HECA Ord Kridge 19-Jun-1981 OLY V. O.K. Transcript of Morion: the D the Severage antonity's Morior for Summay Judgmen and D Municipal Utility autoritys notion to strike certain Firenogetoria pg2 = 99

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Use as org SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 1 LAW DIVISION - MIDDLESEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. L-32516-80 2 C+Y OLD BRIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP., : 3 STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT Plaintiff, OF 1 4 MOTIONS -V8-1 5 Friday, June 19, 1981 Middlesex County Court TOWNSHIP OF OLD BRIDGE, TOWNSHIP 2 6 COUNCIL, PLANNING BOARD, SEWERAGE House AUTHORITY and MUNICIPAL UTILITIES : New Brunswick, New Jersey 7 AUTHORITY, 2 8 Defendants. 9 10 **BEFORE:** HONORABLE J. NORRIS HARDING, J.S.C. 11 12 APPEARANCES: 13 MESSRS. BRENER, WALLACK & HILL BY: HENRY A. HILL, ESQ. & GULIET D. HIRSCH, ESQ. 14 Attorneys for the Plaintiff. 15 LOUIS J. ALFONSO, ESQ. Attorney for Defendants, Township of Old Bridge & 16 Township Council. 17 THOMAS NORMAN, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant, Planning Board. 18 MESSRS. YACKER, GRANATA & CLEARY 19 BY: LOUIS E. GRANATA, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendant, Sewerage Authority. 20 MESSRS. ANTONIO & FLYNN 21 BY: WILLIAM E. FLYNN, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendant, Municipal Utilities Authority. 22 STACEY P. STOLP, 23 CertifiedShorthand Reporter Reporting Services Arranged Through 24 ROSENBERG & ASSOCIATES Certified Shorthand Reporters 25 769 Northfield Avenue West Orange, New Jersey 07052 CA002320M (201) 678-5650

THE COURT: Okay. I seem to find the following motions that I have.

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MR. ALFONSO: I wanted to, Judge, on behalf of all counsel to congratulate you on being permanently assigned to this case. We will look forward to spending much time with you.

THE COURT: I am not sure if express of condolence would be more appropriate than congratulations, but I thank you for your well-wishes anyway, and as somebody said, "Will you love me in Decemeber as you love me in May?"

I find the following motions are in one form or another outstanding. There is the Defendant's, Sewerage Authority motion for summary judgment which I deferrred from the last time. There is the Defendant's Municipal Utilities Authority motion to strike certain Interrogatories. There is the Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff's motion to dismiss counterclaim.

There is the Defendant Township and Council motion for partial summary judgment

or alternatively permitting the filing of an amended counterclaim or third party complaint which is joined in by other defendants; another motion to dismiss all damages claims of Plaintiff for failure to comply with the Tort Claim Act.

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There is the Defendant's Sewerage Authority's motion to vacate an ex parte order of dismissal, to extend time for discovery. There is the Defendant Township's motion to require the Plaintiff to post security for costs and Defendant Township's motion to allow 70 days extension in answering Interrogatories. Those latter two I don't have I believe.

Are there any other motions that anybody can think of that may be you even forgot about? Does anybody have any particular preference or order of addressing these motions? It seems to me I ought to save the motion to strike the Interrogatories until last because that's probably going to involve only two of the counsel.

MR. GRANATA: As a preliminary matter I believe as far as the Sewerage Authority's

application is concerned that the Court should first entertain the application to vacate the ex parte order striking defenses and entering default.

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MR. HILL: One other thing. Your Honor, our records show that two of those motions that are noticed for July 2, the one for security by costs by the Council and the one to extend Interrogatories. We have no objection to the latter motion being heard today, but the one involving security for costs involves a legal question which we are just completing research on.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HILL: We are not prepared. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ALFONSO: If I am going to come back I just assume come back on both if I am going to come on one.

THE COURT: I don't think you are going home now anyway and perhaps the one to extend the Answers to Interrogatories would make more sense to dispose of that one way or another at this point rather than wait two weeks and have the same problem,

because what it only does is extend the time for everybody.

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In any event I have an application to vacate the ex parte order of dismissal and extend time for discovery made on behalf of Defendant Sewerage Authority. I have received no opposition to that. Is there any?

MR. HILL: We were short noticed on that. We only got notice on the 17th. Yes, we object to that. We have looked over the affidavit. The affidavit states that we never told them that we would enforce the rule. It doesn't say anywhere that we misled them.

Of course, unless we hear from counsel --

THE COURT: Well, suggesting that you misled them --

MR. HILL: Well, unless we hear from counsel with regard to their intentions, counsel called us and asked for an extension, and unless we hear from them and if they assume that we will not enforce the rules the assumption was mistaken. It is our position that the only way under the rules to reinstate a claim that's been dismissed is to answer the Interrogatories first within 30 days, and then if they are answered within 30 days we have no objection to the reinstatement. In fact that is their right.

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THE COURT: Except that all time periods as far as I know with limited exceptions can be extended by the Court. I don't think anybody is going to say that 30 days is perhaps reasonable.

MR. HILL: We think that those Interrogatories have been in their possession for 100 days. It is not our --

THE COURT: How long will the Sewerage Authority need?

MR. GRANATA: Your Honor, the Sewerage Authority will need at least 70 days. These Interrogatories set forth in the affidavit are quite extensive. They involve extensive record searchings and tying up of quite a bit of time for the experts for the Sewerage Authority. Document gathering and the experts for the Sewerage Authority are not on exclusive retainer with the Sewerage Authority.

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There are also depositions that are scheduled of those experts depending on the outcome, of course, of today's motion for July 6 and 7 and depending on that it is difficult to say, Judge, but the mere size of these Interrogatories would indicate no less than 70 days for the Defendant to adequately answer those Interrogatories.

THE COURT: Do you have any serious objection to that?

MR. HILL: Yes, we object to it strenuously. That takes us way over the period of discovery. It extends the time that this matter can come to trial. All discovery should be completed within 150 days, and we object because we can't seriously get into the case until those Interrogatories are answered, and we think they can be answered in 10 days if they are diligently pursued, and we think it is shocking that this Defendant has sation those Interrogatories since March and now says they haven't done any work on them and asks for more time than

8 the rules would allow them in the first instance. We think 70 days is way over the time. We think they can easily be answered in 30 days, and we do object. MR. GRANATA: Most respectfully, your Honor, the motion that is pending for dismissal was timely filed with the answer to the Complaint, and had the motion been disposed of I would have been well within time to answer the Interrogatories. THE COURT: Can you do it in 60 days? MR. GRANATA: I will do my best, your Honor. THE COURT: Because that will bring you to roughly mid August. Nothing is going to happen in the month of August in any event, so whether I say 30 days or 70 days for that matter it really is not going to affect a trial date because we are not going to have a trial date until September at the earliest.

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MR. GRANATA: If I cannot complete them within 60 days I will come back to the Court.

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MR. HILL: Your Honor, we can't intelligently pursue depositions until we get answers to the Interrogatories. The Interrogatories were propounded almost simultaneously with the servicing of the Complaint.

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THE COURT: That's why I tried to set it in the middle of August so it will at least give you gentlemen and ladies some time toward the latter part of August or early part of September to pursue depositions if you wish.

MR. HILL: We don't have an expert witness list. I think at the very least counsel should be required within ten days of today to furnish us with a list of people that they propose to use as expert witnesses.

MR. GRANATA: Most respectfully, your Honor, Mr. Hill speaks out of both sides of his mouth. He has served me with deposition notices, and while we were negotiating dates for the depositions makes no mention of requiring Answers to Interrogatories or made them in any way necessary for him to conduct the deposition. If I had known this when I was speaking openly with Mr. Hill I would have certainly done my best to cooperate with Mr. Hill, and depositions are scheduled between us for my experts on July 6 and 7.

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MR. HILL: I don't know who his experts are.

MR. GRANATA: He is taking the depositions of several people who he knows are my experts.

MR. HILL: We have sewer engineers because we don't know who his expert witnesses are, and we'd like to progress and try to finish discovery, the depositions over the summer, and we can't begin to do that until we know who the expert witnesses are.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Granata has said a couple of times that he has told you already. Did you say it in a specific letter?

MR. GRANATA: Yes, attached to my affidavit it makes reference to it.

MR. HILL: You are saying Cupper

Associates are your only experts? Those are your only expert witnesses in this case? Is that what you are representing to the Court? MR. GRANATA: That is what I am telling the Court at this point. MR. HILL: Well, if we have that representation that's fine. MR. GRANATA: That's not in any way to limit it, your Honor. That's all I have right now. MR. HILL: Your Honor, the quicker defense counsel focuses on the defense and lets us know who they are hiring --THE COURT: He's already given you at least two names and a group. I think that we can proceed from there. Obviously counsel is bound by the requirement, and I assume the question has been asked for the names and addresses of experts. I have seen at least those entities or gentlemen will be furnished, and I think counsel is all well aware of the requirement to amend their answer if they intend to utilize them at the time of trial.

