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1 2 3 4 5	URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER NEW BRUNSWICK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL of the BOROUGH OF CARTERET, et al., Defendants, and	•	
7 8 9	CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation,	: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION : MIDDLESEX COUNTY/ OCEAN COUNTY : (Mount Laurel II)	
10 11 12	WOODHAVEN VILLAGE, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, Plaintiffs, v.		
13 14 15 16 17 18	THE TOWNSHIP OF OLD BRIDGE in the COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, a Municipal Corporation of the State of New Jersey, THE TOWNSHIP COUNCIL OF THE TOWNSHIP OF OLD BRIDGE, THE MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AUTHORITY OF THE TOWNSHIP OF OLD BRIDGE, THE SEWERAGE AUTHORITY OF THE TOWNSHIP OF OLD BRIDGE and THE PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP OF OLD OLD BRIDGE,	OF MOTION:	
20 21	Place: C	x Ocean County Courthouse	
22	I	oms River, New Jersey	
23	Date: S	eptember 14, 1987	
24	BEFORE:		
25	HONORABLE EUGENE D. SERPENTELLI, A.J.S.C.		
	Judith R. c	-Marinke, C.S.R.	

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: 1 2 STEWART M. HUTT, ESQ. 3 APPEARANCES: RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL 4 CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION CLINIC For Urban League of Greater New Brunswick, 5 BY: BARBARA STARK, ESQ. BRENNER, WALLACK & HILL, ESQS., Attorneys for O & Y Old Bridge Development Corporation BY: THOMAS JAY HALL, ESQ. HUTT, BERKOW & JANKOWSKI, ESQS. Attorneys for Woodhaven Village, Inc. BY: STEWART M. HUTT, ESQ. RONALD L. SHIMANOWITZ, ESQ. JEROME J. CONVERY, ESQ., 11 Attorney for Township of Old Bridge 12 NORMAN & KINGSBURY, ESQS., 13 Attorneys for the Planning Board of the Township of Old Bridge, BY: THOMAS NORMAN, ESQ. 14 HANNOCH & WEISMAN, ESQS., 15 Attorneys for O & Y Old Bridge Development Corporation BY: DEAN A. GAVER, ESQ. 16 17 19 21 22 23 24

THE COURT: We cut down on the number of tables hoping we'd get you out of here faster.

I apologize for the absence of the facilities. We are in the process of renovating and just have this temporarily preoccupied.

This is a motion by the defendant Old Bridge
Township and Planning Board to vacate the final
judgment and settlement of January 24, 1986, motion
made pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 and to thereafter
transfer, assuming vacation, the matter to the
Council on Affordable Housing.

Alternatively, the defendant seeks to modify the settlement pursuant to the settlement, and I have read the accumulated months of pleadings together with the exhibits that go with it. Okay?

Who wants to go first?

MR. NORMAN: Your Honor, I guess it's the Planning Board's motion to set aside. We boil down to the bottom line.

The builders and the Urban League are arguing that the Blue Book contains performance standards and that those performance standards would apply to any development on any buildable land in Old Bridge Township, and particularly with regard to the two tracts,

O & Y and Woodhaven.

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Therefore, they argue logically from that premise that since performance standards are established, they have a perfect right to ask the Township to approve development smaller than the one originally proposed.

In fact, I think they point out in several cases that this is an unusual circumstance.

Generally, builders are attempting to go in the other direction, expand development.

So, they tell us that since we have the performance standards in place, we ought to be able to submit an application for smaller amounts, follow the standards, receive approvals and be in strict compliance with the Blue Book.

In effect, the Blue Book doesn't quarantee to large developments. It simply sets up the groundwork.

The Planning Board doesn't agree with that at all We think that the Blue Book salvages three standards. We agree that there are performance standards. Really there are.

We spent a year and a half working on them. also spent a year and a half working on two other aspects of what in effect is a master plan that's in the Blue Book.

Second is use provisions. What particular kind Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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of uses and general categories will be allowed; and thirdly, locational factors.

Any master plan, any plan has three elements in it: Performance standards, vocational factors and use criteria. We believe the plan has all three.

The Planning Board believed that in the negotiations it was willing to accept the fair share number of 1,668 units because it also believed it had negotiated for a particular master plan.

No question that the plan itself would change over time. It covered large amounts of land and involved the largest development proposed in New Jersey.

However, built into the plan itself, into the Blue Book was a 20 percent error factor.

Mr. Sullivan, the expert for Olympia & York pointed it out very clearly to the Planning Board at the hearing.

In fact, the Planning Board continued the application three times pending further delineation of wetlands, because it acknowledged that there would be changes and that if the changes represented less than 20 percent or some percentage in relation to the whole tract that did not destroy the integrity of the plan, the Township would maintain the agreement, continue the hearings and follow the process.

As time went on it became extremely clear to everyone's surprise, not only the Planning Board, but I think the applicant was probably more surprised than we were, more wetlands turned up as a result of more intensive detailed investigation.

The surprise aspect is important to understand in that all municipal bodies that are involved in the planning process are now following the delineations of the Division of Wetlands in the Department of Interior.

They flagged suspected wetlands.

On the basis of that there is an analysis of the area and a delineation of wetlands.

The areas flagged in these two particular tracts were relatively small, and there was no real concern that the amount of wetlands will be as — reached a magnitude that it has in this case — it destroys entirely the Blue Book Plate A Plan of Olympia & York and does substantial damage to the Woodhaven Plan.

It eliminates approximately 2,000 acres of land, and the location of these lands are not some symmetrical form, but are scattered all over the place.

It raises questions with access. It raises extremely important questions with respect to the Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

servicing of the development.

We understand that in order to protect the areas that can be developed, costly roads can be established. We are sure that the roads will be turned over to the municipality.

Suddenly, we now have the responsibility of maintaining an extreme number of bridges through a larger municipality.

The point is this: That the Planning Board bargained for a particular type of master plan development. It was conceptual, but they understood that it had certain meaning and they were convinced on the basis of that meeting that they would agree to settle the matter, accept — accept a higher fair share number —

THE COURT: What do you think you have lost out of this? You have lost possibly the trans Old Bridge connector?

MR. NORMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: I think maybe it's fair to say that in all likelihood you have lost it. I realize that it's alternative B to the revised plan, but that alternative calls upon you to get permits which the builder rather candidly indicates might be somewhat difficult.

MR. NORMAN: That's correct. MR. NORMAN:

THE COURT: I think that puts it mildly.

You have lost, and it's not quite clear to me, but you have lost some significant commercial ratables. We believe so.

THE COURT: How significant? There was mention of three major malls. Are they gone or are they downscaled to strip stores, or where are they?

MR. NORMAN: Well, the locational aspects again are important. The areas that were designated for the malls and for the nonresidential were along Routes 9 and 18.

At the moment they appear lost.

THE COURT: Because of permit problems?

MR. NORMAN: That is right. We are told that applications will be submitted to ask essentially for variances from the Court to permit development on these areas. We hope that's possible.

Those are significant in areas that we kind of need for ratables.

Because of the location, we saw the real possibility of developing those areas as ratables.

THE COURT: Is the golf course gone?

MR. NORMAN:

THE COURT: For sure? It's not clear to me in Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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the papers.

MR. NORMAN: Yes. My understanding is the golf course is gone.

THE COURT: You have lost employment, which, I take it, you felt was a linchpin here, because if you were going to have all these 15,000 homes, you wanted some place for these people to work.

Can you calculate the reduction in employment?

MR. NORMAN: The actual numbers? No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Percentage?

MR. NORMAN: Well, at the moment, all we know, because we haven't seen a new plan yet, and that's not necessarily the developer's fault, but there has been no plan redesign which shows the area that's designated for employment.

The last plan I saw shows no areas for employment, although we are told there will be a provision made for it in the future.

THE COURT: What do you mean by "no areas of employment"? There is still remaining some commercial professional allocation under the plan.

MR. NORMAN: There is some of it in the Woodhaven Tract.

As far as I have seen to date there is none in the O & Y Plan except for areas that are also Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

identified as wetlands that may become available for employment in the future, assuming they can work it through the court process for waivers.

THE COURT: You mean you have lost everything under the O & Y Plan potentially because of wetlands?

MR. NORMAN: We believe so.

THE COURT: That's your position?

MR. NORMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: That would mean commercial, professional, any non-residential use?

MR. NORMAN: Yes. As we understand it now, there are approximately seven to 800 upland acres in the entire tract that can be developed, and the proposals we have seen for maximum residential density would utilize all that land for residential development.

We have no doubt the applicants can build some areas for small neighborhood commercial activity. In fact, I think it would be foolish not to.

But the large scale areas are gone.

THE COURT: Under their revised report of May 26th, 1987 they show 845 acres of residential area which includes public purpose area, recreation area. Then they show a commercial area of 128 acres, and I take it, it's your position that that is wet?

MR. NORMAN: Can I work backwards, your Honor?

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	1	THE COURT: Yes.
e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	2	MR. NORMAN: Our position is that the SD areas
	3	THE COURT: I am sorry.
	4	MR. NORMAN: Our position is that the SD areas,
	5	the Special Development areas are wet.
Section 1985 Secti	6	THE COURT: That shows 149 in this report.
	7	MR. NORMAN: We received a new set of plans.
The second secon	8	THE COURT: I am looking at this. May 26, 1987.
	9	Is there something more recent?
drivers of the second of the s	10	MR. NORMAN: Yes, your Honor.
	11	MR. CONVERY: Received today.
	12	THE COURT: Received today? That's one I
<u>.</u>	13	couldn't read.
	14	MR. NORMAN: We were rushing ourselves.
審論を見る。Line all and Line all and in が確認しませます。 をはませれる。 のは、 のは、 のは、 のは、 のは、 のは、 のは、 のは、	15	THE COURT: You realize if the Giant/Chicago
	16	game were on yesterday, this motion would have been
	17	adjourned.
	18	I mean, nothing else would take up my viewing
	19	time. But instead this replaced it.
	20	MR. NORMAN: It's our position that a portion of
	21	that land is wetlands and will have to be re-
	22	classified in order to be developed as buildable.
	23	THE COURT: So, the numbers I have in this
u T	24	report are not the current numbers?
	25	MR. NORMAN: No, they are not. And we believe

MR. NORMAN: No, no. I am misleading you, your One thousand four hundred fifty-nine acres are the areas delineated by the Corps of Engineers, which There are also other isolated parcels which are uplands but are not accessible, and, therefore, are THE COURT: Well, the breakdown given there is that of the uplands, there is 581 acres or 39 percent which are contiquous. Two hundred acres are in tracts ranging from ten to 19 acres, and the balance is apparently smaller, non-contiguous parcels, and I don't know whether or not they can be used. I understand you may be talking about bridges But have my numbers been changed or Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

as an inducement. In any event. . . 2 What else is there? 3 MR. NORMAN: That's what we perceive as lost. 4 How about the public -- I am trying to look for the designation -- the lands that you could use for public purposes? There was going to 7 8 be some dedications, so I take it you could have schools and that kind of stuff? MR. NORMAN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I gather that that would just stay and be proportionately downgraded? 12: 13 MR. NORMAN: We would assume if the matter is continued, that that is what would happen. 14 THE COURT: And you would assume that public 15 purpose areas, aside from the golf course, would be 16 there and scale down? 17 MR. NORMAN: Yes, your Honor. 18 There is a 19 difference. 20 The Plate A showed 35 acres per community, recreational and public purpose. 21 The latest map we have shows 22 acres. 22 23 So, there is a down scaling. Your Honor, we don't have any doubt whatsoever 24 25 that the developers can down scale the map based on Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

smaller densities.

In this particular case, however, we think we are losing the benefits of what we bargained for.

THE COURT: You have lost an integrated road system, perhaps?

MR. NORMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Correct?

MR. NORMAN: We believe so.

THE COURT: I mean, as you looked at the plan before, there was a well thought out and well planned new road system essentially?

MR. NORMAN: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And now there is a proposal that essentially relies upon existing roadways and some improvement therein.

MR. NORMAN: That is correct. As far as we know.

THE COURT: Okay. I have no other questions.

MR. NOPMAN: I just wanted to point out one additional point, since it's been raised several times, and that is, what the Planning Board expected, you know, what the Township expected.

We have been told that our expectations are now too high, that we should have no right from the beginning, that these were performance standards, and it can be scaled down.

There is nothing wrong with that. However, in the hearings before the Planning Board of March 18th, the testimony by Mr. Sullivan, the O & Y planner's expert discusses every other page the village concept—the planning concept that was proposed to the Planning Board and to the Governing Body at the time of settlement.

Mr. Hutt, in the March 11th hearing of the Planning Board, explains again the concept that Plate A and Plate B are not sacrosanct, but they contain the essential ingredients of a settlement in terms of location, where things are going to be and what will be provided.

Additionally, Mr. Wallace, who is the Woodhaven's expert planner, does the same thing.

We believe we were receiving a certain plan subject to a 20 percent change, but not subject to a 50 percent change.

We think now we have turned the apples to oranges, and the Township believes that on that basis the settlement was really not completed.

The changes that occurred were no fault of the municipality nor basically I think were they the fault of the builders in this case.

I think there was a mutual mistake. I think what Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

happened was that, to a certain extent, the rules of the game changed.

The Army Corps of Engineers changed their definitions of wetlands to everyone's surprise.

THE COURT: You have the transcript of the settlement that went on the record on January 24th and I don't.

