Stenographic Transcript of
Setflement. between

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O=7 Y Development Corporation,

Wood haven Village, and

Twp of Old Bridge

CA002539S

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 1 LAW DIVISION : MIDDLESEX/OCEAN COUNTIES Docket No. C-4122-73 2 URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER 3 NEW BRUNSWICK, et als., 4 Plaintiffs,) MOUNT LAUREL II 5 VS. STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT of THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF SETTLEMENT THE BOROUGH OF CARTERET,) 7 et al., RECEIVED 8 Defendants.) FEE 2 2 1780 9 Place: TIBOR (IRPENIELLE CHAIRERS 10 Ocean County Courthouse 11 Toms River, N.J. 12 Date: 13 January 24, 1986 14 15 BEFORE: 16 THE HONORABLE EUGENE D. SERPENTELLI, J.S.C. 17 TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: THOMAS J. HALL, Esq. 18 (Brener, Wallack & Hill) 19 APPEARANCES: 20 ERIC R. NEISSER, Esq. and 21 BARBARA J. STARK, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiff 22 Urban League of Greater New Brunswick. 23 24 Reported by: DAVID G. VORSTEG, C.S.R. 25

CA002539S

APPEARANCES (Continuing):

MESSRS. BRENER, WALLACK & HILL
By THOMAS J. HALL, Esq.
and
MESSRS. HANNOCH & WEISMAN
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MESSRS. HUTT, BERKOW & JANKOWSKI
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
Woodhaven Village, Inc.

JEROME J. CONVERY, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
The Township of Old Bridge.

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INDEX

CARLA L. LERMAN

Name

THE COURT

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1	(Whereupon, the telephone conference was held
2	as follows:)
3	THE COURT: Hello.
4	MR. NORMAN: Judge.
5	THE COURT: Yes.
6	MR. NORMAN: Tom Norman.
. 7	THE COURT: Right.
8	MR. NORMAN: Note here that Jack Sarubbi
9	called me last night.
10	THE COURT: Yes. You are being called,
11	because a hearing is today on the compliance, and
12	we simply wanted to be sure that you consent to us
13.	proceeding and agree with all of that which has been
14	submitted to the Court.
15	MR. NORMAN: Yes. Is Jerry Convery there?
16	MR. CONVERY: The answer is yes. Nothing's
17	changed since last week.
18	THE COURT: All right. He's standing right
19	here.
20	But, now, you are not appearing, and we
21	wanted to be sure. You are going to have to sign
22	this thing.
23	MR. NORMAN: No. I will sign it on Monday.
_ 24	THE COURT: On Monday.
25	MR. NORMAN: Yes.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Any questions? 2 MR. NORMAN: I'm coming up Monday and will sign it. I don't have any problems. THE COURT: Any questions from counsel? 5 Do you want to have Jerry sign it on your behalf? 7 MR. NORMAN: Sure. In fact, yes, if he signs it, then I feel more comfortable that it's okay. THE COURT: Fine, very good. Off the record. (Informal discussion outside the record.) (Whereupon, the telephone conference was concluded.) THE COURT: Is this known as the weight of the authority? Is that what it is? Who's trying to impress whom? We should indicate that this is the scheduled date for hearing with respect to the proposed settlement and compliance ordinance of the Old Bridge matter. I have had filed with me an affidavit of publication of this hearing in the News Tribune, appearing on January 13, 1986. The affidavit will become part of the file.

All right, how do you wish to proceed? You

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1 want to have Miss Lerman take the stand and tell 2 us she agrees, and then we can go from there? 3 All right, Ms. Lerman. 4 5 L E R M A N, having been duly sworn L. 6 according to law, was examined and testified 7 as follows: 8 THE COURT: Off the record. 9 (Informal discussion outside the record.) 10 THE COURT: Okay. The record, I am sure, 11 is amply full of the fact that Carla Lerman is the 12 Court-appointed Master in this case and has worked 13 closely with the parties in an effort to resolve 14 the litigation. 15 BY THE COURT: 16 Q I suppose in the interest of expedition we 17 can simply ask whether Ms. Lerman has reviewed the proposed 18 order of judgment and settlement agreement and associated 19 documents and is satisfied generally with the proposed 20 settlement? 21 Yes. 22 Q That's as brief as you can get. 23

Does the proposed settlement result in the likelihood that not all housing will result in a number equivalent to the fair share of the municipality?

I think that what this represents, really didn't.

I think that what this represents, really, is a great deal of, you know, negotiation and discussion, compromise, working through figures, and what will result, I believe, is the realistic probability, if that's not a redundancy, that the number of units set forth in the settlement agreement will be built in the six-year repose period referred to in the agreement. The dual number is lower than the fair share number that had been agreed to, initially, the fair share number relating what would have been the requirement for a ten-year period. The six-year period really represents what realistically might be built in six years and marketed in this period of time.

O That's the 1668?

A Right.

THE COURT: I'll direct this to counsel:

The order refers to 1,668 units. In the settlement agreement, Section III-B.2 there's a reference to the "suspension of lower-income housing obligation," which refers to 2,135 units.

I want to be sure I understand what the difference is.

MR. CONVERY: May it please the Court,

Jerome J. Convery on behalf of the Township of
Old Bridge.

That section was negotiated several months back concerning the concept that if the Township of Old Bridge reached the number of 2,135 lower income units prior to 1990, that there would be no further obligation to have developers construct Mount Laurel housing at that point. It later became clear that the realistic number that could actually be built by the year 1990 would be much less than that, but this was an assurance to the Township Council that once we reached that number of 2,135 units, that no one would expect the Township of Old Bridge to require builders to continue to build Mount Laurel housing in excess of that number in spite of the fact that we would have ordinances in effect that would have a set-aside.

So I am trying to explain to the Court that this was a provision that was negotiated to satisfy the Council that they would not be required to go beyond that number. That paragraph is acceptable to the town in the form that it's now stated, but I think all the parties agree that the figure in the order represents the obligation of 1,668 units for the next six years following the entry of the order.

THE COURT: Well, to the uninitiated, including

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me in terms of your negotiation and purpose, it appears to me there is an inconsistency. The two seem quite inconsistent. It seems to us your fair share is 1,668, and you should be entitled to cut it off then in 1990.

MR. CONVERY: Rather than --

THE COURT: I'm not arguing against the idea.

MR. CONVERY: Rather than belaboring the point, the provision is acceptable to the town. If the provision is not acceptable to the Master or to the Court, I would ask that that provision be stricken rather than having additional negotiation.

THE COURT: Mr. Neisser.

MR. NEISSER: Eric Neisser on behalf of the Urban League.

THE COURT: I want you to know I said it right.

MR. NEISSER: Yes, you did, and I appreciate it.

Mr. Convery's description is accurate. I think he only failed to explain, as Your Honor said, to the uninitiated where the number 2,135 in that paragraph you referred to came from. That comes from Your Honor's order of July 13, 1984, in which the fair share was set at 2,414. Then in this

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document credits were given for some units that had been developed since 1980. So the remaining period, remaining fair share obligation at this point was 2,135.

I think it would be adequate to state, unless the Court wishes to go further into it, that all of these points that Your Honor's raising have been contested quite hotly over a period of time and that, including the question of the number and phrasing of the various terms of this agreement, and the town has agreed to that paragraph that's there. We do not view it as inconsistent. If Your Honor feels appropriate, I would be glad to go into lack of inconsistencies.

THE COURT: If the town is agreeable to be bound by that, I don't have any problem. I just thought maybe there was some negotiation with regard to the fair share number, and we didn't pick up the change here.

THE WITNESS: That's one way of putting it.

THE COURT: If the town is willing to let it go beyond the fair share number to 1990, that's fine with me.

MR. CONVERY: I may take one last shot. If Mr. Neisser and the other plaintiffs will agree to

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change the number on Page 9 from --

MR. HUTT: Do you want to agree to take a shot at us?

MR. CONVERY: -- 2,135 to the number, 1,168, I will agree to that change.

MR. NEISSER: I think he knows the answer. For the record, we do not agree.

THE COURT: Counsel's indicated he is not willing to be bound by that and the record is clear.

While I am on this paragraph, and I don't want to interrupt the general review of this document, but while I am there the second sentence says, "In the event, any party shall have the right to petition the Court for clarification."

I assume you mean any party to this agreement. You are not creating the right in any party anywhere? Yet it could be interpreted that way, because there could be other parties who are affected by that The purpose of this is to allow 0 & Y and cap. Woodhaven to say, okay, now, what's our responsibility, since we reached this number?

I would think you might want to say to this agreement --

MR. CONVERY: I would agree, Your Honor, and I would agree to the document being amended to read,

"any party to this agreement."

THE COURT: Okay. Somebody better keep notes on this. I assume Mr. Hall is the drafter.

You can keep notes.