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12 1 X All right. I will restore your 2 answer and extend for 60 days from today 3 the time in which to answer the Interrogatories. 4 MR. GRANATA: Your Honor, I request 5 also a waiver in the requirement of the 6 costs. 7 THE COURT: I will waive the costs. 8 MR. GRANATA: Thank you. 9 THE COURT: What next shall we 10 address? 11 MR. GRANATA: The Sewerage Authority's 12 motion which has been pending and carried 13 from the Court I think is the oldest if 14 the Court wants to take them as far as age 15 is concerned. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. GRANATA: Your Honor, this is 18 my motion to dismiss the Complaint for 19 failing basically to exhaust the administrative 20 remedies. There's an extensive affidavit 21 and several briefs that have been submitted. 22 Olympia and York or O & Y Old Bridge 23 Development Corporation has in their 24 Complaint set forth allegations that the 25 rules, regulations and procedure that the € s ka traent

Sewerage Authority has adopted are in their estimation arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and not well suited to their purposes.

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There is no application that has ever been filed by this Plaintiff before the Sewerage Authority to process any applications for approval, for review, for consideration, for anything. The Plaintiff has by-stepped the administrative body that has been created by --

THE COURT: But the problem or challenge they are mounting is would that be at all helped by submitting to the Sewerage Authority their application.

MR. GRANATA: Most certainly, your Monor.

THE COURT: Let me finish.

If their point is that the rules and regulations themselves are either unduly cumbersome or harsh or whatever.

MR. GRANATA: No, your Honor, because the Sewerage Authority rules and regulations as I have submitted to the Court provide that any applicant who comes in can request of the Court the authority to waive any or all of the rules and regulations.

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THE COURT: Well, that in and of itself I guess creates a challenge by the plaintiff in affect saying that you can't do that. You just can't have a waiver rule without any particular guidelines as to the how it is to be exercised.

MR. GRANATA: The guidelines are set forth in the rules and regulations specifically, whatever the applicant --there is no application. All that this Authority has ever seen is the Complaint and a map showing Old Bridge Township. That's the essence of their application that is before the Court at this time.

What they are asking this Court to do is suspend the powers of a legislative creative body to administer --

THE COURT: Let's lay aside the application to suspend the powers for a moment for the argument.

Isn't the rest of what they are saying namely that your fee schedule and the rules and regulations themselves are arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious

for one reason or another, and isn't that a question of law? It is not a question of saying we were unfairly treated, but that the rules and regulations pertaining and the fee schedules themselves are defective as a matter of law; and isn't that one of the exceptions whereby you do not have to exhaust your administrative remedies in order to bring it before Court?

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MR. GRANATA: That would be the case, your Honor, if that was the thrust of the Complaint. The thrust of the Complaint is that a \$10 filing fee ---

THE COURT: That has to do with the fee schedule.

MR. GRANATA: That's basically what they are saying, that the fee schedule is onerous because they have 13,000 applications.

THE COURT: You wouldn't want to say they would want to pay the \$10 for each of the 13,000 and then go through a proceeding before your board before they can finally come to a Court and say the rules and regulations and the fee schedule are onerous.

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MR. GRANATA: Yes, your Honor, especially when they are saying the Oakwood at Madison Case has directed the Sewerage Authority to do something concerning the use of the ground and the Old Bridge Sewerage Authority was never a party Defendant, party Plaintiff or in any way controlled by the Oakwood at Madison matter. That was against the Old Bridge Township Council Planning Board. The Sewerage Authority and the Municipal Utilities Authority as far as I know was never part of that litigation.

The Plaintiff's theory is Oakwood at Madison has said Old Bridge, you will do this. Olympia and York or O & Y Development Corporation comes in and says the Town did not do that. They have adopted rules and regulations that violate the mandate of the Supreme Court, that the Sewerage Authority violated the mandate of the Court by adopting those rules and regulations. That's why they are unreasonable arbitrary and capricious, that the fee

schedule is not in accordance with the Oakwood at Madison matter, and we are not part of that, never have been part of that.

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Our rules and regulations have been since the creation of the Authority not challenged or reviewed by any Oakwood at Madison Court decision. They have just come in in a grand sweep, filed an application for every single board and everybody in Old Bridge by paying \$65 to the clerk of the Superior Court instead of going to each body and saying here is our plans, please review them. We come in with a massive project. You the planner, you the engineer, you the road department, you the park system, you the Sewerage Authority, you the Municipal Utility Authority, let's المتحاج الأربية والمحاجات والم sit down and work it out.

They didn't even bother. They just circumvented them and came to this Court and alleged that the rules and regulations of the Sewerage Authority are arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.

If that was the law of the State of New Jersey, your Honor, there would be no

use to have an administrative tribunal. Any Plaintiff can allege their rules and regulations are arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and bypass the administrative body that has been created especially to hear and determine these matters.

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THE COURT: Let me say two things. Number one, I am not sure that it is material to my decision, but I think the Plaintiff would disagree with you in contending that they did not attempt to sit down and work it out with the Authority.

I think part of their allegation as I understand it -- I don't know whether it is true or not -- but it is their contention they did sit down at one time or another and try to work out problems and were told that they weren't going to work out in effect. That's their contention.

MR. GRANATA: That's their contention, and the only document that supported that, your Honor, --

THE COURT: Number two is that, as I perceive the overall thrust of the Plaintiff, it is not merely to get around

the bodies except in the limited area that they seek a suspension of authority which I may have some trouble with, but what they are ultimately seeking is that there be coordination between the various boards in Old Bridge in reasonably -- I am now doing what are allegations -- I am not saying this is what ultimately my decision would be or I am sympathetic with the position -but it is my position what they are attempting to do is to coordinate the various boards in some reasonable fashion to consider their application. I don't perceive that their complaint was not to be ultimately presented to the various boards.

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MR. GRANATA: If that be the case, your Honor --

THE COURT: In other words, they don't want me to take the place of all the boards.

MR. GRANATA: If that be the case, your Honor, there's a mechanism by which they can do that, just as there is a mechanism by which they could appear before this Court. They have gone through the

expense of preparing a Complaint, bringing it to Trenton and paying a \$75 filing fee in order to gain jurisdiction here. They have not done the same thing that is set up in the Municipality to go to the boards and invoke the jurisdiction of those boards.

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Boards just don't respond nor does the Court respond to somebody who walks in the door and says, "Look, I'd like to resolve this for me. I'd like you to sit down and figure out how we are going to work this thing out before I come in and file my application or complaint, so let's sit down."

Now if the Court refuses to do that does that then give the plaintiff the right to go to the United States District Court and say that the Courts of the State of New Jersey acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable way by establishing rules of Court and challenging the rules of Court?

THE COURT: I would think not at easily because the vehicle to force a Board to do something or challenge the constitution-

21 1 ality at least in the first instance here, 2 I am not sure that same jurisdiction is 3 open in the Federal District Court. 4 MR. GRANATA: They are not challenging 5 the constitutionality of these boards, not 6 the Sewerage Authority. 7 THE COURT: They are challenging 8 the reasonableness of the due process being 9 offered by the boards through the rules and 10 regulations; aren't they? 11 MR. GRANATA: Because they allege 12 that the fees are costs generative. They 13 have not -- if the concept as the Court 14 understands is to get these boards and this 15 town together then there is a vehicle to do 16 that, not the Courts. There is a vehicle 17 set up specifically by the mandate of the 18 legislature, the ordinances, rules, regulations 19 of these legislatively created bodies. There 20 is a vehicle for that. 21 If they feel that the fees are 22 unreasonable they have a way of taking care 23 of that. They could file their filing fees 24 under protest. They can file their appli-25 cation under protest and preserve those

rights; but they cannot, I would submit to the Court, just ignore a legislatively created entity and say we don't think your fees are right and then come over to this Court and say that they are wrong.

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We have to have an opportunity to at least respond to an application, to at least look at it.

THE COURT: The nature of the application that would : be made before you or would your board take up then the issue of whether or not their fees, the fees are valid or the rules and regulations are valid? That is not something that the boards would entertain.

MR. GRANATA: They certainly can. I am not speaking for any other board. I am speaking for the Sewerage Authority that I represent.

The statute that creates the Sewerage Authority allows them to set rules at rates, fees and charges. It is discretionary with the Board. The Board has established rules and regulations and fee schedules that they amend from time to time, and they

have a vehicle by which any agreed party can come before them, challenge it, go through the process, preserve that right and --

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THE COURT: Why would they have to preserve it? My question to you was would the board entertain the application itself?

MR. GRANATA: It certainly would.

THE COURT: If the applicant were to come in and go before the board and say, "Now I have paid some money and the first I want to challenge before I present my application is how much I paid. The second thing I want to challenge is the validity of your rules."

You think the board at that is going to have a hearing on their own rules?

MR. GRANATA: Your Honor, that is something that the Board may entertain, and I would submit to the Court that the Board has that right because they were given that mandate by the legislature. They have adopted a vehicle in their rules and regulations to handle that, and unless they are given an opportunity to respond there is no way of determining that. I can't say what the Board would say, but I can represent to the Court --

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THE COURT: Well, they have a way of responding through you before me.

MR. GRANATA: And I am going to do that. In the seventh count of the Complaint there is an allegation that O & Y Old Bridge Development Corporation paid to the Sewerage Authority \$5,000. The person who paid or the entity that paid \$5,000 to the Sewerage Authority is a corporate entity established separate and apart from this plaintiff as recorded in the Secretary of State's corporate files.

