Chester M2

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MERRIOR COURT OF HEW JERSES

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

THE COURT: I take it, gentlemen, having been full of rhetoric in your papers, you do not need to have any further oral argument on that.

MR. LINDEMAN: I think so.

MR. FERGUSON: Only to say that in the event the Court should deny the motion, I would like to give the reasons for the denial to the Appellate Division since we anticipate---

THE COURT: I do not think the

Appellate Division nor the Court is going to get
too excited about the stay because you are still,
even if you do not do anything now, it is just
going to continue that way, but come on forward.

I have got some poetry for you. I will not spare you because you made me read your papers. I am going to make you listen to my poetry.

In this action in which a judgment was entered on November 8, 1978, wherein the zoning ordinance of the Township of Chester was invalidated and the Township was directed to adopt a new Master Plan and zoning ordinance by December 30, 1978, the Township moves for a stay of certain aspects of the judgment pursuant to Rule 2:9-5(b).

The judgment in question retained jurisdiction over the matter. Both parties treated the judgment as a final judgment and filed notices of appeal pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a).

Thereafter plaintiffs sought an order to show cause to institute a challenge to the new Master Plan and zoning ordinance adopted by the Township in December of 1978. I refused to sign an order to show cause and suggested a motion under Rule 1:10-5 and such a motion was filed. Then I decided that I did not have jurisdiction and I notified counsel since the notices of appeal were filed. I considered the 1:10-5 application outside of my jurisdiction.

Plaintiff then filed a 1:10-5 motion in the Appellate Division seeking, one, a transfer of the case to another county; two, certain discovery; and three, an injunction against the Township from granting any subdivisions, site plan applications, or any actions pursuant to its newly adopted zoning ordinance.

Now, the Township seeks a stay of so much of the Court's opinion effectuated by the judgment: One, prohibits the Township from

zoning for minimum five-acre lots; two, requiring small-lot zoning and three, requiring the Township to provide its fair share or least-cost housing under Mount Laurel and Oakwood of Madison.

The Township contends as a basis for its appeal, there was no evidence to support the five acre minimum zoning declaration of invalidity, that it has met its obligation assuming it is a developing municipality by the zoning ordinance and that in doing so, it provides its least-cost housing.

It argues no one had to tell Chester in a manner—in the manner of good planning. "Chester Township did this well before Mount Laurel required them or any town in New Jersey to do it."

It argues that it is not a developing municipality and the stay will eliminate confusion and that it is the duty of the Court to preserve the status quo and that an absence of the showing of exceptional hardship stay shall be granted, relying on Humble Oil & Refining Company v.

Wojtycha, 48 N.J. 562 1967 and similar cases.

Forgive me for the next paragraph,
gentlemen. Both counsel have inebriated their

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papers with some ambulant rhetoric. The Township's cause abounds with some very essence of goodness while Mr. Caputo's cause abounds with the virtue of Saint George after slaying the dragon. As Shakespeare said: "Zounds! I was never so bethump'd with words since I first call'd my brother's father dad." That's from King John, act two.

Now, back to the issues at point: pliance with the Court's decision, eradication of the five-acre zone, I do not consider to be All variety of housing has to be prodictum. vided including small lot. I do not consider that to be dictum. The status quo has not been preserved here. The Township has adopted a new Master Plan and has adopted a new zoning ordinance. Were it not for the filing of notices of appeal, the review of the newly adopted ordinance would be now within the jurisdiction of this Court and the matter would be proceeding if not have proceeded to trial. It was for that purpose that jurisdiction was retained. To grant a stay at this point to preserve the status quo would be to grant a preservation of the status quo that the Township says should

exist, but only after the Township adopted its new zoning ordinance.

It is not the status quo that existed after the entry of the zoning ordinance so the cases that were cited to me I do not consider apposite. A municipality was given—that municipality was given as case law and dictates an opportunity to make its zoning ordinance conform with the Court's opinion that invalidated it. Once it was given that opportunity, once having exercised it, and once having claimed the status, I see no justification for granting any stay.

