RUES - AD - 1989 - 200 7/20/89

- transcript of motions for SJ & Rox. Orlars

M2.80

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION - OCEAN COUNTY
2	DOCKET NO. L-30039-84
3	x x
4	THE HILLS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, :
5	Plaintiff, :
6	v. : STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT
7	THE TOWNSHIP OF BERNARDS IN THE : OF COUNTY OF SOMERSET, a municipal MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
. 8	corporation of the State of : JUDGMENT ND New Jersey, THE TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE PROTECTIVE ORDERS
9	of the TOWNSHIP OF BERNARDS, THE : PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP OF
10	BERNARDS, :
11	Defendants. :
12	x x
13	Place: Ocean County Courthouse Toms River, New Jersey
14	Date: July 20, 1984
15	
16	BEFORE:
17	HONORABLE EUGENE D. SERPENTELLI, J.S.C.
18	TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:
19	HENRY HILL, ESQ.
20	
21	APPEARANCES:
22	BRENER, WALLACK & HILL, ESQS., Attorneys for the Plaintiff,
23	BY: HENRY HILL, ESQ.
24	FARRELL, CURTIS, CARLIN & DAVIDSON, ESQS., Attorneys for the Defendants, Township
25	BY: JAMES E. DAVIDSON, ESQ. HOWARD P. SHAW, ESQ. Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

THE COURT: This is the return date of four motions, two each: Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion for a protective order and the defendant's motion for a protective order. It's kind of oneupsmanship.

I have read all the moving papers, had an opportunity yesterday to discuss some of the factual issues involved in this case with Mr. Hill and Mr. Davidson in order to try to clarify in my own mind exactly what the facts were.

Subsequent to that conversation, so the record will reveal, Mr. Davidson called me back to -- or called my clerk and I spoke to him, to try to clarify his position with respect to what the ordinance in this case says and so that Mr. Hill should be aware of that, as I understand it, and for example purposes only. The provisions of the PRD zone, at least as it relates to PRD-3 and PRD-4 are governed not only by the portions of the text commencing with Page 400.15 through 400.18 or .19, but also by two tables in the ordinance being Table 401

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

and Table 403 -- I am sorry -- Table 404.

works now, if there is a hundred-acre parcel of property, it is Mr. Davidson's interpretation on behalf of the Township that the ordinance provides that 25 percent of that parcel must be set aside for a single-family residential zoning although need not be used, and that 75 percent of it may be used for multi-family and that may be used at a density of two units per acre, but the density is based upon the total acreage of a hundred acres as opposed to 75 acres.

So, as I understand it, you can build 200 units of multi-family dwellings and you may build them at a density of nine units per acre on the 75 percent or 75 acres which would mean that if you chose to cluster them, theoretically you could get them all on roughly 8 1/2 acres.

Did I properly now characterize

Mr. Davidson's --

MR. DAVIDSON: Almost, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's hear the part I didn't.

MR. DAVIDSON: The only part that I Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

1	think is in the 175 acres you could put the
2	200 units.
3	THE COURT: In the 75 acres.
4	MR. DAVIDSON: Excuse me. Seventy five
5	acres you put the 200 units in less than your
6	eight acres.
7	What you cannot do is make the multi-family
8	zone the eight acres.
9	THE COURT: How could you get them in
10	less than eight acres if you could only have
11	nine units to an acre?
12	MR. DAVIDSON: That's in the zone itself.
13	It's a gross density. It's not a net density.
14	THE COURT: I understand that.
15	MR. DAVIDSON: Okay. Let me give you
16	the opposite example.
17	If I went in and said that my multi-family
18	zone was seven acres and the rest of it was
19	my residential zone, okay, the nine is going
20	to apply to the seven acres. The most I can
21	get in that seven acres is 56 units.
22	THE COURT: How do you come up with that?
23	MR. DAVIDSON: Nine times seven acres.
24	THE COURT: Sixty-three.
25	MR. DAVIDSON: Oh. Well, math is not a
	Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.
- 1	

strong point either.

THE COURT: The reason I hesitated it is my weakest point.

MR. DAVIDSON: But you knew the answer to that one anyway.

