Transcript of Settlement Conference

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LEFKOWITZ & ROCKOFF, ESQS., Attorneys for North Brunswick BY: LESLIE S. LEFKOWITZ, ESQ., ROBERT LECKY, ESQ.

MR. LEFKOWITZ: If your Honor please,

I believe your Honor has been delivered a copy

of a proposed Order of Judgment as to the

Township of North Brunswick.

THE COURT: Yes, I have a copy.

MR. LEFKOWITZ: Therefore, on behalf
of the Township of North Brunswick we wish your
Honor to approve and enter this order and judgment
with the following minor modifications: If your
Honor will turn to Page 4, Paragraph (e) where
it reads "construction of 120 units on the
75 acre Hamelsky tract," it should be amended
to read "construction of 120 units on 75 acres
of the Hamelsky."

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LEFKOWITZ: Paragraph (f) directly below where it reads "construction of 58 units on the 36 acre Johnson and Johnson. . " It should read "construction of 58 units on 36 acres of the" . . .

Directly below, Paragraph 6 it reads

"the Township shall rezone the" -- it says

"municipality owned nine acre site." It should

read, "the Township shall rezone a portion of the

municipally owned nine acre site."

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Page 9, your Honor, Paragraph 10. It says "the Township shall rezone the 36 acres of the tract."

The word "the" should be stricken and then it will read properly.

MR. HUTT: The second "the".

MR. LEFKOWITZ: Yes, "the Township shall rezone 36 acres of the tract," it should read.

THE COURT: The first "the" or the second? Thirty six acres of tract.

MR. HUTT: No, the second word "the".

THE COURT: Oh, there are three "thes".

Okay.

MR. LEFKOWITZ: Okay. Did we come to an agreement, counsel, with regard to Page 10 in changing the language with regard to the standards?

MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, your Honor, we did.

Adding a couple other sentences to the end of

Paragraph 10, we would like to add the following

language: "The Township shall provide plaintiff

within 30 days clear and satisfactory evidence

that the owner or option holder intends to

develop the tract for residential development

as specified in this paragraph; that if the owner

or option holder is not able to provide such

evidence, the option holder relinquishing its option and/or the tract becomes unavailable, the Township shall rezone either the Hamelsky tract to provide an additional 58 units of low and moderate income housing or provide suitable alternate tract sites for such housing."

THE COURT: All right. The Hamelsky site is Mr. Wolfson's client.

MR. WOLFSON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, we are going to satisfy Mr. Wolfson one way or the other.

MR. WOLFSON: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Where does that leave you?

MR. WOLFSON: Out on the left and ready
to speak when your Honor will hear it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEFKOWITZ: On Page 12, your Honor,

Item 19 it would be the second paragraph. It

reads: "The Urban League, or its designee,

shall have the right to inspect all prepared

development applications." I believe the

word should be "proposed" instead of "prepared."

Now, with regard to -- there was an additional paragraph that was omitted by oversight when it was retyped from the proposed prior form

of order that the Urban League desires to put in without any objection from North Brunswick and without any objection from Mr. Hutt.

The only other question that I would have at this time is with regard to Paragraph Number 12, the top of Page 10 and Mr. Hutt would like to be heard with regard to that language.

THE COURT: Page 12 is it?

MR. LEFKOWITZ: Page 10.

THE COURT: Page 10.

MR. HUTT: Paragraph 12. The first sentence on Page 10.

MR. LEFKOWITZ: Paragraph 12, the first sentence on Page 10.

MR. HUTT: Just the first sentence, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HUTT: Your Honor, as you know, from looking at the judgment there are provisions in here that is going to apply for as long as 20 years.

We had discussed, all of us and counsel at my request, that if in the event, and let's say as a scenario, let's say two years from now or three years from now the common standards

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eight, for instance, of the Mount Laurel decision or as you, trial judges, eventually evolve them in the next six months, let's say, if those standards change in the next two or three years, either because the Courts recognize that what they thought would work is not working or because, for instance, there was a bill that's been introduced in the legislature last week by Leona Lippman and David Schwartz on the Senate for a Housing Allocation Act it's called. I don't know whether this bill will pass, but it's somewhat similar to the Housing Allocation Commission.

In the bill they define the various things of income levels and what is moderate and what is low and so forth, and I would hope in the legislation, if it passes, if it ever comes out that that Housing Commission —

Administrative Agency of the Executive Branch would, over time, develop, as experience dictates, possibly different standards, maybe low should be 20 percent, maybe low should be 90 percent, whatever.

What we want to be concerned about is Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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over time, the language we are suggesting, North Brunswick and myself, is that instead of saying the Supreme Court, because that limits the Supreme Court, we would prefer to say that instead of the language that's there: Anybody -b-o-d-y because it might be the administrative agency for instance or it might be the legislature itself. Anybody of competent jurisdiction as determined by this Court changes the standards, then any party to this settlement can make application before your Honor and which you will determine two things: When such a body is a body of competent jurisdiction, and number two, are there good causes shown for amending any of the standards set forth in this judgment?

I think that's the only way we could all protect ourselves as to future events, and I include you, your Honor, to be able to foresee today what condition may exist three years from now or five years from now or ten years from now. It's not capricious.

It would still have to go before the courts and say an appropriate administrative agency or the Appellate Division came down or

the Supreme Court came down to change the standards and this is the reason why we think this order should be modified.

The parties will argue pro and con either way, and you will still make the final determination.

But I am concerned if you don't have that
in there, some taxpayers, for instance, could
come in here two years from now knowing full well
you can't build under these circumstances and
say, you can't change them. A contract is a contract
or a court order is a court order, for what I
consider exclusionary purposes because, you know,
if you can't build, they are going to say,
hey, you can't change the standards.

Mount Laurel, itself, for instance, has enacted an ordinance. It talks about every builder has to build 40 percent inclusionary buildings.

