9/18

(1984)

VL v. Certoset

Transcript of Proceedings

18 pm

CACCO852S

	1 2		SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY OCEAN COUNTY: CHANCERY DIVISION DOCKET NO. C-4122-73	
	3 4	URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER NEW BRUNSWICK, et al,	: Civil Agtion	
	5 6 7	Plaintiffs,  vs.  BOROUGH OF CARTERET, et al,	Civil Action : TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS :	
	8 9	Defendants.	Toms River, New Jersey September 18, 1984	
	10   11   12	BEFORE:  HONORABLE EUGENE D. SERPENTELLI, J.S.C.  APPEARANCES:		
	13 14	WARREN, GOLDBERG & BERMAN, ESQS. BY: BARBARA J. WILLIAMS, ESQ. Attorneys for Urban League		
	15 16 17	BY: FREDERIC Attorneys for	EISENBERG, ESQS. DERIC S. KESSLER, ESQ. s for Lori Assocs.	
	18 19	BY: CARL S. Attorneys for	NCOTTO, ESQS. BISGAIER, ESQ. Monroe Developers, et al	
	20	BY: STEWART Attorneys for	HOLLANDER & JANKOWSKI, ESQS. M. HUTT, ESQ. Great Meadows	
	22 23	Attorney for WILLIAM TIPPE	INO, JR., ESQ. Township of Monroe  R  nroe Township Council	
24 MICHAEL LIEBOWITZ Monroe Township Cour		MICHAEL LIEBC	WITZ	
			CAROLINE WOLGAST, CSR Official Court Reporter	

THE COURT: So the record might be clear, on July 27, 1984 this Court issued a letter opinion that fixed the fair share of low and moderate homes for Monroe Township in order to satisfy its Mount Laurel obligation, and based upon the Township's admission that its ordinances did not comply with Mount Laurel, the Court also directed that the Township revise its ordinances within ninety days.

Miss Carla Lerman was appointed as a master to assist the Township in its efforts.

Now, on Thursday, September 13 I had a conversation with Mr. Farino, Township Counsel, that the governing body has decided that it will not engage in any ordinance revision and therefore not comply with the Court's order.

Mr. Farino, does that accurately state where we are at?

MR. FARINO: May it please the Court, good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. FARINO: Yes, it does.

THE COURT: All right.

And as a result of that, I advised

Mr. Farino that I would like him to appear before

the Court today for the purpose of determining how the matter should proceed, and I also notified all counsel, if not, belatedly to Mr. Kessler's office, for which I apologize. I confirmed that request by letter dated September 14, 1984 and in that letter I also invited, but did not order that the mayor or other members of the governing body attend this hearing if they wished to do so.

Now, before I proceed, does counsel for the plaintiffs wish to be heard?

MR. BISGAIER: No, Your Honor. I would just like the record to reflect that I did submit a letter request regarding relief in this matter and that letter continues as to my position on behalf of my client.

MISS WILLIAMS: I would just like to add that that letter also reflects the position at this point of the Urban League and we have nothing further to add at this point.

THE COURT: Mr. Kessler?

MR. KESSLER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Hutt?

MR. HUTT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Farino?

MR. FARINO: Just briefly, Your Honor, I would like the record to reflect that the Township of Monroe, in response to Your Honor's request, does appear this morning. In the presence of Your Honor, representing the Township of Monroe, are William Tipper, President of the Monroe Township Council, and Michael Liebowitz, who is a member of the five-man governing body in the Township of Monroe.

Just briefly, Your Honor, to summarize the position of the Township of Monroe as a defendant in this matter, as I know it as of this morning, following Your Honor's letter opinion dated July 27, 1984, the mayor and governing body of Monroe Township did engage in substantial deliberation regarding the content of that letter opinion and the various courses of action available to the Township. The chief executive of Monroe Township, Mayor Peter P. Garibaldi, took the strong position that he would not endorse any effort at a rezoning in the Township of Monroe aimed at producing a compliant zoning ordinance.

There was additional deliberations by the governing body subsequent to the mayor's early

position and as late as last Wednesday, the governing body, by official action in the form of a resolution, unanimously endorsed the position of the mayor in seeking to adopt the position of essentially inaction and not embark upon a rezoning process.

THE COURT: Fine.

Let me say first I want the record to
be clear that whatever the Court is about to say
should not in any way reflect adversely upon
counsel for Monroe Township. I know that both
directly and indirectly through my conversation
with Mr. Farino and the representations made to
the Court by plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Farino has
acted in every respect professionally appropriately.
He has advised me of the general outlines of
his advice to the governing body and I believe
that he has performed his task as an officer of
the court as well as counsel for the defendants
in an entirely appropriate manner.

Secondly, let me say that I'm grateful that Mr. Tipper and Mr. Liebowitz are present.