Olympia and York Properties paid to the Old Bridge Township Sewerage Authority under an agreement \$5,000 for the Sewerage Authority's engineers and professionals to sit down with the engineers and professionals from Olympia and York Properties to review the matter, to set up a vehicle by which they can conduct studies, by which they can process an application and present it to the Board.

That was done in February. In

February the engineer for the Sewerage Authority was ready to report to the Sewerage Authority of those meetings and the outcome of those meetings, when this complaint was filed. So the Board has already done that. Not with this particular corporate entity, because this corporate entity has never come to the Sewerage Authority. The Olympia and York Properties had come, paid \$5,000 and our engineers were directed to sit down with their engineers and work out some figures.

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Our engineer has completed the study, had charged the Sewerage Authority \$3,000 for a study known as the Erisa Brook Study (phonetic) just for Olympia and York Properties.

THE COURT: Has the results of the study been furnished to Olympia and York Properties?

MR. GRANATA: O & Y Development Corporation filed litigation. We have not heard from Olympia and York Properties any more.

The next application or the next

correspondence we get after this complaint is a letter from Killiam Associates (phonetic) who is now the engineer for O & Y Old Bridge Development Corporation with a letter, and I believe I attached it to my moving papers in one paragraph saying, "Can you service our property," and they enclose a map that shows the southern end of Old Bridge.

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Now in order for the Sewerage Authority first of all under its mandate with the legislature and secondly under its rules and regulations, they have to study and respond. They just can't look at it and say, "Sure, come on in. Run sewers where you are going to run them." There has to be a study.

They have to have the director engineer respond in some way. He responds to applications. They did not prepare applications for an applicant. They don't do their studies. They don't lay their lines.

We, the Authority, merely got a big map. We don't know how many igallons of

sewerage they propose. They don't tell us any of those technical matters that we could respond to, whereas Olympia and York Properties agreed with the Sewerage Authority to pay the Sewerage Authority engineers up to \$5,000 to do this massive study which they did and it's ready. It's prepared. It's for presentation to the Sewerage Authority by its engineers.

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Olympia and York Properties never came back. The litigation was filed. So the Sewerage Authority is not just sitting out in the left field not doing anything. They are ready. They are willing. They are able. They want to get this thing going. They want to have something with which to grasp, but they cannot grasp something that is not an application, nothing to respond to.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, there are a lot of factual allegations which aren't in the Record that have been made.

The one that is bothering me particularly is the allegation that we paid and met with them in 1979. Our affidavits show we repeatedly requested this study for two years. It just so happens two years later when we file suit never having heard from them and having been told by them in a meeting that they won't service us as our affidavits say, that they just coincidentally finished a study that was waiting, that they were waiting to give us.

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I don't want to make factual allegations because my client isn't here, but we have the files showing stacks of correspondence requesting the Authority between 1979 and time suit was initiated if they'd give us the study or give us our money back or tell us what they were doing and there were just no replies.

I think what is important on this motion for the Court to focus on --

THE COURT: I think one of the things -let me interrupt you -- one of the things the Sewerage Authority is saying is that you didn't use the right letterhead in writing for your response.

MR. HILL: Maybe that's an honest misunderstanding. As you can see there is a cancelled check attached to an affidavit.

It does say re: 0 & Y Development Corporation. Maybe Lloyd Brown dealing with them talked with Olympia and York and when they got a check where their money is kept in an account under Olympia and York Properties which is the banker for this subsidiary, there may have been in fact a bona fide 1 confusion as to who paid what; but I think that the tax records of the Town will show that the only corporate entity that owns any property in Old Bridge is 0 & Y Old Bridge Development Corporation, that that property owner owns 2500 acres and yes, Lloyd Brown with supporting, with cards that say Olympia and York which is what the O & Y stands for has been talking and trying to apply and meeting with engineers for a period of years, and that they might have honestly thought that the property owner was Olympia and York; but I think the facts show that regardless of the confusion there were a number of meetings. There is an affidavit on file which says that at the final meeting O & Y was told we cannot service your property.

Our allegation here is that they have a franchise. They have a monopoly to service all the sewerage in the Municipality.

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The briefs and the Court records would show that the only other applicant who is of any size who sued Oakwood at Madison had to sue the Water Authority and then has still to put a spade in the ground.

Our theory is, and we'd like a chance to prove to the Court, that the Township Council has set up these independent entities given the monopolies and franchises which gives them the only right to sell water in the Town or to service sewer in the Town and through these independent authorities controls development in Old Bridge, and that this is -- that there is a scheme of noncompliance, and it is that scheme the we'd like the Court to address. We think and our brief shows and our Supreme Court has said that when the relief requested is a declaration by the administrative agency that its own regulations or actions are invalid and then there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies, that there is no

need to exhaust administrative remedies where the issues are issues of law and not issues of particularly in the realm of administrative expertise.

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The affidavits on file in connection with this motion show prima facie that if we were to develop our land for 13,000 units that it would cost us, physically cost us five million dollars to build a sewage system to service that property connected to the Sewerage Authority, but that their fees, their connection fees and their application fees would total eleven million so that under their system of regulations it would cost us eleven million in fees and five million in construction or \$16,000,000 to physically construct a sewage system in this property.

We think we have the right to argue before this Court that \$11,000,000 is too much to regulate a \$5,000,000 construction job. It goes beyond the scope of this motion, but there is case law on this subject in New Jersey. We believe that when these facts are properly before you

that the Court will have jurisdiction to rule on them, and we think that we should have a chance to argue those issues in the main case to try and show this Court that the Sewerage Authority is acting in concert with other agencies to stop development by making it too expensive to build in Old Bridge Township, and that the statistics on building starts will support this allegation.

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Old Bridge Township with 20 percent of the vacant land in Middlesex County --

THE COURT: I think you are getting beyond the scope of the argument.

MR. HILL: Thank you.

MR. GRANATA: Your Honor, the confusion is exactly why the matter should be returned to the administrative body setup to get rid of this confusion, get down to the bare bones and decide whether Olympia and York Properties is the same entity as O & Y; whether there was an application filed; whether there was anything at all going on. That's what the administrative agency is set up for.

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1	This Plaintiff wants you, your
2	Honor, to sit down and review the sewer
3	site plan to determine pipe lengths that
4	conform with the EPA
5	THE COURT: I am not sure I have
6	intentions presently at least of doing that.
7	As I gather it now the only thing the plaintiff
8	wants me to do is to look at the rules and
9	regulations as well as the fee schedule and
10	determine whether or not they are reasonable
11	and arbitrary and capricious.
12	MR. GRANATA: If the Court were to
13	say unreasonable and arbitrary they'd still
14	have to come back to the Sewerage Authority
15 16	I assume; and when he speaks about an
10	onerous burden there are preliminary
. 18	applications. We are talking about \$130,000
· 18	to submit their preliminary sewer plan.
20	Just very quick calculations 13,000 units
21	they propose. If they sold those 13,000
21	units at \$50,000 which is \$30,000 below the
23	national average for an average home, we are talking about \$6,500,000,000 that
24	Olympia and York is grossing out of a
25	project in Old Bridge, and \$130,000 or

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34 1 \$11,000,000 in application fees is a mere 2 drop in the bucket to such a monstrous 3 application. 4 Concerning the allegation of Oakwood 5 at Madison yet putting a spade in the 6 ground ---7 THE COURT: I still don't think that 8 you necessarily balance the fees on 9 basis that you just suggested. 10 MR. GRANATA: No, your Honor. That's 11 what I am trying to lead to at the Oakwood 12 at Madison matter. 13 The Oakwood at Madison application 14 was approved at the last meeting. Mr. Hill 15 was there when the Sewerage Authority 16 processed an finally approved the Oakwood 17 at Madison application because Oakwood of 18 Madison was involved in litigation, not with 19 the Sewerage Authority. Nowhere along the 20 lines of the Sewerage Authority involved. 21 Oakwood of Madison terminated. 22 There was settlement negotiations with the 23 Municipal Authority. They came up with a certain number of units. Oakwood at 24 Madison processed their application through

the boards. After they go through the boards they finally come to the Utility Authority. Their application came in one year ago to the Sewerage Authority and it was approved at the last meeting. Oakwood at Madison has not had to pay all their connection fees because of an agreement of the Sewerage Authority because of the size of their project and the concern with the Authority. There is a prime example.

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What Mr. Hill is pointing to as why he should be here, Oakwood at Madison is beginning to put a spade in the ground, because they went through the Sewerage Authority, they submitted their application, they paid their filing fees and they sat down and went over it with their engineers, and the Sewerage Authority waived certain parts of their rules and regulations to the satisfaction of the Sewerage Authority and to the satisfaction of Oakwood at Madison; so when we are talking about these fees that's what the rules say. Come to the Sewerage Authority. Tell us what you want to do. Tell us what your problems are. We will listen. We will decide. If you are not satisfied you have preserved your right. Should I stand before the Court and

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say, "Your Honor, I throw in the rules and regulations of the Sewerage Authority"?

THE COURT: Of course not.

MR. GRANATA: Then what? Oakwood --O & Y --

THE COURT: Of course you are not going to say that. You are going to say they are valid.