In Jewish we have an expression: "You are talking about your daughter, but you mean your daughter-in-law."

They come out with these -
THE COURT: I have never heard it put
that way.

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MR. HUTT: Well, that's because you didn't have a daughter-in-law.

THE COURT: It's not because I don't have the background in that field.

MR. HUTT: So, these people -(Discussion off the record.)

MR. HUTT: In any event, I think there has to be that kind of flexibility built in here to protect everybody in the future.

MS. WILLIAMS:
Your Honor, we would
object to changing the language from what is
set forth in the proposed order.

It is our belief that Mount Laurel II, since it was a Supreme Court case, any modifications the Court should be governed by the Supreme Court in terms of the settlement between the parties.

We have perceived it being administratively unworkable if every court or a body of competent jurisdiction determined by this court becomes the standard. It creates the potentiality of a situation of any administrative regulation or any case which may be in the interest of the developers or the Township for there to be a potential modification.

It would be our view that the language should remain as it stands by the Supreme Court.

I don't believe that it is totally preclusive from a legal standpoint of the defendants or the plaintiff being able to come into court and modify the agreement, but we see no necessity for it to be part of the proposed order other than the Supreme Court language to reflect Mount Laurel II and the standing of that court.

MR. WOLFSON: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WOLFSON: I just have a very short comment as to that.

I will save my comments for whenever your Honor will hear from me.

We are concerned about this settlement for a lot of reasons. One, particularly because it says "any party."

Now, I don't know what my status is at the moment. I have a feeling of what it's going to be in a few minutes, but this form of order is replete with phrases like this and, you know, if any party is to be given any flexibility, does

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that mean only Mr. Hutt's client or the Urban League or the Township? Or does that mean any subsequent applicant?

Part of our application this morning is that the eight units to the acre really reflects a taking on that, and we would want to be able to make applications. So, we don't really know what is going to happen procedurally after the Court determines what to do with this proposed settlement.

But I think that really careful scrutiny has to be given to this order forgetting the fact that your Honor may give it to Carla Lerman in connection with fair share compliance because the way the order was drafted, just from our quick review of it, which we were under some pressure, we have identified a lot of problems like this where we think that it is just going to cause problems down the line specifically for our client, but also for the Court and for the Court-appointed expert which is why we are here today.

THE COURT: Let's go off the record for a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

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there has been an extensive discussion off the record concerning the modification of the first sentence on Page 10, and apparently counsel have agreed that the Court can rule upon a modification. I would direct that that sentence be changed to adopt wording which would include: "The order of any court of competent jurisdiction, any Statute adopted by the legislature or any administrative ruling of any agency acting under statutory authority, and it should be clear that the action of the legislature or any such agency are not binding upon the court, but only provide a basis for an application to be made to the court."

Now, I also did not discuss off the record, but I think Mr. Wolfson's objection is well taken. There is a rezoning here of parcels of many people who are not parties, and it seems to me that anyone affected by the order certainly, and anyone who seeks to build low and moderate housing should have the right to make the application.

So, it should not read "party," but
"any applicant or anyone may, upon good cause" -and the word "party" should come out.

1	MR. HUTT: If you switch the word "party"
2	to "person."
3	THE COURT: Pardon me?
4	MR. HUTT: If you switch the word "party"
5	to 'person.'
6	THE COURT: Any person. That person
7	includes a corporation. All right.
8	Now, what else do we have?
9	MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, we have one
10	paragraph that was omitted. It was part of the
11	first draft of the proposed order which was
12	submitted to your Honor, Paragraph 13.
13	There now has been a new 13, and I guess
14	it would probably be best if we added it to the
15	end of the draft which we gave to your Honor
16	today.
17	THE COURT: This was in the first order
18	you gave me. Which paragraph was that?
19	MS. WILLIAMS: Thirteen. Would it be
20	right to read it into the record at this time?
21	MR. WOLFSON: I would request that
22	your Honor do it because I have been given a
23	copy of that.
24	MS. WILLIAMS: All right. Fine.
25	THE COURT: That paragraph which is also
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on Page 10 of the original order which I received, if I am reading the same thing --

MS. WILLIAMS: That's correct.

THE COURT: -- says the "Township of North Brunswick shall amend its zoning ordinances so that all developers of low and moderate income units are required to affirmatively market those units to persons of low and moderate income irrespective of race, color, sex or national origin.

"Such affirmative marketing shall include advertisement in newspapers with general circulation in the Urban Corps areas located in the ll-county-present-need region identified in the court-appointed expert's report dated April 2, 1984.

"The Township shall also require the developer to advertise the low and moderate income units with local fair housing centers, Housing Advocacy organizations, Urban Leagues and governmental social service and welfare departments located within the 11-county region.

"The Township shall also require that all marketing practices comply with applicable federal and state laws against discrimination."

1	Mr. Hutt.
2	MR. HUTT: Barbara.
3	(Discussion off the record.)
4	MR. HUTT: Your Honor, we would like to
5	change one word that you read in the third
6	sentence.
7	It says: "The Township shall also
8	require the developer to advertise the low and
9	moderate income units."
10	We want to change that word from
11	"advertise" to "notify."
12	THE COURT: Yes. I think that is
13	grammatically correct.
14	You didn't intend to advertise. You were
15	advertising in the previous paragraph.
16	MR. HUTT: Yes. Just notify the agencies
17	as distinguished from advertising.
18	THE COURT: Fine.
19	Is there anything else, Mr. Wolfson?
20	MR. HUTT: There is one blank on
21	Paragraph 16. I just wanted you to know there
22	was a blank.
23	THE COURT: I see that.
24	MR. HUTT: We left something for you
25	to do, your Honor.