Now, let's just go back to the general question of whether Ms. Lerman has any questions concerning any aspect of the documents on which she wishes to comment further with regard to the proposed settlement.

you want me to run through where the numbers come from. I don't have any further questions. We have reviewed documents that have then very minor revisions and some major revisions going back after a number of months. So that I think what Your Honor is seeing is the final, that we have all been involved in many, many drafts earlier. There have been, as I say, some small changes and some major changes over the last six months or so.

I don't have any further questions with what's in here. I would, if I may, just say one thing, that the reference to the party having the right to petition the Court, I don't know whether to further clarify the party to this agreement involves

10 percent mandatory set-aside for all residential

development. So that one of the parties, I would picture, that might have a question is any residential developer who is faced with a 10 percent set—aside, and now it's theoretically 1990. We reached 2,135. How is it clarified for my residential developer that he was not continued or she does not have to continue to provide 10 percent mandatory set—aside?

with local authorities. If they disagree with the resolution, then, of course, they would have an independent right to institute legal proceedings.

I just didn't want to leave this problem open to the point where anybody could simply come in here on a motion. I would hope that this case is complete and finished, so I think your point is well taken. But I think they should proceed through normal procedures to --

THE WITNESS: To plan for it.

THE COURT: Yes, to get here.

MR. CONVERY: Excuse me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CONVERY: I wanted to make the point on the record. It has always been my understanding that the intention of the parties regarding that paragraph

was that it only apply to the parties to the agreement. So that was what was in my mind when I negotiated that particular paragraph.

THE COURT: That's what I assumed.

MR. CONVERY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. I think what I would like to do is proceed through the documents. I'm going to ask Miss Lerman to stay here. So that, there might be questions in which she would like to comment, she is easily available to anyone to question her if you have any questions.

Does anyone have any questions? I assume not.

All right, let's just take the order and judgment. There is no statement of repose in this judgment, unless I completely missed it.

MR. NEISSER: Page 8, middle of the page.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, Page 8, Item 8.

THE COURT: Okay. I wrote a note over it.

That's what happened. Then I would say the caption should be changed to "order and judgment of repose."

All right? That suggests to the Clerk's Office a termination of these proceedings.

Page 4, Paragraph 5, third line, well, I guess you have to start at the first line if you read

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it by yourself. By the time we get to the third line we are reading the words, "must average, in any calendar year, \$7,500." That could be interpreted each year or each unit. You mean each unit, I take it.

MR. HUTT: Each unit.

THE WITNESS: Each unit.

THE COURT: Now, it would seem to me to be perfect to insert the word "unit."

Then it goes on to say that the "grants must be used to bring the units up to fire, building and housing code standards."

Now, I would assume that the purpose of the grants are to remove the housing from the category of efficient.

BY THE COURT:

Q Now, would one equate to the other? In other words, would it be inappropriate here to amend this to say, to ensure that the units will not be deficient as defined in AMG or as defined somehow?

A Well, we did discuss this, and one of the questions here is that in the AMG the standards that were used to arrive at what the indigenous need in Old Bridge is were based on three specific categories. Actually, a few of those categories could be standard and the roof could be

Lerman

1 falling in or there could be, you know, a whole broken 2 front porch. There could be a variety of other delapidated 3 characteristics which don't get reflected in those numbers. 4 The reverse side, however, you could spend Q 5 7500 on cosmetics and not remove deficiencies? 6 But if you brought it up to all of the codes, you would also be removing the deficiency. 8 That's what I am asking. You are satisfied Ω 9 then that by code compliance we will remove all deficiencies 10 as identified under AMG? 11 I believe so, yes. 12 Q I suppose you could spend all the money on 13 fire code compliance and then not spend it on building and 14 housing code compliance, and you wouldn't remove your 15 deficiencies? 16 It is possible that within their rehabilitation they 17 would have an upper limit on how much, you know, the maximum 18 amount that any grant could be. There have been houses, I 19 don't know about Old Bridge, but I have seen one myself. To 20 correct all of the deficiencies, code violations, takes more 21 than what the program can afford. 22 I think what I am aiming at is whether it 23 wouldn't be appropriate to say that up to the \$7500 limit 24

the money must be used first to remove heating, plumbing

and overcrowding deficiencies and thereafter for any other

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burpose. Otherwise, what we are liable to do here is to improve union for the purposes of cotting a credit to the town for their fair diste and they are not going to get it and and up with blue in their rext count, if there even is a roxt count.

A Yes, I think.

MR. HUTT: That's their risk. They are supposed to do that. What they are doing, if they do that, and I understand they haven't solved it, this way it's availater. That makes the time to solve it that you are concerned about, in other words, giving money for solving AMC deficiencies rather than just cosmatics. Because if they don't solve AMC deficiencies, adjust costs, so cosmetics — they are going to get it in the next count, so it's

THE COURT: It is at madic risk. It's also the people that are accumulate it, I'm concerned about.

a self-molicing code.

restriction that the credit would only be given in this case for units that had fire or bousing code deficiencies. In other words, description in would not be consided as a credit words of the code of the consideration.

worried about is the general description of "fire, building and housing code standards," which might allow the use of the \$7500 for matters which would not necessarily resolve the deficiencies, which we say create a substandard unit. They might work on other things other than plumbing and heating or overcrowding. What my concern is, I just — if it's not a principal concern to the plaintiffs, Urban League, and the Master, then I will drop it. But I think the town should at least be on notice that if you don't cure those kinds of deficiencies, then you are talking about not being able to claim a credit in the next count.

Now, I think the town could protect itself by developing regulations as to the allocation of the \$7500.

MR. NEISSER: Perhaps I can address it. I think that the intent of the language that you see is to address deficient units that were established or identified in the AMG methodology. It's admittedly a linguistic shorthand attempt to address it. I cannot state here for sure that if one is up to every fire, building and housing code that's applicable, that necessarily we will have caught

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every other deficiency.

It seems to me the basic deficiency, like there is no heating, the building that is used year-round, other basic deficiencies of that nature, no adequate plumbing, and the problem would seem to be covered by ordinary codes.

With regard to your concern about cosmetics, we obviously share the concern. I do not perceive a paint job as being something necessary to bring one up to building or housing codes, and clearly the town is fully aware of the reason that we oppose such. In fact, the amount of the grants, which are required by the clause, consist of fairly substantial sums. Because we wanted it clear to the town that they have to be addressing serious deficiencies. So just as Ms. Lerman, I can't be absolutely sure that this clause will, in fact, take care of each of the deficiencies, but this is the intent to do that.

THE COURT: Okay. I think the town has got to try to protect itself by channeling the money to those things you are really talking about in delapidated units.

All right, Page 5, is there a provision elsewhere for review of the rules and regulations?

I'm sorry.

Paragraph D, the rules and regulations, which are to be adopted by the Affordable Housing Agency either by the Master or by the Court, that's at the top of the page, it says they are going to adopt regulations within 120 days. Customarily, of course, they are reviewed and then thereafter approved by the Court in an order.

MR. NEISSER: There is no explicit provision that I am aware of. However, the provision right below the one you are looking at, which is 7a, speaks about bringing the resolution of disputes that might arise between the parties before the standing Master and, of course, --

THE COURT: I'm not talking about a dispute;
I'm just talking if they adopt regulations that are
not appropriate.

MR. NEISSER: That's what I am saying. If they are not in conformity with the ordinance and the kind of provisions required by the judgment and settlement agreement, then presumably at least this party would have a dispute with them as to the adequacy of those regulations. Similarly, the developer might have a dispute with regard to a particular regulation. But to my knowledge there is no express provision for coming back on a date

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certain for review.

THE COURT: That's what I call a trust-me argument. I do, but, by the way, trust you, --

MR. NEISSER: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- better trust you than make me review them, as a matter of fact.

MR. CONVERY: Yes. Jerry Convery the trust-me remark is a lead-in to a Stu Hutt joke.

THE COURT: I'm sorry I said that.

MR. CONVERY: Before he gets to that, I would like to indicate if Your Honor feels that these rules and regulations should be approved by a Master, the town would have no objection to that. If you feel that that is a necessary part of this order, I think that's a reasonable provision. Your Honor usually has the Master review the rules and regulations. That's acceptable, so I would have no objection to a clause being added that says, "and shall be approved by the Master."

THE COURT: I think for the town's benefit it should be there and in terms of consistency and so forth with other matters. I don't mean just a consistency, because of consistency's sake, but rather that there be some procedure that's relatively similar in all of the townships it might be useful as

well.

MR. HUTT: I was going to say, Your Honor,

I don't recall that the rules and regulations were
to be reviewed by the Court. The ordinance is here
and that has to be reviewed. The reason I raise
the question, supposing a year from now they want to
change the rules and regulations. Does that presume
they can't change it without Court approval? I've
never seen you get involved in the rules and
regulations as distinguished from the naked ordinance,
setting up what it has to contain. The rules and
regulations just flush out the guidelines in the
ordinance which is, of course, do you have to approve
and you may well approve today.

THE COURT: I have been involved in the regulations, because they can directly impact.

MR. HUTT: Then I ask the question. Suppose a year from now it changes.

THE COURT: Let's go off the record.