MR. GRANATA: Supposing I just throw them in. All right. \$10 an application is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. Pay us one dollar. Come in. Let's look at the application. After we look at the application then we can decide whether one dollar is reasonable or unreasonable.

How long did it take your engineer to prepare the application? How long did it take your engineer to prepare the plans? A year, two years? Well, our engineer has to look them over. That's what the \$10 is for, for our engineer to look over your plans. If it took your engineer a year shouldn't it take ours at least a couple of months, and that's the basis of it, your Honor.

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We are wasting the Court's time here. The Sewerage Authority is set up to handle this, set up to review it, set up to sit down and negotiate and work out something that is beneficial to the Town and beneficial to the applicant; but 0 & Y Development Corporation just ignores that and expects the Court to take over this administrative burden; and I don't believe the Court has that much time to waste on this kind of an application, your Honor.

MR. FLYNN: Your Honor, before you close out on this one, I by letter to you and copy to the Brener firm indicated I would join in the application of the Sewer Authority because I think the Water Authority is basically in the same position not having had any applications, probably even less by way of negotiations or preliminary work; and I would join in the written arguments of Mr. Granata and in his oral argument today on that same issue.

MR. GRANATA: Just one further thing, your Honor. The Court can remand this back to the Sewerage Authority and still retain jurisdiction over it and still control it and still get rid of all these side issues, these confusions, these little "who are you; I am me," and this nonsense that the Court has to delve through before it gets to the main issue.

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THE COURT: I would say that I think we will get along much better if we try and make it as least difficult to litigate the main issues as we can rather than play by gamesmanship, and I am not accusing anybody of doing that.

I think the problems are difficult enough without trying to also seek to the tactical advantage rather than take the more cooperative road in the approach to all the problems.

Let me ask you a question, Mr. Hill. Other than the fee schedule what other rules and regulations are you challenging? I am really unclear as to the rules and regulations that you are challenging.

39 1 MR. HILL: The Sewerage Authority 2 and the Water Authority are different 3 entities, and we are challenging different 4 things. We allege in the complaint with 5 respect to the Water Authority that ---6 THE COURT: Let's stay with the 7 Sewage Authority right now. 8 MR. HILL: Okay. Basically we are 9 alleging that we have been through their 10 accountings filed with the State, and we 11 ere alleging that the connection fee, the 12 whole way they calculate fees ---13 THE COURT: Other than monetary 14 calculation which I for want of a better 15 term call fee schedule, is there anything 16 else in the rules and regulations that you 17 wish to challenge as being arbitrary and 18 capricious? 19 MR. HILL: We would challenge the 20 time periods --- I can't -- other than 21 their regulatory scheme and the fact that we 22 allege that they are serving a Township 23 purpose of frustrating development rather 24 than serving developers, no, there is 25 nothing that we would challenge.

THE COURT: What you are saying is you are fearful they are going to foot drag, but you are not really challenging the rules and regulations themselves.

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MR. HILL: We are saying we have already talked to them. We have paid them the \$5,000. They told us they couldn't serve us part of the sewage. We tried to get our engineers to show them how we could do it. They were not cooperative.

We believe they do not intend to facilitate the development of that portion of the Municipality other than for purposes of being the Sewerage Authority. I don't know how otherwise to express it to you. We believe in the conspiracy scheme. We believe that the Municipality intends to preclude in this area from development and the three or four years that Olympia and York has spent trying to work with the Municipality has resulted in this conclusion.

So yes, we think that the regulatory scheme and the discretionary powers as to where and how and which areas they will

sewer -- you see, in this area a developer would need to cooperate with the Sewerage Authority and assist the Sewage Authority in enlarging certain pipes and increasing the capacity of certain pumping stations. It's an engineering problem, and in Oakwood at Madison the Supreme Court ordered the Town to extend the sewer system.

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One of the orders in the case, and it was directed to the Municipality and maybe Mr. Granata is technically right, is that the Sewer Authority not being a party to Oakwood at Madison didn't have to comply with Oakwood at Madison because they have not been complying; but I am saying the Township Committee appoints the Sewerage Authority. They approved it. They created, and they could dissolve it and ---

THE COURT: I really don't think, though, that you are answering the question, and you are making the other attorneys feel uncomfortable or their objections being slightly gored.

My question solely is as far as the rules and regulations are concerned is there

any other specific rules and regulations other than the fee schedule or computation of fees that you feel should be knocked out as being arbitrary and unreasonable?

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MR. HILL: No. At this point the fee schedule and those rules which require them to cooperate with the developer we find inadequate.

THE COURT: How about with respect to Municipal Authority, the Water Department?

MR. HILL: We have another problem with the Water Authority. We have a problem with the Water Authority in that we allege that they have a duty to apply for deviation permits. Old Bridge Township gets water by drilling into the ground, and they need to get permits from the DEP to pump out a certain amount of water.

THE COURT: Is there anything wrong with the rules and regulations? Aren't you talking about the implementation that you are really arguing about?

MR. HILL: No. We claim there is nothing wrong with the rules and regulations other than the fee schedule. We do claim,

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	however, that they have an affirmative
м. М	duty to expand their water capacity and that
	they are not fulfilling that duty.
1	THE COURT: But that again is
ананананананананананананананананананан	not encompassed within the rules and regulations,
	the expansion of the water ability; is it,
	the water provision ability?
Dy.	MR. HILL: No. The fact that they
	cannot physically supply the water that we
	need.
	THE COURT: That is not going to
· ·	be governed within the rules and regulations
	themselves though.
	MR. HILL: We have had some preliminary
•	discussions with the Water Authority. We
	have told them that we would be satisfied
i	if they would release us from their franchise
- 	and let us supply our own water, let us
···	dig our own wells and supply water to our
	community or go to the DEP and apply for
	more deviation permits so they can supply
	the water. We don't care; or three, let us
-	let another franchise in the next town over
	come in and supply water to us.

There is plenty of water, but they

don't have the right to get it because they have never applied for the right, and their failure to act, their failure to apply for more water permits is what has limited development in parts of Old Bridge; and we'd like the Court to focus on whether or not they have an affirmative duty as long as they have a monopoly.

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THE COURT: I understand that. That's not within the scope of the rules and regulations.

MR. HILL: That's correct. The rules and regulations don't set out an affirmative duty for them. I guess I am at a loss because I am wondering as you ask the question should rules and regulations set out affirmative duty, and if they should and they don't then we think they are wrong in that respect; but I don't know the answer to that question.

MR. ALFONSO: I just don't want the Record not to reflect my disagreement in his statement that the Township Council controls the authority and can dissolve them. That's not the case at all in this case.

MR. NORMAN: Your Honor, may I answer one of counsel's questions briefly? THE COURT: Can we try -- again we are going to be really here a long time if everybody feels obligated to jump up and respond to something that is really not germane to what I am trying to find out. I mean I know that you all feel you have an obligation and you are protecting your own clients, but --

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MR. NORMAN: Your Horor, I just want to point out one simple thing, that exhaustion of administrative remedies goes to the argument that they ought to apply to the State for your well permits. He makes the application and none of the Boards in the Town really have an obligation to apply to the State for anything.

A THE COURT: With respect to the applications of the Sewage Authority and Municipal Utility's motion for summary judgment they are denied insofar as it is argued that the Plaintiff must exhaust its administrative remedies first before obtaining a judicial review or a look-see

at the fee schedules themselves.

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It seems to me that that is a question of law. I don't perceive the Plaintiff's complaint to be that he wants this Court to serve as any of these boards or reviewing authorities. It seems rather what the plaintiff wants to do is to get on with his whole development and will submit to reasonable requirements of boards; but he feels one of the unreasonable requirements is the fee schedules themselves; and it seems to me that whether or not those fees are lawful and appropriate it becomes a matter of law in the case of Matawan vs. Monmouth County Tax Board, 51 N.J. 291, A1962 decision of our New Jersey Supreme Court, is not necessary when we are dealing with questions of law to challenge in effect some part of the scheme that you have to actually present an application in order فيتقا وتعاريج فالهود وأردرهما to be able to challenge.

With respect to the complaint as it may challenge the other rules and regulations of the Sewerage Authority and the Municipal Utilities Authority except for how, whatever provision it may be having to do with if there is such a provision applying for additional water rights, the application for summary judgment is granted. In other words, there's no offer made that they are challenging any other provisions except the fee schedules for both utilities, and to whatever extent it may apply the requirement if there is such a requirement that the Municipal Utilities Authority allow either themselves go in and get additional water rights or exempt the plaintiff from providing its own water either directly or indirectly through another community.

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With respect to the application for summary judgment having to do with the payment or nonpayment of \$5,000 and the return of that amount of money it seems to me that that is a fact question as to whether or not it was paid; who paid it and whether it was an interlocking relationship, and they are fact questions presented so I must deny summary judgment on that account. Okay.

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1		MR. GRANATA: Your Honor, the order
2		would read that the issue in the complaint
3		concerning the Sewerage Authority is only
4		the reasonableness of the rate schedule?
5		THE COURT: Yes. You are going
6		to submit an order for both yourself and
7		Mr. Flynn's client.
8		MR. GRANATA: We will cooperate
9		in preparing the order.
10		MR. HILL: Let me understand. Are
11		you saying that
12		THE COURT: You may challenge without
13		exhausting the administrative remedies,
14		the reasonableness of the fee schedule and
15		to whatever extent the rules and regulations
16		of the Municipal Utilities Authority has to
17	.:	do with how they get water rights. That you
18		can challenge. The rest you can't challenge.
19		You have told me in fact there is no
20		challenge.
21		MR. HILL: All right. So the fee
22		schedule plus the deviation permits we may
23		challenge.
24		THE COURT: Without exhausting
25	- 	administrative remedies.