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	THE COURT: Which Sunday night am I
2	supposed to do that on?
3	You mean Paragraph 16, Page 11?
4	MR. HUTT: Yes, sir.
5	THE COURT: I would want to just consult
6	with Miss Lerman concerning that. She has
7	normally been doing it in 30 days, but I understand
8	the Piscataway situation is causing her some
9	problem and I just want to make sure that 30 days
10	is reasonable.
11	Is there anything else before we
12	hear Mr. Wolfson?
13	All right, Mr. Wolfson. I haven't
14	looked at this revision here, so I don't know
15	what happened to your parcel.
16	MR. WOLFSON: Well, we haven't seen
17	anything of late other than the first draft, your
18	Honor.
19	So, we are to some extent handicapped.
20	THE COURT: You mean the draft that I
21	was handed today?
22	MR. WOLFSON: The draft which we
23	have attached to our complaint, we have nothing
24	other than that.
25	MR. LEFKOWITZ: Judge, the provision is
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the same with regard to the unit in the allegation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOLFSON: Your Honor recognized from my argument that my reading and counsel's reading of the proposed form of stipulation as distinguished from, or in addition to, the proposed form of order contains a myriad of items that affect us that we are not a party to.

The best example is this advertising requirement where the Urban League has agreed with the Town to put in burders upon developers that are not a party to the suit separate and apart from Mr. Hutt's client.

It seems to me that to the extent that
the Court adopts the Judge Skillman-type-of-classaction approach, which I have serious problems
with, at least in those contexts the developers
or the class have an opportunity to opt in
or opt out.

Here I am placed in a situation where, in a moment's notice, we find out that a settlement is being proposed that seriously affects our land.

It proposes a direct rezoning. It does not propose to have a court-appointed expert make Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

a recommendation as to what it should or should not be. It asks that it be zoned low and moderate density and it contains a tremendous number of provisions that adversely affect us without our having been given any opportunity for any input at all prior to the Court's order.

I respectfully would submit to your Honor that an opportunity to present arguments or documentation of evidence to Carla Lerman is not

the same as being able to present it to the Court prior to that time because the Court-appointed expert will be operating to some extent under a court order.

Any implementing ordinance will be able to be adopted by counsel by saying, well, we are doing it because there is an order that orders us to do it. So, we won't have any realistic input at the public hearing.

I say that based upon past experience
where public hearings are held, but there are
public hearings in name only because the councilmen
are acting under a compulsion: Well, the Judge
ordered it. We have to do it."

And to some extent I am to understand that that is sometimes politically

how those things have to occur.

number of cases and I am sympathetic with that.

I don't want to disrupt what I would otherwise perceive to be a legitimate settlement except the numbers here are so bad that I don't believe, on its face, Judge, although we have had that discussion in the Franklin case, but on its face, I think on its face a five and a half unit difference is so, you know, it so boggles the mind that it has to create at least a doubt in your Honor's mind that this settlement should even be directed to Carla Lerman until much more work is given to it.

This is the result of very speedy action.

I don't think a tremendous amount of in-depth
thought, with all respect to counsel, went into it.

I think there are serious problems with it separate and apart from the constitutional issues that we wanted to raise in our complaint and which we will raise by an amended complaint if we are given the opportunity to do so.

By our letter we ask to be consolidated into this case since we were being treated from my prospective as a party since we were being Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

tremendously affected by the proposed order of stipulation. And if we were going to be affected, I thought it was only fair and equitable that we be a party to the litigation so that we could have input in a meaningful way, that is, before all these things happen.

Now, the serious problems I have from a legal standpoint, your Honor, are -- include the following: (1) I really perceive this to be a reverse kind of spot zoning.

It is a situation where separate parcels have been identified by the parties to receive this either beneficial or lack of beneficial treatment, depending on whose side you are on.

From our perspective it is bad treatment.

Eight units to the acre with a 20 percent set aside from our perspective is a taking, and without any overlay zoning, that gives us an option to do something other than low and moderate, it completely destroys the value of our property because we cannot build eight to the acre with low and moderate. We have no choice to build conventional at some lesser density. So, we are stuck with nothing and the Urban League gets nothing because there are no houses built.

I just find it funny.

your Honor's fair share, and my understanding of the Mount Laurel case and what I thought your Honor had said on other occasions in other contexts was to realistically provide for low and moderate income housing, you must provide more than the fair share in terms of the actual number in the zoning ordinance in order to be left with a realistic possibility of approaching the fair share number.

The numbers on this particular form of order reach a compromised fair share number to begin with and no more.

For the Urban League to be concerned that the Reider tract may or may not get built, and that is going to reflect a difference in this settlement, I think is absurd.

If they are worried about the Reider tract not being built, they should worry about the Hamelsky and all the other tracts getting built.

I think your Honor can take judicial notice of the fact that at least it is my understanding that there is no case that is

Properties at one point in time was -- there was a question about sewerage. Shainee also wanted to build at eight per acre. So, I don't know that one cannot say it cannot be done, but on the other side, I don't think that anybody has really litigated the issue of proper density and that is the whole, one of the things which I did not express when we were off the record: One of my concerns about builder's remedies is we would get into litigating those. We are going to get into litigating some extraordinary and difficult issues as to profitability and all those sort of things that are going to take as long as fair share things.

MR. WOLFSON: I agree that they are complicated issues and they would require much more input then either of these parties have had.

THE COURT: Or almost anybody has had.

MR. WOLFSON: I agree with you. I think that that is correct.

The Urban League, with all due respect for all the good they are doing, they are not builders, and although they seem to be willing to accept the settlement of the eight to the acre with a 20 percent set aside, my client has

indicated that it is an impossibility, and based on that representation alone the Urban League should at least investigate that. They should be willing to accept the eight to the acre especially when faced with the situation where the only other plaintiff in the case is getting 13 and a half to the acre.