It is my fervent hope, gentlemen, although
I do not ask for lawsuits, that the Appellate
Division recognizes that the reason I retained
jurisdiction was simply so that I could then
review what I had directed the Township to do
and it is my fervent hope that the Appellate
Division says, "Judge, the case is coming back
to you."

Mr. Lindeman, I would be delighted to have some other county share the burden of our zoning cases, particularly the one that I am going to hear in a few moments, but I can't do

I make no comment other than that, but I see no justification for granting a stay. The implication by my granting a stay I feel is that the Township's status quo that they now have is worth preserving. I have said that it was not worth preserving. The Township takes issue with that.

All right. I retain jurisdiction for the very purpose of reviewing that subsequently. If the Appellate Division can—if you can get to the Appellate Division promptly and get some action taken so that the matter can be resolved by them on Mr. Ferguson's motion——

MR. LINDEMAN: ---Mr. Lindeman.

THE COURT: ---Mr. Lindeman's motion-excuse me--perhaps we can get to the issue at point.

To grant a stay at this point, Mr. Ferguson,

I feel would be a superfluous act. Neither I,

nor the Appellate Division are going to say that

business cannot go on in Chester Township. As

I pointed out to you in the first instance, to

stay the effect of my decision so that other

property owners cannot use their property would

be, I think, patently a constitutional denial of

grant any stays in this case. I am going to allow the matter to proceed. 3 I can very frankly tell you that I am 5 going to call Mrs. McLaughlin at the Appellate Division and ask her to have the matter moved 6 7 with great dispatch and to have whatever party the case is assigned note that I retain juris-8 diction and were it not for the notices of appeal, we would be proceeding forthwith with 10 the matter. 11 MR. LINDEMAN: We will appreciate that, 12 13 your Honor. THE COURT: 14 Okay. MR. FERGUSON: I suggest---15 THE COURT: Forgive me for my poetry, 16 but I have today been through some inebriation 17 of briefs with ambulant rhetoric in two cases. 18 19 The other case I have another poem of my own doing that I will read. 20 MR. LINDEMAN: We won't stay around 21 for it, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: You won't? 23 He has to. 24 MR. LINDEMAN: 25 Okay.

their right of due process. I am not going to

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1 2		SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION - MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO. L-42857-74 P.W.
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5	JOSEPH CAPUTO and )	
	ALDO CAPUTO,	CERTIFICATE
6	) Plaintiffs,:	
7	)	Place: Morris County Courthouse,
-	<b>v.</b>	Morristown, New Jersey
8	TOWNSHIP OF CHESTER,	Part Name O 3070
9	et al,	Date: March 9, 1979
10	Plaintiffs.)	
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15	I, JUDITH R. MARINKE, an Official Steno-	
16	graphic Reporter of the State of New Jersey, do hereby	
17	certify the foregoing as a true and accurate transcript	
18	of my notes in the above-entitled cause.	
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	14	
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21		
22		Judith R. Maruhl
23		JUDITH R. MARINKE, C.S.R., OFFICIAL STENOGRAPHIC REPORTER
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24		
<b>2</b> 5	March 11, 1979.	

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY MORRIS COUNTY LAW DIVISION: 2 DOCKET NO. L-42857-74 P. W. A-0813-78 3 JOSEPH CAPUTO and NOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT ALDO CAPUTO, 4 EEDINGS 5 Vs. 6 Stephen Weboursen CHESTER TOWNSHIP, 7 Defendant. 8 Morris County Courthouse Morristown, New Jersey 9 Tuesday, October 11, 1977 10 BEFORE: 11 ROBERT MUIR, JR., Assignment Judge, Superior Court 12 APPELLATE DIVISION 13 TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: JAN 80 1979 14 PHILIP LINDEMAN, II, ESQUIRE 15 APPEARANCES: 16 MESSRS. HELLERING, LINDEMAN, LANDAU & SIEGAL PHILIP LINDEMAN, II, ESQUIRE BY: 17 For the Plaintiffs. 18 MESSRS. MCCARTER & ENGLISH NICHOLAS CONOVER ENGLISH, ESQUIRE and 19 ALFRED L. FERGUSON, ESQUIRE 20 MESSRS. HILLAS & GOODRUM JAMES R. HILLAS, ESQUIRE. 21 22 EARL C. CARLSON, C.S. R. 23 Official Court Reporter Morris County Courthouse 24 Morristown, New Jersey 07960 285-6249 25

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JK/hl

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Lindeman, let's proceed. I don't think we will get too far. I have to stop at four o'clock because I have a conference.