(Informal discussion outside the record.)

THE COURT: Back on the record.

Paragraph D, I think we can simply provide that the rules and regulations shall be submitted to the Master for her review, period.

Paragraph 7c, I just want to make sure what

the intent of that paragraph is. When you are making the Court an offer you see what it says, six, the line of that paragraph, it says, "may offer to the Court a mechanism whereby the developer shall be assured of obtaining an adequate supply of potable water for their entire projects."

Once they make this offer what am I supposed to do?

MR. HUTT: Make it presented to the Court.

THE COURT: One at a time.

Mr. Hall.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, it's Thomas Hall
for Olympia & York. The intent of this paragraph
is to put into place a procedure whereby one of the
several outstanding serious problems can ultimately
be resolved. It is anticipated there have been
significant discussions that have taken place back
and forth between the developers and Old Bridge
Township Municipal Utilities Authority, and it is
anticipated we can arrive at an agreement in a timely
fashion. However, if we can't, we believe it will
be appropriate for us to bring the matter back before
this Court. That's the intent to this paragraph,
both to put the parties and this Court on notice
that if we can't resolve this dispute in a timely

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fashion, the provision of potable water is critical to the establishment of this development and we would have to come back before this Court for its assistance.

THE COURT: So, in other words, it will really remain, apply to the Court for relief. All right, just leave it.

I made a whole bunch of notes here as I went along. Then they were answered by things when I got what I got later on, so I have to weed through those. Okay.

Page 8, Paragraph f dealing with the \$30 fee, does this mean that upon the first certificate of occupancy or non-Mount Laurel development that the \$30 fee must be paid for all the lower income units?

MR. NEISSER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Or just each lower income unit as it's certified? In other words, if there are 200 lower income units in the project, you are going to have to pay thirty times 200?

MR. NEISSER: Prior to the certificates, issuance of any certificates of occupancy, including any units.

THE COURT: Market units will be first?

MR. NEISSER: Obviously, at that point they must pay \$30 for each of the lower income units approved for construction in that application. I think that clause in that application is important. For example, with regard to the O & Y and Woodhaven, they don't have a single application on some. They will have a number of applications over the years, each application time, the first CO of any unit in which there is an application, that approval.

THE COURT: So if Phase A has 60 units, it's going to be 60 units times thirty paid up front when the first CO for the Mount Laurel new --

MR. NEISSER: For the paltry sum of \$1800, that's correct.

MR. HUTT: Your Honor, the record should note it's always paltry when you are getting it; it's not so paltry when you are paying it.

THE COURT: Paragraph 10, page 9 deals with the "outrageous" order I entered with respect to Oakwood at Madison. I say in quotes; somebody said it was "outrageous." Is that left dangling here if we have not resolved it?

MR. NEISSER: Yes. We have not resolved it. After your order of May 31st the understanding would be that Oakwood would come forward with some

proposal that we could negotiate. They never contacted me. Finally, in December, as December is nearing completion, I contacted Mr. Mezey,
M-e-z-e-y. He is the attorney for Oakwood. He had basically not given much thought to it, if I can characterize his response. We discussed some things and have had a subsequent conversation, so in the last few weeks I have written a letter on the matter, making a suggestion there has been some progress, but as of this date it is not concluded.

I should say that Oakwood has come into the Planning Board for whatever model home building permit, so it's clearly proceeding with the project. Therefore, it's vital to us that this order be continued and that's why it's in this paragraph.

THE COURT: You say they are abiding by the restraining order?

MR. NEISSER: So far this month they haven't gotten close to 120. We are sure they will abide by it for the duration.

THE COURT: It would have been nice to wrap that up too, but I understand you can't do everything.

What does the effect of that right to comment that is retained by the Urban League under Paragraph 11 have upon the conclusion of this matter? I mean

is it just kind of a preparatory thing? You just have a right to comment. Everybody says you can comment, but we don't want to listen to any more comment, is that it, for the record?

MR. NEISSER: For the record, I don't know.

I have to accept your characterization. In substance, yes. That is to say, we have, as indicated, we have not been involved in the detailed engineering, planning, road and drainage standards. There have been a few comments that we have transmitted to one of the parties, some of the parties, from our reading of them and from our involvement, that we have no significant problem. We just seek the right to comment if there is something of benefit in the process that we can offer.

MR. CONVERY: May it please the Court, Jerome Convery on behalf of the Township. I think it's appropriate at this time to put something on the record concerning the Township Council's authorization for me to sign the judgment and agreement. When this was presented to the Town Council some of the details of the various appendices had not been completed, so by resolution the Township Council authorized me to sign the judgment and agreement upon receipt of written communication from the Town-

hip Planer, Henry ignell; the waship Engineer,
darvey P. Goldie, and our constant regarding
planning matters, Carl Hintz. just wanted the
record to be clear that I am in receipt of various
memoranda from those individuals whereby Henry Bignell,
who is, in fact, in Court, has indicated that the
final version of the Appendices B and C are acceptable
to him as the Township Planner and are consistent
with sound planning and design.

In regard to Mr. Hintz, he has also written to me, saying substantially the same thing, that he approves of Appendices B and C and finds they are consistent with sound planning and design.

In regard to Appendix D, I have a letter dated January 22, 1986, from Harvey P. Goldie, the Township Engineer, saying that he approves of the final version of Appendix D.

In regard to Appendix E, I've provided the Court with a copy of a memorandum to me dated

January 23, 1936, which in view of the time restraint of appearing here today, I would like to add as an addendum to Appendix E and incorporate it into the compliance settlement packet. These are some last minute comments on Appendix E by the Township Engineer, and it's my understanding the parties are

1	agreeable this would be incorporated as an addendum
2	to Appendix E and become a part of the settlement.
3	 THE COURT: Did you give that to Mr. Convery?
4	I don't think he saw it.
5	MR. HALL: I presented this to Mrs. Hegarty
6	this morning.
7	THE COURT: As part of these?
8	MR. HALL: I believe we put it in this same
9	package.
10	THE COURT: I didn't get to anything beyond
11	the order.
12	MR. CONVERY: I have an additional copy for
13	you, if necessary, Your Honor. In fact, the original
14	was given too, because we felt the original documents
15	should become part of the Court's file.
16	THE COURT: It's not in the settlement.
17	MR. HALL: It could have been put into one
18	of those books, one that Mrs. Hegarty said she had.
19	THE COURT: She said there was a book. Okay.
20	That's January 23rd from Mr. Goldie.
21	MR. CONVERY: Yes.
22	THE COURT: Yes. It's at the back of one
23	of these books.
24	MR. CONVERY: Just to reiterate, I provided
25	to the Court an original copy, because I viewed this

as an addendum to the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: I take it there is no objection to annexing this to the section?

MR. NEISSER: No objection.

MR. HALL: No objection.

THE WITNESS: May I look at it?

THE COURT: Yes. Maybe you can take a peek while you are going along here.

Let's just go over a few things in the settlement agreement just as a matter of technical form. The first sentence of the agreement in one place and perhaps two places elsewhere in the agreement there's a reference to "this Court." Of course, this Court is not a party to the settlement agreement, and it would seem to me it would be appropriate to say, "the Court." Okay? I mean I'm not a signatory.

Paragraph 4, I have no problem with this if nobody else has a problem with it. But I must tell you that I have some difficulties understanding how this settlement agreement can bind people who are in no way connected to this litigation, that is, named in this litigation.

MR. HUTT: Neither do I.

THE COURT: Now, Page 2 was left out of my copy of the settlement agreement, but I did go back

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to the previous draft. You have people in there, like independent consultants, and all of them, they are bound by many things, which I question that they could be bound. But nonetheless --

MR. HALL: Your Honor, if I could merely explain that, there are a series of procedural standards that are attached hereto, and it's basically in that vein we said, as people go through it is our intent that they will be following the procedural standards and actual design construction standards that are attached hereto even though they may traditionally have been looking at either other published standards or ordinances and so forth. It was our intention to have these published. These standards, which are attached hereto, prevail over other standards, which these other appointed officials or engineering types may have ordinarily followed.

THE COURT: You see, they are defined as being part of the Township of Old Bridge, Old Bridge for the purposes of this hearing agreement, and I have no problem if you want to leave it that way.

You see, on Page 6, the last "whereas" clause there is reference to "this Court"; probably should be "the Court."