Now, I don't want to take anything away from Mr. Hutt's client except to use that to say there is a pretty big difference between eight and 13 and a half, and why would that be necessary except that Mr. Hutt does need his client to do it at eight units to the acre and the Town doesn't believe that anybody can do it at eight units to the acre which is probably why they are willing to go along with this settlement.

I think the Court should delay this direct investigation and further input from our client as a party to this litigation in order that a more intelligent, more well reasoned result or conclusion can be reached, and if the conclusion is the same, so be it, but at least at that opportunity we will have had realistic input. We will have had an opportunity to take

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some time, produce documentary evidence, at least discuss with the Urban League or the Town or Mr. Hutt's client why we feel the settlement documents are the way they are inappropriate and at that point if the Court disagrees with the position of my client and wants to approve the settlement subject to input, to some extent from its expert, well, that will be at least, you know, a more realistic and reasoned approach.

The only other legal argument, your
Honor, that we have in connection with this
settlement, and I hate to be in a position of?
disrupting settlement because it goes against
the grain of everything that I believe in,
especially in a Mount Laurel context, because
I strongly believe that Mount Laurel will work
and low and moderate income housing will be built
and that is why I take such an emotional approach
to this settlement because this will stop the
low and moderate income housing from being built
and my client is building it and is voluntarily
building it without litigation in the Towns, but
at different densities and different requirements.

I have a general comment as to the manner in which your Honor is being requested to approve the Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

that the Court is authorized for the first time, basically, to direct rezonings within the Town to assume the humble power of the municipality under circumstances where the municipality fails after an order to comply, or in the circumstances of builder's remedies, where the Court can direct a rezoning of a particular plaintiff's property who is, what Judge Skillman and I perceive the phrase, successful plaintiff.

Here we have a situation where we are not a party, Hovnanian is not a party and the Court is being asked to enter an order directing a specific rezoning of a specific parcel of property of a non-successful plaintiff, where the successful plaintiff otherwise would have an opportunity to have input as to what density he needs or she needs, and the Court would hear that and the expert would hear that and a particular remedy would be given to the successful plaintiff.

Here we are not a party to the lawsuit, and the Court is being asked to direct a specific rezoning of a specific parcel.

So, we have been deprived of the Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

opportunity that an ordinary litigant would get
in proving its builder's remedy case and the
Court is being asked to exercise authority that
I do not believe was delegated to it or authorized
by the Supreme Court to engage in direct rezoning
situations other than that which were contemplated,
I believe, by the Supreme Court in Mount Laurel.

I don't think that your Honor has the right or the authority to enter an order directing the Town to rezone property subject to the Court's finding of the Town's noncompliance after giving the 90-day period, for example, or unless we were the successful plaintiff asking for a rezoning based upon the input after a trial or a settlement where everybody had an opportunity to have input.

You are being asked to rezone our property as part of a settlement which we are not a party to and which we have not been committed to take part other than today and last week in your Honor's chambers.

For all the reasons that I have stated, and I know I have thrown a lot at your Honor very quickly, we do not think that your Honor should approve this settlement because there is

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There is still a tremendous, to me, prima facie inability to comply with Mount Laurel on this proposed form of settlement, and I don't think you need to send it to Carla Lerman to realize that.

I think your Honor is well versed enough in what has happened between this and the other two trial courts to realize that it will not produce realistically low and moderate income units in a number that will authorize, in my opinion, a settlement of the Mount Laurel case and I would also request, your Honor, to the extent you are going to approve a settlement in some form today between these parties to please do not enter an order directing any particular rezoning of our property because that will deprive us of any meaningful input with either the Master or with the local governing body at the time of the public hearing because they will be able to say: We are just doing what the Court ordered us to do and we will be back here again under much harsher standards, I suspect, trying to justify a different zoning on our tract.

I strenuously would urge, your Honor,

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that if your Honor wants to see low and moderate units built, and I know you do and we do, that's our business and that's my business, I would urge your Honor to restrain -- refrain, excuse me, from entering this settlement or approving the settlement in the manner being requested because I think that nothing will come of it and that will do nothing to help either the Urban League, my client or the Township's or the low and moderate income people in the State.

What do you perceive a trial court will have to do, assuming there were no builders involved in this case at all, assuming that neither you, nor

Mr. Hutt had sued before we settled it, and in order to fulfill the fair share, North Brunswick had to rezone 20 parcels? Does that call upon the Court to require notification to all those people? None of them are parties and their rights are being affected and presumably settled and won't want what the zoning is going to be.

MR. WOLFSON: I don't think your Honor should enter an order approving the case until the zoning is already in place.

At that point if there are public hearings,

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there will be input at the public hearing, more meaningful input, as to what the zone should or should not be.

posture as opposed to a litigated posture, and

I haven't given this a tremendous amount of thought
as you just posed it to me this morning, but it
seems to me when the municipality has a public
hearing to either amend its Master Plan or to
amend its zoning ordinance to provide sufficient
densities for low and moderate income zones, there
is notice.

Notice is published in the newspaper.

There are Sunshine Law requirements as to what
has to be advertised, and at that point at least
to some extent there is some advertisement, some
notice to people who own property of the input
and know what is going on, and they will be able
to provide their input at the public hearing.

whether or not that is effective to convince a local governing body to act differently in their collective mind is another question, and I don't think we have to answer that.

THE COURT: You are saying that notwithstanding the fact that here there will have to be

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an amendment and a revision, the fact that it is already being done under court order is going to mean that should other property owners affected by this appear and say, we don't want it either or we don't like it is not going to mean anything because the council is going to say, well, the judge ordered it.

MR. WOLFSON: Your Honor, that is precisely what I am saying and that is precisely what I have been confronted on a number of occasions. I am sure to the extent you had an analogous situation when you were borough attorney, when you were township attorney, the same kind of things happens: It gives the municipality the out, and I know the people in this room are astute enough to know that is sometimes what they want the judge to do. They want the judge to take that leap, but under these circumstances where a settlement is being proposed, which I think on its face is deficient, that your Honor ought to take that ability or take that option that the Town is trying to utilize away from them unless they come up with a better plan or a much more defined plan to do that.