MR. LINDEMAN: Does your Honor want to hear an opening statement?

THE COURT: Well, if you want to waive your openings, you can. If you are brief, fine. It is up to you.

The Rules have certain references to openings and closings, but you may, of course, waive them if you wish to do so.

MR. LINDEMAN: Your Honor, I will keep my remarks very brief.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LINDEMAN: May it please the Court, this is a Prerogative Writ action in which the plaintiffs, Joseph and Aldo Caputo, bring an action against the Township of Chester for a number of Counts, among which are claimed, and I believe that the ordinance which was adopted in the, or about August of 1976 is invalid under the criteria of South Burlington County NAACP vs. Mount Laurel under the Land Use Act recently adopted and effected in the State. In addition to which we will show that the property of the Caputos, which was acquired by them

upwards of fifteen years ago comprising of about 275 acres in the municipality in which Mr. Joseph Caputo himself is and has for some time been a resident, is property which is peculiarly suitable for the kind of development which this municipality so sorely needs, namely, that of high density, least cost housing for low, moderate and even some not so moderate income people.

As of this time, the ordinance in the municipality provided virtually none, or to the extent that it provides for any multi-family dwellings is totally inadequate under the criteria that I just mentioned. In addition to which the properties that have been set aside for that purpose are nowhere near or are not as adaptable and appropriate as the plaintiffs' property.

Some of the facts that will come out in this case are these: That in or about 1974, the Caputos, Mr. Joseph Caputo in particular, at or about the time that the lower court's determination was coming down in Mount Laurel had devised a plan at great expense and of some complexity and yet eminently simple as far as the town was concerned for the development of his property for high density or reasonably high density purposes and environmentally sound and in

every respect that possibly could apply.

He presented this plan to the municipality which was rejected, of course, because the zoning for the township did not allow it in his location. Indeed, it didn't allow it any place.

The units that he was suggesting were 856 townhouses with tennis courts, a body of water that would
serve as a lake and for other purposes, sewage
treatment arrangement in such a way as to be, I daresay,
we will be able to show aesthetically acceptable,
indeed beautiful, and it would accommodate the
needs not only of the township, but of the region
which will be described during the course of the
trial. The township rejected the plan. Subsequently
this was, of course, under an ordinance that previously
had been adopted in 1964.

Then subsequently in or about 1975, the township adopted a new comprehensive plan and under that a new zoning ordinance. That having been adopted in or about August of 1976, which became final October of 1976.

Under the 1964 ordinance, the properties of the plaintiffs were zoned in a R-2 Zone, which means, of course, that they were able to build two units per acre. An acre unit on a two-acre tract, excuse ms.

In the 1976 ordinance, their property was upgraded so that a substantial portion of it was raised from R-2 Zone to the R-5 Zone and the condition, the situation is such now that even fewer units can be built on it. Whether or not the municipality operated prudently or not is not something to which we will address ourselves, but we will show that over-all, the municipality went from a situation of an extremely limited number of units as of 1964 to a fewer number of units in 1976.

The ordinance, we submit, as will be shown from the testimony, is invalid under the Mount Laurel and statutory criteria because it does not provide for anywhere near high density or even moderate density housing. That there are three parcels that have been zoned for multiple family dwellings. The ordinance provided that a maximum of 300 such units may be constructed on all three of those parcels and that only a hundred and fifty, the maximum of a hundred and fifty units may be constructed on any one of them. That's the limit in the municipality.