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1		MR. HILL: Without exhausting
2		the administrative remedies and the rest
3		we can't challenge. I understand.
4		THE COURT: All right.
5		MR. HILL: A minor confusion.
6		Apparently both Mr. Flynn and I sent orders
7		on the last motion and your Honor signed
8		both, and they are slightly differently
9		worded.
10		THE COURT: On what?
11	c c	MR. HILL: That was the motion to
12		extend the time to answer the Interrogatories
13		Maybe we can get a better procedure for
14		making sure we don't have duplicates.
15		THE COURT: I asked Mr. Granata
16		in this instance to prepare a joint order
17		with Mr. Flynn.
18		Let's go to the plaintiff's two
19		motions.
20		MR. HILL: Miss Hirsch will argue
Ż1		the plaintiff's motions.
22		THE COURT: Now as I understand it
23		the plaintiff has two motions. One is
24 ⁻		for partial summary judgment respecting a
25		claim for a libel. The second is plaintiff's

motion to dismiss the counterclaim or counterclaims insofar as they still set forth a cause of action for which damages may be realized for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

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It seems to me that I decided this once already; am I correct?

MR. GRANATA: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Is there any opposition to making the motion or my decision as I decided previously since I think it's addressed to the amended answers, that I shouldn't have the same result that I rendered at that time should not be equally applicable to the amended answer?

MR. GRANATA: I filed no amended answer on behalf of the Sewerage Authority so I presume that the Court's order, plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant Township Sewage Authority's counterclaim sounding abusive process is denied without predjudice would be a continuation of that order?

THE COURT: Is that the thrust of what your motion was,' to make it current?

MS. HIRSCH: Excuse me, your Honor. I think the problem was I was looking at the order that I submitted which was signed which only dismissed the malicious prosecution claims.

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I'm sorry. There's some confusion in my mind. I know that you did rule on the libel claim.

THE COURT: Can I suggest to you why don't you withdraw this motion until you don't have the confusion because I am confused too, and if you are going to tell me that you are not sure what you are addressing why don't you withdraw the motion without prejudice and refile it if you find the confusion still exists.

MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, I noticed a motion for partial summary judgment referencing several points in the brief that we had previously submitted. Those briefs refer to the libel claim which arises out of statements which agents of plaintiff may have made to the newspapers. My understanding was that was denied

at the time without predjudice to renew

after a permanent judge was appointed to handle the case.

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THE COURT: Well, that had to do with the libel claims. I rather think that may be treated with some of the other motions that deal with the libel claims brought by the defendant Township.

Let me put that libel motion aside for the moment today.

The other motion was to dismiss the counterclaim. It seemed the purpose of that motion was to make current on all present counterclaims the concept that you can't seek damages against your client for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

MS. HIRSCH: Yes, your Honor. That was against the Municipal Utilities Authority who filed an amended counterclaim stating five new separate defenses and also repeating the counterclaim which sounds in abusive -excuse me -- failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

MR. FLYNN: That's where she's got her mistake because what she thinks it sounds in it doesn't sound in. That's her problem.

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MS. HIRSCH: Ultimately we move to dismiss it for failure to reinstate it. THE COURT: You haven't told me why. You just make a broad statement in about a sentence. It's the last paragraph of your motion or your brief. MS. HIRSCH: I understand that. I am unable to tell if that is not an allegation of failure to exhaust administrative remedy what the claim sounds in. THE COURT: No. You say it ought to be dismissed because of failure to state a cause of action; doesn't it? MS. HIRSCH: Yes. THE COURT: But you haven't told me why. You just made that as an allegation as part of your motion. I don't see really how I can treat it at this time. MS. HIRSCH: I can't figure out what cause of action it states. It alleges that we are a foreign corporation, that we have a purpose to harass these particular defendants, especially the MUA, that we have never filed any applications for service or

approval and as a direct result of that they will incur damages.

THE COURT: Okay. Now I think I am going to deny -- have you finished your argument on this motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the two grounds?

MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, this is the identical counterclaim we argued before.

MR. FLYNN: Exactly. They made the same argument before. Your Honor ruled that if exhaustion of remedies was the only basis of my counterclaim then I had none, and that was the order; but it's basically a malicious abuse of process and I talk about the nature of the suit being arbitrary and unreasonable. That's what it sounds like, not exhaustion of remedy.

MS. HIRSCH: In that case it's missing a critical element of that tort. $\mathcal{H} \not \mathcal{K}$ THE COURT: With respect to the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim again the Municipal Utilities Authority it will be granted insofar as that counterclaim may sound in seeking damages for failure to exhaust an administrative remedy.

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I believe that this is consistent with my ruling the last time. It is denied as it is generally set forth to dismiss because it doesn't spell out a cause of action.

It is denied without prejudice to being renewed when you tell me more specifically what you mean and let. Mr. Flynn have a chance to respond to what you mean; but you just say it in a sentence and it doesn't spell it out. You have not told me in what way you feel it is defective, and I think in fairness to Mr. Flynn he ought to be given an opportunity to understand your argument as well as --

MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, this is an argument we have posed before. It is an argument that there are --

THE COURT: The only thing I am telling you is I don't doubt your right to make it, but I would like for you to spell it out to me what it is precisely that you are saying because I don't think it is fair for me to just take a paragraph and say but we made this three weeks ago. You will recall. your Honor said thus and such, and then for

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Mr. Flynn to get up and say but we said three weeks ago thus and such, and I have no idea of what you are talking about.

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If you told me that you want to rely on something that you said at least in preparation for your motion I could read your paper and understand the rest of your argument, but for me to evaluate the drawing upon what you recall was said, what he recalls was said, and I am sitting in the middle trying to recall myself off the top of my head, I don't think I can deal with your motions that way.

MS. HIRSCH: I understand that. Our difficulty was that the cause of action was never spelled out. I can respond to it now.

THE COURT: I don't want you to respond off the top of my head or trying to evaluate arguments. I deny it without prejudice. I request if you want to make it make it formally and spell it out so Mr. Flynn can address himself and I can have a chance to evaluate those arguments before coming out to hear it. Even if you refer in

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those moving papers to something that may have occurred I can have a chance to look that up; okay?

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MS. HIRSCH: Yes, your Honor. MR. FLYNN: Just for clarity is she going to prepare the order on that? THE COURT: Why don't you prepare this one?

MR. FLYNN: She has been granted in part.

THE COURT: Mr. Flynn, please, you won. Please prepare the order.

MR. FLYNN: All right, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Now the order on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment had to do with the claim for libel. I think that that really should be taken in conjunction with the defendant Township's motion for partially summary judgment or some of the alternatives released as that deals with libel; but I think you, Mr. Hill, apprised me you really don't want to respond to that today; and I correct? MR. HILL: Well, I can respond to

the motion for leave to amend their counter-

1 claim to bring in the individual parties. 2 We are ready to respond to that. What I 3 was not ready to respond to was ---4 THE COURT: There's two other parts. 5 One has to do with the conspiracy count and 6 the other has to do with failure to comply 7 with the Torts Claim Act. 8 MR. HILL: We were served on June 16 9 with a conspiracy count. I just have not, 10 you know ---11 THE COURT: Can we deal with the 12 libel question then? 13 MR. HILL: We can deal with the 14 libel question, but we are not prepared 15 to deal with the conspiracy count insofar 16 as there is a new conspiracy count motion. 17 We just simply haven't done the work on 18 that. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. HILL: Why doesn't Miss Hirsch 21 deal with our affirmative motion and then I 22 will deal with our response to their motion 23 for leave to amend to bring in the individual 24 plaintiffs. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, the statements at issue are statements that allegedly were made to newspapers sometime around the time the complaint was filed in this matter. All of those statements are at pages 12, 14 and 16 of my earlier summary judgment brief, but I can read them into the Record if that's the easiest way to deal with that.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MS. HIRSCH: "After two years, Olympia and York hasn't even been able to get an application in." That's the first quote.

The second quote is, "The proposed development, which would contain between 15,348 and 20,464 units of mixed housing, would also include commercial developments such as a supermarket." That's the second quote.

The third is, "He said the Township and its ordinance require the company to provide architectural designs of proposed homes before the Township will determine whether we can actually build the homes. We are not allowed to know what we can plan

to build until we design the plans." That's the third.

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The fourth is, "Hill said that the Sewerage Authority and Utilities Authority prohibit the developer from using Municipal Services, but also prohibit the company from drilling for water or building utility lines."

The fifth quote is, "Old Bridge is ignoring the second most famous land use decision in the State, Oakwood at Madison, which came out of its own Town."

The sixth quote is, "Henry Hill, attorney for Olympia and York, said that the 63 page suit was a strong indictment of not only the Twonship's zoning ordinance but of the way in which business is conducted in Old Bridge."