I just don't think that asking the Town Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

any input or any legitimate notice or any possibility that the public could be heard on these things.

THE COURT: If a town's ordinance is found in noncompliance and it comes back with another noncompliant ordinance, and the court rezones, nobody is going to get much input on that. The second thing --

MR. WOLFSON: Well, I don't know that that is true. You will tell me that is true, your Honor, but if you rezone, you will direct, I would suspect, a Master to do a study and make recommendations to you --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WOLFSON: -- as to what it would be and what it would not be.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WOLFSON: And that would be free from the self-interest input, for example, where the Town and everybody would have a fair shot and everybody would have what you permitted to the Master on an equal footing.

If my land was on the same caliber as

Mr. Hutt's caliber, my opinion is it would receive

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close to the same density and same treatment.

Here is a tremendous difference in that case, and all the other plaintiffs are being used to qualify for fair share numbers. More than five units to the acre with a different set aside.

As your Honor knows 3 or 4 percent on a low and moderate would make a big difference as to whether or not it can afford it or not.

My client tells me that you can't.

But certainly between 13. Certainly you cannot -- I don't see how you can require any particular property owner to have his land zoned low and moderate.

something and then there would be an overlay which says, if you want a higher density and you are willing to build low and moderate income housing, you could have this, but if you don't wish to build low and moderate income housing,

I don't see how this Court at this point can order any particular client's land especially not a party to a lawsuit, that he must use his land for low and moderate income housing.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know about that.

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1 I wouldn't want to express an opinion. 2 It seems to me the Appellate Division 3 has done that in the remand in the Field case 4 where neither party had requested low and moderate 5 housing. 6 MR. WOLFSON: Well, a party to that 7 lawsuit did, your Honor, an intervenor. 8 THE COURT: It was not part of the 9 appeal. Neither Field, nor Franklin Township 10 was looking for low and moderate income housing, 11 and the Appellate Division said, by the way, 12 on remand you are going to build 15 percent low 13 and moderate housing. 14 Now, I know that the plaintiff in that 15 case had not desired that and that the town had 16 not asked for it. That case is before me. 17 MR. WOLFSON: Mark First, who represented 18 the intervenors in that case, did request it, and 19 asserted that they were entitled to that. 20 THE COURT: But whether or not -- I am 21 not aware of that, but even assuming that, the 22 Appellate Division did not give an option, they 23 said, you are going to build 15 percent. 24 If you are going to build at all, you 25 are going to build 15 percent which says to me

that apparently that court thought they had that power. That is an issue that I have not reached. It is an interesting one.

The question is: Can you zone in such a fashion as to limit only to that particular type of use of the property? That is basically what it boils down to.

MR. WOLFSON: Separate and apart from whether it is feasible?

THE COURT: Yes. The question that -
I think you have raised several very good arguments,
but the question that concerns me is how does a

court ever settle a case?

and says, look, we are willing to accept this
fair share number, if the courts are going to
accept it, and this is how we are going to comply,
and let's say there is only one plaintiff, whether
it is the Urban League or whether it is a builder,
as I indicated to you, we have one town in which
a builder has brought about the revision and the
town is only interested in not getting sued by
somebody else.

They want 90 days in which to have a compliant package, and how is the court ever going

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to rezone without stepping on other people's toes if the town cannot be the one to select the parcels? It doesn't preclude those people whose toes have been stepped upon from saying they have been arbitrarily treated either by being excluded or being included arbitrarily, and in some way unfairly affected by the revision.

How are we ever going to accomplish a revision if we do it in the manner you are suggesting? It would appear that the municipality would have to come in and say: Here is what we propose, and the court would say, okay, that looks all right, but I want you to go back now and hold public hearings on that. And in the meantime they get sued by another five builders and those builders are going to raise all sorts of issues concerning the propriety of it.

It would seem to inherit the process, for the process to go that way. Wouldn't it?

MR. WOLFSON: One clear message that
the Court can send out is that it will not approve
of a proposed form of settlement where the
rezoning specifically takes into account only
enough space to rezone the precise fair share
number that is being agreed upon.

THE COURT: That is a separate issue.

The over-zoning issue I see as separate.

MR. WOLFSON: But that to me, I think, from a practical standard will eliminate part of the other revisions.

If the municipality in good faith is trying to allow a substantial amount of low and moderate, it is going to have to go to land far in excess of that which it's done here, and it's going to be zoning in densities that are much more realistic, and I think that you are not going to see the same kind of Johnny-come-lately lawsuits that your Honor is being confronted with on a recurrent basis now of date.

Because of those proposed settlements that the Urban League seems to upset, you are not going to have all these people coming in.

If you see in the newspaper that the town is attempting to settle a lawsuit at a certain number, all of a sudden the property owners having now gotten notice for the first time, they contact their lawyers, the lawyers do a little study and all of a sudden they figure out that they are going to get nailed.

THE COURT: Of course, it doesn't only

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happen in that context. I mean, in Warren

Township we did not have the Urban League. We
had two builders who, if they prevail, would
build a very sizable portion of Warren Township's
fair share by anybody's number and still we had
somebody starting the suit after the trial was
completed.

So, the Johnny-come-latelies come in all kinds of cases, and it is just not the Urban League cases.

MR.WOLFSON: I think to some extent that is part of the genius of the Supreme Court opinion in the Mount Laurel case.