THE COURT: It would make my daughter proud. I never did learn it. I was forced to relearn it with my daughter and she never got past the eight times table, so let's not take an example.

MR. DAVIDSON: Okay. I will stay away from my multiplications.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. DAVIDSON: But if you have set aside, for instance, 50 acres, you could put the whole 200 units in it or you could put -- as long as the amount you set aside for your multi-family area, multiplied by nine does not exceed nine, you know, nine acres.

THE COURT: But in my example with 75 acres set aside and you wanted to get a maximum density, wouldn't it be correct to say that you would use eight and a half roughly acres?

MR. DAVIDSON: Well, I am saying that you could do it at 20 an acre. You are not

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

1 limited by the nine. 2 The nine only limits the zone -- they 3 don't call them zones, they call them areas 4 themselves. 5 What I can't do -- what the developer 6 can't do is use most of the land for residential, 7 large lot residential, for instance, and then 8 take the last five acres and jam all the 9 multi-family in. That's what he can't do. 10 THE COURT: But that chart on 404 -- well, 11 it's Page 400T4. 12 I tell you the guy who numbered this 13 ordinance should be whipped. 14 MR. HILL: That is Mr. Frost. 15 MR. DAVIDSON: He is not here. 16 THE COURT: I am only kidding. It is 17 very comprehensive and it is also very detailed, 18 but as I read that other column, the right column 19 on 400 "T" as in Thomas 4, it says nine DU/AC 20 and I take it that --21 MR. DAVIDSON: That's correct. 22 THE COURT: -- to mean nine dwelling 23 units per acre. 24 MR. DAVIDSON: Yes, and that is the 25 maximum dwelling for the multi-family area. . Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

So, you take how many dwellings in the multi-family 1 area. 2 THE COURT: Twenty five must be set 3 aside for single-family residential and that 4 leaves us with 75 acres. 5 6 MR. DAVIDSON: That is right. THE COURT: And you are saying that if 7 8 he could do it, he could build -- I take it 9 he could build a high rise --MR. DAVIDSON: Assuming there is something 10 else. 11 12 THE COURT: Except for the height limitations 13 MR. DAVIDSON: That is correct. 14 MR. HILL: Could I ask a question of Mr. Davidson? 15 16 MR. DAVIDSON: Sure. 17 MR. HILL: If -- what is new to us is the notion that you could put -- we always 18 19 assumed that 25 percent of our units had to be 20 single-family, but on this 100-acre tract, 21 if you took 75 acres for multi-family and put all 200 units there leaving 25 acres vacant, 22 23 if you turn to Page 600.22 it says that in a PRD-3 or -4 we must have 25 percent open space. 24 25 Does that mean in addition to the single

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

family --

MR. DAVIDSON: No.

MR. HILL: Is that a 50 percent open space requirement if you were to do it that way?

MR. DAVIDSON: No. I haven't read the provision, but the way you have said it, no. You have got 25 open space.

MR. HILL: But it's a single-family zone.

MR. DAVIDSON: That's correct.

THE COURT: You could leave that 25 percent undeveloped to settle your open space.

MR. DAVIDSON: That's correct.

MR. HILL: I understand that, and for purposes of this motion, we don't contest it although the notion we didn't have to build the single-family zoning was new to our planners and designers, but, perhaps, you could read it that way.

I don't think it's essential to our motion for summary judgment.

What is essential is an understanding that the overall gross density in all zones with vacant developable land is nowhere less than two units per acre.

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

1 THE COURT: If I understand this correctly 2 then, assuming again my 100-acre tract and 3 assuming again we put all 200 units on the 4 75 acres, regardless of where we put them at 5 what density per acre, and assuming there is 6 40,000 square feet to an acre, we would have 7 something like 3,000,000 square feet; and 8 putting 200 units into 3,000,000 square feet 9 would give me my unit per square foot. 10 MR. HILL: Mr. Hutt has one. 11 MR. KERWIN: It would be two to the acre. 12 THE COURT: I think it works out to 13 something like 15,000 square feet or something 14 like that per unit. 15 The first question is: How do you turn 16 it on? 17 MR. HUTT: When you give it to a judge, 18 it's already put on. 19 THE COURT: Is this a plaintiff's 20 calculator? 21 MR. HILL: It's a plaintiff's calculator. 22 THE COURT: It's not doing anything: 23 Start, stop. 24 MR. HUTT: You are messing up my case. 25 THE COURT: My guess was right: It is Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