I just wondered, and this is going to be an odd question, but I just wondered if there is any indication in there that we talked about wetlands at any length or at all.

MR. NORMAN: No, your Honor, but there is a discussion in it -- in the transcript of what would happen in the event of a major change.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NORMAN: And Mr. Convery --

THE COURT: A major change? What are we talking about?

MR. NORMAN: Unfortunately, I was in the Virgin Islands at the time.

THE COURT: You just proved you are smarter than we are.

MR. NORMAN: I would like to defer to Mr. Corvery.

THE COURT: I will tell you, you cite in your letter of August 11th to me, your reply brief or reply

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letter in lieu of brief, you cite something I said with regard to mootness.

I always hate to read these things, because it just shows me how inarticulately I talk.

But in any event, I said something that I am wondering why I said it, although I vaguely have a recollection of it, and I denied the motion, based on mootness. But I said the mootness may evaporate and come back, and I was talking about a major change basically.

I wonder what we were talking about.

MR. NORMAN: That is correct, your Honor.

Your Honor, I think you were referring to Mr. Convery's letter.

THE COURT: Yes. I am sorry. Yes. You are right.

MR. CONVERY: You struck on the exact point I was going to address, which was the transfer motions, and figuring that Mr. Norman, as the attorney for the Planning Board, would address the Planning considerations.

But if one were to look at page 80 of the transcript of January the 24th, 1986, line 24, the Court specifically says, "That the mootness may, if I can put it that way, disappear if anyone sought to change

the terms of the agreement."

THE COURT: Yes, but my question to you was:

That's what I had before me, because you cited that.

But why did I say that?

MR. CONVERY: If I can expand just a little bit, your Honor, I think I can put it in perspective.

You then go on to say on page 81, "Therefore, if there is an application to suddenly modify the terms of the agreement as opposed to enforce it, the Township would not be precluded from countering with a motion to transfer."

Now, what led to this discussion, if I may go back to that day, is that the settlement was being put on the record.

Carla Lerman was testifying to certain facts, and the attorney for 0 & Y saw fit to say that — he wanted to put everyone on notice that there could be a possibility of a performance question raised by 0 & Y regarding the staging of commercial with residential.

THE COURT: Staging?

MR. CONVERY: Staging.

THE COURT: It didn't sound that way up here.

Okay. Go ahead.

MR. CONVERY: There was a discussion regarding Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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the transfer motion that followed, and I think that what was led into this discussion was the fact that the attorney for 0 & Y was speaking about putting everyone on notice that we could come back and say it's impossible to make the staging — and I think you put words in my mouth, and I am glad that you did — if you read the transcript saying that, well, I am sure Mr. Convery would think it would be fair that if somebody came back to modify the agreement, that then it would be appropriate for the Township of Old Bridge to move to transfer this to the Council on Affordable Housing, and that was amplified, your Honor, on the record.

Now, specifically, the Court on page 78 says,
"In the interest of time -- in the interest of time
what my view on this would be simply this: It's with
prejudice with respect to the settlement agreement as
placed on the record.

"If there is a modification of the settlement agreement as opposed to an enforcement of the settlement agreement, then it seems to me that the Township clearly would have the right to make an application."

"I mean, if the terms change, if the basis upon which they settled this changed significantly, then it would be unfair if there is going to be such a change Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

not to allow them to make that application."

Furthermore, on the next page the Court said,
line 2, "That's what Mr. Convery was saying. He said,
if you changed the terms on which we settle, it should
work both ways. We should have a right to change our
terms, and that's only fair. But as long as no one
seeks to change" -- he was uneasy about the suggestion
-- "that the basis upon which they settled might be
changed."

And then the Council -- referring to the Township Council -- Governing Body, could say, well, then, why do we settle? Why not go to the Housing Council?

That's a reasonable question. So, I submit, your Honor, that we are here today with a significant change.

THE COURT: I was a prophet and I didn't know it.

MR. CONVERY: It is, your Honor, a significant

change when 50 to 54 percent of 0 & Y's property constitutes wetlands.

It's a significant change when they initially talk in terms of building approximately 10,000 units and now their revised plans call for approximately 5,000 units. It's a very significant change to the Township of Old Bridge when Mr. Brown, on behalf of 0 & Y, comes before the Township Council and speaks Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

in terms of changing our staging provisions in the Township Ordinance to accommodate O & Y so that O & Y can build a regional shopping center at the intersection of State Highway 18 and State Highway 9 in the Township of Old Bridge.

THE COURT: Yes. I didn't understand something in your August 11th letter. That may not be your There is a lot of stuff here. fault.

You said that if the present settlement is enforced under the terms as written, O & Y would be permitted to build 50 percent of its dwelling units before it provided any ratables pursuant to Section V-C.6 since O & Y now proposes to build approximately 5,000 dwelling units, it would be able to avoid any commercial development under the staging performance scheduled outline.

I understand up to 50 percent they don't have to build anything under the schedule. But isn't the 50 percent then scaled back?

MR. CONVERY: Well, if we ever were into a reopener position --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CONVERY: -- I would submit that that would be true.

But what I am saying is the way this document Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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reads now --

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. CONVERY: -- O & Y or Woodhaven are taking the position, or at least Woodhaven can build up to the amount that's mentioned in this agreement.

But if you stand by the agreement as written, if Woodhaven, for example --

THE COURT: Well, it would be 50 percent of the 5,000 instead of 50 percent of the 10,000. Wouldn't it?

MR. CONVERY: Well, it would if we reopened the case.

But the way this reads now, they are entitled to build over 10,000 units, and they would be able to build 50 percent of their dwelling units before they have to come in with 25 percent of the ratable.

THE COURT: I thought I missed something. What is good for the goose is good for the gander.

MR. CONVERY: There is one other thing that's important about this: This was a change to the benefit of 0 & Y and Woodhaven from the existing ordinance.

The reason for the change is — and this is in the certification of Eugene Dunlop, the Town Council President — the reason for the change is because Stewart Eutt, on behalf of Woodhaven, and Lloyd Brown, Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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in the presence of his attorneys on behalf of 0 & Y, came before the Township Council on commercial development, and there was some concern about commercial development staging, and Lloyd Brown indicated that what 0 & Y is going to do at this location, the intersection of two State Highways, is going to be of benefit to the Township of Old Bridge for years to come in regard to a quality shopping center and a quality commercial/industrial complex at that area.

The Council even agreed that Woodhaven could build less than 10 percent commercial, but would have to only build 73 acres of commercial because Mr. Brown pointed out, "Well, look at what 0 & Y is going to build."

If you consider the overall picture, we are well beyond 10 percent, even taking 0 & Y and Woodhaven together.

He also stated that in order to give more time to develop attractive ratables, they would have to develop something that would be a credit to 0 & Y and the Township of Old Bridge rather than putting in, let's say, strip malls at various stages of development in order to meet some staging performance requirement.

So, what I am saying is: This is significant Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

because we are now told that that regional shopping center at the intersection cannot be buildable because of wetlands.

If one looks at the agreement, when it speaks in terms of site specifics, I think, it's clear that all the parties contemplated that this was going to be built as part of this agreement.

Now, looking at page 19 of what Stewart Hutt refers to as the Blue Book --

THE COURT: How a black book became a blue book here is beyond me.

MR. CONVERY: Section V.-C.2 says "shopping center site."

THE COURT: You are talking now of the settlement agreement?

MR. CONVERY: Settlement agreement, yes, page 19, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CONVERY: Now, that says, "O & Y shall construct a regional shopping center of up to 1,350,000 square feet on approximately 93 acres of their lands designated for this purpose located on the southerly side of the proposed trans Old Bridge connector road in the vicinity of its juncture with State Highway 18 with no additional low-income housing obligation

attendant to this right, et cetera."

My point here on this is that: Why was the word "shall" used?

Did not the Township of Old Bridge have a right to rely on the fact that this was a site specific provision and that a shopping center was going to be built at that location?

I have given you the certification of Eugene Dunlop. I can produce the minutes if there is a controversy on this, but I submit that this was something the Town relied on.

If you look at Section V.-C.l on the same page, at the top of the page, it says, "Industrial/Commercial Development. O & Y shall construct office/retail and commercial/industrial space on PD/SD Zone Lands which are included in the Settlement Plan which lands are contained in two separate parcels as follows. . ."

And it goes on to speak of the site as Texas

Road in the vicinity of 9 and 18, and it speaks in

terms of the total permitted gross floor area to be
built.

I am attaching significance to the word "shall."

It doesn't say "may."

It doesn't say, "be given the opportunity to be built." It says "shall construct."

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Now, did not the Township Council have a right to rely upon this when they voted to accept this settlement?

THE COURT: That's about six million square feet of space.

Do you know what is going to happen now, assuming they could build on the reduced area?

It could still be built right at least at the intersection.

MR. CONVERY: The reason that it says site specific provisions I think is because of what Mr. Brown had pointed out is the desirability of building at the intersection of two State Highways in the Town of Old Bridge.

Now, looking at the area that's designated as wetland, the first thing that popped out when we saw the wetland delineation was -- it just happens to be that intersection is all wetland, that everything that's on Plate A from O & Y to build in that area, I submit, cannot be built.

Now, whether or not they could go back to put in what we would consider less desirable commercial properties elsewhere is not the issue.

The issue is: Did we have an agreement? they agree to build on these specific sites? Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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they build now?

Mr. Hutt seems to argue that Plate A and Plate B really have no significance.

I totally disagree with him. I think that they are specifically incorporated into the settlement.

The language is clear in the judgment and settlement that these are specifically incorporated.

The purpose of the public hearings was to review Plate A and Plate B, not to review some other plan that would be submitted by the parties.

When you look at Plate A, which is attached to the judgment, you look at what is designated Special Development, you will see that it encompasses that entire area where Route 18 meets Route 9 and Texas Road. Now you are talking about the area where jobs would be produced, where Old Bridge and its Town Council would get what it was told it would have, which would be a major regional shopping center at that location which will draw people to the Township of Old Bridge.

So, I don't agree that they have no significance. I think they are very significant, and I think that's what induced the Township Council, the Township of Cld Bridge to agree to this settlement.

I think it's significant that the two councilmen Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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in Wards 5 and 6 --we have a Ward system where this property is located -- did in fact vote in favor of this agreement, and I think it's because they saw things regarding commercial development.

They saw a golf course. They saw things that were placed in the plates and were part of the settlement that no longer are available to the Township of Old Bridge.

So, on these site specific provisions, I think that it's impossible for O & Y to meet the settlement that it agreed to, and for that reason I think the settlement should be set aside.

Now, on the transfer, your Honor, I think that when the Supreme Court decided Hills Development

Company v. Bernards Township, what it was saying is that it was the State's intention for — that every municipality would have the benefit of the comprehensive plan and its method of implementation.

I think that everyone contemplated that if there were a significant modification to this agreement, that Old Bridge and its residents would have the right to participate in this statewide implementation.

And I think that through no fault of the Township of Old Bridge or its residents, we stand before you today with the settlement that is impossible to Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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implement.

We are not talking here about enforcement. We are talking about substantial modification.

I think that at various times when discussing this, all the parties refer to the substantial amount of wetlands that occurs on O & Y property, and I think it ties right in with the discussion on a transfer motion that is indicated in the transcript of the proceedings.

I think that your Honor contemplated that if any of the parties significantly changed the basis upon which this settlement was granted, that the Town could proceed with its transfer motion.

Your Honor, I obviously want to incorporate by reference the materials submitted by Mr. Hintz.

I think they are voluminous, and all the parties have had an opportunity to submit these materials, but I want to point out another thing. If it comes down to your Honor feeling that it's going to depend — his decision is going to depend upon how many jobs are lost or whether or not substantial commercial properties can be developed in the near future, then I would ask that you go forward with the plenary hearing and we allow Mr. Hintz to testify.

Various -- at various times Mr. Hutt has said Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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this is a legal argument, there is no need for testimony. I agree that we are proceeding on the legal question of whether or not the motion to set aside should be granted, but, of course, you have to take into consideration the fact as to whether or not there has been a substantial change, whether there has been a substantial mistake of fact.

Now, if it comes down to you wanting to know on the record those details and to make a determination as to the credibility of whether or not our planner is correct, or whether or not another planner is correct, I would ask for you to set down a plenary hearing.

If, on the other hand, your Honor is satisfied from the materials submitted that there is enough of a basis for him to determine the amount of change that is required by the wetland problem, then I would ask your Honor to rule in favor of the Township of Old Bridge. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. HUTT: Your Honor, I will be brief because learned counsel have many things to say to you.

They brought in a few brief cases, but I think the crux of the case is what Mr. Convery pointed out.

The simple issue -- maybe it's not so simple to Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

resolve -- but the simple issue: Are the plates

part of the settlement agreement? Or aren't they?

And if they are part of it, what part do they

play?

Now, the Town's coming back in with all this second guessing about: They thought they were --

THE COURT: I don't think the issue is that narrow in all honesty. I don't think we should get off on that. It's more than that.

It's much broader than that. It's whether the parties have failed to account for material facts unknown to both of them at the time and what the facts were that they knew at the time.

I think that's the issue.

MR. HUTT: That's another way of saying whether the plates were getting some ratables development.

THE COURT: No, because the plates are only one aspect of the facts.

MR. HUTT: If you look at the settlement agreement itself, it sets up certain things: The fair share number, the criteria of building, whatever type you are going to build: The genetic standards, the road standards and everything else.