Page 7, I marked this all up, because I was

i	reading at midnight last night. I missed the word,	
2	"adjusted P.M.S.A. median"; I just read "median	
3	income." As I understand this, and Ms. Lerman can	a company
4	merely confirm this for the record if I am correct.	
5	the effort here is to adjust the P.M.S.A. Primary	
6	Metropolitan Statistical Area for Middlesex, Somerset	
7	and Hunterton Counties in a way that its median	
8	income would actually be reflective of the eleven-	#
9	county region established under AMG?	
10	THE WITNESS: That's correct.	
11	THE COURT: And the 94 percent, does that simp	ly,
12	because you know that, I take it	
13	THE WITNESS: Yes.	
14	THE COURT: Okay. What happens? Is there	
15	any likelihood that 94 percent might become an un-	
16	reflected figure?	B0 000
17	THE WITNESS: It's possible.	
18	THE COURT: I mean grossly modified or minutel	у.
19	THE WITNESS: It's possible after the 1992 cen	cus
20	there might be a change in that percentage.	
21	THE COURT: Well, that's far enough.	
22	I think if it's close enough in 1992, I am satisfied.	
23,	I'm satisfied unless there is something	
24	MR. NEISSER: There's been some information	

provided to us by Mr. Hutt that indicates that because of some statistical, because of statistical methods used there may, in fact, be a more significant variance between 94 percent of the P.M.S.A. that's noticed here and the median income of the entire eleven-county region.

When this was initially negotiated, as other settlements were using 94 percent, as a simple mathematical technique to avoid a lot of complicated stuff, especially because, as you know, the censustaking, you know, county stuff is sometimes hard to get appropriate yearly updates, so it is of concern to us that the 94 percent figure may not, in fact, reflect the truly lower median income of the broad eleven-county region.

I don't know whether that would require application to the Master at an appropriate time, whatever, but that was identified recently. I think it came out in Mr. Caton's reports or comments on a variety of other townships that were within the same region.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm aware of some difficulty there. I thought perhaps it was chosen as the best we could do.

THE WITNESS: I think that's why it was chosen.

It was simply --

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MR. NEISSER: It was simplest. It was before this information had become available. It was just that the local P.M.S.A. median is, in fact, the one that's published, it's not actually reflected, and that the median is quite a bit higher by several thousand dollars. It's of obvious concern to us. Because while that may be accurate for those two or four counties, it's not accurate for the entire eleven.

THE COURT: Okay. Page 8, with respect to the "reopening clause," there is a phrase which relates to "a subsequently adopted administrative regulation of the State agency acting under statutory authority."

I would like to understand what that means.

I think I understand what it means.

MR. HUTT: Your Honor, I was responsible for that provision. Supposing, for instance, the Fair Housing Council in a year or two comes to the conclusion that the definition of "low and median" is just too low, maybe it's got to go higher, because if interest rates — and they make a State-wide rule and regulation, what they are defining as median or what income levels or something else, we didn't want

to do it ad hoc case. We didn't want to come in here, saying you should do this or you should allow us to do that, any of the parties. But if there is some general State guideline by either legislation or rule or regulation of a State agency, how, it's going to be treated as to what's the definition of "lower," for instance, my definition of "lower" is 50 percent. Maybe a year from now it might be 40 or 60 or by a State-wide regulation they are projecting that twenty years on this judgment.

We want the opportunity to come in and if
the case is proven the Court will have, ultimately
have to prove it. Any party would have to come in
for due cause shown. You may say it's irrelevant.
That's fine. You may say it's very substantial. We
don't want to lock in new rules, any of the parties,
or declare rules that we are going to have to protect
for twenty years, even though all kinds of conditions
change ten years from now. The guidelines would be
if it applies to the State at large, not just any
particular case by case basis of a particular town,
that was the best language we could come up with to
solve that problem.

THE COURT: Suppose the Council on Affordable
Housing adopts some regulations which would affect the

fair share number.

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MR. HUTT: The fair share, I think, is solid under this.

THE COURT: That's not obvious from this wording.

MR. HUTT: To 1990, but after that --

THE COURT: This relates to the whole question, what the status of this case is after today in terms of the motion that's been filed with the transcript too and we have to deal with that later on. But I mean I read this and have no problem with it. perfectly happy to leave it, but I read this as leaving some uncertainty in the process.

MR. HUTT: I think, really, as you expressed it on the matters here, Your Honor, if the formula comes down with the Township fair share, shall I say, coat in hand, under some new formula that you come in with, because they decide from independent study for a quarter of a million dollars, let's knock out the appeal in this case or are willing to solve the problem for a hundred thousand, I think under that clause someone would have the right to come in for good cause shown, asking you to grant relief. They'd have to prove it and it would be a tough time.

The point is it wouldn't be res judicata, say.

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You could never come in for relief. Collaterally you are estopped. You signed the settlement. A settlement is a settlement and there for all; be gone.

MR. NEISSER: Obviously, Your Honor's question suggests we have a great deal of concern with this clause, and it's no secret, I don't think; again a point of great contest. We are, Your Honor, not very happy with its resolution as part of a larger compromise, and this is one on which we may necessarily compromise. I certainly can state my views on it, which are somewhat basically similar to what Mr. Hutt just said, namely, this is not, very clearly is not an automatic reopening clause, although the title of it is "Reopening Clause." It does not give a right to a party to do so. What it does, it gives the right to apply to this Court, to the Court upon good cause shown, so there has to be some showing, as Mr. Hutt indicated. The Court ultimately is going to be the decision-maker with regard to that application.

Secondly, we agree with Mr. Hutt's view that it is not to deal with any little small change or something that one of the towns negotiated with somebody or something that they came up with an adjudication,

even. We are talking about the intent, which is, as Mr. Hutt said, with regard to administrative regulations. If any are applicable, it would be a State-wide change dealing with a basic fundamental standard that might be perceived by the Court upon a proper application of an appropriate party as being essentially unfair and requiring major revision.

Clearly we are concerned with any revision, because it is a negotiated settlement. I think that's really all I would have to say at this point.

I would like to add one thing. It was certainly our understanding that question you raised on fair share was not going to be reopened. I can say that much.

THE COURT: There is an omen, silence.

MR. HUTT: Even if it went up, Judge, -
MR. NEISSER: If you signed that, I would

sign it too.

THE COURT: The next paragraph, I think maybe it would be useful to have the Master explain for the record why these developers are only setting aside 10 percent when the Supreme Court has suggested that a minimum should be 20 percent. I think I know the answer, and I assume the answer's satisfactory.

But while we make the reference to builder's remedy

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in this case, one could perceive that's what's arising out of it. In light of that perhaps we can explain why they were not required to produce 20 percent lower income housing.

THE WITNESS: Right. Very briefly, there are several reasons. The numbers of units anticipated to be built by the two developers who are the plaintiffs are such that they exceed any proposals that have been discussed in other places throughout the State. So the number of units at 20 percent would actually have exceeded anything that the fair share number was.

Secondly, the densities that were being given to the developers were not the higher densities that had been discussed in terms of builder's remedy; traditional, you know. They are four to the acre, which actually was the zoning in effect at the time that the latest of these suits in this case started.

The third reason is that the question of marketability of units, the units that are anticipated to be built by these two developers are not anticipated to be the very high cost luxury units that are being built in some of the other towns, and the cost, therefore, of providing 20 percent would have much greater impact on the possibilities of a reasonable

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profit.

THE COURT: tay. I've heard those explanations before, and I am satisfied with them.

I thought they should form part of the record.

Next question is on Page 10. It is really not a question. I just think that the second paragraph, first line, and I don't in any sense mean to be critical, because these documents are very well done and, I know, prepared under a great deal of pressure, but I don't think that first sentence is very clear. I read it three times before I understood the sentence. Part of it is probably because of the absence of a comma, which would clarify it. If a comma goes, and here it gets a little bit clearer, but it's still not terribly clear, "It is clearly understood" -- I suppose "clearly" is redundant and in this particular case not appropriate. "It is . . . understood, however, that the provisions of this settlement agreement and the attachments hereto provide a mechanism under which O & Y and Woodhaven shall seek development approvals and by which development undertaken by 0 & Y and Woodhaven shall be controlled."

I assume what you mean is that the settlement agreement and attachments control the manner in which

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recommendations. Is the Master's report in any way subject to comment, cross-examination or otherwise?

I know there is no testimony concerning the application.

But it says, "No testimony, other than the Master's reports" -- now, if the Master's report is going to be there, presumably the Master is, is the Master subject to cross-examination? If so, do we have another hearing within a hearing?

MR. HALL: Your Honor, this section addresses one of the primary concerns of the plaintiffs, and of the defendant as well, in that there is a need to crystallize this development enterprise or the development enterprises of both O & Y and Woodhaven into a concept which is acceptable to the plan without creating an enormous problem of having a general development plan hearing process which extends for months. We have attempted to crystallize the intent of this document into plates, which are going to be presented to the Planning Board with appropriate documentation, and it was the intent of the parties to have a public hearing or public hearings conducted by the Planning Board, that there would be a relatively limited scope of concern by the Planning Board. Do these plates adequately and accurately

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O & Y and Woodhaven will build and develop.

That's correct, Your Honor. MR. HALL:

THE COURT: I think the wording is putting the whole sense of the sentence -- at the very end, maybe I could add a comma at the end of the "hereto." I can't imagine anyone objecting to that comma. already a little bit clearer, if anybody else is crazy enough to read these things.

Okay, Page 13, next to the last paragraph, this is an interesting provision, because I've always wanted to sit on the other side of the table at Planning Board meetings. Do I become a Planning Board under this provision?