We will also show that the ordinance itself
does not even follow the precepts and dictates of its
own Master Plan of the Township of Chester. And among
other things, we will show that Chester is in such a

citizens. It surely cannot accommodate its own citizens. It surely cannot accommodate those in the region and it makes no allowance whatever for the poor people and even the moderately poor people who live in and about this area and who are inexorably moving toward it to come into the town, to have any kind of housing that would be within their economic reach. So the ordinance is not only invalid on its face, but the efforts which have been made by the Caputos to try to get the township to do that which it should do has been long and arduous. It has met with nothing but rebuff.

The expense which they have gone to and which we will show in this proceeding has been staggering. But the Caputos have had the heart to stick with it and they have come to this point now where we believe that a judgment will direct the township not only to zone in accordance with those precepts, but also will direct that the Caputos' property itself will be used for the purposes, or should be used for the purposes for which they have applied.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Ferguson.

MR. FERGUSON: I will try to be brief, your Honor.

The Township of Chester will be described by the witnesses who come before the Court and the physical characteristics of the Township of Chester will be described in some detail. Particularly its characteristics as a watershed area, the geology of the township, the physical characteristics are a definite limitation as to the proper planning and zoning which should occur in the township.

The evidence will show that the watershed area in the township is a peculiarly valuable natural resource and must be protected. The question, indeed, is not whether to protect it, but how to protect it and what means to use.

The township itself is primarily rural. Indeed, if you exclude the Borough of Chester, which is the hole in the center of the doughnut, there is very little in the township at all. The question really has to be raised, is this a developing community at all?

MR. LINDEMAN: We take the position that it is not.

MR. FERGUSON: We also acknowledge the township's efforts to meet whatever regional responsibilities may be by zoning for a higher density land use in those areas around the intersection of Route 24 and

206 next to the Borough.

So to answer the question in the negative, it is not a developing community, doesn't take us very far except to get rid of this lawsuit.

We, the township, that is, is planning to meet its regional responsibility because if it is not a developing community this year right now, it probably will be in the next five or ten years and Chester Township has always planned ahead looking toward future development.

Your Honor, to be candid, this is one of a growing category of lawsuits which is brought by a developer who says I want my project on my ground and I want it at all costs. And indeed, that seems to be echoed by the opening statement of counsel for the plaintiffs when he tries to make equation between the number of dollars spent in the preparation of the proposal as somehow if it is big enough and you spend enough then we should get our building permit.

If the proposal is for the wrong project at the wrong site in the wrong part of the township on land that is not suitable, there is no reason on this earth why he should get a building permit, no matter how much money he spends, and that is the thrust of our case.

The planning process in Chester Township commenced

in 1960 and there is a comprehensive master plan on that date and one of the fundamental tenets of that master plan is that development in the township should occur near the Borough of Chester. This is the center of the doughnut. That is where the community facilities are. That's where your transportation would hopefully be because indeed there was then and indeed very little now in the public transportation in Chester. That is the most logical area for development. That was followed through in the comprehensive plan of 1974 prepared by Candeub Fleissig & Associates and it was followed through in the new zoning ordinance adopted in October of 1976, which zoned three tracts for a higher density use denominated MDR or MR Zone.

Parenthetically on January 18, 1977, because of the Municipal Land Use Law, the ordinance which is called 76-12 was re-adopted as an interim zoning ordinance pursuant to Section 90 of the Land Use Law which gives the municipality the right to adopt a reasonable interim ordinance which is valid for a period of one year and can only be extended for good cause shown by another ordinance, passage of an ordinance for another year.

What we have then for this Court to decide

is the reasonableness of the ordinance as an interim ordinance. I must state here that I will state for the record and the Court is well aware of it, that the planning process is going on at this time in Chester Township. A planner who will not be a witness in this lawsuit has been retained to prepare the land use element of a new master plan and to prepare an ordinance where the groundwork for an ordinance after the preparation of the land use element.

Now, that procedure is mandated by the Municipal Land Use Law and the process required by Statute. That process is going on now. And as far as I understand it, that process must be completed by January 18, 1976, the date beyond which -- 1978, excuse me, the date beyond which the ordinance ceases to have any effect because it is only an interim ordinance. I think this Court must question whether it is feasible that both parties and this Court try this on the reasonableness of the interim ordinance while the planning process has been going on and will be going on and there have been Motions prior to this and the Court has ruled that the trial should proceed.