The Town is not complaining that Woodhaven or O & Y is not meeting these standards.

What the Town is pointing out is what Mr. Convery said is they settled on the basis of a certain commercial — at the intersection of let's say, 9 and 18.

However, if you read Mr. Dunlop's own certification, he doesn't say that at all.

At the time of the settlement, what was the Town bargaining for? What were the developers bargaining for?

Mr. Dunlop says, and I just like to quote from paragraph 7 of his certification which I quote in my brief, he says that "Under the concensus formula the municipality" — they were to Council — strike that — the Council was advised by Mr. Hintz that under the "concensus formula the municipality's fair share number would be — would probably be 2,414."

He goes on to state, "When the final settlement figures were negotiated, it was proposed to me as a Council member that the obligation of the Township of Old Bridge would be 1,668 units, half to be low income and the other half to be moderate income.

"It was very important to me that the proposed mechanism for the development of these units would be that Olympia & York would provide 500 units and Woodhaven would provide 260 units.

"It was proposed that these units would be developed during the six-year period of repose.

"As a Council member, it was always important to me that a settlement with 0 & Y and Woodhaven would provide the bulk of the fair share responsibility of the Township of Old Bridge concerning Mount Laurel Housing and that the main reason for settling with 0 & Y and Woodhaven would be to meet our Mount Laurel obligation."

And I think that's a fair statement of exactly what the Town was looking at.

As your Court well knows, there is nothing in any Mount Laurel settlement that requires negotiations, requires builders to build any kind of commercial.

The issue in the Mount Laurel case is: What density can you build for markets and how many Mount Laurel units do you have to do?

Now, there was a lot of negotiations back and forth. The builders anticipated certain things, waived them. For instance, the builders anticipated getting a density bonus which, in fact, in this case we never got.

The Town, because -- and we also agreed to go back and forth -- but what you have got to look at is the polestar of what they actually signed. Nobody says in Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

the Blue Book, for instance, that O & Y, for instance, is going to build a golf course.

In fact, even the section that counsel just read from in terms of O & Y, he left out the last two sentences of each relevant paragraph.

THE COURT: I read it. I know what he left cut.

MR. HUTT: He says there isn't a right —

THE COURT: You know, Mr. Hutt, without meaning

to demean a profession, that kind of sounds like

stereo typical real estate salesman talk. You know,

those were just, you know, that's puffing.

All you get is what is in the contract.

MR. HUTT: No, no. We had more. We bargained -- both developers bargained for this conceptual planning to give us the right to go in before the Planning Board and establish to do it.

THE COURT: Before we put this on the record in January of '86, was it unknown to the Planning Board that they were going to get all these goodies that they are losing? They knew it. Didn't they?

They knew about the potential -- not the potential -- the likelihood of the trans Old Bridge connector.

They knew about the likelihood of six or seven million square feet of commercial area, about all the jobs that that would provide, about the golf course.

We couldn't prove that it works, so we had the right to come in with a new plan.

There is a whole new provision there. If we tried through our method to show that what we had was Plate A or Plate B didn't work, then they didn't have to give us an approval and we would have to come back with another site plan.

THE COURT: This is a one-sided situation.

MR. HUTT: Pardon?

THE COURT: This is a one-sided situation.

MR. HUTT: No.

THE COURT: By a consent judgment the Planning Board locked themselves into not being able to alter what you only had the right to do but didn't have to do.

MR. HUTT: No, they locked themselves into a couple of things.

THE COURT: That's the language of it as a matter of fact. It says that.

MR. HUTT: One thing, they have a smaller fair share than they would have gotten. That's what Dunlop said.

Another thing is they got repose.

So, they got a lot of things that they bargained for.

Another thing is for the amount -- that they weren't giving the developers any bonus densities. We had four units to the gross acre before.

Now, we have four acres now.

THE COURT: Is it not true that the developers could not use, using your language, the theoretical plans that were before it at the time of the settlement? It could not alter what was in this Black Book or Blue Book.

MR. HUTT: If we could prove that it could work. Otherwise they could.

THE COURT: Well, it would be -- you would be altering it if it couldn't work.

MR. HUTT: No, no, your Honor.

THE COURT: But the Planning Board, as long as it could work, could not change it.

MR. HUTT: That's what we bargained for.

So that you don't consider that that THE COURT: constitutes some kind of binding arrangement between the parties?

MR. HUTT: I do. I consider it binding if we could prove it worked.

But by the same token if we couldn't prove that it worked, they had a right to deny it, and then there is a procedure which is really the procedure we are in Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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now which we are saying we can't make it work.

We agree we can't make it work, so we now have to go back to what the new procedure is.

If we can prove that new plan works, then they give it. If they don't prove that the new plan works, then they don't give it.

These horror stories of Carl Hintz and what they are dreaming up, that remains to be seen. That's a Planning Board issue.

If, at the time we go into the Planning Board on the next round of maps, they want to deny the map because they say it's got this kind of environmental problem or it's got this kind of road problem or whatever, they can deny it and then it's up to the master in one of the procedures to come up with their recommendation as to whether they are right and the final call will be either the master's or yours.

But the whole book contemplated the whole thing.

You recently went out on a tour of Jackson Township where you didn't contemplate seeing some kind of bomb there or whatever it was, but it happened.

So, all parties knew: The Town knew. They had as much information as we did

Well, we took from their wetland map -- they have a natural resource inventory and a map, it shows the Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

green areas. We took that. They would have you believe — and this has never happened in any Mount
Laurel case, including everyone before your Honor
where the developer does intensive site investigations
prior to a settlement, nobody does that because you
don't know what kind of millions you are going to
spend without knowing you are going to have a settlement.

What happened in this case is really no different than any other Mount Laurel case.

You make yourself a map. You go in and make investigations. It could show a toxic waste dump.

In this case the investigation showed a lot more wetland than anybody else. Does that mean the settlement is put aside?

It makes me smile to hear all of a sudden the

Township attorney and Planning Board is saying, "Hey,

we are being deprived of a highrise building." We

were not going to build it anyhow, but I remember

O & Y banging on the table and screaming and hollering,

saying, "Please, let us build these five-story build
ings," and the Town saying, "No, no, no, we don't want

this to be the Queens," and finally conceding that

they are not going to get it.

They settle for 1600 units and the test of all Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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this is red herrings, because if the current number wasn't lower, we wouldn't be here today.

THE COURT: It's hardly possible to equate this case to any other Mount Laurel case and to suggest, for example, that there would have been no investigation of wetlands before because that's not true in any other case, is hardly possible when I read in the pleadings that it's costing a half a million dollars a month just to carry the O & Y land. I don't know. I can't equate it to any other case that comes before me.

MR. HUTT: Well, what I am saying is: There is surveys that had to be done. What I am saying is the Town has taken the position because every known fact wasn't in existence at the time the Blue Book was signed that there would be a settlement.

The fact is they had as much opportunity as we did. We used many of their materials to come up with it.

Now, in the case of Woodhaven there has not been any substantial change.

I put in my brief, and I don't want to express it, but I don't want to forget it either, that Woodhaven can proceed exactly the way it was indicated.

They come up with a couple hundred acres more of wetland, one way or the other it doesn't really make

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any difference. They don't say that anything we promised them we are not delivering. We said we would give them 73 commercial acres. We are going to give them 73 commercial acres. Supposing there was wetland. Supposing the market turns out. Right now the interest rates are starting to go up. The market turns. There is no guarantee in that settlement agreement that any commercial was going to be built.

All it said was if you are going to want to build houses, you are going to have to build commercial on a certain schedule.

There is no guarantee that houses would be built.

There is no guarantee that commercial would be built,

and if they wanted to say that, they could have said

it and there wouldn't have been a settlement because

no builder is going to guarantee in advance.

Supposing, for instance, it was determined, there was no wetland, supposing it was determined on the intersection of 9 and 18 that the market studies show that it's saturated. You don't need any more of this stuff.

THE COURT: You have a right under this agreement to build even more.

MR. HUTT: Pardon?

THE COURT: Didn't you? You had a right under Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

this agreement to build even more than that, provided the original 15,000 or so units.

When I say you, the collective plaintiffs. You could have acquired more land, and it would have been treated just as any other property.

MR. HUTT: Yes, with certain infill parcels.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HUTT: Right.

THE COURT: So, there is some argument to be made, if you want to take that the other way, that the parties could have contemplated they were going to get even more than they got under the agreement.

MR. HUTT: Well, your Honor, obviously the purpose of that provision was to protect the developer. not the Town.

THE COURT: Depends, because it would have been proportional.

MR. HUTT: No. What I am saying is the developer would have been able to make economic sense of fulfilling infill parcels. This is the first time I have heard them complaining that the proportionate amount of housing we are going to give them, and O & Y says 50 percent of what they contemplated. Woodhaven says the same amount.

The Town is complaining about that it's going to Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

be lesser? I mean, this stretches reality.

The settlement agreement, as far as I was concerned, never locked anybody into that map, because if it did, they wouldn't have had to go before the Planning Board.

What we were concerned about from the developers is that we had a right to present the conceptual approval.

We didn't want to get bounced around. As your Honor knows, this case had many previous years of litigation. We wanted to have the right, take our plan and say, if it works, then you got to give it to us. If it doesn't work, then you don't have to give it to us. We will argue about it later.

We didn't know ourselves. It was our best guess at the time whether it would work.

THE COURT: So, basically what you are saying if I can boil it down is that Old Bridge bought a pig in a poke with the hope that its Mount Laurel obligation would be satisfied through these permits?

MR. HUTT: No, I didn't say that at all, your Honor.

In every Mount Laurel settlement that you have Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

been involved with and that I can recall, they did everything but present a plate.

Never has a plate been a part -- those towns didn't buy a pig in a poke. They bought certain things, the density, the amount -- maximum amount of units and Old Bridge topped that by getting commercials tied into it. Okay?

For instance, the settlement that you approved where we are involved in with North Brunswick, a very big deal, 3,000 living units, and I think it's three million square feet of office building. As part of that settlement there is not one picture as to where the residential is going to be, where the non-residential is going to be, where the commercial is going to be. It's never done.

These plates were at the insistence of the developer, not the Town, because we wanted to make sure that we had certain ideas that we had a right to at least establish it.

I can't think of any case that was decided in Mount Laurel where a plate was established that said this was going to be built.

In fact, in Washington Township under the Public Advocate, I think it's Pequannock, but I am not sure which town it is where they settled and they

Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

make black acre as a location for Mount Laurel housing.

It turns out after the settlement is made and everybody is working on it, a few months later the black acre is 90 percent wetland. So, they can't build it there.

Now, the Town had selected the site, not the developer.

Now, the Town has to go back and find another site.

THE COURT: That's happened in cases I have had.

MR. HUTT: Sure. Well, it's the same thing here.

There is no guarantee -- I take offense when you
say that the Town is buying a pig in a poke. They
weren't buying any more pigs in a poke than any other
town in Mount Laurel where Dunlop testifies the number
would have been 2400, now it goes down to 16.

THE COURT: I don't see how you can equate this case to any other Mount Laurel case that has been settled. It's a magnitude totally inconsistent with any other case in terms of what this Town was permitting to be done in its town in order to settle its fair share.

Totally, totally different than any other case before me. And to suggest that before one site was substituted for another site, hardly in my mind is Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

persuasive.

Furthermore, I think you would agree that in every one of the cases that were settled, the Court had to convince itself that the proposed sites were realistic, otherwise it would have never approved them.

MR. HUTT: That's true.

THE COURT: And I had to be convinced in this case too.

MR. HUTT: No, because in this case the Mount

Laurel numbers that were in the settlement are still

there. Even the Town admits that O & Y only had to

build 500 under its Mount Laurel settlement between

1990 and 1992, and the Township is cutting the project

in half.

THE COURT: That's not what I said. I don't think you heard my question.

I said I had to in this case be convinced that the sites were realistic.

MR. HUTT: Oh, in the past. I am sorry.

THE COURT: In this case.

MR. HUTT: Yes.

THE COURT: In this case.

MR. HUTT: That's right.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HUTT: That's right. And everybody went on that basis.

The Town thought it was realistic and we thought it was realistic.

It's really realistic when you take into account, under the worst case scenario, if 0 & Y builds their 6,000 and we build our 5,000, it's 10, 11,000 units, I still say there isn't another town in the State of New Jersey that's going to build that many units and even have a 10 percent set aside of that many Mount Laurel units.

So, it's still realistic in the terms of the Mount Laurel problems.

What bothers me here is the Town bought certain things and we were entitled to buy certain things.

They bought giving us no bonus density. They bought a lower number, as Dunlop testified, from 2400 to 1600.

They have an area of repose since. They bought the fact that the developers would lock in a lock step of commercial development.

Under a builder's remedy lawsuit there was no obligation whatsoever for these developers to build any commercial whatsoever. All right? But we did.

So, they bought a lot of things which they have Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

had the benefit of for the last couple of years.

There have been no other Mount Laurel lawsuits in that town. They have been operating on a repose. They have been collecting Mount Laurel fees under the settlement agreement from other developers in accordance with the Mount Laurel settlement.

Now, it comes about that even though we can't build what we thought we were going to build, we are still locked in by the Blue Book.

You will notice that they don't complain -- maybe

I ought to sit down and let 0 & Y's attorney handle

it -- but we say we can still do the same.

The infrastructure is still there. I don't know if it was brought to your Honor's attention, I am sure it was, but I will repeat it: There is a very detailed sewer agreement with the Utility Authority.