"The Master shall provide the Court with recommendations, and the Court shall base its decision on the record of the Planning Board, materials supplied to the Master, and the Master's recommendations." That is if the Planning Board disapproves the plate. What am I doing in that? What is the Judge who may be sitting on these matters doing in that capacity? Is he reviewing a typical prerogative writ posture? Is he or is she reviewing or acting as a super Planning Board? Then the other question, you can respond to two of them at once, is the Master is going to provide the Court with

reflect the documentation? Are they in accord with our understanding of the procedures? In the event that this process does not work the way we hope it's going to work, we have provided an appeal process.

We understood that Your Honor's role would be or the role of the Court would be to say this is part of a settlement of litigation.

The intent of these plates is to crystallize these two development schemes into a workable and visual scheme. Are they part of this? Do they meet the procedures and standards set forth in here? Are they adequate from a planning perspective? We see not where Your Honor takes the role of a super Planning Board, but, as does this plan, does this record do what it's supposed to do in terms of putting forth in a visual and clear fashion what it is that these projects are going to be?

THE COURT: Well, does this suggest that if there is a judgment involved, and the answer to that question, that I can replace the Planning Board's judgment, in other words, if reasonable people would differ and if the Planning Board says, no. They don't do it, and I say, they are good enough, that what it kind of sounds like was, that's not the standard of review. Normally it's arbitrary and

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capricious.

standard wouldn't be exactly the way you phrased it. What it is, it's more akin to being the final arbitrator on recommendation of the Master. The object was you are not as a super Planning Board. If there is going to be a bona fide dispute, let's say, we hope it won't happen, let's say there is a bona fide dispute between the Planning Board and the developer as to whether or not under these settlement agreements you should do this or you should do that. Both sides would make their pitch to the Master, the Master that will be involved in this whole process for a long time. Maybe there are certain questions, like -- another thing, your book could have been twenty volumes more. Sometimes you don't even think of something, but you know the intent. You can still make a recommendation to the Court in the nature of more like a binding arbitration. The Court will then look to which side is more reasonable in this respect with regard to the documents based on the Master's statement and oral

arguments, documents like a prerogative writ.

would be no testimony and this would resolve the

problem. We've done this, for instance, in the

MR. HUTT: Right, Your Honor. But the

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Branchburg case and there are other cases. It's just a way so that the Court -- both parties are looking for, not to make a hassle -- somebody has to call the shot so to speak.

THE COURT: I don't think that's what you did in Branchburg. No. Now, in Branchburg I decided that as a matter of law and based upon the facts presented.

MR. HUTT: No. But it hasn't come to that yet. We are going in for applications. If the application under that judgment, Your Honor, if our application is -- if they request, we don't think it's right, let's say they request a new Verrazano Bridge.

THE COURT: I thought you were talking about the room and heat problem.

MR. HUTT: If we solved that and we decided to go for a pony and dog show, but if Branchburg, for instance, supposing the Planning Board when we go for our application wants a new Verrazano Bridge, then under that procedure we can go to the Master and say in our opinion this settlement didn't contemplate that. He could say it did or didn't. Then you can --

THE COURT: That's different. But what the settlement contemplated is a different issue. This

1 to me sounds like factfinding as an arbitrator, not 2 as a Judge. 3 MR. HUTT: Yes. In a sense that's true. 4 a sense that's true, but we are making the Court the 5 arbitrator. 6 THE COURT: And the arbitrator did not 7 arbitrate to completion; it's just who's more right. 8 MR. HUTT: And reasonableness. 9 THE COURT: Well, suppose they are both 10 reasonable. That's what I am asking. 11 MR. HUTT: What does the arbitrator do when the 12 Board is reasonable? 13 THE COURT: He splits it down the middle. 14 MR. HUTT: Then that's what you do, decide 15 your own problem, and the Master will do this too. 16 It's merely confirmation of a Master's report. 17 THE COURT: Well, I am assuming the Master 18 could straighten it out. 19 MR. HUTT: We are too. 20 THE COURT: He could have that potential, 21 that the court of last resort is the Court. 22 MR. HUTT: That's it. 23 I think, Your Honor, that's what MR. HALL: 24 we have here as a potential problem. We will work 25 it out the very best we can. The parties have agreed

on a procedure whereby if there is an ultimate dispute, we cannot resolve it, and we have taken it to the Master and the Master has done her very best, it may have to come before you for --

MR. HUTT: For a holy blessing.

MR. HALL: -- you to do whatever you have to do, but there has to be an end to it.

THE COURT: I agree with you. I should be clear on this. I don't mean to beat a dead horse here. No. 1, I may not be here. No. 2, the agreement is really silent as to the standard of review. Traditionally, I don't know that a Judge has ever been used in this capacity, because the standard of review here is not arbitrary and capricious. It's a question of who's more reasonable. I think that's what I heard.

MR. HUTT: That's not quite true. It could be either. In other words, it might be --

THE COURT: Well, okay.

MR. HUTT: -- arbitrary, but if it isn't --

THE COURT: There would be no problem if it was arbitrary and capricious.

MR. HUTT: Don't say that. Half the litigation is because one party is arbitrary and capricious.

THE COURT: And the other half is, because the

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other party is arbitrary and capricious.

MR. HUTT: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Mr. Convery, do you have a thought on this? I mean I can just see, you know, three years down the line when there is perhaps a new Judge and new attorneys and the whole thing.

MR. HUTT: It's all going to happen in the next three months.

THE COURT: Three months down the line, I don't care. I may be telling you something. Who knows? Somebody's going to come in and say, well, first, it doesn't make any difference whether there are new people involved.

You are going to say, I didn't understand it that way. You would have to show what we did was unreasonable.

MR. CONVERY: May it please the Court, Your Honor, understanding that Mr. Norman isn't here, and we know from the telephone call to you that was on the record that he's authorized me to sign this document as it is on his behalf and on behalf of the Planning Board today, this particular aspect of the settlement agreement on approval procedures, my understanding was it was set up, because everyone realizes there's sufficient time to go to the

Planning Board for a public hearing on a review in the matter. It was clear that the Planning Board wanted a public hearing, so the public would be aware of what this is going to look like ultimately, at least as proposed by the developers. So that this procedure was agreed to by Thomas Norman on behalf of the Planning Board in order that the settlement agreement could come before the Court today with the understanding over the next two months the matter will be before the Planning Board for a public hearing.

This section of the agreement is for the limited purpose of reviewing the plates. It does not intend to carry the Court into the role of an arbitrator on other issues, and it's solely for that limited purpose. Quietly, it was negotiated by Mr. Norman along with the developers, and the way this reads, now, is acceptable to him and the Planning Board. For that reason I would ask the Court to accept it.

THE COURT: Okay. Whenever in doubt I also go back to the old adage that time cures all ills, and this case is an example of it. Okay, it will just be one more experience in this whole setting, put it that way.

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All right, Page 22, just a technical issue 2 there in the last paragraph. I suppose that this 3 document is really not an order; it's an agreement. 4 And we can change the word "order," which is in that 5 second sentence in two places, just change it to

> Other than that, the only objection I have to the document is to the use of the term "signatory hereto," but that sounds like something one of my old professors used to do.

> > Now, Appendix A.

"agreement."

MR. NEISSER: Before you go on on the last point you made on Page 22, perhaps we could clear it up. My understanding of that paragraph was that "this order," meaning not that it's incorrect to say, "this order," the order and judgment, which was the prior document and this settlement and the appendices are what governs.

> THE COURT: Yes.

MR. NEISSER: That's really what it was. was a reference to the order and, of course, everything attached, isn't that correct?

MR. HALL: That's why I raised it at this time.

THE COURT: I could say "order and judgment and

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this agreement."

MR. NEISSER: Exactly.

MR. CONVERY: Excuse me. Your Honor, while we are on the record I would like to request that we nail down the exact language that we want in this paragraph under "Potential Conflicts," so we all have it with us right now.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm hopeful you can take these original documents and maybe mark them up. We haven't had that many changes. We can take care of it today. I think we are just changing the first "order" to "order and judgment" or "judgment." I don't care.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, I have it on Page 22 of my draft, E-F. One, "It is further provided that if there is a conflict between any ordinance now in existence or passed subsequent to the order and judgment, this agreement, and the attached appendices--"

MR. HUTT: You mean any conflict or a conflict?

MR. HALL: A conflict between any ordinance.

MR. GAVER: What shall control? No. It doesn't work. What shall control?

MR. HUTT: Exactly.

MR. GAVER: You have to restate it down there.

No. Leave that.

MR. HALL: You are right. I see what happened.

MR. GAVER: They just carried it in.
MR. HALL: It's like these documents.

(Informal discussion outside the record.)

THE COURT: On the record.

MR. HALL: Mr. Gaver points out once we start
making that change you have to make a further change
in this sentence, so that there's going to be -- right
now it will be somewhat inelegantly stated, but
"It is further provided that if there is a conflict
between any ordinance now in existence or passed
subsequent to the order and judgment, this agreement
and the attached appendices, the order and judgment,
the agreement and the appendices, as affecting the
rights of O & Y or Woodhaven shall control."

