RULS-AD-1984-190 5/25/84

- transcript of judge's decision on

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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION - OCEAN COUNTY DOCKET NO. L-28061-71PW and L-36896-70PW

LYNN CEISWICK, Plaintiff,

vs.

TWP. OF BEDMINISTER. Defendant. TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JUDGE'S DECISION

OCEAN COUNTY COURTHOUSE TOMS RIVER, NEW JERSEY MAY 25, 1984

BEFORE:

HONORABLE EUGENE D. SERPENTELLI, J.S.C.

## APPEARANCES:

RAYMOND R. TROMBADORE, ESQUIRE, Attorney for Timber

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KENNETH E. MEISER, ESQUIRER ECEIVED
Attorney for Ceiswick JUL 12 1984

Attorney for Hills and Deane White SEATERLY'S CHAMBERS

JOSEPH L. BASRALIAN, ESQUIRE, -and-

PETER J. O'CONNOR, ESQUIRE, DONALD A. KLEIN, ESQUIRE, Attorneys for Dobbs

ALFRED FERGUSON, ESQUIRE -and-DANIEL F. O'CONNELL, ESQUIRE, ROGER W. THOMAS, ESQUIRE GARY HALL, ESQUIRE, Attorneys for Bedminster

> Reported by: GLORIA MATHEY, C.S.R.

that my ruling on the motion continues to be, and what I consider to be, the unique posture of this case. As counsel are aware, the order that has been many times redrafted in this case has, at my request, contained language in the last paragraph, or maybe it's the next to last paragraph, but at the end of the order, which indicates that the order should not in any way be deemed as precedential or as creating any inference that it establishes policy with regard to other Mount Laurel litigation, and what I'm about to say with respect to the ruling on these motions is within the same context.

I look at this case as being quite unique and, along with the Urban League litigation that is pending before me, as kind of in a different category itself, and I would second caution that no one infer too much from the order which I am going to enter beyond what I say.

I'm going to give the Public Advocate and the Township of Bedminster a period of thirty days to present to the Court a settlement of the entire litigation; that being inclusive of the Township's fair share and a complete compliance package.

I would permit the compliance package to be conditioned, and the settlement to be conditioned, on one of two things: First, a ruling by the Court that there is no right of builders remedy in either Timber Properties or Dobbs, or a ruling by the Court that there is a right to condemn as to Dobbs and no right of builders remedy in Timber.

The ordinance revision must include adequate

The ordinance revision must include adequate over-zoning. It must not provide for phasing by site availability, which I have previously found to be unacceptable notwithstanding the recommendations of the Master, and it must consider the availability of sites most readily developable at this time, including Dobbs and Timber.

Now, what I mean by the second condition, that is, that it must not provide for phasing by site availability, is that I deem it improper to provide as a compliance package sites which are not readily available if other sites are readily available and usable for implementation of Mount Laurel purposes.

As you'll recall, Mr. Raymond recommended acceptance of a compliance package which included sites that would not be usable for Mount Laurel purposes into the 1990's. If those are the only

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sites available in Bedminster, then that's the way it has to be. But it's been represented to this Court that there are other sites much more readily available, and in my view that is a very significant element in the selection of sites. Ι don't preclude the possibility that there might be one site more available and implemental at this time than another which should be rejected because of some sound planning or environmental purpose, but the municipality would have to have the burden of demonstrating that clearly to me before it could be passed over in preference to a site for which Mount Laurel housing would have to wait much longer.

Now, if the Court finds that either a right to condemn exists or there is no right to builders rememdy, a hearing will be held with notice to Dobbs, Timber, and the public, why the settlement should not be approved. At this time I will not indicate the scope of that hearing. I will only do that in the event we reach that point.

If the Court finds that there is either no right to condemn and a right to a builders rememdy, that is, if Bedminster may not condemn against Dobbs, or there is a right of builders remedy in

Dobbs that may not be cut off by condemnation, or

that Timber has a right of a builders remedy, then

the application for intervention will be

reconsidered at that time.

Now, if no settlement is presented to the

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Now, if no settlement is presented to the Court within thirty days, I will then consider granting Dobbs' motion to intervene and also consider granting Timber's motion to intervene.

I want it to be clear that I am not now deciding the appropriateness of a class action concept or what procedures as it relates to Dobbs or Timber would be appropriate if a settlement is reached. I will decide that if, in fact, a settlement is reached.

All right. Any questions as to the order which I'm going to have Mr. Meiser prepare? Hoping through the use of the Public Advocate to cut down on some objections.

Yes, Mr. Hill.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, one question. There have been references to a down-zoning of Timber.

Will the order carry anything either by implication or directly as to the right of any property owner within Bedminster who may be down-zoned as a result of -- from their present zoning as a result of

actions taken by Bedminster allegedly in compliance?

THE COURT: No. I thing that's premature.

Aside from Timber, assuming that one were to get to the issue of acceptance of a proposed settlement, there is going to have to be a general public notice and there may be others who are down-zoned, if we can put it in that posture. I don't want to rule in a vacuum as to the appropriateness of that.