Now, Mr. Lindeman indicated that the Caputo

tract was peculiarly suitable for the proposed development. It is our position that it is exactly the opposite. It is peculiarly unsuitable. The Caputo tract is in the southern part of the township. It is isolated from the borough and the intersection of Route 24 and 206 where most of the infrastructure of Chester are located.

There will be expert testimony as to that infrastructure is and services available and the one thing that is absolutely clear, there is nothing, there is nothing in the southern half of the township except for the Peapack Brook and rolling, rugged terrain.

There will be testimony that there are no utilities near the Caputo tract. No sewers and no water. The terrain itself is hilly and steep and the soils are not good for on-site septic disposal. And since there are no sewers on-site septic disposal is required.

The road system is poor. The Caputo tract
is at the corner of Fox Chase Road and Old Chester
Road. Fox Chase Road is an unpaved road. Old Chester
Road is a minor arterial road. Both of these roads,
even the Plaintiffs' expert concedes will have to be
significantly improved to handle the traffic.

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Now, the Caputo proposal las it stands today is 856 units and a total of 270 acres. The only plan that was put forward, indeed, in an informal way, no formal proposal at all, called for in excess of 1,400 units.

The only time we heard 856 is during the deposition of John Rakos in this litigation when a site plan had been prepared the week previous to that deposition. And I submit to you that the evidence will show that the Caputos' proposal was prepared during the course of this litigation. Was never presented either informally or formally to the township. It was never presented in such a way that the township could accept it or reject it or accept it in principle or reject it in principle. Indeed, as far as I know, they were never asked to do so. And I do not think much mileage can be gotten by the plaintiffs from the fact that the township didn't fall over backward to say yes, you can do whatever you want on that land, when all they had before them was plan Number 1 for 1,400 units, and incomplete proposal and the plan that this Court is asked to approve is Plan Number 3 for 856 units with a very detailed septic spray irrigation proposal.

With respect to the specific proposal before

the Court, we believe the expert evidence will show that it is insufficient to meet good planning criteria, and particularly it is deficient in terms of the spray irrigation on the site.

I won't go into that now. The evidence will be technical and detailed, but suffice it to say that of all the areas in the township, this may be the worst because the Peapack Brook runs right through the middle of the land. There is a steep ravine on each side. Houses are going to be on the west. The spray field will be on the east and there is a significant danger that the effluent untreated because of the poor soils will slide either underground, on top of the bedrock or on top of the ground frozen in winter or unable to permeate through it for other reasons, right down into the Peapack Brook.

The evidence will show according to recognized planning principles, that is, environmental considerations, transportation, the road system, these infrastructures, the availability of social services, police, fire, schools, all those principles, the most logical place for future development is not at the Caputo site, but closer to the intersection of 206 and Route 24, which is the only development of any significance in the township at all.

That is up near the Borough and that's where the 1974 Master Plan and ordinance put it and we submit that's where it should go.

The evidence will show that the regional planning considerations, that is, those reflections on planning by the Morris County Planning Board, the Somerset County Planning Board, the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, the Regional Plan Association and indeed, even the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, target Chester Township as an area of low density development for very specific reasons. It is a critical watershed area that must be protected from overdevelopment.

Finally, your Honor, we must raise the question of what relief the plaintiff could receive even if there is some technical deficiency in the ordinance which this Court must examine. We believe that the only relief which can properly be ordered would be to re-plan and come up with a Master Plan pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law and a new zoning ordinance. That process is going on anyway and it will be done no matter what this Court decides may be deficient in the present ordinance.

The thing that differentiates this lawsuit

from any others that are going around the State will

the potential for the degradation of the water quality in the Peapack Brook. This takes on added significance when the entire problem of water pollution and water degradation is examined in light of what we call PL 92-500, which is the Fresh Water Pollution Control Act Amendment of 1972 passed by the Federal Congress.