I think what the chief -- what the

Supreme Court did in that case in connection with

the use of a Master was done and I think intentionally

precisely for these reasons: That a particular

plaintiff, whether it is a builder plaintiff or

public interest plaintiff, more likely if it is

a builder plaintiff who wishes to reach a settlement,

the Supreme Court recognized that that settlement

was likely to be self-serving, and, in fact,

the town and that plaintiff are going to read

what they want and the rest of the Town they

really don't give the same kind of attention or

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input. They have the rest of the town, and I
think to prevent -- and I am not suggesting it's
happened in this case -- but to prevent a
corroborated kind of conspired settlement where
the builder gets what he wants and the town is
getting out of everything without realistically
making any opportunity for low and moderate income
housing to be built --

THE COURT: I can't say I agree with everything you have said, but generally speaking I think I agree with the concept that we should do nothing that is going to discourage builders to sue because the genius of the opinion is in the caret which has been held out, and also the fact that by having builders here as opposed to a non-builder plaintiff, you are more likely to get actual construction which is what the court was after, and I must say in all candor in this particular case, while I can't take judicial notice of the fact that certainly your plaintiff is well known to be a large-scaled developer who is not in here buying an option to sell the property necessarily, they are known to build and be able to build and build with dispatch. important to the court not to see that type of

builder excluded from the process.

The other side of the coin is that

voluntary settlement have got to be encouraged,

and if towns cannot come to some resolution

without anyone who is offended by it, upsetting

it, we are just not going to get those settlements.

Miss Williams, this question of overzoning,
I know we discussed it in chambers. I understand
your position is that you believe that the sites
selected are so certain that you are going to
satisfy your fair share.

Mr. Wolfson, in effect, is saying, well, to the extent that you are using my client, you are wrong because we are not going to build an eight acre with eight and therefore we are going to fall short on the fair share.

MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, you are correct, but the potentiality of the housing being built was one of our main concerns.

We are satisfied at this point in time that that will occur.

I do not believe that the issue of eight per acre, in terms of density which is now being objected to, our planners have assured us that there is not a problem with that, we do not believe

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that that should stand in the way of a settlement at this point in time.

Certainly other settlements have gone through with that type of a density, that type of a set aside, and we discussed it before, and I believe that overzoning in this case in terms of a settlement is not necessary.

MR. HUTT: Your Honor, may I be heard for a moment?

The first thing I'd like to get back in direct answer to some of these questions: To Page 9, Paragraph 10, if you will recall, Miss Williams read in an amendment to that in addition to it. The substance of that addition was that if a Reider tract is supposed to be certified satisfactory to them by the Township of North Brunswick, that it's going to build and if it doesn't, it's going to go to Hamelsky or other suitable land.

I made a representation to counsel, which

I want to put on the record, that on behalf of

my client that in the event that Reider does

not build or that certification does not occur,

that in that event my clients are ready, willing

and able to acquire the property from Johnson and

Johnson under the same terms and conditions as
Reider has it and to build in accordance with the
terms of the order, the eight units per acre and
so forth so that in the event it turns out that
he doesn't build or doesn't want to build, we
represent that we will take over his option or
buy the land from Johnson and Johnson at the
same price and comply with the very terms of the
order.

THE COURT: Not only ten --

MR. HUTT: Ready, willing and able.

THE COURT: You are in a position to acquire it?

MR. HUTT: Yes.

THE COURT: Legally?

MR. HUTT: No, not legally. Johnson and Johnson would have to be willing to give it to us.

I don't know what the reason is they are concerned. If Reider just doesn't want to build or he is not interested or something, we will step in his shoes and build it.

THE COURT: What I am asking is: Do you know that if you can acquire it from Johnson and Johnson?

MR. HUTT: No, I don't.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HUTT: We haven't even discussed it.

THE COURT: So, you are ready, willing

and able, but you don't know if Johnson and

Johnson is ready, willing and able?

MR. HUTT: Right. But we want to be

in that position.

Now, it is not often that I get up in court and say that I agree with a lot of things with an adversary. He is not really an adversary yet, but I do agree with what he said.

There is a dilemma in this situation,
no question about it, and there is a lot of merit
to what he said. The trouble is: If you followed
through on what he suggests, number one, there
could never ever be a settlement in Mount Laurel
on fair share number, okay? And you could never
even have a settlement on a lot of these other
things because if you go through this public
hearing process and one guy says, I need eight,
one says I need seven and the other says I don't
want to build, how come you don't do my lands?
And the public hearing process is far less
coordinated than with a court stenographer. I mean
one that works — they use these tape machines and

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everything else, and people are screaming. I think
the Court could take judicial notice of at least
one thing that Mount Laurel is an emotional issue.
All right? So, it doesn't work.

What I see is: You have to devise, and the Court is devising a unique situation -- When I say "unique situation," I mean this: You are kind of allowing a settlement that is distinguishable from any other kind of settlement in that this settlement, if it affects third parties such as his client or any other land owner in North Brunswick he may some day in the future have a portion of it changed, not voluntarily by the parties, but because, for instance, he could come in and -or any other land owner in North Brunswick, after this thing occurs and that's why I related to that other paragraph about the Supreme Court and everything else, somebody could come in and say, hey, there was a court order. There was ordinances. They made it eight units to the acre on my property. I am not a builder. I am a lover and I don't know how to build eight units to the acre, and what is more, all my experts had hearing with the Urban League and convinced them they were wrong in the first place.

No way can we do it eight units to the acre.ac I think they can come in and ask the Court to set aside that portion of the ordinance that affects their property on the same grounds as before Mount Laurel, any land owner could come to any court to ask if it would set aside a municipal zoning ordinance on the ground that it's unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and if you establish the fact that it won't work, you can't use it, that it is arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious, the Court could set aside its own finding, that their property should be zoned this way, without, at the same time — I say it is unique — without at the same time destroying the fact that the case was settled.

Because in all these Mount Laurel cases the towns are settling these cases with the Urban League, with builders and public advocates for two reasons. Only two reasons they are settling: One is they are getting -- three reasons -- one is they are getting a lower fair share number than they are at risk if they go to trial.