1	15,000 square feet per unit. That's very rough
2	because I said 40,000 square feet per acre.
3	But, all right, I have got a better
4	picture.
5	Now, my second question factually which
6	we didn't discuss: Is there anything in Mr. Frost
7	affidavit which tells us how many square acres
8	of land is open in the PRD-3 and -4 zone?
9	MR. DAVIDSON: I don't think so, your Honor,
` 10	but let me say one thing: PRD-3 is not a zone
11	which
12	THE COURT: Is not a zone?
13	MR. DAVIDSON: Well, it's not one in
14	which any Mount Laurel housing, you would expect
15	to be built.
16	THE COURT: PRD
17	MR. DAVIDSON: -3.
18	THE COURT: So, it's just PRD-4?
19	MR. DAVIDSON: No, PRD-4 and
20	THE COURT: PRD-2 was used up. Wasn't
21	it? Isn't that the one where you had 600 and it
22	was used up?
23	MR. DAVIDSON: No, that's PRD-1.
24	THE COURT: That's -1?
25	MR. DAVIDSON: That was a basic floating
	Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

1	zone throughout both the R-2 and the R-4, and
2	those 600 units have been used up. I don't
3	know of any low and moderate income housing.
4	MR. HILL: But some may come in as low
5	as 90,000 it says.
6	THE COURT: I don't see PRD-1 in the
7	tables. There is a PED-1.
8	MR. DAVIDSON: On 400Tl, your Honor. R-2
9	and R-4 both have PRD-1.
10	THE COURT: Yes. That's what I said.
11	They are not a zone. It is a use permitted in
12	the zone.
13	R-2 is your zone.
14	MR. DAVIDSON: That is correct. That is
15	with all the PRD's, that's true.
16	MR. HILL: But it ups the densities
17	of six units per acre that's available.
18	THE COURT: That's used up.
19	MR. DAVIDSON: That's used up.
20	THE COURT: And R-3 is not I am sorry
21	PRD-3 is not a Mount Laurel.
22	MR. HILL: Which is part of the R-3 is
23	not We don't think of it as a Mount Laurel.
24	THE COURT: But R-2 and R-4 PRD-2 and -4.
25	MR. DAVIDSON: -2 and PRD-4.
	Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.
	11

1 PRD-2 goes in the R-5 and PRD-4 goes in the R-8 and that is the Hill's -- the Hill's 2 3 property is R-8, part of the Hill's property. 4 THE COURT: Now, I will re-ask the question 5 then: Do we have any idea how many acres there 6 are in PRD-2 and -4 that may be used for Mount 7 Laurel construction? 8 MR. DAVIDSON: PRD-2 -- excuse me --9 PRD-4 is 500 acres plus or minus. 10 MR. KERWIN: 501. 11 MR. DAVIDSON: 501. 12 THE COURT: And PRD-2? 13 MR. DAVIDSON: I don't know if that appears 14 in Mr. Frost's affidavit. I do believe in 15 Mr. Frost's affidavit it can produce 3,000 units 16 of housing though. 17 I don't know if his acreage is in there. 18 THE COURT: Yes. That's why I wanted to 19 know how he got at that. That's what I was 20 getting at. 21 His total figures, as I recall, is 22 6,000. 23 MR. KERWIN: Is that Zirinsky? 24 THE COURT: In other words, I want to 25 come down on the question of how many acres here Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, I think maybe

Mr. Davidson would agree that the PRD-2 zone

is the product that has already been approved

for construction, that is, Lawrence Zirinsky's

piece, and I don't know if it is in the affidavit

you have got to build on in those two zones?

I don't know what the densities are, but it's all approved and I don't know if it is under construction yet. Is that correct?

or not and it is a no Mount Laurel zone.

MR. DAVIDSON: If the density is six and a half units per acre and it is, your Honor, the piece he is talking about is less than half the zone.

THE COURT: Half the zone?

MR. DAVIDSON: Bonnie Brae owns a big piece in there. Fred Kirby owns a big piece in there. Hovnanian is in there before the Board now and the approval you are talking about is for 15 or 20 percent of the Zirinsky piece.