THE COURT: That's another one of those "shall control" problems.

Appendix A, just a very basic question with regard to A.2, "Housing for Rent: The combination of contract rent plus an allowance for utility bills shall not exceed 30 percent of the Total lower income household income." Why are we saying, "plus an allowance"? In other words, really, aren't we just saying, "not more than 30 percent of the renter's income can be spent on the housing"? That's what that means.

MR. HALL: That is what it was supposed to say.

is paying for their utilities, you really cannot control how much they are going to spend. What's generally done is an allowance based on the actual valuation of the size of the unit type of heating of what would normally be the cost. It is then attributed to this unit as part of the rent. So that somebody who keeps their apartment at 90 degrees, if they have control of the heat, versus one who keeps it at 70 --

THE COURT: By "allowance" you mean an estimate?

THE WITNESS: Right.

THE COURT: An estimate of the utilities?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Reasonable estimate or an average estimate, something like that?

THE WITNESS: Yes. And this is provided generally by the utility companies, what it should cost.

THE COURT: I just want to make it clear here that we are holding it to 30 percent based upon an average usage. That's the intent, and that's what

Lerman would guide the housing group within the Township. (Informal discussion outside the record.) 3 THE WITNESS: If that's not clear, just 4 add "plus a full allowance for utility costs," so 5 there is no question it's just not any allowance. 6 It's not just a little correction. It's supposed 7 to represent the anticipated full utility cost. 8 THE COURT: Well, as long as the record is 9 clear. What the Master is saying, it's the anticipated 10 full utility cost for average usage, I think. 11 THE WITNESS: Yes. Not normal. 12 THE COURT: Not normal. 13 THE WITNESS: Right. 14 THE COURT: So that the normal average or what-15 ever, we are not dealing with the one who couldn't, 16 the unit at 90 degrees. With regard to Appendix F, it 17 appears to me that in this, and this I read, I must 18 admit, very quickly at a very late hour, that the affirma-19 tive marketing plan is somewhat different than that 20 used in the North Brunswick case. Am I wrong or 21 right? That seems more affirmative. I mean more

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broad. MR. NEISSER: Which seemed broader, Your Honor? THE COURT: The North Brunswick matter.

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North Brunswick, I think, actually undertook affirmative marketing in all eleven counties. THE WITNESS: This one does also. MR. NEISSER: I don't have the provision in front of me. THE COURT: It does. I'm sorry. I missed it. THE WITNESS: Yes. MR. NEISSER: What page? THE COURT: I'm looking at the last page. THE WITNESS: It's Paragraph F. THE COURT: Paragraph F of Ordinance 54-85. THE WITNESS: It does say, "housing centers, housing referral organizations . . . in the elevencounty." MR. NEISSER: I think it's identified. MR. HUTT: In North Brunswick. THE WITNESS: Identified. MR. NEISSER: On the bottom of the last page, the next to the last page, pardon me, in Ordinance 54-85 reference is to the North Brunswick ordinance and to the particular cities in which newspaper advertisements must be placed and, as the Master just said, at the top of the last page, which is the

last page of the ordinance, last paragraph of the

ordinance, it also specifically indicates notice to

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the "eleven-county present housing need region" of those various identified groups, so I believe that language is the same.

MR. HUTT: It's the same as North Brunswick.

THE WITNESS: Actually, it does not include the change we made in North Brunswick.

MR. NEISSER: Yes, it does, if you will look.

THE WITNESS: My copy, it doesn't. It still
refers to "public welfare departments."

MR. NEISSER: If you look at the very last page in the book, it contains the ordinance and amendments that have been adopted, excuse me, that were introduced on first reading this past Tuesday, January 21st, and the very last amendment, "and change 'government social service and public welfare departments' to: 'government housing or community development departments.'"

I think we made the changes in North Brunswick as well.

THE COURT: It's in this book I just got.

MR. NEISSER: Yes, at the very last page.

THE COURT: I didn't have that. Last night
I may not have read any of it.

MR. NEISSER: It's under that, the amendments, which are the last five or six pages of the book and,

as I said, were introduced on first reading have not yet been finally adopted. They were introduced this past week in the form which appears here and we hope will be adopted in a very short period of time or the next meeting, whenever. Therefore, there is a deadline in the order with regard to adoption.

THE COURT: Mr. Convery.

MR. CONVERY: May it please the Court, Your Honor, I intend to make a statement regarding these various ordinances. I think it would be appropriate, now.

You have in Appendix F Ordinance No. 54-85 and Ordinance No. 55-85. They were adopted by the Township Council on December the 19th, 1985, with the proviso that they would become effective after the settlement agreement was signed. So it's intended they become effective immediately after publication, and I would notify the Township Clerk after this meeting, assuming Your Honor signs the judgment, to proceed with publication.

The next ordinance in the Appendix F does not have an ordinance number. This is the one that's one page. It indicates an amendment to 4-8:1.1(g). If you want to indicate in your booklet, you should note that that is known as Ordinance No. 1-86.

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SEL BAYONNE, N.J.

THE COURT: I just took the book. Appendix --

MR. CONVERY: All the way at the back, the last appendix is Appendix F. At the beginning of Appendix F we have Ordinance No. 54-85.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CONVERY: Therefore, we have a two-page, three-page ordinance, 55-85. The very next ordinance has no number. It's one page. That should be numbered Ordinance No. 1-86, and I'd like to indicate that the Council adopted that ordinance on January 21, 1986, at its last meeting.

Therefore, you will see another ordinance, which was just referred to by Mr. Neisser and is a series of what we refer to as technical amendments to 55-85 and 54-85. That will be known in the Township as Ordinance No. 4-86. It was introduced on January 21, 1986, was given its first reading and passed on first reading by a vote of six to two. It will be on the next agenda of the Township Council for public hearing and adoption.

I would just like to go back for a second, Your Honor, to the settlement agreement, Page 7 of the settlement agreement first, top of the page. The third line was changed today. It had "O & Y and

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Woodhaven agree to provide \$3,000 each towards the funding of the first year's operation of the agency."

That should be changed to read, "\$5,000" by agreement of the parties.

THE COURT: At least, okay.

MR. HUTT: I thought there was another typo.

I thought it was supposed to say, "together."

THE COURT: I read this change of 50,000 -- is that 5,000?

MR. CONVERY: Judge, I will take either language, at least five or fifty is acceptable to the Town. Perhaps the plaintiff should comment.

THE COURT: All right. I understand it's 5,000 instead of 3,000; might be good if we initial these changes too. I see one initialed in the margin.

MR. NEISSER: I then have one comment, for the record, about what Mr. Convery just said about the ordinances and their adoption. There was, to my knowledge, nothing in the ordinance saying that their effectiveness was stayed until the agreement was signed. The reason that is significant, it was understood by all the parties, and I believe by the Council as well, and I know by the Planning Board as well in the letter from Mr. Norman, that the ordinance was adopted, excuse me, the main ordinances were

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adopted on December 19, 1985, and were, therefore, to apply to applications for planning approvals subsequent to that, including, for example, the Brunetti application and other -- it was at least the understanding of not only myself, but Mr. Norman in a letter of January 13th of this year to the attorney for Mr. Brunetti that their application, which I believe was first up on January 16th, was subject to this order.

MR. CONVERY: I believe Mr. Brunetti's attorney has indicated that they are proceeding with their application with the understanding that they have a Mount Laurel II obligation, and they state publicly that they will meet their obligation.

Mr. Hall can confirm that, because he was at the meeting that when the Township Council adopted the two ordinances, 54-85 and 55-85, they were adopted, but in view of the fact that we were negotiating the final language of the settlement they instructed the Clerk at the time of the adoption not to advertise the ordinance until such time as the settlement agreement and judgment had been signed. That was their instruction to the Clerk.

It doesn't affect the fact that the ordinances were adopted. We fully intend to enforce those

ordinances. That will be done, but the understanding was that this was a compliance package, that the ordinances were a part of that package. If negotiations fell through and we did not settle this case, it was certainly not the intention of Old Bridge Township to enforce ordinances setting up an Affordable Housing Agency and things of that sort, which had not been agreed to as part of the compliance package. But I represent to the Court that immediately upon the signing of the judgment I would instruct the Clerk to advertise the ordinances as required by law.

MR. HUTT: No problem.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HALL: Your Honor, there is one other change in the text on Page 19 of the settlement agreement. There's a reference to a midrise structure and a limitation that no midrise structure shall contain more than 160 units. There was in the actual negotiating process a variety of different numbers that were thrown about as we came through the appendices to provide for a midrise structure of no more than 150 units. We would like these documents to be consistent, so we are asking the parties to change on Page 19 Item (a) should read, "No midrise

structure shall contain more than 150 units."

THE COURT: That's not been change on the original.