That's one compelling reason that every town that is settling has in mind.

The other is: They are avoiding extensive litigation.

And the third is: They have a right to select where this compliance property is going to be.

THE COURT: There is a fourth one, and that is repose.

MR. WOLFSON: Repose.

MR. HUTT: And the repose. Right.

But even if repose, in my opinion,
doesn't stop a plaintiff in the future, a property
owner coming and saying my zone is arbitrary and
illegally zoned, I can't use it.

THE COURT: That's the question. I think that is what is bothering Mr. Wolfson.

I mean, if you are right, then a lot of the impetus for the town to settle is taken away.

Let me say that I have been in many settlements requiring that the judgment contain a provision that if the particular builder plaintiff does not build within a certain period of time absent their being justification for his failure to build, that he loses the builder's remedy and the town will have to rezone for someone else.

MR. HUTT: That is in there too, by the way.

THE COURT: That is the type of thing--Now, I don't think that destroys repose.

MR. HUTT: No.

THE COURT: Because the town should not be able to object since they are supposed to be rezoning in good faith.

MR. HUTT: Right.

THE COURT: But beyond that, if I were to say, for example, if any parcel here is not utilized within a reasonable period of time, then anybody can make application tothis Court to set aside the rezoning of that part, it seems to me.

MR. HUTT: Excuse me, sir. That is not what I was saying. I was saying the opposite.

I was saying where the ordinance or the order zoned somebody's property for mandatory set asides, he didn't ask for it, he doesn't want it, he wanted one-acre farm-lands and now he comes to this black acre and zones it for mandatory set aside and he comes in, he says, two years later I woke up this one day and saw this mandatory set aside.

There is no sewer. There is no water.

The only one that can get here is horses.

That's why I want farmland.

I can't use it for anything else and he establishes that to the Court's satisfaction.

I don't think any settlement or order gives the towns six years' repose and says, despite the fact situation, he can't use any of his property, he can't get that zoning ordinance knocked out as to his land. I can't believe that is what is meant by repose.

I think it gives repose on their fair share standards, their fair share and everything else, but nothing can bind a non-party from something that, by my scenario, is arbitrary, illegal and capricious.

The Middlesex board says, yes, someday they will put water there.

That's why Carla Lerman is looking over it, so there is no risk of somebody coming in and saying that is small, but it's still there.

I don't think you can take a property owner's right to prove at any time that his land has been confiscated.

But that is why I said it is unique procedure in that regard because ordinarily in a Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

settlement, a settlement is a settlement and that's it, and nobody could ever change it.

But it has to have that manual flexibility for the due process of constitutional problems that Mr. Wolfson is raising.

MR. WOLFSON: I am just not so sure that I reach the same conclusion.

If the town feels that eight units to the acre can and the plaintiff thinks it is a fair settlement, I am not sure that they are barred from coming in and litigating the issue of eight units to the acre.

THE COURT: I assume you wanted to amend your complaint to allege that the rezoning is arbitrary or capricous?

MR. WOLFSON: And confiscatory, taken.
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOLFSON: And if the Court enters
an order of compliance, I am not so sure that
insofar as those issues -- I don't know the
answer to this, but I'd hate to have to wake
up six months from now and have the Court decide
on motions or after a year that we are barred by
the six-year repose because what we are really
doing is saying that the ordinance that was adopted

pursuant to this settlement or court order gives

a six-year repose as to the densities necessary

to produce low and moderate, as to the numbers

of low and moderate that are going to be produced ---

THE COURT: You mean barred by the six-year repose in a sense that you could not do anything else with your property?

MR. WOLFSON: I don't know the answer to that, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, I think I'd answer that for you now: I think that any order entered in this case would direct Carla Lerman (1) to look at the issue of overzoning which gives me some concern. I am not suggesting that in every case there has to be overzoning.

As a matter of fact, the Court says it doesn't have to make it.

But secondly, it should look at the reasonableness of the treatment of your parcel specifically and all the rest of the parcels for that matter.

And third, I am prepared to make as part of this order -- You write your amended complaint to allege arbitrary -- since you have started the suit and your suit is still viable, I don't think

that this case disposes of your suit. It doesn't have a right to, and you have a right as a matter of fact if you want to go full blown with your suit, but I think you have a right certainly to challenge the reasonableness of the treatment of your parcel.

one of two things is going to happen: Either the township could choose to modify, alter the treatment of your property so that you could build low and moderate or maybe they will rezone it in another fashion altogether. They have that option too.

So, you know, you could win the battle and lose the war. I don't know. But if they choose the second step, then they are going to have to turn around and provide some alternative parcel, and I think they realize that risk as well.

MR. WOLFSON: If I am not a party to this suit, your Honor, I won't have any realistic input with Carla Lerman.

that you have all input that you want to have in terms of the unreasonableness as you deem it of the zoning of your parcel and the unreasonableness of the order in general because it certainly will

relate to your ability to build low and moderate housing, whether it is under a density of eight or whether it is under a rezoning density that should result from the finding that the ordinance was arbitrary and capricious as to your parcel.

So, I have no problem with you having a right to completely review and disclose to Carla Lerman your findings with respect to the inadequacy of this order both as to your parcel with respect to specific zoning, and secondly, with respect to the order in general and also with respect to this issue of overzoning because if Miss Lerman finds that there is something tenuous about any of the parcels involved here, she is going to have to report that to the Court and we are going to have to take a look at whether your parcel should be treated differently or the Town should do something else with some other parcels.

So, I don't think that the prejudice is as great, but I will concede that if I didn't settle it at all, I suppose you would be happy.

MR. WOLFSON: Well, if you didn't settle it today.

THE COURT: Yes. However, the problems

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inherent in that are so numerous that I don't think that that is a sound or viable alternative.

