this issue of credits. I'd just like to take that position on behalf of Old Bridge.

Secondly, I would like to concur in what's been said on behalf of the Urban League, that Old Bridge sought a hundred fifteen credits regarding Community Block Grant development and a certain criteria was presented by the Urban League which was accepted by Old Bridge which led to seventy-five credits. So we gave up a substantial amount of credits which we believe we were entitled to based upon the criteria that was indicated.

Furthermore, we sought ninety-nine credits regarding Section 8 rental assistance and based upon the criteria presented by the Urban League and through settlement and negotiation, the township withdrew its request for credit regarding that. I think it is important to point that out so that no one can draw any kind of inference that these credits are not deserved by Old Bridge and that the settlement was not reasonable in regard to the credits. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Hill.

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MR. HILL: Your Honor, I'm satisfied on that. I just wanted to understand the rationale and I do better now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You see, I think one could argue here, if you want, about three hundred units one way or the other, but this isn't the best example how Mount Laurel II is working as the Court had hoped for it to work and is working to produce actual housing. I don't know what it is. I mean, Olympia & York is a good example. It's been litigating all these years and has been batting zero up to now and now, within a process of a very short period of time since Mount Laurel II, we are at least in the stage where in ninety days we will know whether the Olympia & York and Woodhaven matters are resolved or, if not, we are going to have a very abbreviated trial on the issues of Builder's Remedies.

So, it seems to me this settlement is clearly in the interest of the plaintiffs in this case and represents the kind of expedited resolution of Mount Laurel issues that the Court was aiming at.

The differential in credits or the

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differential in the fair share number existing between Hintz, Mallach and Lerman without the financial need is inconsequential and is something that we could argue about from here to doomsday in terms of reasonableness and I think that I have no difficulty at all with regard to that number.

I was in the process of indicating the revision which should be made to paragraph two and then three as well, indicating that those credits are a credit against the twenty-four fourteen, and then to paragraph five indicating that any agreement as to the ordinance revision will not be binding upon the other plaintiffs in this case; that a full hearing will be held with respect to the ordinance revision and you may as well, while you are at it, include that in the event a revision is found acceptable to all of the plaintiffs, that notwithstanding that fact, Carla Lerman will be asked to review the revision as an expert witness only for the purposes of providing the Court with a report that, in her judgment, the ordinance does meet the mandates of Mount Laurel II.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, as we compile data

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and comments on the ordinance, if we choose to do that, can we communicate those to Carla Lerman? Do we have permission to at least give her reports that may or may not assist her?

THE COURT: She will not be in it at all. at least for forty-five days. It seems to me that the first thing you want to do is submit to the township and to the Urban League any proposals you have for revision and specific proposals with respect to Builder's Remedy. mean, this is the opportunity to resolve your case in full.

Now, maybe the township is going to say well, you know, we don't take your proposal. Then we will get to it later on, but the first step I would suggest would be to submit to the town your position as to revisions of ordinance and your Builder's Remedy. At the end of fortyfive days we will know where the town and Urban League stand with regard to the revision and we will know whether Miss Lerman comes in at that point, and if she does, then you start submitting to her as well.

MR. HILL: How, mechanically -- I ask not just for this case, but other cases -- I have

wondered, when you are in litigation, is it proper to submit suggestions to the other side?
You know, how, mechanically, would we do this?
Send it to Mr. Convery or send it to the township committee, or what are the --

THE COURT: You are dealing with counsel and I say there is a completely open and free exchange. You have the right to give them as much information as you feel you want to and they have the obligation to give you any proposed revisions of the ordinance as well.

MR. HILL: When we deal with counsel, does counsel have an obligation to share what we send them to the township committee or the planning board?

THE COURT: I think, if nothing else, they have the professional and ethical obligation.

That goes unsaid.

MR. HILL: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. HUTT: I agree with you, Your Honor.

The one thing I want to make clear, and I have had this problem before -- it doesn't even have to be in the order -- my understanding is that all four parties, whatever they submit, one will

submit to the other so we will have a complete interchange and not having to say how come he got a copy. I think clearly all four of us are entitled to whatever document crosses anybody else's desk.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HUTT: Thank you.

MR. CONVERY: I just wanted to indicate that if the developers wish to submit proposals, I would simply ask that they send a copy to both me and Mr. Norman because I just think that it's in their best interest and the town's best interest. Mr. Norman represents the planning board. I represent the township. Obviously, we are going to be working together, but we are so far apart, as far as offices are concerned, by distance, as a practical matter --

MR. HUTT: There's no problem.

THE COURT: Absolutely. I indicated it should go to counsel, all counsel, and that's entirely appropriate and it may be that the township would perform one function and the planning board another. I don't know how you want to handle it. That's entirely up to you.

Okay, Mr. Gelber, you will submit a revised

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stipulation and order.

MR. GELBER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

CERTIFICATE

I, CAROLINE WOLGAST, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter of the State of New Jersey, do certify that
the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of my
stenographic notes.

CAROLINE WOLGAST, CSR License No. XI00316

DATED: (Lug. 8, 1884)