MR. HALL: That's correct. We just finished that this morning, Your Honor, and I have not gotten to your change. We got mugged for the money, but he got change in the numbers.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NEISSER: We have no objection.

THE COURT: I don't think I have any other questions unless there is anything else outstanding. We would only have to resolve the pending status of the motion.

MR. HALL: I could make one other comment,
Your Honor. During the course of the negotiations
that we went through on this document I was frequently
reminded what happened in New York City during the
height of their fiscal crisis where unions were on
strike and everything was falling apart. They didn't
have enough money to pay for everything. I was
talking to an aide to the mayor, and he said, "Tom,
the only way this thing is going to settle, the only
two ways out of this, either God comes down, gets us
all, changes the water to wine and gives us all loaves
and fishes and paves the streets with gold and lets

us all move to Philadelphia or we reach a settlement agreement. The second would take a miracle, and I don't think that's going to happen."

We were actually able to reach an agreement on all these issues. There are a couple of areas of concern that Olympia has, and I just want to note them for the record. You've already touched on two of them. There's a problem of reaching agreement on potable water, which we consider as critical. It is the next item of high level negotiation which is going to take place. We wish Your Honor to be aware that that is an issue that has yet to be resolved.

Your Honor's also touched on the fact that the Planning Board process is one of some concern. We've provided a mechanism, which we hope we don't have to use.

The third area that we have a concern with is something where the Township at the last set of negotiations insisted on the item on Page 20. Item

V-C.6 incorporates a staging performance schedule,

via the non-residential development and the residential development. We have negotiated these numbers. We believe they will work, but we wish to note for the record that we see them as a significant problem as we go down the road. It may yet again be an area that

this Court may have to, that a Court may have to yet resolve. Our concern is that as we go forward, if there is any lag in our ability to provide the commercial facilities, which are required by this agreement to be provided in tandem with the residential development, that the development could come to a screeching halt, which would obviously impact on all aspects of this agreement, including our ability to deliver lower income housing units.

We believe we've negotiated a settlement that we can live with, but I do wish this Court to be aware that we regard the provisions of V-C.6 as a potential problem down the road.

of the parties to the agreement must be entering into it with some concern, and I suppose that nobody could be more concerned than the elected officials of the Township and its attorney. I mean this is not an easy thing for a town in today's setting, given the existence of the alternative, past and everything else that exists, for them to do. I think it's quite incredible that we've come this far. I think it bespeaks of a lot of hard work and diligent effort on everyone's behalf. I'm sure the town may say, we may have second thoughts about this too. If that's

what Mr. Convery was going to say, I could clearly understand.

Okay, Mr. Convery. We may have second thoughts about this too. If that's what Mr. Convery was going to say, I could clearly understand. Okay.

Mr. Convery.

MR. CONVERY: I would just like to incorporate your comments, Your Honor. But in response to what was just said about this commercial staging, I think in fairness it should be stated that the commercial staging provisions in our present ordinance are stricter than those that were negotiated by Olympia and York and Woodhaven in this settlement agreement. So we did change our standards solely in regard to Olympia and York and Woodhaven in order to reach an agreement. I just think in fairness that should be on the record as well. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further on the agreement before we get into the motion?

MR. HUTT: I say if we do in fairness to each other we are maybe talking ourselves out of a settlement. I make a motion we do it.

MR. NEISSER: I second that motion.

THE COURT: Reminds me of a contempt hearing

I had about a week ago, and this fellow who didn't

pay his support, his former wife was here, the more I pressed him, the more she came to his defense.

Before we were done I offered to marry them. I do that too, you know.

THE WITNESS: Can I just add one thing for the record?

THE COURT: Yes.

Ms. Lerman would like to say something.

briefly, we first met in December of 1984, the first time I went down to Old Bridge to meet with this whole group. I think that the town was facing and is facing a substantial change in the character of the town regardless of the Mount Laurel component. The developers are facing very substantial investments and hopefully profits that will make those investments worthwhile.

The Urban League is really facing the test of everything that's been working for the last ten years in these cases, and I would just like to say everybody involved in this case through the ups and downs, anger, some laughter occasionally, has really, I think, dedicated themselves to trying to reach a settlement. Everyone has given something. Everyone has given up something that they thought was very important to them.

I think essentially there have been very straightforward answers, and on behalf of the parties I think
they deserve a lot of credit.

wrapping it up, I will have to take care of the other issue, but I might also say that if I have to single out one decision that I made since I've been a Mount Laurel Judge, which was clearly correct, it was to select Miss Lerman as my first Court-appointed Master. I think she's demonstrated that in this case with an extraordinarily difficult matter, together with all the other difficult matters she's been handling in the Urban League.

I thank you for your work. I don't know that you can get paid enough to do this job. All right.

We have no need for her additional services.

THE WITNESS: Just getting paid.

THE COURT: Just getting paid, it's a problem. We will work on that later.

Okay, I guess we are done except to handle the motion, so we can excuse the Master until this afternoon at least.

THE WITNESS: Right.

THE COURT: We have the issue of the outstanding motion, which is of course a motion to transfer the

and will be held pending developments in this case.

I have an order before me proffered by the Urban

League to dismiss. That pending motion is moot.

Okay, we will go back on the record.

MR. NEISSER: Your Honor, yes. There is one very serious and important matter remaining, which is, as I already indicated, the motion that was filed by the Township, October 30, 1985, to transfer this case to the Affordable Housing Council under Section 16 of the Fair Housing Act. We have made abundantly clear both to Mr. Convery orally and in two letters to him, which were provided, of course, to all members of the Council, that it is a condition, an absolute essential condition of the Urban League agreement to this order and judgment settlement agreement that the transfer motion be withdrawn or denied by the Court with prejudice.

Mr. Convery can explain the circumstances,
but it is my understanding that he is not authorized
to consent to withdraw, and that is why the final
draft of the order and judgment, which you have
before you and just reviewed, does not include such
a provision. This puts my client in an extremely
difficult position. Maybe I was trained wrong in the

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law, but I understand either you settle or you litigate. You can't do both at the same time. So that the matter requires at this point a Court order which is not consented to. I have submitted, I believe I gave every other party a copy, a proposed order to that effect.

THE COURT: I should note that principle,

of either settling or litigating, is belied by some

pending appeals before the Supreme Court.

MR. NEISSER: My co-counsel said the same thing to them.

THE COURT: We had settlement orders there or close, anyway.

MR. NEISSER: We are hoping we are right on both points.

First of all, let me say that we never filed formal response papers to this motion. Indeed, it should be noted Mr. Convery never filed anything, but a notice of motion and no affidavits were presented. We would, however, to preserve the record, seek to have incorporated those opposition papers, which we did file with regard to the transfer motions before other towns, Cranbury, Monroe, Piscataway and South Plainfield, also in the same Urban League litigation.

More importantly, I think, are a few other points here. It is clear, that intent of all the parties to settle this entire litigation, actually, three pieces consolidated, I would say, Olympia & York and Woodhaven and the Urban League suit against Old Bridge. It is, therefore, the intent to bring to a close all litigation. We would ask the Court to find that it be the intent. I think the voluminousness of the documents as well as the responses to the questions, I think, should indicate that is the intent.

Secondly, we bring to the Court's attention the fact that in Paragraph 12 of the order and judgment before you, Page 9, the very last page, it says, "This Court shall retain jurisdiction of this case, so as to ensure the implementation of the proposed agreement and all other aspects of the compliance package."

It is my understanding that Mr. Convery has the authority to and will consent to this entire order and agreement, including this paragraph.

Thereby, the town is consenting to retention of jurisdiction for purpose of basically enforcement of the order.

Finally, Section 16 of the statute under which

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he made the motion permits any party to the litigation, and this refers to cluster zoning cases filed more than sixty days before the effective date of this act -- as Mr. Convery pointed out, we just barely squeaked past that date, any party may file a motion with the Court to seek a transfer of the case to the Council with the settlement. The case is concluded while implementation of the order obviously remains. The litigation is concluded. Therefore, there is nothing left to transfer. It is our position, therefore, we request that Your Honor find the intent of the parties, as I indicated, the intent that can add a complete and final settlement of all litigation, that the order provides on consent for retention of the jurisdiction by the Court for implementation and perhaps most importantly from our point of view, and I believe the other plaintiffs will speak to that, our consent. Urban League consent is expressly contingent upon the denial of the transfer motion and in light of the conclusion of the entire case, that, therefore, the matter is moot and we would request Your Honor to interpret an order holding it to be moot and denying the motion with prejudice as moot. Thank you.

MR. CONVERY: Your Honor, may it please the

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Court, Jerome Convery on behalf of the Township of Old Bridge, first of all, I would like to indicate for the record that at a case management conference I indicated to the Court that I believe that, as the Township Attorney, I had an obligation to file the notice of motion to transfer on behalf of the Township even though the Township represented on this date that we were proceeding in good faith and in an attempt to resolve the litigation and the settlement matter. Obviously, that statement was true, because we are here today with this settlement agreement and a form of order concerning judgment.