So, the sewers are going to be in that entire end of town. It's guaranteed.

There is bonds posted and letters of credit and everything else.

Water in the community — they had just made an arrangement with the Middlesex Water Company. They are going to have more water now than they have ever had in their history. So that is going to be there.

So, there is no reason in the world why we can't Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

proceed, and when I say "we," I am talking about Wood-haven, to do exactly what the settlement agreement calls for.

So, while I don't think they ought to knock out any settlement, if you happen to, I still say as far as us, we are giving them what they bargained for and we are entitled to get what we bargained for.

MR. HALL: For O & Y. One of the risks of having Stuie go first is that you never know all the points that you might be able to cover.

Your Honor is quite correct in pointing out this is kind of a special case. There is a situation here where I know in the case of my client we have owned this land since 1974. We have been attempting to actively develop it since 1979.

During the course of that activity, we have gone through a number of different plans, a number of different iterations of what we could do or what we couldn't do in that town.

At the same time, since 1971 I know the Urban League and Oakwood of Madison have been trying to actively look at the issue of whether or not there is enough affordable housing in Old Bridge Township.

We are at the place now where, yes, the scale of this thing is so unusual, vis-a-vis your other

realities of life, the fact that we have 1100 acres of developmental -- of land which we could put residential and commercial development on should in and of itself be enough to say, yes, we can go forward with the development which is going to provide everything that we thought we were going to provide in terms of the context of a planned unit development.

There will be a variety of different housing types. There will be a variety of commercial development and industrial development as we say that we would be able to provide in 1986.

It's not the plan that we contemplated, for example, and we brought before the Planning Board in 1983. It's not the plan --

THE COURT: You might have been a line from

Fiddler on the Roof that says, "We don't have a man

that we have when we began" when they were trying

to marry off one of their daughters.

Their densities are different too. Aren't they?

MR. HALL: What I again -- what Stewart was

talking about is it's unusual to listen to a Town, to

look at an open space and what the actual result is

in terms of the O & Y Development.

What we had contemplated in 1986 when we brought in our initial development was 1,721 acres of Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

residential development with an overall density for the use per acre.

We now have about 150 acres which is land used for — it's the same density that's going to yield somewhat in the neighborhood of 5,000 homes.

We contemplated then that we were going to have a proportion of our property --

THE COURT: You mean to say that the density has been increased because that s what this side says?

MR. HALL: No, your Honor. The overall density—the densities are going to be shrunk proportionately with the available amount of development land.

We are not asking for any increase. We are not asking for any changes in the zoning at all.

What we had, as Stewart suggests, is four of these per acre overall.

We had certain areas that are non-developable. We have those areas which are non-developable.

We have open space in the flood designation and their NRI designation.

We have some additional open space in this Town.

We are going to be developing a community that's going to look somewhat different. It's going to have more open spaces.

There is going to be more open space connected with a planned unit development, but it's going to be a planned unit development.

At the request of the master that has been appointed in this case, we have been looking in a variety of different iterations of how we could put some commercial areas here, some commercial areas there. We are not sure exactly what the final numbers are going to look like, but the master has pointed out that what we have in terms of an area of South Old Bridge currently exists without central sewer, currently exists without a central water supply and currently exists without any traffic improvements that would be necessary to cope with a 5,000 unit development.

Once those developmental features are in, there is no doubt that the existing out-parcels which have not been within our contemplation, as we had no idea exactly what we were going to be doing, are going to be developed as well, and that, within the overall development that's going to take place in Southern Old Bridge is going to be a community that is going to provide that variety of housing — housing types, housing densities and commercial and industrial opportunities which, I believe, were contemplated by

the parties in 1986.

Yes, there is going to be more open space. No, there is not going to be quite as much in the area of industrial and commercial ratables as we contemplated at that point, but we can't predict, and neither can the Town, what the ultimate outcome in terms of the developmental aspect of that — of Southern Old Bridge is going to be.

In the meantime we sit with a community which has no real basis other than what is set forth in this settlement for building any kind of affordable housing.

This started out as a Mount Laurel case, and it remains a Mount Laurel case. We have got a mechanism that we can bring to operate within South Old Bridge which is going to yield definable quantities of affordable housing, and we can't forget that aspect of it too.

THE COURT: Tell me what this was intended to mean. It's Appendix A in our Blue Book, page AlO actually. The last paragraph on the page: "The Planning Board attorney shall instruct the Board as to the limited nature of the Board's jurisdiction and the nature of the plans to be reviewed and shall indicate that the plats are at the 'master plan concept' level and are part of the settlement —

"and are part of a settlement litigation and cannot be changed without sound reasons."

MR. HALL: That means, I think, exactly what it says, your Honor: The master plan for Southern Old Bridge included a known level of density for the use per acre.

It included a desire to have a planned unit development with certain development types. It wasn't going to be just single-family tract housing or wasn't going to be simply a multi-family housing.

It was designed to be a planned unit development.

It was designed to have certain features in terms of public water and sewer supply.

THE COURT: It doesn't mean this: That the plats are a part of the settlement of the litigation.

MR. HALL: As I read both the texts within the settlement agreement, it talks about how we would, once we have gone through the plan, the Planning Board concept, those plans in Stuie's Latin phrase nunc pro tunc are going to be put back in the settlement.

It was an interesting problem that we were contemplating at the time, your Honor.

THE COURT: How could any fair minded person read what I just read and come to the conclusion that any fair-minded person --

MR. HALL: The idea of having the Planning Board-THE COURT: Let's stay with my question. Don't ask me another one, I can only handle one at a time.

MR. HALL: The idea of having the Planning Board hold conceptual hearings was designed to give the Planning Board a realistic opportunity to review those plates.

If we were just going to jam it down the Planning Board's throat, we wouldn't have a Planning Board process.

Mr. Norman, when he introduced the plates at the Planning Board hearings, indicated to the Planning Board they had a responsibility to look at those plans fairly, and if they had real problems with them, they had an opportunity to raise those real problems.

THE COURT: That's what the thing says. But you still haven't answered my question.

The words in plain simple English to me mean that the plats are part of a settlement of the litigation. You don't agree or you do agree?

MR. HALL: I agree that the plans were designed to put in visual form the overall scheme of the development with respect to where commercial properties were going to be located, where residential properties were going to be located and what the overall densities

of the development were. That's a master plan level.

We weren't going in at a subdivision plan level.

THE COURT: But the Supreme Court waived under this agreement any right to change those things unless there was some sound planning reason, and absent the wetland problem, the Planning Board was stuck with this plan of development.

MR. HALL: Unless, of course --

THE COURT: Legally bound by a court order.

MR. HALL: Unless, of course, we had other reasons why we couldn't have made the development work. That is correct.

And that's the way most Mount Laurel settlements work.

THE COURT: And yet they have no right to rely on

it.

MR. HALL: They have a right to take a particular area of town -- let's take an area like Bedminster where there is a particular area that has been zoned for high-density development.

At a master plan level certain things were said:

The town set aside a certain area. It went from Washington Valley Road to Schley Mountain Road and zoned at 10 DU's per acre from here to here. How you make it work in terms of traffic flow, in terms of utility layout, et cetera, those are legitimate

Planning Board issues, and, believe me, they have all been raised.

When you get to the point where your Planning
Board is able to say, yes, Southern Old Bridge is now
set aside as a 4DU per acre, planned unit development,
and we contemplate there will be no more than 15 or
22,000 or whatever the number of homes that would be
actually built with a full development of that area,
that there would be no more than one major regional
shopping center, that there will be no more than six
million square feet of commercial area. These are
legitimate Planning Board Master Plan level issues.

Do we want to have high density development in Southern Old Bridge or do we want it to be a low-density park? That's a master plan level scheme.

When you get down to exactly how many singlefamily units, how many multi-family units, how much
regional shopping facilities, et cetera, et cetera,
et cetera that are going to be put in there, that's
the preliminary subdivision or site plan level. And
certainly none of us knew then and none of us know now
what we are going to actually put on that site.

We know we have got 1100 acres that we could develop. We know that we are going to be instrumental in providing sewer and water supplies to Southern Old

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Bridge.

We know that we can put in a planned unit development of some size and scale. We know that it's going to have a variety of different housing types. going to have shopping. It's going to have industrial facilities. Those are the things we do know.

We don't know anything other than that. We are not at the site plan or subdivision level.

THE COURT: Do we know whether we started off with a nice round disk of brie and ended up with a slice of Swiss Cheese?

You know, what I am told here is that, as I cited in the beginning, we had nice neat four and a half contiguous acre package. Now we have only 581 acres out of the original 26 of from -- 2,640 acres which are contiguous acres. We have 200 acres which are not contiguous and range in tracts from 10 to 19 acres and the balance -- between that 781 acres and the 1100 plus acres are even smaller than that.

We are going to have a thousand bridges here. mean, that's what it kind of sounds like.

I am exaggerating, I understand.

MR. HALL: The Township advocate can present any picture it wants with respect to what is actually going to be built there. We have gone through a variety

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of different iterations.

We have one where counsel for the Township has pointed out, we finished up last week and sent out to all parties. That shows how you could put a village concept with a variety of different housing types on that site at a cost that we can contemplate building and come out with 5,000 units which we would build and housing which is going to be built within the current zoning by others within the same area that we have allocated.

We are not presenting that as the way that we are going to develop it. We are trying to respond to what the Township's advocate has said.

This is Swiss Cheese. It isn't Swiss Cheese.

There is the probability of putting together a development that will meet the variety of different housing type issues which are inherent in a planned unit development.

It's probably appropriate, your Honor, for you to have your master review the developmental process and assist the parties to come back before the Planning Board with concept plans which are in your planning master's view workable and feasible. We have no objection to that. We think that is an appropriate outcome of this case.

We don't think an appropriate outcome of this case is to permit the Township, under the use of the wetland issue, to yet win yet another one, round of delay and yet another forum for them to deal with what has been their continuous issue, how they are going to build any affordable housing in that Township.

We are prepared to work with the master. We are prepared to work with the Town.

I am not as good as Stuie is at telling jokes. I was just pointing out to the Township earlier that I noticed I am on the bridge between all the plaintiffs and the Town.

Mr. Convery pointed out it was a bigger chasm than I thought, but we are willing to work with the Township. We would be willing to work with the Planning Master and put together a revised developmental scheme that we think will meet the Township's concern about our ability to provide both housing, housing types, affordable housing, commercial and industrial ratables, and, again, your Honor, I think that that is certainly within your Honor's purview of choice.

THE COURT: We will take ten minutes then.

(A recess is taken.)

THE COURT: Now, we are better off. I can

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

understand the pictures you see.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, during the break my client suggested it would probably be useful if I did go to the pictures, being worth a thousand words, and, perhaps, I can take a few minutes to illustrate what we have got and what we don't have.

Let me suggest to you, first of all, that when the Township talks about what it's getting and what it's giving up, I would like to have that in some kind of context.

The area which my client and the area which Wood-haven have owned since before the lawsuits were initiated were always zoned PD at four per acre, and
the area that had been designated for zone at SD and
SD was supposed to be Special Development and was
supposedly going to be commercial and Special Development. It had Routes 9 and 18 at that point.

The Township seems to have created a sense within itself that areas that are wetlands, which are these dark green areas here, plus the areas which are immediately adjacent to them and are going to be rated as wetlands are undevelopable.

We are not saying this is the way we are going to build it. We are saying this is the way we sat down with our planners and reviewed what we had, what Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

we owned, what other people owned in terms of an overall developmental context.

The Township had indicated earlier that it wanted to have some kind of village perspective on this thing.

So, we have set it up into three different villages. We are not saying that this is the way it's going to develop. We are not trying to put together a Plate A and Plate A-1 in the same context that we had thought about it earlier, but this is a way the project can develop under the current regulatory scheme with the current zoning.

It demonstrates that there are areas which are currently within 0 & Y ownership and which are currently under the current regulations completely developable.

These areas here within the SD are developable.

This area where the regional commercial center had been contemplated is developable partly by 0 & Y, and it's partly owned by others at this point.

The same kind of economic determinism which makes other areas developable, because once the water and the sewer are put in, the areas that have been at lower intensity uses are not developed at all or going to be developed.

This area sets up three different villages. Ιt sets up a balance of commercial and development ratables that tract the lock step which is set forth in the ordinance and which is the lock step we agreed to earlier.

It sets up a transportation system that works, and if it doesn't work, the Planning Board has the right to tell us, "You have got to improve the transportation system."

I should point out again the Trans Old Bridge Connector had been not our scheme. It had been part of the Township's Master Plan scheme.

We put it on our map. It doesn't particularly help O & Y.

We don't care if it's built or not. If we have a workable scheme using -- this happens to be using existing roadways. This happens to be the Old Bridge Englishtown Road. This happens to be the Texas Road.

THE COURT: That's another way of saying that the Trans Old Bridge Connector was part of the quid pro quo.

You didn't want it, but they did. That's part of the settlement.

MR. HALL: It had been a Township Master Flan road. We put it on our plan.

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THE COURT: And they want it as part of the settlement.

MR. HALL: If we could develop it completely and it would help our development, we would have no objection to doing it.

In this case if we set aside land for Old Bridge Trans Connector or any equivalent road, this is the one we would make as an equivalent road and it works fine, we will put it in.

If the Trans Old Bridge Connector in a specific location which transverses the wetlands is what the Township wants, we will be glad to dedicate the land to the Township and be glad to set aside whatever resources would be necessary to pay for our fair share of that road.