Those Statutes require first a basin plan.

That is a section 303, basin plan. There is one
in preparation for the Raritan Basin of which the

Peapack and the Raritan River are a part. That is
in draft form. It is scheduled for completion sometime in 1978.

After the basin plan is established, then you have an area plan. The area plan focuses this on specific areas in the basin. The over-all goal of 92-500 is to have fishable and swimmable water by 1983. And the fact of the matter is you can't do it unless you begin to control the kind of land use in your watershed areas and in your areas immediately adjacent to your streams that you must clean up.

And the evidence will show that it inevitably follows that the more population you put on the bank of a stream and in a watershed area, the greater

potential for pollution.

Now, this -- I do want to be brief, your Honor, but I must differentiate between what we call point pollution and non-point pollution. Both are significant. A point source is a pipe discharging into a stream. That is regulated under the Federal Act and is now regulated under Enabling New Jersey Legislation signed by Governor Byrne this past summer.

The non-point pollution includes such things as over the land runoff, storm water runoff, which does not go through a point discharge source.

Evidence at this trial will show that more than 50 percent of your total pollution comes from non-point sources. And the simple fact of the matter is that if you cover the ground with asphalt and have dense development in a watershed area, you increase your non-point pollution significantly. Now, this is not to say that you must stop all development from occurring in a critical region. That is clearly not the case, but it does say that you must be very particular about the sites you select to use for intense development. And we submit that those sites have been appropriately selected in Chester Township. And we also submit that the Caputo site is not

appropriate at all. Thank you.

THE COURT: It occurs to me that it would be a good idea for me at the outset to see this property.

MR. LINDEMAN: I think that is a good idea, your Honor.

THE COURT: Right from the outset, you start talking about it. As you may both know, I live in the Mendham area. I don't know this site at all.

I have a general idea of the area, but I think I should see the site in particular and get a viewpoint of it so we start talking about north, south, the Peapack Brook and what have you, I will know what you're talking about. Where it is located, I have something in my mind.

MR. LINDEMAN: I think that is a good idea.

THE COURT: The most appropriate way to do it would be to start out right away and see it. See it and then I will come back and I will put my comments on the record. If there are any divergents, what you feel is any inaccuracy of my observations, and in fact, geographical or what have you, I am talking about geographical, about what I can see. Obviously not what I can't see. Then you can cover that during the course of the trial.

Now, having said that, you talk about Fox Chase

Road. I know, or I think I know there is a Fox

Chase Road that runs off 24 approximately perpendicular
to it as it proceeds, I guess it is generally going
west. But it is going up a long hill in Chester

Township. Is that the Fox Chase Road you are talking
about?

MR. FERGUSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LINDEMAN: May I interrupt, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LINDEMAN: For the moment I think I get the drift of what your Honor's suggestion is.

THE COURT: See it right away, in other words.

MR. LINDEMAN: But the Court, I know, but the Court would go there without --

THE COURT: No, I would go there with you people.

MR. LINDEMAN: Oh, because I think that is the

best way to do it.

THE COURT: I can't go there without you showing me where it is. I was just thinking of the standpoint of the Court Reporter. There are two ways of doing it. One, for me to go out with my court reporter and as I see it, recall it, or for me to write it down on a pad. I think the better way to do it is by writing it down on a pad. There is no

benefit to bring the court reporter and having him trying to run after me.

MR. LINDEMAN: That is satisfactory.

MR. FERGUSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Now, I would suggest tomorrow morning.

MR. FERGUSON: I will be there.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LINDEMAN: That's fine with me, your Honor.

THE COURT: Could I see a map?

MR. FERGUSON: Your Honor, may I make a suggestion? Would it be helpful to the Court to supply the Court with the development plan which Mr. Lindeman proposes to put in evidence?

MR. LINDEMAN: A good idea.

MR. FERGUSON: So that you can get an idea of what it is.

THE COURT: That was my next step. Give me what you think you would like to have now so that I can look at it over the evening. And if you've got a map of the property, so I can write down things on a pad of where you are going to put this, where you're going to put that and the correlation with the map of the property. I don't think we are going to get to a witness either today.