Let me say that - somebody indicated, and I let it go only because I didn't want to interrupt that the Supreme Court has given the town carte blanche to do anything it wants once it meets its Mount Laurel obligation. I don't think that the Court intended to repeal by implication existing case law of the State of New Jersey with respect to the reasonableness of municipal conduct in its zoning powers. I concede that it did talk about the right of a town under proper circumstances to maintain large-lot zoning. I do not believe that it has indicated that once Mount Laurel is satisfied, that anything else it does is okay. And I can say only to that extent, in terms of quidance, that a town can't proceed to be totally arbitrary with respect to the rest of its zoning if

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it's satisifed its Mount Laurel obligation.

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Any other -- yes, Mr. Ferguson.

MR. FERGUSON: Yes. At what point in time will the Court determine whether there is or is not a builders remedy for the two -- the developers who seek intervention or as to the right of condemnation?

THE COURT: All right. I will only address that issue if I get a settlement package in thirty days, and then I will set a date for further proceedings in this matter. It might be that we'll have to have an initial hearing as to what proceedings or how we're going to proceed, and them set specific dates as to the determination of that issue.

I expect that the town will move promptly on its condemnation intentions, and if it doesn't do so, I will treat that as an abandonment of the condemnation and just deal with the builders remedy. I will just go ahead with the decision on intervention, and I'm going to bar condemnation at a certain point unless the town moves. I'm not going to set that date now, but I'm telling you up front that if you're serious about it, you've got to move.

MR. FERGUSON: The chain has started and we will take each step along the way as soon as we can.

THE COURT: You can accomplish that in a thirty-day period. That's why I chose thirty days. The statute sets as a minimum a fourteen-day period for negotiations, requiring a notice and negotiations, and you can accomplish all of that. And it's been represented on the record it's going to be fruitless as to Dobbs, and I believe that before the return date of any further proceedings here, it will either be clear — it will be clear that condemnation will be fruitless or you would have resolved your lawsuit with Dobbs and the owner of the property, one of the two.

MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, only one point. The ordinance was introduced Monday night; public hearing on June 18th. We can't legally negotiate with anybody to offer them money that isn't yet in place. That will not go into place until the ordinance is adopted on the 18th, published, and twenty days past a bond ordinance. So we have no money.

THE COURT: Publication. The publication is just a ministerial act. You publish it the next

day.

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MR. O'CONNELL: But the statute says it is not effective. A bond ordinance is not effective until twenty days after that publication.

THE COURT: Make your offer anyhow, subject to the bond ordinance being unchallenged within that twenty-day period.

> MR. O'CONNELL: We will do what ... THE COURT: Mr. O'Connor, Mr. Meiser.

MR. MEISER: Just one question. understand that you're really talking about a signed agreement between the Ceiswick plaintiffs and the Township, not merely some rezoning on their part, that's what you mean by a settlement. I just want it for drafting purposes. I want to be clear I understood that.

THE COURT: I'm talking about there being an agreement by the Public Advocate that it's willing to accept a fair-share number; that it accepts the compliance package proposed by the Township, and the Township in turn saying that it accepts the fair-share number and proposes the compliance package.

All right, Mr. O'Connor.

The order that's before MR. O'CONNOR: Yes.

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you right now, we don't have a copy of, but it's my understanding that is only on the 260, and all the references to the 180 have been deleted?

THE COURT: Well, you're right, that it settles the 260. There are references to the 180 and you're welcome to see the order. We're going to continue — I gather we're going to talk about it after we finish this motion, and it essentially says that the 180 will be given if the town gets repose and, I guess by inference, if Dobbs and Timber are out of the picture. In other words, if the town has a Court-approved compliance package satisfactory to the town, the matter could be settled today if you weren't here, and I think that's a fair characterization of the order. I don't hear Mr. Ferguson objecting to that. May be a little bit blunt, but that's what it says.

You're welcome to see the order.

Anything else?

All right. Thank you. And within the thirty-day period we will notify Dobbs -- or, after the thirty-day period we will notify Dobbs and Timber. In the interim, any proposed settlement, written proposed settlement, must be presented to Timber and Dobbs for informational

purposes only. 1 MR. TROMBADORE: Thank you, your Honor. 2 MR. BASRALIAN: Thank you, your Honor. 3 4 MR. FERGUSON: Just so there's no misunderstanding, we don't intend to include Mr. 5 Dobbs or Timber in negotiations themselves. 6 7 THE COURT: I'm not suggesting you have to. There is prior language in 8 MR. FERGUSON: the Court order that when we worked with the Master 9 and the parties, we must give notice to and include 10 11 For purposes of this hearing, I take it 12 that is inoperative. 1.3 THE COURT: Yes. I'm saying now is the time to find out whether in fact the town wants to 14 settle its litigation. Let's find out what their 15 16 posture is specifically and then we'll go from 17 And I'm giving you the ability to go ahead 18 and propose your settlement. MR. HILL: Your Honor, it's our 19 understanding that these negotiations are between 20 Ceiswick and the municipality. Allan Deane need 21 22 not participate. 23 THE COURT: Allan Deane cannot participate, any more than the other two may not participate, 24 25 but Allan Deane will also be informed of any

proposed settlement. / MR. HILL: That's Allan Deane, Hills, et cetera. THE COURT: Yes. You used Allan Deane. Anyone in their corporate representative capacities. All right. Thank you. . 16 

## CERTIFICATE

I, GLORIA MATHEY, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter of the State of New Jersey, do hereby certify that
the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of my
stenographic notes.

GLORIA MATHEY, g.S.R.