THE COURT: Is Hovnanian -- Zirinsky,

I have heard that name before.

Is Hovnanian proposing low and moderate in that zone?

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

1	MR. DAVIDSON: Proposing low income,
2	I believe.
3	THE COURT: Lower income, but not low and
4	moderate. He has not been known to build low
5	and moderate yet.
6	MR. DAVIDSON: I think that's incorrect,
7	but I can't make the representation to you.
8	THE COURT: I mean in this court he is
9	not proposing. But you don't know what he is
10	proposing?
11	MR. HILL: The ordinance does not require
12	it, does it?
13	MR. DAVIDSON: He is in the zone that
14	was the subject of the Lorencz suit.
15	I can't say this from knowledge that he
16	is going to put in at least low and moderate
17	income housing, yes.
18	THE COURT: You mean moderate
19	MR. DAVIDSON: It's the housing they
20	are talking in the Mount Laurel II case.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Now, would you say
22	that there are more than 500 acres in the PRD or
23	less?
24	MR. DAVIDSON: Yes. Oh, my gosh, yes,
25	more than a thousand.
	Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

1	THE COURT: More than a thousand not used?
2	MR. DAVIDSON: Yes, almost totally unused.
3	THE COURT: In the PRD-2 zone?
4	MR. DAVIDSON: That's correct, your Honor.
5	THE COURT: So, we may be talking about
6	1500 units acres in the two zones by your
7	calculation at a density of two units per acre?
8	MR. DAVIDSON: Six point five.
9	THE COURT: No, no. The maximum density
10	by your admission is that it's two units.
11	MR. DAVIDSON: No, sir.
12	THE COURT: You can cluster them to nine
13	or six.
14	MR. DAVIDSON: No, sir. No, sir. No, sir.
-15	If you look at 400Tl under R-5, it is PRD-2,
16	there is an asterisk. It says in the PRD-2
17	the maximum allowable density that will be
18	5.5 dwelling units per acre on land defined
19	as R-5 dry lands in Article 200 and 1.0 dwelling
20	units per acre on lands defined as R-5 Lowlands
21	in Article 200.
22	THE COURT: Yes, but we have already
23	agreed, and that's why I want it to be clear
24	in the beginning, we have already agreed that
25	in the text portion of your ordinance that in
	Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.
	u ·

ž

no event can it exceed two units per acre.

MR. HILL: Aren't all the densities at Table 401, your Honor, maximum allowable densities?

THE COURT: Just a second. PRD-4,

Page 400.17 it says "Development according to

the maximum allowable density set forth in

Table 401 is subject to the ability of the

applicant to provide sewerage and sewerage

treatment," and the maximum density allowed in

401 is two units to an acre.

MR. DAVIDSON: No, your Honor, we are talking about PR--

THE COURT: If you go back to PRD--Well, -3 is out now.

We are back to PRD-2. Let's see what that says.

MR. DAVIDSON: Yes.

"The maximum development within a single-family".

In fact, this is more explicit -- "The maximum development within a single-family development area of a planned residential neighborhood shall be controlled by the minimum lot areas, sizes and frontage requirements, but in no case shall

It is your position

site you can get how many?

the development of such single-family development

area exceed the maximum allowable density of

1

2

24

25

2	dry lands, you could get 650 units.
3	THE COURT: On a hundred acres.
4	MR. DAVIDSON: Excuse me, 550 units.
5	THE COURT: And 25 percent would have
6	to be set aside.
7	MR. DAVIDSON: I think it is 35.
8	THE COURT: In that one it's 35.
9	MR. DAVIDSON: I believe so.
10	THE COURT: Okay. Now, in the PRD-4 what
11	can we get?
12	MR. DAVIDSON: PRD-4 is as we discussed
13	on the telephone.
14	THE COURT: So, you could get 200
15	MR. DAVIDSON: units in the 75 acres.
16	In a hundred reduced by 25.
17	THE COURT: So, if you have 500 acres
18	of PRD-4 land, you can get some 10,000 units.
19	MR. DAVIDSON: PRD-4? No, sir. No, sir.
·20.	A thousand units. It's 200 units for 100 acres.
21	That was the example we used.
22	THE COURT: 200 units for a hundred acres.
23	MR. DAVIDSON: And you just said 500 units
24	I believe.
25	THE COURT: Yes, a thousand. And in your
- 1	