THE COURT: But they shouldn't hold their breath.

MR. HALL: But they shouldn't hold their breath waiting for a 404 permit crossing of the wetlands which we have come to ourselves.

Your Honor, this is what this so-called Swiss Cheese effect looks like. We have higher development -- high density development.

We have recreation areas. We have lower density development. We have recreation areas. There are mid-rise units.

If they want mid-rise, we will be glad to give them mid-rise.

We have shown a couple of areas where we could put mid-rise units and so forth.

The point is, your Honor, that the current master plan of this area and the current Old Bridge Township Master Plan shows this area as SD land. It shows it as 4D's per acre and it shows it as contemplating having Public utilities being provided.

That's what this is going to be. There is going to be 4D's per acre on the development portions of the land.

There is going to be enormous amounts of open space that had not been contemplated before, and there is going to be a workable transportation system.

What you are probably looking for, your Honor, would be Plate A, which is a colored plate.

THE COURT: Well, I was looking for two things, but the interesting thing would be to juxtapose that to Plate A.

MR. HALL: Well, you will find there is a lot more green on this than there was in Plate A.

THE COURT: There is also a lot more holes.

MR. HALL: Well, but is it developable? Can you put together a competent development that's going to

provide a set of planned unit developments that is going to have public sewer and water, that is going to have a development of commercial and industrial ratables in lock step with the residential?

Are you going to have that in excess of 4D use per acre? Are you going to have public sewer and water?

If you look at what we said we were going to do in 1986 and look at the specifics and not just in the areas of generality, then I think you are going to agree that we are providing the specifics of what we were going to be providing.

We don't know whether or not we can get a 404 permit for the balance of this SD land.

We do know we have some 68 acres in this area which can be developed without a 404 permit.

THE COURT: Is it reasonable to conclude that in reaching this settlement that Old Bridge cared somewhat about how these four and a half miles would be developed and that planning issues were important to them?

MR. HALL: There is no doubt they were, which is why they requested the opportunity to have our plan submitted to them before — at the concept plan level at the Planning Board, and (b) they didn't give up any

right to say this subdivision works or it doesn't give up --

THE COURT: The overall planning development under the plats or plates, depending on how you want to pronounce it, which are attached to this or included in this Blue Book indicate they have get a much different plan, I think you would agree, of development on what I am looking at now at whatever that is — I guess it's the most current plan or one of the most current alternatives as opposed to what they had in this agreement, and whether or not one says that they couldn't be sure they get any of it, at least they could assume that if they got anything, they get it in the way it's in Al.

They wouldn't get a totally different layout of those four and a half acres or a significantly different layout if it was built. If it wasn't built, they wouldn't get it. It would still stay green.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, I would submit as a practical matter what they had in 1980, 1981, 1982, *83, *84, *85 was an area which was zoned in three ways: PD, SD and WS. That's what they have got.

They had PD land which was the Planned Development Land which is most of our land.

They had some areas which were zoned SD for Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

special developmental, such as RCA or a commercial area, and they had WS land.

The fact of the matter is they were wrong in zoning WS land which we have found to our regret we are more WS land than we thought. But we are not changing the overall zoning in that tract. We have WS land.

We unfortunately have more than we thought we had.
We have PD land. We have SD land and we still have
SD land, not as much as we hoped.

But basically, the Township's zoning that has been in effect in that Town for, I guess, 15 years now is still there.

We haven't changed the zoning. At the Master Plan level this was intended to be a higher density development.

They are going to get a higher density development although, ironically, not quite as high in intensity as they looked at before.

THE COURT: I am not suggesting your changing the zoning, although there was an argument made at least that you are changing the density.

Putting that aside, assuming you are not, Mount Laurel II, which is still good law, I understand, in many areas --

MR.HALL: I thought so.

THE COURT: It finishes up the opinion, and I vaguely recall finishing the Warren case when you are talking about planning and Mount Laurel II said something slightly different than I said, which basically said that all this could be accomplished without affecting the quality of life.

I suggested that we couldn't throw away planning considerations.

Now, I am ready to accept your representation for purposes of argument that this isn't bad planning — for purposes of argument.

But why should the Town be forced to accept alternate planning when it didn't bargain for that? It bargained for a substantially different plan, and your picture couldn't be more graphic.

I am glad you put it up. That is significantly different than Al. I don't think I need a planner to tell me that.

MR. HALL: I am glad you are willing to accept that this is not, for purposes of argument, that plan.

THE COURT: Assuming that issue.

MR. HALL: What do we have? We have a municipality. I hope I am not going to step on too Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

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many of Barbara's lines.

We have a municipality that has since basically 1971 had the illusion of a planning process that yields something in the area of affordable housing, but non-habitability.

You throw us up. You throw this plaintiff out, and you are going to remove one of the only real opportunities Old Bridge is going to have of actually translating what they purport to offer in their ordinance into some actual housing units that are going to be affordable for lower income people.

THE COURT: It seems to me I have heard that argument 11 times and got reversed 11 times, and I agreed on it.

MR. HALL: I don't hold --

THE COURT: I do hold a record for one-day reversals.

MR. HALL: I don't think you got reversed in terms of the principle.

THE COURT: I mean, it doesn't hurt, but --MR. HALL: Only a little.

THE COURT: -- but it's the old line of the trial judge: I still think I was right.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, I think you were right in 1986 when you approved this settlement. I

think you are going to find that if you look at the actual delivery of what the Township thought it was going to get, it's going to get a planned unit developed.

It's going to get ratables that are delivered in accordance with the schedule that's set forth in that system, and I might add that if I can relieve Jerry's view, we are obligated when we come back for the concept plan level to start discussing what it is we are going to do for ratables and put together a ratable delivery schedule.

We never got that far when we were before them in March of 1986. We never got to the point where we could identify exactly what we were going to build and when we were going to build it. That takes place at the concept plan level and the lock step or the scheduling of that is put into effect at that point.

We never got there in 1986.

I'd like to get there before 1988.

So, one of the things I am going to ask your

Honor to do is: When we do finish up this, I hope

that your Honor is going to deny the Township's motion,

and I hope that your Honor is going to be able to

schedule a hearing for the Planning Board to start

looking at our concept plan levels, and we would be

delighted if your Honor would order us to work with your master and come up with new Plates A and Al and B and Bl that will meet the Township's considerations.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Miss Stark.

MISS STARK: Your Honor, the Township seems to have forgotten what this case is all about, which is affordable housing.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey established that there was a Constitutional right to the realistic opportunity for that housing, not contingent upon how many golf courses or how many ratables or how much commercial development were obtained in exchange for it; specifically is satisfied, specifically agrees with the position taken by the plaintiff developers, that what the Civic League bargained for and got was a fair share of whatever development took place.

Now, it appears that the developers will be fully able to construct the housing that was contemplated by the settlement within the fair share period prior to 1992.

Construction of the commercial ratables under the judgment is tied to the residential construction, and, again, Old Bridge never had a guarantee that its commercial ratable -- all of the commercial

development would be built.

The settlement merely provides a framework for decision making.

The settlement — the review mechanisms are in place, and they are perfectly suited to deal with the revised plans to be submitted by 0 & Y and Woodhaven.

The issues raised by Mr. Norman are perfectly suited to be dealt with by those mechanisms.

What the Township is asking for here is a replacement mechanism. The Township is asking that the mechanisms, that COAH's mechanism be substituted for the mechanism that they have agreed to.

Mr. Convery said that the councilmen saw things when they agreed to this, to this settlement that are no longer there.

Those councilmen may well have saw things that never were there. That doesn't matter.

Their affidavits, written in hindsight that they presently regret what they agreed to a year ago, is precisely the kind of bootstrapping that characterizes the Town's whole argument here.

THE COURT: I don't read the affidavits to say
that they regret what they agreed to a year ago. I
read them as saying we are not getting what we agreed

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to a year ago.

MISS STARK: Your Honor, I believe they are saying we are not getting what we now perceive we agreed to a year ago.

THE COURT: All right, I will take that correction. That's all right.

But that's quite different than saying what you said, I think.

MISS STARK: Well, it's whether — it comes back to how final the settlement or whether the settlement was an agreement to continue to negotiate, to continue to agree.

It's our understanding that under the terms of the settlement, the Township would reject the -- the Township can reject this plan.

The Township can reject the plates that were submitted, and then the developers have to come back. All that's required from the Township is compliance within the parameters of the settlement. Good space compliance.

Second, even if the judgment were reopened, we submit that this Court should retain jurisdiction of the case and it should not be transferred to COAH.

The Fair Housing Act gave the municipalities a specific limited period in which to seek transfer.

Old Bridge is far too late. Mr. Convery expressly conceded that by settling the case, Old Bridge waived its right to transfer.

THE COURT: But if there is no judgment of repose, I have to transfer it. Don't I?

MISS STARK: If there is no recpening the judgment with the kind of judgment that's before the Court that this Court signed with a reopening clause, the judgment does not evaporate upon reopening that judgment.

I don't mean reopening it, I mean if THE COURT: I vacate.

MISS STARK: If the judgment was vacated, but we see no basis in the Township's position, in the Township's argument for vacating -- there is no --

THE COURT: No, no.

MISS STARK: Yes, your Honor, I understand.

THE COURT: The answer is: Yes, I have to transfer it if I vacate it. Okay.

MISS STARK: Well, it's -- your Honor, I can't concede that because I don't know whether -- it's our position that under the Fair Housing Act, at this point it would not be proper for the matter to be transferred to COAH. So, if the judgment was vacated, we would be, or it could be argued that we would be

back in the position we'd have a live case pending before a court. The repose would be lifted.

THE COURT: But what you are saying to my decision in the Far Hills case in which I said the Supreme Court drew the line at a final judgment.

That's what you cited to me, and that's the one that is the one that is over the line on one side doesn't get transferred. And I assume that what I meant was that if you are not over that line, if you don't have a final judgment, you do get transferred.

MISS STARK: Within the time read in conjunction with the provisions of the Fair Housing Act, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's not what I said in Far Mills, because there the question was, you know, whether the judgment was final or not. And I said, once it's final, it will not get transferred and it's final.

MISS STARK: Your Honor, it wasn't necessary to reach the issue here in that case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MISS STARK: Under the Fair Housing Act, if you have the judgment — it's not necessary for us to reach that issue either at this point.

Finally, only — there was earlier discussion with Mr. Convery as to the meaning of your Honor's Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

ruling on mootness, and it was what the Court said —
the Court said was, therefore — this was at page 80
of the transcript, your Honor — "if there is an
application to suddenly modify the terms of the agreement as opposed to enforce it, that then the Township
would not be precluded from countering with the motion
to transfer."

Implicit in that, your Honor, is that if there were an application by one of the plaintiffs to renege on the agreement, to get out from under the agreement, then the Township would be in a position to counter by transferring. But there has been no such application.

THE COURT: But there would have to be, because you are not doing here what you had promised would be done, and any municipality that has attempted to substitute one plan with another has come back and said, is it all right, Judge, and I would expect that these plaintiffs would do that. So, there would have to be a motion.

MISS STARK: Your Honor, what would happen under the terms of the settlement if the plaintiff developers went before the Planning Board and the Planning Board said this is a bad plan, we are exactly where we are now.

The obligation is then under the terms — under Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

the mechanism set forth in the settlement, the obligation is then on the plaintiff developers to come back with a modified plan.

THE COURT: Yes. In addition, I am talking about something in addition to that.

Even assuming you could satisfy the Planning Board, you would have to satisfy the Court.

MISS STARK: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Because I would have to make a determination that the new plan represented a realistic opportunity to provide for the fair share as determined by the Court.

I might have to downgrade the fair share number, depending on what may ultimately develop, all of those things, and I have done that on several occasions because of site problems as Mr. Hutt has already referred to.

MISS STARK: Your Honor, we agree with the Court.

Again, on the reopening point and our final point is that at the very least, even if this judgment is reopened, the Court should retain jurisdiction of it and the matter should not be transferred to COAH.

It would be inequitable to deprive the parties of the Court's expertise, familiarity with the facts and broad understanding of the goals of this litigation.

THE COURT: Again, I said I thought that was true in a number of other cases. That was a very persuasive argument to me back then.

Apparently, no one was impressed with the expertise. No, I guess the Court said differently.

All right. Anything further from the plaintiff?

MR. CONVERY: May it please the Court -
THE COURT: Briefly.

MR. CONVERY: -- an issue was raised after I spoke that I think has to be addressed on behalf of the Township of Old Bridge.

Many of the plaintiffs seem to refer to the

Township and the Planning Board interchangeably, and
that's not true in this case because when the Township

Council voted to approve this settlement, it did so
as a separate body and as a separate party to this
lawsuit.

And when it voted to accept this settlement, it agreed to accept Plate A and Plate B without any right of review by the Township Council.

Now, the question of whether or not this Plate A and Plate B is part of the settlement, I submit is clear by the language throughout.

I would ask any of the plaintiffs to show me one example where it's referred to as anything other Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

than part of this settlement.

Every reasonable inference is that it is part of the settlement. For example, Appendix A, which your Honor referred to earlier, in the first section of A-13 it says concept plan approval hearings. This is page A10 of the Blue Book.

It says -- and you can tell that this was drafted by the attorney for 0 & Y originally because it says, "The Planning Board shall hold hearings to approve Plates A and B using the standards set forth in the settlement agreement."