The seventh quote is, "The 1978 Ordinance restricts the development of small lot single family homes. We are charging that Old Bridge had no intention of permitting this kind of development."

Your Honor, you can notice from all of those guotes that the Township Council, either the council itself or its individual members are not mentioned by name or even implicated in any way. There is discussion of the Town in general.

Under New York Times Company vs. Sullivan, the landmark Supreme Court Case and additionally a recent law division decision by Judge Gibson of Atlantic County rendered February 26, 1981, this kind of an impersonal attack on Government operations may not constitute libel of the officials or the Government agency as a matter of first amendment law.

In the Weymouth Township Board of Education Case decided by Judge Gibson the plaintiff was the Board of Education. The defendants were taxpayers who alleged that the Board of Education had misused, lost or possibly embezzled School Board funds. The Law Division held in that case discussing other case law, doing a thorough review of the case law throughout the country and found that the article at issue, these statements even if they were defamatory could not be the basis for an action in libel.

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In the New York Times case the Court found that an individual member of the governing body also did not have a right to sue for libel. Defendant Sullivan in that case as an elected commissioner of local government who is also the Police Commissioner, he claimed --

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THE COURT: Didn't the New York Times Company say they didn't have a right to sue for libel in those factual circumstances? Didn't say didn't have a right at all; didn't it? Didn't it cough out an area where an individual could sue for libel?

MS. HIRSCH: Only when the statements which are allegedly defamatory are of and concerning the plaintiff as a matter of law. That is not a question of fact. That's a question for your Honor's decision and the statements of the type I just cited from the Weymouth Township case which made explicit reference to the Board of Education, the plaintiff in that case, the Court found that as a matter of fact that could not be the basis for libel for the Board of Education.

In the New York Times case the issue is whether Sullivan, the Police Commissioner had an action in libel. The Court found not only did the Commissioner as a body not have an action of libel, but he did not have an action in libel because the statements did not refer even implicitly to Sullivan or to his actions or in any way refer to his actions. That's a basic requirement of libel that the statement be of and concerning the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court found in that case that there were not and these cases are direct analogies to the types of statements which the Township Council complains of.

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THE COURT: Are you saying to me that there would be a cause of action in certain instances if they were personalized to a particular member and made with malice?

MS. HIRSCH: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Whether it is generally addressed to a Board's conduct, that that doesn't give rise to the Board itself to seek a claim for libel?

MS. HIRSCH: That is correct. The

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1		statements have to explicitly reference the
2		individual, not necessarily by name, but
3		sufficiently enough so that a reader may
4	ж	identify the person being libelled.
5		THE COURT: Who has claims for libel
6		besides the Township, anybody?
7		(No response.)
8		THE COURT: Okay, just the Township.
9	26 °	Okay, Mr. Alfonso?
10		MR. ALFONSO: You have two separate
11	н. 1	defendants here. You have a governing
12	•	body and then you have the members individually
13		that make up the governing body.
14		THE COURT: So they are not named.
15		MR. ALFONSO: No, they are not,
16	•	but I am saying as far as the cases are
17	• • •	concerned they are drawing a distinction,
18		and I would agree that as far as a governing
19	· ·	body itself it would appear based on that
20		recent case which they submitted a governing
21		body itself could not maintain an action for
22		libel.
23		THE COURT: Do you agree then that I
24	-it • • .	should grant them summary judgment under
25	3	your counterclaim alleging libel?

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MR. HILL: Yes.

MR. ALFONSO: One point of clarification, and I think by their not objecting we know where we stand. They brought an action against the Township Council without their now objecting, I assume they bring it against the Township Council as a governing body and not against the individuals.

MR. HILL: That is correct.

THE COURT: The suit is made against the Township as an entity and the Council as a body but not as against any individuals.

MR. HILL: Yes. We have no claim for damages. We are seeking to reference the ^{cause} of action. It's in the nature of a declaratory judgment that we are seeking here and nobody is being sued individually. The government as the government is being

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sued in prerogative writ in order to get a declaration of rights and get certain ordinances declared invalid.

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MR. ALFONSO: The next point then for me to address myself to I would think would be my affirmative motion to amend that count one and instead of listing it as coming from the Township Council have it be the individual members of the Township.

THE COURT: Don't you really have to file some of the individual members who are not a party? Can you really file a counterclaim or third party complaint? Don't you really have to file a separate suit?

MR. ALFONSO: That may very well be to file a separate suit and have it consolidated with this action. We can certainly proceed that way.

THE COURT: It seems to me that a counterclaim or third party complaint where the people who you want to bring in the suit are not a party. I just can't add them in at this time. The best I can do is after it is filed is to consolidate if that

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were the appropriate thing.

MR. ALFONSO: Fine. I was just trying to save some Court appearances if I could. We will then proceed on that.

THE COURT: Do you wish to respond? I think he's conceded.

I think counsel conceded preedurally I can't do it, so the defendant's application, defendant's Township application to amend the counterclaim or file third party complaint

so as to set forth causes of action for individuals itself is denied. It is, of course, denied without prejudices to those individuals starting their own suit or seeking their own remedy in some other way and leave it for a future day whether such claims should be consolidated.

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Who is going to submit the order? MR. HILL: We will submit the order.

Your Honor, on the two other motions by counsel we would like to suggest that the motion for extension of time be argued now and we are willing to submit the issue of whether we should file security if the Court would give us five days to file a letter with the Court just quoting some law on that. We are willing to stipulate that the Court should determine that motion. The security involved is \$100 I believe under the statute, if Mr. Alfonso is right. We don't believe he's right; but we'd like to make a brief argument on that point and submit a letter opinion and have your Honor decide it thereafter if that is agreeable to Mr. Alfonso.

MR. ALFONSO: That would be agreeable to me, Judge, on the proviso that I get an opportunity to respond also by letter brief. I have given no basis.

THE COURT: Ten days each.

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MR. HILL: Fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: So on defendant's Township motion to post security for costs alleging the plaintiff is a foreign corporation and should be required to post the bond for \$100 I will allow you each a period of ten days to file a brief in response. Again may I say though that I really think you have enough trouble meeting the issues without getting into --we are talking about a building project here, without worrying about security of \$100.

MR. ALFONSO: I absolutely agree. That was brought as a result of their taking action against Mr. Granata. If they intend to do it we do too.

THE COURT: I think I have enough difficulty getting along and coming to some agreement or at least sensibly litigating the gut issues without trying to either act punitively or -- and I am not accusing anybody of doing it here, or gamesmanship, and I am not necessarily making that accusation here either; but I just wish that we would not have to have all counsel technically have the right to make such motions, not have to fight the dispute in those terms. Okay.

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Now on the defendant Township's motion for 70 days to answer Interrogatories I have already granted the Authority 60 days. Is there any objection if I give them 60 days? What difference does it make?

MR. HILL: Having granted the Authority 60 days I don't want to waste the Court's time.

THE COURT: Does 60 days cause a problem to you versus 70 days?

MR. ALFONSO: No, sir. THE COURT: Defendant Township's motion to extend the time for answering Interrogatories is granted for 60 more days. MR. HILL: Let me try and relieve an inequity. One counsel, the Planning Board attorney, called me and asked for an extension of time, and we agreed to an extension of time and he had until August 3. Now it doesn't seem very fair to him because his Interrogatories may be the longest. His Interrogatories --

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THE COURT: Theoretically he started sooner. I will have to deal with the problems as they come up, but it seems if 60 days is fair for one 60 days is fair for the other as of today.

Okay. Let's take a five minute recess.

(Whereupon a recess was taken.)

THE COURT: Mr. Flynn, have you read the letter from Plaintiff's counsel? He makes certain suggestions as to what would be appropriate answers.

MR. FLYNN: I think that some of them, yes, some of my objections will be solved by my referring to our records. THE COURT: Accepting the suggestion which ones then do we still have at issue?

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MR. FLYNN: Well, the whole host of ones concerning relationships between parties, actually for two reasons now. I think your Honor has ruled that the only thing left with the Water Authority is the rate schedule and the divergence so since the conspiracy is out all the others would be irrelevant.

THE COURT: I am not sure that ends the conspiracy parts.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, we didn't understand that motion to be directed to the conspiracy count.

THE COURT: I didn't understand it to have been so ruled either. All right. We are going to have to go through them one by one.

Number 18 asks for photographs, movies, drawings, sketches, charts, maps, et cetera. Is it satisfactory rather than annex full copies to make reference; is that the thrust of the plaintiff's position with respect to that?

MS. HIRSCH: We can specify more

directly.

THE COURT: If they tell you what they are relying upon.

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MS. HIRSCH: We would be satisfied with inspecting, yes.

THE COURT: 18 will be answered by specifying the items rather than annexing. 25 is the next one. What is your opposition to that?

MR. FLYNN: Your Honor, he wants such detail and such data that is not available in any one place.

THE COURT: It says list or generally described.

MR. FLYNN: Reservoirs is easy, but then he gets down to certain things as sewers and water distribution systems, water ways, sources of water, supply, wells. He wants a whole history of the Water Authority in one question.

That question alone would take probably a staff months to prepare such a list. It's taken us 20 years to get in this position to have all these things and to do it in a short period of time is an almost

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impossible and voluminous job.