MR. DAVIDSON: If it were all in the

2	for every hundred
3	MR. DAVIDSON: Five hundred on the
4	multiplication. I think in real life that is
5	probably high, but that's what your multiplication
6	would be.
7	THE COURT: That's how you come about
8	the 6,000 roughly, I mean, not 6500.
9	MR. DAVIDSON: Yes, that's a theoretical
10	number though.
11	MR. HILL: Your Honor, does your copy
12	of the ordinance have the zoning map on it?
13	MR. DAVIDSON: It would be in the pocket
14	in the back.
15	MR. HILL: In the pocket in the back?
16	THE COURT: No.
17	MR. HILL: Maybe the judge could look
18	at that. It shows you the PRD-2 zone, your
19	Honor, which is what we are talking about,
20	which the portion of it which is dry it shows
21	pou, and the portion which is wet it shows you.
22	The portion that is wet is one unit per
23	acre. The portion that is dry is 5.5 units
24	per acre.
25	It is our contention about 50 percent

PRD-2 zone at 550, now you can get -- that's

18 19

16

17

22

23

24

25

of the zones is wet in each case, so that you could see we are talking about a gross density in the zone area of approximately half of the 5.5 unit zone.

MR. DAVIDSON: Your Honor, it's the piece right above the Dead River on the right-hand That's the zone we are talking about and that's why I said that the number you arrived at, the 5,000 number is a theoretical number.

I think Mr. Frost indicates that the number that you can actually get in them a little more than 3,000.

MR. HILL: Just calculating, it is one unit on the area that is wet and 5.5 on the area that is dry, and it depends on what tract you carve out.

We have been focusing on it --

THE COURT: If you can get 3,000 in the PRD-2 and a thousand in the PRD-4, you can only et 4,000 units in.

MR. DAVIDSON: I think that's what Frost says.

THE COURT: I thought he said six. Maybe I am wrong.

MR. DAVIDSON: I think he might have

said theoretically you can get six, but I 1 think he has come to the conclusion it is four. 2 MR. HILL: The Hills land is in two zones, the PRD-3 and -4. 5 One is zoned as two to the acre and the other is .5 to the acre. 6 MR. DAVIDSON: But the 500 acres we 7 8 are talking about is the PRD-4. 9 There is also 500 acres or maybe a little more than 500 acres in the PRD-3, but that 10 should not go into your calculation because 11 I don't think anybody views that as Mount Laur 12 type land at least now. We don't anyway. 13 THE COURT: Twenty percent of 4,000 14 units is going to produce 800 Mount Laurel units. 15 MR. DAVIDSON: That's correct, your 16 17 Honor. MR. HILL: If there were a mandatory 18 19 set aside. THE COURT: Well, if there was a . . How is that going to reach your number? MR. DAVIDSON: We think that's about 22 23 our number. MR. HILL: Didn't I see a number set 24 25 forth in your papers of 1272?

MR. DAVIDSON: No, sir, not in our papers.

MR. HILL: We supplied copies of the

numbers that Harvey Moskowitz had supplied to

them as their fair share, and it is attached

to our motion to depose him.

Maybe because of that number he isn't their planner anymore. I don't know, but --

THE COURT: So, in other words, you don't concede Mr. Moskowitz's number?

MR. DAVIDSON: I am serious when I say we think our number is about 800.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to be heard, Mr. Hill?

MR. HILL: Your Honor, basically, on our motion for summary judgment, it is our position that given the total lack of mandatory set aside mechanism or incentive zoning as it is defined in the literature in the Mount Laurel case as opposed to the way Mr. Frost uses the language, i.e. in the ordinance there is no mention of lower income housing and there is no benefit to providing lower income housing, of course, Mr. Frost is right that someone who has chose to out of charity, a developer could do so. However, all the developers that I

.20

represent have owners who tend to push them to increase the bottom line.

of any incentive zoning, as it is defined in the Mount Laurel case, in the Mount Laurel case, in the Mount Laurel case, in the absence of any mandatory set aside, that the Court can look at the large lot zoning and in the predominance of the town, the cost-generating items which we have identified in the planner's affidavit which are not contested and which appear in our reply brief and determine that we have established a prima facie case that the municipality is not providing its fair share.