It's clear throughout that Plate A and Plate B was a part of this settlement agreement and it was accepted by the Township of Old Bridge in that form, and it's incorporated as part of the Appendix.

Now, if we take that next step that's being urged by various plaintiffs and counsel, they are indicating that if the Planning Board is unhappy with the new plate that's submitted, the Planning Board can review it.

The Planning Board can recommend changes. The Planning Board, if it says that it's not acceptable, would have it go to the master and ultimately to the Court.

There is no mechanism for the Township Council

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

on behalf of the Township of Old Bridge, to review any subsequent document that's submitted.

I think that's significant, because it shows that the Township Council relied upon Plate A and Plate B.

In this so-called mechanism to allow the plaintiffs to take an entirely new plan or call it Plate A
or call it Plate B and substitute that for review by
the Planning Board doesn't allow for review by the
Township Council which means that the Township
Council made a decision, based upon what was presented,
and now that has changed.

I think that to some extent, you know, if you try to draw analogies, I think back to that situation where a number of people bought Cadillacs and they found that they had Chevy engines.

It's a real case. In this case I think 0 & Y came forward, in particular Mr. Brown, and told the Township Council that they were going to get a Cadillac. They were going to get 0 & Y, with its major holdings, was going to build one of the main shopping centers in the State of New Jersey at the intersection of two State Highways, and now we find out that when you lift up the hood, you don't have a Cadillac, you have a Chevy engine. And I think what you would do if you were a judge and you were placed in that situation,

you would say, I am going to give that purchaser the right to rescind.

Well, these concepts, when you apply them to everyday people, should also apply to townships and other entities that have to approve settlements.

When this settlement was approved, it was the understanding that it would incorporate Plate A, and there is no mechanism for this Township Council to change it.

Furthermore, when your Honor was discussing with Carla Lerman the settlement in question, there was a discussion on page 41 of the transcript whereby you talked about the review process and you made the reference to: Is he or is she reviewing or acting as a super planning board?

Now, I submit that if you allow these plaintiffs to submit a new plan to the Township Planning Board, it's obvious that their hired consultant has indicated that the planning won't work in this area.

Even if it's referred to the master or ultimately to the Court, you are being asked to substitute your judgment as to what constitutes good planning for Old Bridge.

I don't think that was contemplated by the Township Council for the Township of Old Bridge when it

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

entered into this agreement, and I think that any need for you or a master, no matter how qualified the master is to substitute its judgment for the Township of Old Bridge, was not agreed to and is a basis for the setting aside of this agreement.

The last point, your Honor, is, and I will be brief, is the question of the intent of the Township.

The Township agreed to pass ordinances to set up a mechanism for a 10 percent set aside. That was done. That's in place.

The Township agreed to hold hearings before the Planning Board for a review. That was done.

There is no example in this settlement document or judgment where the Township agreed to do something that it did not perceive to do.

This reference to bad faith going back to 1971 is totally inappropriate. The Township of Old Bridge stood before your Honor on January 24th, 1986, entered into a settlement knowing other towns had refused to implement orders that your Honor had given.

Where township councils and mayors were being told they had to appear before your Honor to implement the orders of the Court regarding Mount Laurel, we were commended for cooperating with the Court when we entered into the settlement.

I think the Town acted in good faith.

The fact now that there is a drastic change in the amount of wetland on their property, and the fact that it totally upsets the agreement that we entered into, is not the fault of the Township Council of the Township of Old Bridge, and we should not be held to an agreement that was not before us when the agreement was voted upon, and I would ask you to set it aside on that basis. Thank you.

MR. NORMAN: Your Honor, one point. I would just direct the Court's attention to page 13, VB3a entitled Settlement Plan.

THE COURT: Where are you?

MR. NORMAN: Page 13. This is Roman Numeral V
B3a page 13. It's captioned Settlement Plan.

It states very specifically, "O & Y and Woodhaven shall have the right to develop their land in accord with the settlement plans set forth on Plates A and B applicable to their land upon the entry of this order."

That's what we understand the agreement was.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, if I could finish the rest of that phrase, I think that it does demonstrate exactly what was contemplated and what we are seeking today.

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That sentence continues: "Provided, one, we had to come before the Planning Board for public hearings; two, the Planning Board had to reach a decision on those hearings."

And then we get to the interesting part which, perhaps, we can remind the counsel for the Planning Board and the Township they agreed to: That the Planning Board should either approve a plate and then it is incorporated, the approved plate into the approved settlement agreement or in the event that the Planning Board doesn't approve a plate, the Court is to refer the matter to the master.

There was a belief at the time we entered into the agreement that we had tried to incorporate what the zoning was, what the Town's thinking was and so forth.

We had the obligation to give the Planning Board an opportunity to fairly review the planning considerations.

We did not try to stuff it down their throats. They had the opportunity to have a hearing.

If they approved the plan with the planning considerations, then it was incorporated into the settlement agreement.

> If they didn't, we had the opportunity to come Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

back before the Court.

The theory was that we had a plan which we thought was going — which incorporated the various issues that the Town had looked at, the Town had the opportunity to review the plan — the planning considerations.

It was a realistic opportunity. If they objected to it and had legitimate reasons, then we had to come back either before the Court or to satisfy the Planning Board and that mechanism is set forth in place.

Your Honor, let me just conclude with one reminder: We didn't come into Court seeking a change in zoning. The zoning was there.

We didn't come into Court seeking an increase in density. The density was there.

What we tried to do was present the Court and the parties and the Town with a way that we could carry out what the existing zoning was at the existing densities.

The big issue that had to be dealt with in our judgment was: There were no realistic opportunities for any developer to come into the Township of the planned developer with a clear understanding of what the procedures were, what the standards were, what was

meant by affordable housing and how to achieve a 4DU per acre development.

We think that the settlement agreement in all its volume set forth an understandable way for us to proceed.

We'd like to live within the context of the standards that we set forth at that time.

MR. HUTT: Your Honor, I would like to add one thought to that. The funny part is that Mr. Norman had referred to page 13 because I was going to refer to it too. It constantly uses the words "right to develop," not "the obligation."

You asked a question of Mr. Hall about instructions Mr. Hall was to give to the Planning Board. That's at page 10 of Appendix A.

He did give those instructions. He told us in advance he was going to give those instructions, and he did give those instructions.

The issue though is this: That he instructed him as paraphrasing, you can't change anything unless you have sound reasons.

Obviously, there is sound reasons. There is a lot of wetlands. They can't work.

So, now, we are altogether. Now the question comes: What does the settlement agreement say about Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

what happens when they find there were sound reasons for changing Plate A or Plate B or whatever? It doesn't say they moved —

THE COURT: Mr. Hutt, that's not what the parties were contemplating when we were talking about change.

We were talking about a plat or plates which bound the Planning Board to their fundamental planning allowed.

Unless the Planning Board found some problem with them from a nuts and bolts standpoint or otherwise which would justify a change, but it certainly was not in the contemplation of the parties that the changes would relate to a massive wetland problem, because if it was, they would have never had those plates in the first place.

MR. HUTT: Supposing there was a difference?

Supposing instead of wetland, as we started to build,

you found a toxic wasteland —

THE COURT: Over 50 percent of Old Bridge.

MR. HUTT: No, over 50 percent of the land.

THE COURT: Fifty percent of affordable acres.

Is that what you are saying?

MR. HUTT: What I am saying is we contemplated going in and changing.

THE COURT: No one contemplated that 50 percent Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

of the land would be unusable for any reason.

MR. HUTT: I would point out that that is not true in the case of Woodhaven.

THE COURT: I understand it was 30 percent.

MR. HUTT: It was 200 acres, more than you thought it was going to be.

Out of 1450 acres there was 200 acres more than we contemplated. So, it's not that.

But then what you are really saying or implying is if they turned it down, for whatever reason, they could move to reopen the judgment.

It says you come up with a new plan.

Keeping in mind that we didn't zone the property, as Mr. Hall pointed out, we inherited the zoning from the Town. So did O & Y. They are the ones that said the SD thing by Routes 9 and 18 was there.

O & Y didn't ask for that zoning that was there in place.

So, if anybody made an error or didn't know, it was them. They never told O & Y and say, hey, you can't build here because there is wetland. So, don't show it on your plate. They had a natural —

THE COURT: That was the least convincing of all the arguments in the papers. I mean, to charge this Township with the responsibility of mapping your

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wetland is just simply ridiculous. They used the best source of information available to them under what I consider to be appropriate circumstances.

To have every planning board in the State of New Jersey survey all of their property and to find out what streets are going where --

MR. HUTT: Your Honor, that wasn't --

THE COURT: -- and whether a spider's nest is in that area or not to find out whether there is wetland is absurd.

MR. HUTT: My point is: They did rezone something at our request and find out it couldn't work. zoning was in place before we ever came along, and so all we did was try to comply with their zoning.

Now, it comes out later on, neither party knew that you couldn't comply with their zoning, and now the zoning that they made, which we tried to comply with, they should say we should set aside the settlement.

THE COURT: Something strikes me that had you not liked the zoning, you would have bargained for it as part of the Mount Laurel settlement and changed the zone.

You accepted the zoning because you could do it. You accepted the zoning because it would produce Mount

much further reduced number.

All likelihood that continued protracted delay will pay off because the tract record demonstrated it at the time of the settlement.

They couldn't have done any worse, but not settle unless -- unless the development that they got had some incidents.

They were crazy to settle at that point. Weren't they?

MR. HUTT: I don't know. I think you are taking it out of context. Their COAH numbers were not available at that time. They didn't know whether it was going to be higher or lower. Nobody knew.

THE COURT: I think everyone had a strongly held suspicion, let's put it that way --

MR. HUTT: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- that the numbers -- or at the very least, at the very least they would have gotten the benefit of some additional delay and couldn't have done any worse.

MR. HUTT: Your Honor, as you well know, some of these towns got much higher numbers from the COAH.

In Monmouth and Southern Ocean County -THE COURT: Initially let's see where they end
up.

MR. HUTT: I don't know where they end up.

THE COURT: I know where they end up. They will end up lower or virtually lower, and Old Bridge would have had the benefit, after all of these periods of delays, wouldn't they, if they didn't settle? They would have still not had a single plan before them for that matter unless someone wanted to develop in accordance with existing zoning and that kind of thing.

The record would indicate that the Court did ask that the parties supply sufficient information to Mr. Raymond -- George Raymond, who has been appointed as Court Master in this case, to give him the opportunity if he could do so to make some judgment as to the scope and extent of the modification involved here.

One of the attorneys seemed to believe that my intention was to give Mr. Raymond the job of determining whether there should be a vacation, which, of course, is a matter for the Court.

However, there was a legal argument made to him which I consider to be not relevant.

But I am not altogether certain that, based upon what occurred today, the plaintiffs are in a position to inform Mr. Raymond fully.

However, I will ask Mr. Raymond, since he is

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present, I don't intend to take testimony or go beyond this question, but whether Mr. Raymond believes he is in a position or could be in a position to tell the Court definitively how the plan as it existed has been modified.

MR. RAYMOND: Your Honor, this plan or any plan that is possible under the current circumstances is very different from the plan that was incorporated as an administration of what was intended by the developers in the settlement.

I have to make a lot of assumptions because of the short time, relatively short time that I had to consider this matter. But I would assume that given the existing zoning of the site, the developers came forward to the Town with a plan that they thought was the best plan that they could conceive for the area and for the benefit of the Township partly to induce the Township to grant necessary approvals, but partially because they were trying to develop the best possible plan for themselves into the kind of community that they would build on the site.

If the question now is: Can a very desirable community, with the substantial number of units containing a substantial number of units be conceived on what is buildable in the area, I would say yes, it

can.

If the question now is: Can the amount of nonresidential ratables that can be provided be relatively
proportionate with what had been intended originally
with respect to the reduced number of units, I would
say that is possible.

If I were asked a question as to whether the Trans Old Bridge Connector is a necessary adjunct to this plan in order to make this plan work, I would say it is not.

Its infeasibility would be -- would -- negates the possibility of its being built and the new master plan of the Town recognizes that because it does away with it.

So that looking at what is possible on this site in terms of numbers, in terms of satisfaction of the Mount Laurel requirements, in terms of the relationship of non-residential to residential uses, I would say that the plan is a sound plan.

THE COURT: One other question. I will give counsel an opportunity if they wish to address a question, but I am not going to get into testimony.

When you say it is very different, in what respect do you find it very different?

MR. RAYMOND: Well, the plan that was originally Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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conceived was a compact plan with some open space like a central park, but of a size which is quite different from what is contemplated -- what can be developed at the present time.

On the other hand, as the map on the stand shows, what the new plan can be described as is a residential community surrounded by a green belt which is also a very sound planning concept.

So, I cannot say that this would not be a desirable community. I cannot say that this community would impose substantially greater costs on the Town of Old Bridge in terms of services than the original plan, because essentially the area to be covered is about the same, and the fact that the existing roads are going to be used rather than some new roads I don't think are material.

THE COURT: And you are not in a position, if I understood you to say, definitively that the commercial uses would be equivalent or non-residential uses would be equivalent to what was there before?

MR. RAYMOND: No, they are not equivalent but proportionately, in other words, the number of units and the amount of acreage that can be developed for non-residential uses is referable, comparable given the reduced number of units that the non-residential

development has to support.

THE COURT: So, we may be talking about before a major shopping mall, now we may be talking about a reduced mall or maybe a different type?