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MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, we need to know all -- we need to have designated for us all facilities that have been acquired or otherwise purchased by the Authority in order to figure out whether their connection fees are reasonable because their connection fees according to the Sewage Authority statute must be somewhat based upon existing bond payment requirements, that kind of thing. That is the reason for this.

Most of these are very major facilities, reservoirs, basins, damns, canals. I mean many of them may not apply in this case, and that's all that needs be said.

MR. FLYNN: If we limit it to major facilities then it might be a more reasonable question.

THE COURT: Okay. 25 will be answered by requiring the Authority to list the major facilities.

The next one is 26.

MR. FLYNN: 26 is a similar type question.

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	1	THE COURT: I think, though they
	2	are all major facilities they are talking
	3	about there. I think they are all major;
-	4	aren't they? List all major facilities.
	5	The next one in dispute is 27.
	6	Seems to be disposed of in the same way;
	7	isn't it?
	8	MR. FLYNN: 27, list all major
	9	facilities.
;	10	MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, just for
	11	clarification when we say major facilities
	12	we mean major water supply, water treatment
	13	and distribution. Those are three distinctive
)))	14	types of facilities. You are saying list
	15	major facilities of each type?
i	16	THE COURT: Yes.
	17	MS. HIRSCH: Okay.
	18	THE COURT: So again repeat the
	19	categories so Mr. Flynn is clear.
	. 20	MS. HIRSCH: Water supply is the
	21	first.
- 4 ⁻	22	MR. FLYNN: I think the three
	23	questions deal with the three categories
	24	you just said. 25 is facilities. 26 is
	25	supply.

76 1 MS. HIRSCH: No, there is a distinct-2 MR. FLYNN: And 27 seems to be ---3 MS. HIRSCH: Excuse me. 25 refers 4 to facilities. 5 THE COURT: What are the three major 6 categories? 7 MS. HIRSCH: Water treatment, 8 water supply and water distribution. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Supply, treatment 10 and distribution in those numbers. 11 MR. FLYNN: 28. 12 THE COURT: Those three categories 13 would apply to the questions 25, 26 and 27. 14 Now we are on 28. 15 MR. FLYNN: In my certification 16 I indicate the reason why we shouldn't have 17 to answer this one. These are all -- I 18 would like to refer to the records and give 19 them the records with respect to various 20 charges that the Authority has had and the 21 amendments thereto. 22 THE COURT: Is that satisfactory 23 if he tells you where the records are?" 24 MS. HIRSCH: Yes, if he supplies us 25 with the records.

1	MR. FLYNN: Not supply them.
2	We will tell you where the records are.
3	MS. HIRSCH: And we will have the
4	right to inspect them?
5	MR. FLYNN: Yes.
6	THE COURT: 28 will be answered by
7	a designation of the records.
8	MR. FLYNN: And permit inspection.
9	THE COURT: And permit inspection
10	and copied if the plaintiff so wishes.
11	MR. FLYNN: 29 is a similar type
12	of a question, and I assume the same type
13	answer.
14	THE COURT: Similar disposition.
15	MR. FLYNN: 30 I would like to
16	supply our annual audit reports which have
17	the operating expenses, and then they can
18	from their experts extrapolate the information
19	they need.
20	THE COURT: Let me ask you this.
21	Talking from the time of creation how many
22	years are we talking about roughly if you
23	know?
24	MR. FLYNN: I am not positive. I
25	think it's about 15 or 20 years. I am not

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positive though.

THE COURT: You will give the audit reports for 15 or 20 years then? MR. FLYNN: That's the best I can do.

THE COURT: Will that be satisfactory? MS. HIRSCH: As long as it is up to date, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. 30 will be answered by supplying the audit reports.

MR. FLYNN: Then we go to 31. I think answering referring to the records would be similar because it's a similar type question as 28 and 29, and permit inspection and if they want to copy, go ahead and copy.

MS. HIRSCH: I don't agree with that. The question asks for the method by which the fee schedules were determined. That method may be during the course of public hearings. There was discussion over variations in each rate schedule. There may have been reports from their consultant just filing a certain rate schedule. We want to know how they came to the conclusion

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that the rates services would pay all expenses, and if their answer is there has --

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THE COURT: How many times have the rates changed; do you know?

MR. FLYNN: I would say at least about four times to my memory, and the problem with all of the back rates is the personnel has changed. There are people no longer in Town. There's a different engineer. I could do it with respect to the most recent one, and I should think that would be the one in question. That's the one they are challenging.

THE COURT: Does it really make any difference what the rationale was in older rate schedules?

MS. HIRSCH: We'd just like to go back to prior to the Oakwood at Madison decision. We can put a time limit on it I'd say of 1975.

MR. FLYNN: As I say, other than the most recent one the rest would be a fishing expedition.

THE COURT: When was the most recent one?

MR. FLYNN: In '79 or '80.

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THE COURT: When was the one before that?

MR, FLYNN: I don't know. I wasn't there then. The personnel has changed considerably since then, but that's the one they are challenging.

THE COURT: I will require only the most recent one. In answering 30 you will answer information concerning only the most recent rate schedule.

MR. FLYNN: Then we go to 62 I guess is the next one, and this is information that we don't have. We don't keep records like that by year.

THE COURT: Then you could answer it that way; couldn't you?

MR. FLYNN: Well, I didn't think they'd be satisified with such an answer.

THE COURT: Well, if it is a statement we don't have such information --

MR. FLYNN: All right, fine.

MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, I think that the rule concerning the alternative of inspecting documents where information

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81 1 can be obtained from business records of an agency --THE COURT: I understand him to say 4 they don't have those records. MR. FLYNN: Not in the form they want. Somebody could probably -- it would take quite a job to try to do it. I don't even know if it can be done, but they are welcome to look at the records. THE COURT: Then 62 should be answered by designating the records with right to copy and inspect. 13 MR. FLYNN: 63 I think I will go along with their suggestion that making records available will be satisfactory to $\sim 10^{-10}$ answer 63. THE COURT: 63 will be answered by making the records available. MR. FLYNN: 64, I think the same answer. THE COURT: 64 will be answered by making the records available for inspection. MR. FLYNN: And 65, same thing. THE COURT: 65 will be answered by making the records available for inspection.

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MR. FLYNN: 71 is the next one. MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, I believe the confusion with that one was an improper reference to a preceding Interrogatory. That's what the problem is. It should refer to 70, set forth as to -- but not listed in answer to number 70 it should say. Number 70 are permits held by private water companies which were acquired by the Authority.

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MR. FLYNN: So we will answer that -- make that change.

THE COURT: Question 71 will be amended so as to have the internal reference to question 70 rather than 69 as amended. Question 71 will be answered.

MR. FLYNN: Next is question 76, and I just think that would be unreasonable to require us to in effect do a water feasibility study all over Old Bridge Township by each zone of what each zone is allowed to have. That's just not the function of Interrogatories I don't think.

MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, we would be satisfied with an answer that they do not know the answer to this or they have not studied the guestion.

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MR. FLYNN: All right. I will accept that.

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THE COURT: All right. 76 will be answered by either the supplying of the information if --

MR. FLYNN: We will give them what we have and what we don't have --

THE COURT: If the Utilities Authority has it. If they don't have it they should say so, but I will not require the Authority to make such a study.

MR. FLYNN: All right. Now we get to a really omnibus question such as 93 and on. I mean 93 says if any member, agent, employee or consult of the Authority is personally acquainted with any member, agent, employee or consult of the Planning Board. That question is ridiculous. That means that some 40 people who are associated with the Water Authority have to be quizzed to see if they know anybody on the Planning Board, and then if they do all kinds of personal relationships. That question is ridiculous, overly broad and certainly would not be the kind of thing that we do, because how can I ask an employee of the Water Authority to answer such a question? He is not being sued.

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THE COURT: How many people are on your Authority?

MR. FLYNN: Well, they are not limited to just the Board. There's five on the Board. There's another 30 or 40 employees. There's professional staff. You know, this question just goes on and on and on.

Even as to the Board I don't think the guestion is proper.

MS. HIRSCH: We would be satisfied with the Board, limiting this question to the Board itself, its executive director and its engineering consultant.

MR. FLYNN: I submit that that's also improper. The Board is not being sued individually. The engineer is not being sued. They want to take depositions of people, let them take them.

by requiring the Authority to survey its

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Board, its consultant and its executive director and making inquiry of those persons to have them list who they know on the Old Bridge Planning Board and they can tell us who they know.

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Thereafter I think it is up to depositions to determine the extent of that friendship or acquaintanceship.

MR. FLYNN: Then the next two questions are similar.

THE COURT: They apply to different agencies. 93 has to do with knowledge of members of the Planning Board and 94 has to do with knowledge of the members of the Old Bridge Township Council. 95 has to do with knowledge of members of the Old Bridge Sewerage Authority. They will be similarly answered as 93 with the appropriate changes to the variations of the rule.

MR. FLYNN: Then we go to 107. THE COURT: What's 96, 97 and 98? MR. FLYNN: Did I skip those? THE COURT: No. 107 makes reference to 96, 97 and 98.

MS. HIRSCH: Your Honor, they refer

to conversations concerning the idea of providing a theoretically large area for multi-family housing under the 1978 Land Development Ordinance while preventing housing development pursuant to the ordinance by failing to plan and provide water necessary to serve development. That's 96.