I had several reasons for requesting the attendance of the mayor and members of the governing body: First I wanted to be sure that

they fully understood the order of the Court,
its scope, the authority under which it is issued
and the obligation of the Court to insure its
order and to enforce its order;

Secondly, I wanted to reiterate the consequences which may flow from the decision not to revise the ordinance;

And third, and most importantly, I hope that having had the opportunity to talk personally to representatives of the Township, that a better understanding of this Court's function and the consequences of noncompliance, as compared to revising the ordinance under protest, would result and that Monroe's elected officials would reconsider their decision based upon what I perceive to be a real fact that the refusal to comply could result in circumstances even less satisfactory to the residents of Monroe Township than would a revision under protest.

Now, first let me address myself to the Court's order. As noted already, the Court's order requires revision of the land use regulations in the town within ninety days so that those regulations will comply with Mount Laurel II. This is necessary because Monroe has

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stipulated, has admitted for the record that its ordinances do not comply and it is necessary because the Court has found that Monroe has a fair share obligation to provide low and moderate housing.

Now, Mount Laurel is the judiciary's response to unconstitutional zoning and it has always been the province of the Courts to interpret the law and to determine its constitutionality. Generally, it is the province of the Legislature to write the law and the executive to implement it. Our courts have explicitly recognized that in this sense of the law, there are powerful reasons to leave the matters involved in these cases to the Legislature and to the executive branch of government, but our Supreme Court has also recognized that if there is a failure to act in those branches of government and constitutional rights are thereby impinged, then the Court must enforce the constitution.

Our Supreme Court has reiterated its position in the closing pages of the Mount Laurel opinion and I'd like to quote from page 352. The court says, "while we have always preferred

legislative to judicial action in this field, we shall continue, until the Legislature acts, to do our best to uphold the constitutional obligation that underlies the Mount Laurel doctrine. That is our duty. We may not build houses, but we do enforce the constitution."

Now, as a trial judge, I am duty bound to obey the Supreme Court's directives and to enforce them and all public officials who take an oath to abide by the constitution of this state are equally bound. We all have a right to disagree with Mount Laurel and you have a right to petition the Legislature for appropriate redress, but your remedy in the interim does not include the option to refuse to comply with the constitution that you have sworn to uphold.

Now, what are the consequences of continuing on the course which has been presently determined in Monroe? I'd like to make them clear. I believe Mr. Farino has done that already, but I want it to be certain, as a matter of public record, exactly what may flow from what Monroe has now decided to do.

Some of the powers given to me are expressly set forth in the Mount Laurel II opinion

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at pages 285 and 286, but I want to note parenthetically that those listed powers are not intended to be exclusive. A court always has the inherent power to shape the remedy to meet the wrong and the scope of remedies in dealing with constitutional violations are only limited by reasonableness.

Now, the court in Mount Laurel II addresses itself to the remedies for noncompliance and lists four of them. I'd like to go over them and perhaps discuss in layman's terms some of the potential scope of those four remedies.

First the court says that the trial court may order the municipality to adopt such ordinances and resolutions as will enable it to meet its Mount Laurel obligation.

I am not reading this verbatim, but that's a capsulization of what the court says. Now, what does that mean? This could involve the Court appointing experts to draw resolutions or ordinances. The experts could select the Mount Laurel sites they deem appropriate, subject to court review, and the Court could implement the ordinances by court order if the governing body refuses to adopt the ordinances.

Next the court says that the Court may order that certain types of projects or construction be delayed until the ordinances are revised or until part of the fair share is constructed, in whole or in part, or firm commitments are made to build it. Now, this would include or could include the enjoining of the granting of any variances, any site plan approvals, any subdivisions, any sewer and water connections, any reservation of water or sewer capacity or, in fact, the issuance of any new building permits in the township.

Third, the Supreme Court says that the trial court could declare the land use regulations of the township to be null and void in whole or in part so as to relax or eliminate building and use restrictions in all or selected portions of the township.

What does that mean? That means that
the trial court could, if it so ordered, direct
that the building in Monroe Township would be
unrestricted; that anyone could build anything
where they wanted to, or alternatively, the
Court could modify the existing building
restrictions in the town so as to permit construction

at much greater densities or with much fewer construction limits or follow whatever course the Court deems reasonable to accomplish the goals of Mount Laurel.

Fourthly, the Court may order that particular applications to construct lower income housing be approved. This would mean that the Court would bypass all municipal reviews, give approval to those applications the Court deemed appropriate and direct that building permits be issued.

I want it to be clear that presently

Mount Laurel construction, like any other

building, is subject to local review; it is

subject to the applicable site plan ordinances,

subdivision ordinances and any other land use

regulations that exist in the town. So the

mere fact that one is granted the right to

build, granted a builder's remedy and the right

to build some low and moderate housing, doesn't

mean that the land use regulations become

inoperative.

Monroe Township would still have the right to review the manner in which they were going to be built and to assure, within the limits

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of Mount Laurel, that they comply with the ordinances of the community. By refusing to revise its ordinance, Monroe abdicates that option.