MR. RAYMOND: Yes, it's different, but the number of jobs proportionate to the residential development, reduction of residential development would be roughly comparable.

THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else wish to be heard?

As indicated this is a defendant's motion. There
is a cross-motion by the Civic League which we have
not argued and need not be argued concerning 1:10-5
enforcement.

The Court is going to take the time to try to summarize this second because I assume that there may be the potential for an Appellate review, at the same time I don't want to wish — I don't want to delay the matter any further, and therefore, I am not going to take the time to write an opinion. So, it's going to take me a certain amount of time to get to the conclusion.

The defendants essentially claim that subsequent to the entry of the judgment here, all the parties became aware of an extensive amount of wetland on properties of both of the plaintiffs here, that is,

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

O & Y and Woodhaven.

It appears that the numbers are approximately as follows: O & Y owns approximately 2,640 acres and 1,459 of those acres or 56 percent of them are in the wetland area.

As I indicated earlier, the upland consists of contiguous parcels of 581 acres, 200 acres are in tracts ranging from 10 to 19 acres and the balance is apparently smaller non-contiguous parcels. I take that information from the report of May 26, 1987.

I take it there may be some modification of that.

The plaintiff argues -- I am sorry -- the defendants argue that, indeed, there is less upland than I have just indicated.

The defendants -- I am sorry -- Woodhaven cwns approximately 1,455 acres. It appears that 490 acres or 30 percent of that is wet.

The defendants argue that the incentives which induced them to settle are gone for the most part.

They contend that the wetland problem makes fulfillment impossible, and, therefore, the Township loses all the benefits it had bargained for.

Additionally, the general welfare of the Township would not be served, they contend, by enforcement of the judgment.

The defendants argue that this situation is a result of a mutual mistake of fact or newly discovered evidence pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(a) and (b) respectively or that it is a basis for a modification of the settlement, based upon impossibility of performance in accord with Roman Number III, paragraph A.3.

Defendants believe they are entitled to the benefit of the fair share number as calculated by the Housing Council which is roughly one-fourth of their present number.

The plaintiffs, Urban League or now Civic League,

O & Y and Woodhaven obviously all oppose the motion

for similar reasons.

The plaintiffs claim that the essence of this settlement agreement was proportionality, which means that the residential development would be lock stepped with the commercial development and that the defendants will receive that on a lesser scale.

The plaintiffs, Woodhaven and O & Y, claim that the settlement agreement never mentions anything called a "new town" which the plaintiffs have frequently referred to and that the defendants are only entitled to what was agreed to in the judgment and accompanying documents.

The plaintiffs argue that the proposals as represented in the plates were not written in stone and were subject to modification.

They argue that the numbers set forth in the agreement represents ceilings, but do not obligate the plaintiffs to build anything.

The plaintiffs state that the agreement does not mention the Trans Old Bridge Connector or a golf course and that the defendants cannot now claim to have relied on such incentives.

The plaintiffs state that the plates only serve to prevent the defendants from arbitrarily changing their plans.

The existence of a vast amount of wetlands, the plaintiffs argue, is a risk accepted by both of the parties at the time of the settlement.

Plaintiffs claim that all parties knew that there were wetlands in the property and they just didn't know how much. So that they cannot now claim a mistake or newly discovered evidence.

Additionally, some plaintiffs argue that the Township did not act diligently to discover the extent of the wetlands as would be their burden pursuant to Rule 4:50-18.

Plaintiffs admit that the plates are no longer Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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viable but that all the settlement provides for is that the plaintiff is to come back to the defendant with alternate plans which they have, indeed, started to do.

The plaintiffs assert that the reopener clause covers the situation and that the defendants are not entitled to vacate the order, but they may, of course, modify it.

The plaintiffs finally argue that all of the parties contemplated that the order might require a modification at some future point due to the magnitude of the project and the fact that there is a 20-year build-out involved in this settlement.

The plaintiffs state that they can fulfill the essential terms of the order and that there is no impossibility of performance on their part.

The issue before the Court is whether the defendants are entitled to vacate the settlement due to the existence of vast amounts of wetland which were not known to the parties at the time they settled.

And certainly, if they are not entitled to vacate it, the plaintiffs are entitled to some relief in terms of enforcement.

The case law regarding Rule 4:50 has established that to vacate a judgment due to mistake, the mistake Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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must relate to material facts.

The mistake must relate to a past or present material fact to the contract and not to opinions respecting future conditions as a result of present That is Bauer v. Griffin 104 N.J. Super, 530 at -- I am sorry -- 104, 530 at 542 (Law Division) 1969 which was affirmed in 108 N.J. 414 (Appellate Division) 1970 and certification denied in 56 N.J. 245, 1970.

Bauer cites Spangler v. Kartzmark, 121 N.J. Eq. 64 at page 68, (Chancery Division 1936.)

The Bauer Court observed that Spangler involved a known physical injury concerning the future effects of which all were incorrect.

The Court then went on to quote from Reinhardt v. Wilbur 30 N.J.Super 502 at 505, (App.Div 1954) as follows: "The question to be determined is whether a duly executed general release may be invalidated upon the ground of mutual mistake of fact merely because

an injury subsequently becomes more serious than the releasor believed it to be or because she sustained injuries of which she was not aware at the time of the execution of the release.

"The very suggestion of invalidation for such cause is contrary to firmly imbedded principles of law. We cannot shut our eyes to the realities of Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

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everyday practice.

"Persons involved in accidents or their representatives carry on and conclude negotiations precisely because there is uncertainty as to the extent of injuries or liability or both and because of the uncertainty as to the outcome of any ensuing litigation."

That is at page 543 of Bauer.

Bauer, I might mention, is an interesting case, and I have had the privilege in the last two years of lecturing new judges on the principles of finality of judgment which is rather ironic, and Bauer is one that I always cite.

It's a case in which all of the parties assumed that the injured person would die and he fixed them. He didn't die, and, of course, the motion was made to up the amount of the settlement because of the fact that he did not die.

The Court in that context used the language which I have just indicated.

What these quotations illustrate is that the happening of an accident and the existence or nonexistence, that is, the potential for injuries are a bases for entering into a settlement, and the parties recognize that the potential, that the nature of the

injury may change, but they settle rather than run the risk of litigation.

These are known risks, and they are at the core of the settlement.

In this case the existence or non-existence of wetlands was not a COAH issue at settlement.

The risks avoided by settlement were typical —
were Mount Laurel litigation risks such as the award
of a builder's remedy, satisfaction and a setting of
the fair share number, perhaps, avoiding over involvement of the master who might rezone the Town
rather than giving the Town their freedom to do so,
and those types of potential risks facing all
municipalities involved in Mount Laurel litigation.

While all parties may have been aware of the existence of some wetlands on the properties which consisted of 4,000-plus acres, no one believed them to be a significant factor in the development plans.

In fact, Woodhaven provided in its planning report of December '85 and February '86, the latter presumably prepared in conjunction with the plats that 203 acres or 14 percent of its property was wetland.

Additionally, Mr. Norman states in his brief for the Planning Board that O & Y had mentioned throughout Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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the presettlement negotiations that only 14 acres of its property was wetland.

I should refer also to defendant's exhibit A-21 which is a letter dated December 10th, 1985 from Richard Tomer of the U. S. Corps of Engineers to William Tafe, who is the project engineer, I believe, for O & Y wherein Mr. Tomer states, "Your environmental impact report" -- and I will insert the word "indicates" to make it read grammatically -- "there are approximately 14 acres of wetland on site."

So, while clearly the parties were aware of the existence of wetland, it's just simply not accurate to say that it was an issue at the time of settlement.

It certainly was not central to the settlement agreement. It would be absurd to argue that the parties, especially the Township, recognized a potential for sizable amounts of wetland and then settled the case in the face of that risk.

Yet, while the existence or non-existence of wetland was not in issue at the time of settlement and therefore cannot be said to have been material to the settlement at that time, therefore fitting neatly into the cases regarding mistake under Rule 4:50, the extent of the wetland of which the parties now are aware does affect a material aspect of the settlement,

that being the ability of 0 & Y and Woodhaven to build the planned development as depicted in the plates or at least some reasonable facsimile thereof.

Defendant also cites Rule 4:50-1B regarding newly discovered evidence and argue this as another basis for relief.

The facts may fit even more neatly under B than A.

Rule 4:50-1B provides for relief if the newly discovered evidence would probably alter the judgment or order and which, by due diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 4:49.

In the case of Quick Chek Food Stores v. Springfield Twp. 83 N.J. 438 (1980), the plaintiff moved for a new trial citing newly discovered evidence.

The Court said, "The law governing motions for a new trial, based on newly discovered evidence, is the same as a motion to vacate, based on newly discovered evidence under Rule 4:50-1B."

The Court said, and I quote: "It is well established that it must appear that the evidence would probably change the result that it was unobtainable by the exercise of due diligence for its use at trial and that the evidence was not merely

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cumulative."

That is at page 445, citing cases which I have omitted.

It may be important to point out at this point that a motion to vacate is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court guided by equitable principles. See Hodgson v. Applegate 31 N.J. 29 at page 37 (1959) citing Shammas v. Shammas 9 N.J., 321 (1952).

Furthermore, the trial court's decision will generally be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion. See Hodgson at page 37, Quick-Chek and State v. Speare 86 N.J. Super 565 (App. Div. 1965.)

Rule 4:50-1B requires that the newly discovered evidence be such as it would probably have changed the result.

The Court must use its discretion and attempt to determine if this discovery of vast amounts or wetland would have changed the result of the settlement.

Clearly, defendants claim they would not have settled for the new proposal. They claim that the present package or any alternative that's been given to them constitutes poor planning and the benefits which induced them to settle are gone.

The plaintiffs admit that the plates are no longer Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

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viable, but they argue that the plates will not guarantee to the Township, and even if the plates were approved, that they were not obligated to build them.

They also argue that their alternative will constitute a sound, appropriate approach to the satisfaction of the Mount Laurel fair share obligation, and as well constitute good planning.

The Court accepts the fact that the plans were not a guarantee to the letter.

There can be little doubt that the full buildout with all the details shown on the plates, however, was something that was contemplated with some modification in location, size and so forth, and that is what the parties envision.

While the so-called Blue Book is clearly a comprehensive document, the plaintiffs cannot argue that it was a fully integrated agreement wherein parole evidence would not be allowed to explain its meaning.

If they argue that the plates are not guaranteed but are subject to change, it cannot be said to be a complete document, because the development itself is not a part thereof.

It is, therefore, appropriate to consider the present, rather the presettlement negotiations as set forth by Eugene Dunlop in his affidavit and Joan Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

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George in her affidavit.

It is also helpful to look at the planning reports for each development, because although submitted in February, 1986, they merely explain what is depicted on the plates and were probably prepared in conjunction therewith.

Clearly, the plaintiffs' planners were intricately involved with the settlement negotiations, and finally it's not inappropriate for the Court to acknowledge its own involvement to the extent that they are matters of record or at least matters undisputed.

It's evident that the parties involved throughout thought and planned with an expectation that there would be a full 20-year build-out.

Everyone expected that that was the result of the settlement with some recognition of future unknowns.

For example, Mr. Brown, vice-president of O & Y, stated in his October 6th, 1987 certification at paragraph 30, and I quote, "In alleging that the settlement agreement is no longer valid, the affidavits filed by Eugene Dunlop, Council President and Joan Ceorge, Chairperson of the Planning Board, expressed the Township's loss of expectation from the development in Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

essentially the same context as the alleged inability of O & Y to perform its obligations under the terms of the settlement agreement.

"Since O & Y shared these grand expectations for its development, we also share to an even greater degree the significant disappointment ensuing from the realization that due to the impact of the Federal Wetlands, the full potential of the development will never be realized."

Mr. Brown goes on to say that what was the ultimate potential and what was actually agreed upon are very different.

Picking up the argument that the parties only bargained for what is spelled out in the Blue Book, which does not include the plates at least in that form.

So, we see that O & Y at least shared defendants views as to what was initially to be produced.

Additionally, the Planning Board reports of both developers are written in terms of full build-out of 10,560 units by O & Y and 5,820 units by Woodhaven.

The plaintiffs refer to the Trans Old Bridge

Connector as the major circulation spine for the new

development providing excellent internal access to the

Town's center. That is in the O & Y report of February

28, 1986 at page 3.

As a major element of a circulation system which will serve not only the residents of Woodhaven, but also the Township at large. That's in the Woodhaven report of February 28, 1987 at page 7.

The O & Y planning report further describes the circulation system at page 14, and I quote, "The circulation system connects the villages into a cohesive community. It has been designed based on the existing road network with the goal of maintaining as much independence from the local roads in the area as possible.

"The result is a system comprised of new roads which not only serve the proposed development, but also enhance circulation in the Township as a whole. Each of these roads is an important component in the overall circulation system."

The report then goes on to describe the Trans
Old Bridge Connector and other roads as shown in
Plate A, and it is further stated, and I quote,
"The traffic networkwas designed to operate
essentially independent of existing local roadways
to preserve these 'country roads' in their present
state while providing a higher quality of access to
all areas of the development."

A review of the most recent planning report submitted on May 26, 1987 by 0 & Y shows among other changes a greatly changed circulation system.

It provides, and I quote: "Both of the land use alternatives relied primarily on the existing roads -- existing road network With necessary improvements and the addition of some minor arterial roads.