It is quarter to four now.

Off the record.

(A discussion had off the record.)

MR. FERGUSON: I suspect that all counsel would like the Court to have the benefit of all their expert testimony before you see the property.

I expect that you would like to see the property before you hear the expert testimony so you can understand what everybody is talking about.

THE COURT: Yes, it is too difficult for me
to envision something in the abstract which is what
you are asking me to do, when you hear from experts
after the fact, or before the fact, rather. I would
rather hear them after the fact and go out and see it.
And then I can ask questions, it seems to me, if I
have any, with respect to the site.

But having them testify before I see it, does not help me. I might go out again, mind you. And I think I have that perfect right, if I have questions that have not been answered and cannot be answered satisfactorily. I think I have the perfect right to go back out and do the same thing again and put it on the record.

I don't know whether that will be necessary.

I would, really would like to see it first.

MR. LINDEMAN: I am in favor of it.

1 2 3 that has contour lines? 5 MR. LINDEMAN: Yes, that's good. 6 7 area for the spray field. 8 9 document being offered in evidence? 10 11 12 not going to go into evidence. 13 14 15 not there will be any objection. 16 17 MR. LINDEMAN: I realize that. 18 19 20 21 thereon. 22 23 24

MR. FERGUSON: May I suggest that Joseph S. Ward's map included in their report and their geological overview should also be given to the Court because

MR. FERGUSON: Plus the specific designated

THE COURT: Is there any objection to this

I would not like to be given some numbering I mean, I can't see obviously something that is

MR. LINDEMAN: Right. I will certainly offer, I even will offer Mr. Salzman's report, whether or

THE COURT: I don't need reports now.

MR. FERGUSON: No, there will be no objection to the maps going in evidence. We will, of course, argue on the question of their relevance and admission

THE COURT: Okay. Chronologically, then, I don't know whether it is going to make any difference. Mark the maps that he gives you then, starting with the first one, whatever it is, P-1 in evidence, and then

1 - See -

P-2 and you can give me the identification of them.

Let's do it now.

You got a witness sitting here?

MR. LINDEMAN: Yes, I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: No way are we going to reach him by four o'clock.

MR. LINDEMAN: Goodbye.

THE COURT: Let's talk about time. I am normally leaving my house about anywhere between 7:30 and eight o'clock and it would take me somewhere, I don't know how precise, take me to get to the corner of Fox Chase Road and Route 24 will take me something under two minutes.

What time do you want to get there in the morning? Where are you coming from, Mr. Ferguson?

MR. FERGUSON: I will be coming from the shore.

THE COURT: That is a good distance.

MR. FERGUSON: I can be there any time.

MR. LINDEMAN: I come from Essex County.

THE COURT: Okay. I will meet you there at eight o'clock at the corner of Fox Chase Road and Route 24 and you can take me to the property. I have a green Mercury.

MR. LINDEMAN: Wouldn't it be better to meet at

the Caputos' house, your Honor?

THE COURT: I don't know where it is.

MR. LINDEMAN: Well, it is the main road that leads up to the property.

THE COURT: Off the record.

(Discussion had off the record.)

MR. FERGUSON: Let the record show that this map which has been previously marked P-6A for identification on April 7, 1976, is being furnished to the Court for its use and inspection of the property on October 12th.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LINDEMAN: The Court would like to have that topo map as well?

THE COURT: I would like to have what?

MR. LINDEMAN: The topographical map.

THE COURT: If you've got it, yes.

MR. LINDEMAN: Apparently I can't verify whether it is.

MR. FERGUSON: No, that is all right.

Also a topographical map entitled "Engineering Geology Map prepared by Joseph S. Ward, Incorporated, dated April 6, 1976," also be furnished to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Those will be marked P-1 and P-2 in the order that they were read out.

(The documents referred to were marked P-1 and P-2 in evidence.)

## CERTIFICATE

I, EARL C. CARLSON, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New Jersey, certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes.

End Carlson

1/20/79