Now, finally I'd like to address myself to why I think it is in the best interest of this Township to reconsider the action it's It has to be conceded that the options that I have discussed, and others I haven't discussed but will consider, could have a very significant impact on Monroe well beyond that which the Court has already ordered. direction that Monroe rezone or amend its zoning ordinance will not in and of itself result in the construction of a single house in Monroe. Such a rezoning under Mount Laurel II does not prejudice the town's right to appeal the Court's order and no construction will take place until all avenues of appeal are exhausted and then only if this Court's order is sustained.

And by that I mean, in simple language, it may be that an appellate court will disagree with the conclusions that I have reached, will find that I have erred in one way or another and that Monroe's fair share would have to be

modified.

Furthermore, in the interim, any municipality who revises its zoning ordinance under protest, and any revision is deemed automatically to be under protest if an appeal is to follow, in the interim that municipality may pursue every other avenue of relief that it deems appropriate, and I have specific reference to pursuing the political process and to encouraging the political process to work.

I emphasize again that our Supreme Court has hoped fondly in its opinion that those who should be doing this job would do it and it would please this Court and the Supreme Court to have that happen. It has not happened, but in the process of the passage of time Monroe has it within its capacity, along with any other municipality who feels offended with the Monroe dictates, to pursue that process and to see that legislative inaction becomes action, that a consensus occurs and that the fair share of all the municipalities of the state is pursued in that arena.

Now, through Mr. Farino, I request that the elected officials reconsider their action.

Mr. Farino, I charge you to urge them to weigh the consequences of inaction against what I'll be compelled to do if they do not act.

Finally, aside from the fact that they are sworn to uphold the law, I suggest that you have them consider whether they will be able to convince an informed constituency in Monroe that it was the Court and not they who brought the drastic consequences upon themselves which they will force this Court to resort to if they continue with their present course.

At this posture, within the limits of this Court's order, which is subject to appeal, Monroe Township still controls its destiny and I ask is it responsible for elected officials to relinquish to a court that destiny at a time when the rights of its citizens are fully protected and any action taken in compliance with the court order is without prejudice?

I will give the governing body a period of eight days to reconsider its position. I ask that Mr. Farino appear and all counsel for the plaintiffs appear as well on Wednesday, September 26 at 9:00 a.m., if that time is convenient, and if not, we will arrange a

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convenient time to advise me of the Township's intention.

Now, in an effort to be absolutely clear about what this Court has said and what it has not said what the law requires and what protection the law provides to Monroe Township, I am requesting the court reporter to provide an expedited transcript of my comments so that they may be provided to Mr. Farino particularly and, of course, to all counsel. I authorize Mr. Farino to freely distribute to all members of the governing body -- and I know that you have a Faulkner Act form of government there and I included that governing body -- the mayor as well, of course, and to the press, to the interested residents of Monroe Township and to anyone else the comments of this Court. I think that it is unfortunate that the newspapers, none of whom are present today, will report on what I have said without having heard it firsthand. I think it is imperative that everyone understand that this Court has no desire at all to assert any power beyond that which is absolutely required by the constitution and by the dictates of Mount Laurel II. The Court has

no desire to be characterized in a manner it has been characterized, but it is ready to do what it has to do if the constitution is not complied with.

Now, I am grateful that two members of the governing body have attended. I want to make it clear that I never intended this session to be a meeting of the governing body. I invited them so that they could hear me say what I did say. I fully recognize their right to disagree with Mount Laurel. I'm not offended by it. There may be intellectual differences. I indeed have the right to disagree with Mount Laurel, too. However, as a judge who is sworn to uphold the law of this land, my right to disagree does not extend to a privilege to disregard it.

I would invite either member of your governing body, if they wish, to address the Court, and they shouldn't feel they have to.

If they have any comments to make, I would be pleased to hear them.

Mr. Tipper.

MR. TIPPER: First, Your Honor, I would like to thank you very much for your very concise

definitions.

I can also assure the Court that, as you said, Mr. Farino has continuously apprised the Council of our options and consequences of our action and we have been fully aware of them, but points have been clarified.

There is no way at this time that I can speak for the Council because we have not had an opportunity to meet. Most assuredly, you have requested us to reconsider. The Council will be polled in compliance with your request.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Fine. Thank you.

We will stand in recess then until
Wednesday, September 26. If between now and
then counsel for the plaintiffs wish to submit
proposed recommendations to the Court concerning
action which should be taken in the event that
the Township does not revise its ordinances,
they may do so, of course with copies to
Mr. Farino, and Mr. Farino may respond.

I, in the interim, will take no action with respect to the matter pending the hearing on that date.

All right. I thank you for coming. I know

it is an inconvenience both in terms of the trip and your daily schedule, but I do appreciate your being present.

MR. FARINO: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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## CERTIFICATE

I, CAROLINE WOLGAST, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter of the State of New Jersey, do hereby certify
that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of
my stenographic notes.

CAROLINE WOLGAST, CSR LICENSE NO. XI00316

DATED: September 18, 1984