"While neither of the alternatives is dependent upon the Trans Old Bridge Connector, alternative B includes the Trans Old Bridge alignment because this was a requirement of the settlement."

That quote really has two significant meanings. It says gone are the country roads which were bargained for, and secondly, that indeed the Trans Old Bridge Connector was a bargain for inducement to settlement as O & Y candidly admits.

While the initial circulation system as proposed may no longer be required because of the proposed down-scale in the development, clearly the plans that form the basis of the settlement negotiations are dramatically changed.

It is also interesting to note that O & Y's planner perceived the Trans Old Bridge Connector to be a requirement of the settlement. This simply illustrates that even though the plaintiffs may argue

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that there were no guarantees, these benefits were clearly the incentive that the defendants argue about.

A review of the February 1986 plans and the May *87 plans gives a pretty good insight into the magnitude of the changes and just what benefits are lost.

Woodhaven did not submit for the Court's review a new proposal, but clearly even though they state they will still provide the full build-out.

Due to the fact that they have at least twice the amount of wetland they believed they had, they must be proposing a significant modification of their plan.

This review of the various changes was undertaken to illustrate the extent of change now proposed and to consider the same in light of the requirements of the rule under which the defendants move, that the new evidence be such as would have changed the result.

It is clear that the plans are greatly changed.

Mr. Raymond indicated in our brief discussion on the record that this is a very different plan, and in the Court's judgment it appears to be of such a magnitude as would compel the Court to conclude that it could have and would have changed the result.

The plaintiffs' argument that all the defendants are entitled to is residential development, if it

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occurs, being lock stepped with commercial development is simply not persuasive.

The defendants bargained for much more than that, and the concept plans were clearly without any question in the Court's mind, the inducement to settle even if the parties did not contemplate that there would be no change. The parties certainly understood that there would be some.

The parties contemplated that there could be a reduction, but they didn't contemplate that there would be a reduction in half the proposed development which would result in a wholesale modification of the plan even before by the way the first approval was granted.

The plaintiffs' argument that the Township could not rely in any way on the concept plans is very troublesome.

The plaintiffs state approval of these plans permits but does not obligate the plaintiffs to build one unit.

The defendant is said to be protected by this arrangement from overdevelopment by the maximums set forth, and, of course, there is an argument to be made that I alluded to in oral argument, if anything that the parties anticipated that the plaintiffs would

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build even more than is set forth in the plan if they could, because the settlement agreement provides that the plaintiff may acquire additional lands, the infill or out-parcels and that these lands would be treated as a part of the plaintiffs' initial holdings and may be developed as the land would be at the time of settlement.

Had the Court not believed that this settlement represented a binding promise exchanged by the parties, it may not have approved the settlement.

The case law which I will discuss in a minute does not support the plaintiffs' argument in this regard.

Plaintiffs' argument with respect to the nonbinding nature of the concept plans is somewhat belied by the various provisions in the settlement agreement itself.

I pointed already to A-13, concept plan approval hearings which provides, and I quote: "The Planning Board Attorney shall instruct the Board as to the limited nature of the Board's jurisdiction and the nature of the plans to be reviewed and shall indicate that the plates are at the master plan concept level and are part of the settlement of litigation and cannot be changed without sound reasons."

Additionally, Appendix C beginning at C200 illustrates that the parties were relying on the concept plans more than the plaintiffs will admit.

Thus, I believe, that the parties have relied on plans to a very great degree making allowance for minor variations due to planning considerations and minor unknown conditions.

Therefore, the existence of wetlands which reduce development, this substantially would in all likelihood have changed the outcome of the settlement.

Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants could have discerned the existence of the wetland with the exercise of due diligence. As I have already indicated in oral argument, perhaps, more cryptically this is totally without merit.

The plaintiffs themselves state that until they received some preliminary approval, they did not know the type of, or they did not engage in the type of investigation so as to waste money and time on it.

That's the plaintiffs' reasoning, although the Court finds it somewhat difficult given the magnitude of the investment in this case.

It wasn't the defendants' responsibility to discover the extent of the wetland by going out into the field and surveying four and a half miles of

property. That burden is on the developer.

Clearly, the defendants had some obligation, and their master plan, indeed, mapped wetland area in accord with the data available to them.

It is certainly not the standard in the marketplace to have municipalities survey all of the
property within its town or with regard to any application before it, before it approves a plan, because
had the Town approved the plan, the plaintiffswere
still subject to State and Federal regulations either
implicitly or by operation of law which would have
meant approval by all agencies having appropriate
jurisdiction in the matter.

Thus, it appears that the defendant is entitled to a vacation of the final judgment, based on mistake and/or newly discovered evidence.

Yet, due to the magnitude of this case and the magnitude of the defendants' request, it is appropriate to discuss some of the other relevant considerations in a little more detail.

The Court is, in light of the fact that the Township also seeks to transfer this case to the Council on Affordable Housing because of a greatly reduced fair share number. If that was not one of its motivations, it could simply enter into a

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modification of this plan with the plaintiff.

The defendants have even indicated that they believe that they may be able to reduce their fair share number to zero which certainly didn't help this Court in its subjective analysis of this case.

Plaintiffs argue that to allow such a result would be an injustice to the Mount Laurel doctrine.

Clearly, if the defendants sought to transfer it, based solely on the Council's fair share number, the Court would reject such a motion similarly.

As I have suggested, the fact that they even argue is disturbing.

While the reopener clause may appear to support such an argument, the colloquy on the record at the compliance hearing would preclude any relief of that type.

The Court specifically inquired whether the fair share number was solid and there was no dispute that it was.

Yet, if the defendant is entitled to a vacation of the judgment as opposed to a modification due to impossibility of performance in accordance with the reopener clause, clearly then they are entitled to a transfer to the Council pursuant to the language in Hills Development v. Bernards 103 N.J. 1(1986),

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that point was virtually conceded by the plaintiffs with some hesitation.

So, the question becomes whether the defendants should be allowed to vacate or does the reopener clause cover this situation, and must the defendants abide by that agreement as plaintiffs argue?

The Court has made it clear, I hope, that the concept plans were more integral to the agreement than the plaintiffs will admit. In fact, the plans provided the basis for the settlement. That is not to say that any rights vested pursuant to the plans, because the Municipal Land Use Law provides to the contrary. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.1.

However, they are strong evidence of what the parties agreed to. Granted there was room for some flexibility, some unknowns, to find that the plates were practically irrelevant as to -- as the plaintiffs seem to argue would be to find that the defendants were bound by the terms of agreements to which the plaintiffs were not bound.

The plates were said to bind the Planning Board, but not the defendants.

In fact, Woodhaven states in its brief, "It is not as though defendants have a right to specific performance from the plaintiffs with regard to

construction. Woodhaven states that all the Blue Book guaranteed was proportionality.

It says the Blue Book only requires that if there is to be any residential development, then the commercial development must be lock-stepped with any residential development pursuant to the staging performance schedule. This lock-step development is all the Township has been promised and is exactly what the Township will get. That's at page 26 of the brief.

If the proposals as set forth on the plates were not seen as integral to the settlement, it's doubtful whether all the essential ingredients of the contract would be present.

The duties of the parties must be to set forth with enough specificity that the Court can determine what performance was to be rendered.

See <u>Heim v. Shore</u> 56 <u>N.J. Super</u> 62 at page 72 (App.Div. 1959.)

While the mechanism for dealing with the application is present and certain necessary ordinances, a major element is missing, and that is what, in fact, is being proposed if it is not the plates as attached.

A concept judgment -- I am sorry -- a consent judgment is a form of contract as stated in Stonehurst Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

N.J. Super 311, 313 (Law Division) and I quote:
"While a consent judgment is of the nature of both
a contract and a judgment, it is not strictly a
judicial decree, but rather in the nature of a contract entered into with the solemn sanction of the
Court.

"A consent judgment has been defined as an agreement of the parties under the sanction of the Court as to what the decision shall be."

I have omitted citations.

In the case of -- and I will spell it:

G-i-u-m-a-r-r-a v. Harrington Heights 33 N.J. Super

178, 190 (App. Div. 1954) affirmed 18 N.J. 548 (1955),

the Appellate Division stated, "The modern concept is

that in the case of bilateral contracts not only are

the promises consideration for one another, but the

parties also contemplate that the performances

promised shall be exchanged one for the other.

"Failure of consideration exists wherever one, who has promised to give some performance, fails without his fault to receive in some material respect the agreed exchange for that performance.

"Where the counter promise to perform relates to a material matter, the disappointed party has the right Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

to rescind the contract."

Plaintiffs argue that they are permitted, but not required, to build one thing. If this was the case, clearly there would be a failure of consideration.

Lock-stepping is not all that the defendants bargained for. The concept plans are representing of the presettlement negotiations and evidence of what induced the defendants to settle.

The parties contemplated and planned for one of the largest, if not the largest development in the State of New Jersey.

The magnitude of the change, and particularly at the very initial step of development in the Court's opinion results in a totally new plan, be it appropriate, be it sound planning, it is not what we have when we began and it is not in any sense truly comparable to what we have when we began.

Plaintiffs return promise was to develop a project such as depicted in Plates A and B.

An essential characteristic of an enforceable contract is that its obligations be specifically described in order to enable a court to know what was promised and what was undertaken.

See the Malaker Corporation v. First Jersey

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National Bank 163 N.J. Super 463, 474 (App. Div. 1978)

As Woodhaven itself put it: If the developers were able to prove to the Planning Board that the plates work in a planning sense, and in accordance with the standards set forth in the Blue Book appendices, then the Planning Board could not have required something else. That's at page 5 of the brief.

Thus, while conceptual approval does not vest rights, apparently these plates resulted in their being incorporated into a settlement agreement, and the Planning Board review was limited to sound planning considerations.

So, it is clear that the concept plans were indeed material to the settlement, allowing the same type
of flexibility as one might expect in dealing with
nuts and bolts as opposed to major concepts.

With this in mind I return to the reopener clause and whether it covers the present situation.

In the landmark case of <u>Tessmar v. Grosner</u> 23

N.J. 193 (1957), Chief Justice Vanderbilt said, "In the quest for the common intention of the parties to a contract, the court must consider the relations of the parties, the attendant circumstances and the objects they were trying to obtain.

"An agreement must be construed in the context of the circumstances under which it was entered into, and it must be accorded a rationale meaning in keeping with the express general purpose."

At page 201.

The reopener provided in relevant part for modification, based on impossibility of performance. Clearly, performance is as initially contemplated, is no longer possible, yet at various — as various parties have argued, modifications were contemplated because of the size of the project and the fact that it would take 20 years to build.

What might happen to the market and what regulations might come into play which would affect its ability to perform, were really what was covered by the reopener agreement as has been argued by the plaintiffs here.

It would be disingenuous to argue that the parties contemplate having to totally revise the plans before any approvals were received.

Really, what is proposed is not a modification, but it is a brand new plan. Both developers admit the plans designated as Plates A and B are no longer viable due to the magnitude of the change and in light of what the Court believes the parties reasonably

intended, given the circumstances at the time the reopener clause does not cover the situation.

Mr. Convery points out in his brief that the Court denied the motion to transfer, based on mootness but stated on the record that a change in the terms of the settlement may justify a renewal of the motion.

While the Township — I am sorry — while the Court spoke in terms of the Township opposing the modification requested by the plaintiffs, in fact, this is what has happened. And, as I said earlier, the plaintiffs would have had to make an application to this Court for modification sooner or later.

The Township argues and the Court agrees that the change is so significant that the Township is entitled to vacate the judgment and to have its case transferred to the Housing Council.

I say that sentence with a great deal of reluctance with a full knowledge of the enormous
amount of effort and time that has gone into this,
and I presume in good faith from all parties.

The fact of the matter is the Court cannot interpose any sense of what is just and fair in this case and have it comport with what the Supreme Court has felt to be just and fair in all of the cases which

were in a similar posture which were transferred.

Many cases were at the brink, so to speak, of housing, and nonetheless, were transferred.

This case is now without a final judgment, and the Court believes that it has no alternative but to transfer the case to the Council on Affordable Housing pursuant to the Hills decision.

The plaintiffs' motion is therefore moot. I recognize there could theoretically be some obligation on behalf of this Township to pursue the non-payment of fees that has apparently admittedly occurred here. That is not something which the Court need deal with at this particular juncture.

I also recognize that there is pending an appeal with regard to the validity of the collection of those fees in another setting, and the Court will not at this time entertain any motion to enforce that aspect of the judgment.

Of course, it's a substantial question whether

I have jurisdiction to enforce anything at this

point given the vacation of the judgment which I have.

Lastly, the plaintiff Woodhaven did argue that if the settlement is vacated as to 0 & Y, it need not be vacated as to Woodhaven for the reasons which I have stated, perhaps, in too much length.

The defendant is entitled to a vacation as to both plaintiffs. The settlement with respect to the two parties is totally inter-related and interdependent.

The defendant was induced to settle with two parties, based upon the total package because of what each could contribute towards an integrated development.

Therefore, the vacation will apply to both of the plaintiffs.

All right. Counsel can submit an order. MR. NORMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

<u>C E R T I F I C A T E</u>

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I, JUDITH R. MARINKE, a Certified

Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of
the State of New Jersey, certify that the
foregoing is a true and accurate transcript
of the proceedings as taken before me
stenographically on the date hereinbefore
mentioned.

JUDITH R. MARINKE, C.S.R. Official Court Reporter License No. XI-00392

Dated: 0 x 22,1987