The purpose of us bringing this motion is to get on with the case.

If the municipality intends to adopt, as Mr. Moskowitz has recommended when he was their planner, a response to Mount Laurel II, we would like them to do so so that we can have our case.

We think that the advice that they, themselves, have gotten support what we have set forth in our affidavit, and we would like just a finding of prima facie invalidity of the existing ordinance.

These are the ordinances which, as the affidavit will show, were adopted after the Bedminister decision by Judge Leahy.

There was a settlement in 1980 along

Oakwood at Madison grounds between Allan Deane

Corporation and Bernards which resulted in the

rezoning of the property from one unit for

every three acres down to an average density

of one unit per acre, although it is higher

in some areas and lower in others.

The municipality at the time adopted these PRN zones and it was a step along the way to what everyone believed might be called least-cost housing.

I think it is clear on the face of the ordinance that the ordinance makes no attempt to provide for low and moderate income housing, and having failed to provide for low and moderate income housing, the Court can see that there are east-generating standards and there is large-lot ining.

So, we are, therefore, asking for this finding of fair share invalidity which we hope will move along the case so that we can spend our efforts and Mr. Davidson's efforts can be

and more at the leading edge of the law than 2 whether an ordinance such as this meets Mount Laurel. 5 THE COURT: Who says that 5.5 an acre as a matter of law is violative of Mount Laurel? 6 7 MR. HILL: Well, your Honor has a map 8 in front of you. You can see the zones in 9 question were 5.5 units per acre. 10 Where there are wet lands, they are only one unit per acre. 11 The densities that are coming out 12 13 about 3.5 units per acre. 14 We brief --THE COURT: Who says 3.5 is Mount Laurel? 15 I denied the same motion in Franklin. 16 MR. HILL: Your Honor, in the lack --17 in Franklin I believe you had in front of you 18 19 mandatory set asides. You have no mandatory t asides. You have no affirmative action to 20 provide low and moderate income housing in Front of you in this ordinance. 23 Mount Laurel, itself, talks about quarter acre lots as being in Mount Laurel I 24 25 as not being small lots.

spent litigating issues that are more interesting

3.

THE COURT: Single-family.

MR. HILL: -- single-family, multi-family densities in that neighborhood that are multi-family are -- if anything, multi-family should be higher in order to qualify as lower income than single-family development standards, we feel that, you know, absent very, very high densities in the absence completely of mandatory set aside.

If any affirmative provision in the ordinance, any incentive for developers to build low and moderate income housing --

THE COURT: Well, that's not the point

I mean, if Hills development wants to build

low and moderate, go ahead and do it. We do

not have a mandatory set aside.

MR. HILL: I think the affidavits show
that the lowest unit that Mr. Frost said on
Page 28 of his affidavit, he proudly states

Lat while most of the six units to the acre in the
PRD-1 zone have come in at 200,000 plus, that
he is expecting some of the new ones which
have not been built yet to come in at less
than 90,000.

THE COURT: But that's in the zone where

they say they are not claiming any Mount Laurel compliance.

MR. HILL: That zone was a zone -the balanced residential complex zone, the
reason it is 600 is that they figure their
fair share of least-cost units to be 600 at
some time in the past, and they allowed this
floating zone in an attempt to meet Mount Laurel.

THE COURT: They now don't claim it does.

MR. HILL: They now don't claim that
it does, and every other zone is less than that
and we feel that -- I mean, we are -- your Honor,
we will be glad to go to trial on this ordinance.
Nothing could be easier than to try this
ordinance, and if defeating this ordinance
will get us a developer's remedy, I am doing
my client a disservice to try and get this
ordinance set aside.

THE COURT: No, you are not, because you get it set aside sooner, it might coult in the same thing much sooner.

So, you are not doing any disservice.