The problem regarding the transfer motion came to light when Mr. Neisser submitted a proposed form of judgment, which included a reference to the transfer motion. When I took this before the Township Council by a four-four vote they simply felt that they didn't want to deal with any change regarding the proposed form of judgment at that time. fore, because there was a deadlock vote I believe that I was not authorized to make any change in the judgment form. However, I advised the Council that I was certain that the Court would have to deal with the fact that a transfer motion had been filed, and I advised the Council that it very well may be that

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if the settlement documents are acceptable to the Court and the judgment is signed, that the Court may believe that the transfer motion filed on behalf of Old Bridge Township is moot. So the Council is on notice that as a matter of fact the Court may consider the motion moot.

I'd also like to indicate that at no time has the Council seriously discussed with me proceeding with the transfer motion if, in fact, this case was settled. It was clearly at all times discussed as a legal matter that must be done in order to reserve certain rights of the Township of Old Bridge in the event that there was not a settlement of this case.

Now, concerning the language in the legislation, I acknowledge that the language indicates that for those cases, exclusionary zoning cases instituted more than sixty days before the effective date of this Act, that any party to the litigation may file a motion with the Court to seek to transfer the case to the Council. If, in fact, Your Honor accepts the compliance package and signs the judgment, I would submit to the reasoning that the case is settled and is, therefore, no longer in litigation.

In regard to the position of the Urban League

will retain jurisdiction, the Council has authorized me to sign this document, and I acknowledge that the Township of Old Bridge accepts the concept that the Court will retain jurisdiction as to enforcement of the judgment and settlement agreement that is incorporated. So on that basis I would submit to the Court that it is for the Court to determine whether or not the motion is moot.

I would like to be heard as to the form of the order as well at the appropriate time, but I would like to note one other thing. In view of the fact that the attorney for Olympia and York has indicated that there is some concern about whether or not water would be available, some concerns about the staging provisions for commercial, and if these are concerns that they are stating on the record today, I feel that if the Court denies the motion to transfer, it should deny without prejudice. I feel that it's clear that we have an agreement today. But if any other party comes back to this Court and seeks to indicate that there, in fact, was not an agreement, there was not a meeting of the minds of the parties and seeks to ask this Court to indicate that there is no agreement, at that point the Township

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of Old Bridge should have the right to come back
to this Court and seek to transfer. But if the
Court feels that this matter is moot, I would submit
to the Court's judgment. But I believe that the
Court should indicate that the motion is denied
without prejudice as moot.

As to the form of the order, Your Honor,

Page 2 has a lengthy introductory paragraph. I

submit that beginning with the words, "The Court

having entered pursuant to a stipulation of the

parties an order on July 13, 1984," through the

language, the lines stating, "litigation to assist

the parties in seeking a settlement," that that

provision is superfluous. It should not be in any

order that the Court signs.

But, in fact, the order should start with the words, "The Township of Old Bridge, having filed on October 30, 1985, a motion to transfer this case to the Council on Affordable Housing," because that in truth is what issue is before the Court, and the preceding statement, I submit, is superfluous.

THE COURT: What's the problem with superfluousness? Is the only problem it's accurate and so forth? Is it only because it's superfluous?

MR. CONVERY: I believe it's an accurate

statement of prior events, but I don't believe that it's necessary to refer to those events in order for this Court to deal with the question of the transfer motion.

Regarding the last line of the second page indicating "December, 1985," and "January, 1986," as set forth in Appendix F, going over to the next page, "implement the Court's July 13, 1984, order," I object to that language. I would ask that the language be substituted that reads, "would constitute compliance with the constitutional requirements of Mount Laurel II." But I don't feel that we are referring necessarily back to that July 13, 1984, order, but we are referring to the fact that the settlement package indicates that we are, now, in compliance with the constitutional requirements. I would ask that that change be made.

There's a request, I believe, by the developers that it indicate at the end of that paragraph, "That the plaintiffs," plural, "consent to this settlement is expressly contingent on the denial of the transfer motion." I would have no objection to substituting the word "plaintiffs" for "Urban League."

As far as the last line of the order where

it says, "Housing Act is hereby denied with prejudice, that it's moot," I would submit it would be more appropriate for the Court if it does deny this motion to indicate, "Housing Act is here denied without prejudice as moot." Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Neisser.

MR. NEISSER: I think just two points, I don't think the reference to the order of July 13, 1984, is superfluous. It is, as Mr. Convery conceded, accurate in its representation. It was, after all, that order that established the existing ordinances are unconstitutional. I should say the ordinances prior to December of '85. That established a fairer fair share obligation and ordered that the parties appear before you today to try and seek settlement.

Then there is a further order appointing

Ms. Lerman to help you in that process, which she
has done so amicably. I think, in fact, similarly,
it is my understanding this order and judgment
settlement agreement is designed to implement that
order, which established the constitutional
obligation, so I think it is both accurate and
relevant and essential, in fact.

The second point and very disturbing is the suggestion by the Township Attorney that it be with-

out prejudice. He relied, as I understand it, upon the reference by Mr. Hall to the need for agreement regarding potable water and some other points that are specifically stated in the general agreement requiring further negotiation. A problem with regard to water or problem with regard to Plate A or B does not terminate this agreement. That's why Your Honor went through with Mr. Hutt and Mr. Hall, if there is a problem with the Planning Board's dealing with Plate A or B there is a process for this.

view of this would be simply this: It's with prejudice with respect to the settlement agreement as placed on the record. If there is a modification on the settlement agreement as opposed to an enforcement of the settlement agreement, then it seems to me the Township clearly would have a right to make an application. I mean if the terms change, if the basis upon which they've settled this changed significantly, then it would be unfair if there is going to be such a change not to allow them to make that application.

MR. NEISSER: With one proviso, they can't come in and initiate the changes and based on their suggested changes refuse to follow through and then

say, now, we have the right to transfer.

saying. He said, if you change the terms on which we settle, it should work both ways. We should have a right to change our terms and that's only fair.

But as long as no one seeks to change, he was uneasy about the suggestion that the basis upon which they settle might be changed and then the Council, governing body could say, well, then why do we settle? Why not go to the Housing Council? That's a reasonable question.

MR. NEISSER: I think the distinction between it was of implementing the agreement even if there were problems with enforcement as against changing or modifying the agreement. I think that would take care of the concerns of the Urban League. Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Anyone else?

All right, I think that, first of all, upon the execution of this order and judgment there is no exclusionary zoning before me, exclusionary zoning case before me to transfer and in a very real sense it's moot. I couldn't send anything to the Council I don't have.

Secondly, I think the legislation even envisioned, in fact, some cases might not unitarily

continue before the Court and then in those cases, of course, this dealt with cases that had settled before the Act, that a repose was granted statutorily, if you can put it that way. I don't find in the legislation anything that contemplates that whole host of cases, which are still continuing before the Court, can't be settled. As to those cases, the Council on Affordable Housing would have no involvement. We have more cases in that posture than we do have in the transfer posture.

Thirdly, I think it is fair to say, and Mr.

Convery has been very candid about it, that the town
does intend this to be a complete and final settlement of all litigation which in and of itself would
render a transfer moot, because there would be nothing
to litigate before the Housing Council. For those
reasons I think it is appropriate to deny the motion
because of the remoteness rather than the merits of
any right to transfer and that the motion should be
denied with prejudice, it being understood that what
I've said before need not be incorporated in the
order, but is incorporated in the record and, that
is, that the Court understands the denial of the
motion is based on mootness and that the mootness
may, if I can put it that way, disappear if anyone

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sought to change the terms of the agreement.

Therefore, if there is an application to suddenly modify the terms of the agreement as opposed to enforce it, the Township would not be precluded from countering with a motion to transfer. So the prejudice is for — the denial, rather, with prejudice is with respect to the present mootness of the case.

With regard to the form of the order, I take it there is no objection to the change of Urban League's consent, the plaintiff's consent. I think while the introductory planning is perhaps superfluous in a sense that it's not needed to get the result, these types of chronologies are often very helpful when one tries to develop history in a file and given the fact, although these orders are now going to become part of the records or case, I think it's kind of neat, anyhow, that this is all packaged up together. I say that tongue in cheek, but it is very useful when one reads an order of this kind to find in one order some sort of chronology that establishes why you get to this point. So, therefore, that aspect of it, I think, need not be changed. On the other side I do think that it's appropriate to indicate that not only would BAYONNE, N.J.

the ordinances implement the Court's order of July 13, 1984, but they would also constitute compliance with the mandate of Mount Laurel II, and words to that effect can be inserted right following what -- "order, "and constitutes compliance with Mount Laurel II. I think that would take care of the order. I think we probably could write those in. All right, anything further?

Well, let me commend counsel on an extraordinary job here. I like to operate my Court on the theory if you treat lawyers like professionals they act like professionals and this is a good example. I'm very pleased to see the result. All right, if you would like to stay and mark up the order I've given, settlement agreement and the order with respect to the motion, during lunch hour, I will sign it and we will get it done. All right, very good. you very much.

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