I want to emphasize that I don't believe that accepting the settlement is by any means acceptance of a class action approach and I don't want to say more than I don't entirely concur, which I still don't, in the concept that a class action would be viable under all the circumstances if that is the thrust of his opinion and I am not suggesting it is, but some people have interpreted it as such.

What I am saying is I am not passing on that concept at all, and I don't see this as a settlement of a class action concept.

We must look at the fact that your lawsuit was filed last week, and when a settlement here was really already --

MR. WOLFSON: That's because we had no notice of it.

THE COURT: I understand that fact, but
I am not settling it in a class action setting.

MR. WOLFSON: Your Honor, I only have one other comment and that really is spurred by what your Honor has just said.

To the extent that the Court desires to Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

give us meaningful input in the matter as I have
interpreted it, see, my problem is: If you look
at Paragraph 16 of the settlement, there is a
provision there that says, "This judgment shall become
final five days after the Court appointed expert
reports to the Court on the matters specified."

I was talking about with your Honor before. I don't think your Honor should approve anything until the package is complete. Once the package is complete and you have determined its propriety or its compliance and you consider the Master's report and you subscribe to the findings of that report, and if your Honor determines as the Judge delegated by the Supreme Court to make that decision that there is compliance, then an order is entered. This is the order according to these people.

THE COURT: I agree with you and I think that sentence is inappropriate.

MR. LEFKOWITZ: Judge, respectfully, it isn't the order because the order provides for further -- it's the order with regard to the issues contained and specifically mentioned and directed in this form of order and judgment, but that the order does provide that there are to be

further orders of the Court with regard to compliance and the other elements of the Mount Laurel decision.

THE COURT: What does that sentence mean? "This judgment shall become final"?

MR. LEFKOWITZ: With regard to the fair share number. With regard to the areas of -- that have been designated as set aside, with regard to the specifications --

THE COURT: Well, suppose Miss Lerman reports that she has problems with the order by the wording of this sentence, it would become final anyhow. The judgment would become final anyhow.

MR. LEFKOWITZ: That I agree, but if, in fact, she has no problems with regard to the proposed specifications of the order, then I would seek to have the Court, in fact, enter a judgment with regard to the items that are specifically agreed to in this order, and this order does not pretend to deal with the other issues of compliance.

saying that this judgment shall become final after
the Court has received the court-appointed expert's
report and either accept the recommendations thereon
or otherwise rule with respect to those recommendations

MR. LEFKOWITZ: That's fine.

THE COURT: That would then give anyone who I felt might be agrieved enough an opportunity to be heard.

MR. WOLFSON: That's right. Since we would proceed as to whether your Honor's decision is in compliance or not and we would like the opportunity to make comments on the Lerman's conclusions to your Honor before that happens which is also why we want to be a party to this lawsuit because I don't know what my status is now for those purposes.

THE COURT: Well, I see no point in consolidating you because I think that you may want to amend your complaint in any event in anticipation of the matter being resolved.

I think you should amend your complaint as an alternative count.

If it is resolved in its present form,

you are going to pursue your own separate lawsuit
as I see it.

So, there is no point in really consolidating the action. So that you are not a party to this suit, but you are a party before the Court and you are a party litigant against the

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Township of North Brunswick.

I think the conditions which I have indicated should be inserted in the order.

I take it somebody has got that.

We will adequately protect you and, that is, number one, that Mr. Wolfson will have a complete right of commenting upon the proposed form and substance of the order to Miss Lerman, have a right to specifically detail to her that the zoning of his property is not appropriate, that Miss Lerman will review specifically the issue of whether there is a necessity of overzoning as well as the reasonableness of the order in its totality, and that Mr. Wolfson, without -- we could include it in this order -- that Mr. Wolfson will have a right to amend his present complaint to assert a claim generally grounded in arbitrariness and take -- but on those conditions and with those amendments I will approve an order subject, I might say, to my specific re-reading of it, that for wording purposes only the fair share number I am satisfied to accept.

MR. WOLFSON: I just wanted to request, your Honor, and it is a request --

THE COURT: One other thing before we Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

1 get to that, Mr. Wolfson. 2 Does the order specifically bar any further 3 suits for builder's remedy --4 MR. HUTT: 5 THE COURT: -- during the process of 6 review by the expert? 7 MS. WILLIAMS: No. 8 THE COURT: All right. I want that in 9 as well. 10 Any other actions brought during this 11 period of time for builder's remedies are barred. 12 I don't know that I can do that legally. 13 MR. WOLFSON: That doesn't affect us. 14 THE COURT: That doesn't affect you and 15 any other actions to be commenced after this 16 statement. 17 MR. WOLFSON: The request, your Honor, 18 is a simple one, and that would be for purposes 19 of the subsequent event and procedures that are 20 to be followed hereafter. 21 I would like to be given the courtesy 22 or the privilege of getting notice of everything 23 that goes on, the same as any other party to that 24 lawsuit. So, although I am not consolidated in 25 that suit, I would like to be given copies of all Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

the Court?

THE COURT: No, no. I think you should, because Miss Lerman also reviews the ordinances.

MR. LEFKOWITZ: Well, the problem becomes:

Do we go ahead and prepare new master plan zoning ordinances to carry out this and then 30 days from now Miss Lerman throws the whole thing out the window theoretically and then your Honor throws it out the window. It's a lot of work and it's a lot of time for the municipality and a lot of cost for the municipality if, in fact —

I don't see the whole thing getting thrown out the window, that the most that is going to happen is some adjustment, if at all, based upon the objection Mr. Wolfson has raised and possibly the issue of overzoning, but I think there is at least a -- at least in draft form the ordinances should be prepared, in some draft form because she will want to redo those. That's part of her function.

MS. WILLIAMS: Fine. We will go ahead, but I will leave it at that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further?
Thank you. I appreciate it.