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MR. FLYNN: I don't see how this question even relates to the Water Authority. That looks like it should be addressed to the Planning Board. Perhaps it was --

THE COURT: It is not in here in error?

MR. FLYNN: 96 says who conceived the idea. That's not a question that the Water Authority has any knowledge of. That "should be addressed to the Planning Board or the council.

MS. HIRSCH: Well, our theory is that there's a conspiracy to theoretically permit high density or medium density development and then preclude such development by failing to provide water and sewer necessary.

MR. FLYNN: The answer to 96 the right now is going to be no knowledge, we

don't know.

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MS. HIRSCH: That's the answer. We are asking for an answer.

THE COURT: If 96 is no knowledge then 107 can be answered similarly; can't it?

MS. HIRSCH: Not applicable.

MR. FLYNN: It says who conceived the idea. How could anybody in their lifetime dream of who conceived an idea. The question isn't even properly worded. Conceiving of an idea is not something that anybody could know.

THE COURT: Are we talking about 1077

MR. FLYNN: Now I am talking about 96 which is one of the related questions. Who conceded that the world was round? Maybe it was somebody who never told anybody about it.

MS. HIRSCH: It is basic conspiracy language.

MR. FLYNN: If they ask who articulated the concept that might be a little more appropriate, but conceiving an idea is just an amorphous concept.

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THE COURT: Well, you are not objecting to 97.

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MR. FLYNN: No, but as I say, the question is so foolish I can't even answer it. I am just going to say no knowledge. 107 says did you. Who does it mean by the you? Who is the you?

THE COURT: I will limit question 107, the you in 107 to mean the members of your Board, the executive director and the consulting engineer, and direct you to answer even if the answer is no ...knowledge.

MR. FLYNN: And then 108 I suppose would follow?

THE COURT: If your answer to 107 is no knowledge 108 is applicable only if the answer is yes, so it becomes moot I suppose.

MR. FLYNN: 109 I think we have the same defect. Was any group meeting ever called or held concerning the activity described in Interrogatories.

answer that.

MR. FLYNN: What is a group meeting? That is my question to that. What is a group meeting?

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THE COURT: All right. My understanding would be members of your Board or consulting engineer or executive director with persons on similar plateaus with the other boards or council fathers.

MR. FLYNN: In other words like an official type of meeting?

MS. HIRSCH: No, that is not what we have in mind.

MR. FLYNN: We don't know what they have in mind, nor did the Judge.

THE COURT: I don't limit it to an official type of meeting. It could be an informal meeting in somebody's house.

MR. FLYNN: Nevertheless it would be the official bodies?

THE COURT: If we are talking about members of official bodies then I suppose official is appropriate, but I am not talking necessarily about official group meetings. I am talking about if officials met whether formally or informally. 90 MS. HIRSCH: And that would also include, your Honor, a meeting with insufficient members to constitute a quorum or an interest in that kind of a meeting also? MR. FLYNN: That's why we get back to what is a group. MR THE COURT: I have defined the groups to mean members of your Board, your executive director or consulting engineer. Have any of those persons ever met with people on parallel planes from any of your

informally.

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MR. FLYNN: But by members do you mean three, four, five, one? I mean --

co-defendant entities either formally or

THE COURT: Well, I mean more than one.

MR. FLYNN: In other words, if two members happened to have lunch with two members of some other Board that would be considered a meeting?

THE COURT: To discuss the activities mentioned in 96, 97 and 98.

MR. FLYNN: Suppose they met just for lunch and just happened to be talking about it and one person remembered and another did not.

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THE COURT: That may be the problem of future depositions, but I think counsel is entitled to know the recollection of your Board members with respect to that. Did they ever meet, discuss the activities mentioned in 96, 97 or 98 formally or informally.

MR. FLYNN: All right. Now we get to 113 ad infinitum and these questions all deal with a similar type of answer.

THE COURT: I am sorry. Where did we jump to?

MR. FLYNN: 113 and I guess it is through to the end. This is similar to the one you said to just give names and if they want to take depositions we can do that, but even that --

THE COURT: Does 113 through the end ask for substances of conversations?

MR. FLYNN: Yes.

THE COURT: I won't require it. That's something that you will have to address after he's disclosed that there were such conversations. You will have to pursue

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1	that through depositions.
2	MS. HIRSCH: These are 113 through
3	130 to the extent they ask for that?
4	THE COURT: I think that's what they
5	are asking for, the substance of the conversa-
6	tion, the date.
7	MR. FLYNN: All right. That
8	covers it, your Honor. I will submit
9	an order on that.
10	THE COURT: Okay.
11	MR. FLYNN: I am going to leave now
12	because I am not involved any more.
13	THE COURT: Okay, fine.
14	(Whereupon Mr. Flynn left the
15	Courtroom.)
16	THE COURT: The last motion I
17	- think no, we have two more. I am sorry.
18	The next to last motion has to do
19	with the defendant Township's motion to
20	dismiss all damage claims for failure to
21	comply with Torts Claim Act. Have I under-
22	stood correctly that there are no damage
23	claims being made?
24	MR. HILL: There are no damage
25	claims.

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MR. ALFONSO: And I think that we can

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do away with that motion very easily. I will just put it in the form of an order.

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THE COURT: Okay. Your application to dismiss damage claims for failure to comply with Tort Claim Act is granted.

MR. ALFONSO: The last one had to do with the conspiracy, and I understand Mr. Hill wanted more time on that, so is your Honor going to carry that until July 2.0 or some other time?

THE COURT: Well, I will carry it to July 2. I think I really only need you two gentlemen for that; don't I? MR. NORMAN: I am also going to make a motion on behalf of the Planning Poard.

THE COURT: If you are going to make one make it immediately so whoever is going to address themselves to this conspiracy concept, let's have them in on time prior to July 2 so we can do it on July 2.

Now unfortunately we are going to have to do it in the morning.

MR. GRANATA: The Sewerage Authority's

motion that was ruled upon concluded a dismissal of the conspiracy count and --

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THE COURT: I am sorry.

MR. GRANATA: The Sewerage Authority's motion for summary judgment that the Court previously ruled on concluded a request for summary judgment on the conspiracy count against the Sewage Authority. I noted --I asked if the only issues remaining between the Sewage Authority and O & Y constituted the reasonableness of the Sewage Authority and the \$5,000 rate schedule and I presume the Court had ruled the conspiracy out?

THE COURT: I did not mean to. I did not mean to do that.

MR. GRANATA: Then may I argue that or do you want me to argue that also on the 2ndows with the other conspiracy matter? THE COURT: I think it would make more sense to argue on the 2nd.

Okay. Can I just say to counsel though with respect to this, I have two problems. Number one, count 10 is the conspiracy count; am I correct?

MR. GRANATA: That's correct.

THE COURT: I just raise the question at this time rhetorically. Is there any case law that has application to a prerogative writ action with prerogative writ type remedies that deal with conspiracy or are we really now talking about a misnomer rather than get involved in the conspiracy law. Does the plaintiff really mean conspiracy literally because I don't understand the plea of the plaintiffs to be seeking any criminal sanctions for damages.

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Is what the plaintiff is really talking about kind of the Board's acting jointly and improperly with kind of a concept that several of the preceding counts make allegations of improprieties against the Boards and count 10 merely says that they acted jointly in their improprieties? Isn't that in essense what we are talking about?

MR. HILL: Yes, that's what in essense we are talking about. What we have been bothered by is that the issue of whether the different boards and bodies are separate lines of defense against developments or 1

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We simply want the Court to focus on the fact that there's more than one body, more than the bodies addressed by the Supreme Court in Oakwood at Madison which ---

THE COURT: You are talking merely about the concept of conduct jointly and severally among the defendants rather than a conspiracy.

MR. HILL: That's right, and it is to get to the issue of whether the Sewer Authority has an obligation and the Water Authority for instance to promote the development of housing at reasonable cost or whether they can generate up the cost and it is a constitutional issue.

THE COURT: No, I think your allegations are to the converse of that. Your allegations are that they acted together or acted in concert to prevent or thwart.

MR. THILL: That's correct. THE COURT: Whether that is asymptotic is saying the same thing as to whether they have an affirmative obligation or not may be a different question.

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MR. HILL: We raise the issue in one of our briefs. While at Mount Laurel the Supreme Court said in a footnote we don't care whether it is deliberate and they were talking about zoning ordinances that increased costs had precluded low and moderate income housing. We don't care if it is purposeful or by accident. We want to get rid of it. However, in Oakwood at Madison the Court seemed to say that when considering specific corporate relief the good faith of the parties became relevant and we'd like the Court to focus on the necessity for specific corporate relief in this case because of those allegations and the motives of all those bodies acting together.

THE COURT: All right. I just raised the question so when we do return on the 2nd and you give whatever you are going to give me let's not get lost in a lot of conspiracy or criminal conspiracy. That's really not what we are talking about.

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1	We are talking about more or less
2	acting in concert and the survivability of
3	such an account.
4	Okay. We will stand in recess.
5	Thank you all very much for coming.
6	MR. HILL: Thank you, your Honor.
7	MR. NORMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
8	MR. ALFONSO: Thank you, your Honor.
9	MR. GRANATA: Thank you, Judge.
10	(Whereupon the matter was adjourned.)
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