MR. HILL: Seriously, is this town's defense to Mount Laurel, you know, we would be delighted to have our developer's remedy

rest on defeating this ordinance, but we think it is so transparent, if you will see the Moskowitz materials, you will see that he has already advised them that they ought to change the ordinance and that's why they apparently do not want us to depose him. That's why we have been unable to get a deposition of Mr. Moskowitz prior to this motion, which I think would have simplified this motion.

So, we are based, you know, we are left on the ordinance as it stands on things that can't be controverted.

Going through the two affidavits,

Mr. Frost's and Mr. Mizerny's, we have tried

to isolate a number of facts which are not

controverted by either, and we are trying to

establish in this motion that as a matter of

law what we have established is sufficient for

a finding of facial invalidity and that's

the purpose of this motion.

THE COURT: Is your position that in the absence of the mandatory set aside ordinance, an ordinance is immediately violative of Mount Laurel?

MR. HILL: I think that in the absence

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

22

23

24

25

of -- This is an ordinance that is four years old and nobody -- and no Mount Laurel has been produced and no amendments introduced, and I think that its -- I think that your Honor could find on its face that this ordinance does not comply with Mount Laurel because it hasn't done the job.

The densities are not such as to make it very likely it will, and the Supreme Court has indicated that in the absence of allowing. trailer parks and high density, you must have mandatory set asides.

You must have affirmative action.

THE COURT: You cite me something in the case that says that. In fact, cite me to something in Mount Laurel which says that you must have mandatory set asides.

Ç.

MR. HILL: The language, I You must affirmatively provide income housing in almost

there is language +

have, you .

don't have density p have cost-generating pl

THE COURT:

The first issue is: Is the town zoned sufficient acreage to provide for its fair share?

And assuming that you can't resolve
that issue as a matter of law, then the second
step is mandatory set aside required?

Theoretically, if the town removes all cost-generative or sufficient-cost-generative provisions from their ordinance, it doesn't have to be a mandatory set aside theoretically.

I recognize, practically speaking, that if there isn't, in my experience, which is quite different than from what the law says, in my experience then there will be no Mount Laurel housing and I also recognize, and my experience tells me, that a density of two or three or four acres will not produce Mount Laurel housing either.

I think that any town that rests on that proposition is on very tenuous grounds.

However, does that then permit the Court, as a matter of law, to say that in this State or in this town that that sort of density will not, as a matter of law, produce that housing? That's what the issue comes

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HILL: And, in fact, both are based on predicting what methodology this Court may adopt in the future.

So, it's all based on the planners,
Mr. Mallach and Mr. Moskowitz's assertions
relating to how you have handled this kind of
data in other cases. But we, you know, the
only purpose of the affidavit was to show
that the fair share was greater than zero,
because theoretically, if the fair share was
zero, maybe we couldn't bring a motion for
summary judgment and that was the purpose for
which we filed. Conceptually, because we didn't
think that fair share would be established by
affidavits, given debatability of this subject
and the fact that it's always subject to maybe
the rights of trial or factual dispute.

THE COURT: Sometimes towns admit their fair share minimum as did Princeton, and that's what resulted in the summary judgment in that case.

Because I was able to determine, as a matter of law, that they couldn't possibly meet their fair share. This town doesn't admit it

22

23

24

25

or, if they do admit it, they admit a hundred.

MR. HILL: This town was embarking upon a course of compliance when people from next door in Warren came over and said --

THE COURT: Oh, well.

MR. HILL: --fight them, you may win.

THE COURT: So, what else is new?

That's it.

MR. HILL: Anyway, your Honor, all I can say is: Our motion is dependent on our assertion that the relatively large lot zoning, coupled with a lack of affirmative measures, coupled with admitted cost-generating provisions, coupled with a number of provisions which we say, on their face, violate the Municipal Land Use Law and the established law of this State, and our cost-generating provisions coupled with provisions which are void for vagueness which themselves are cost-generating, because to put through an application where youhhave vague standards which are completely subject to the whims of the Planning seard is cost-generating per se, added up to a prima facie case of noncompliance.

We, you know, if your Honor feels that that, you know, that the fair share numbers

Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

have to be established before that is so, you know, perhaps, we can -- well, you know, that's an issue -- that's an issue of law.

In any case, your Honor knows our position.

THE COURT: Mr. Davidson.

MR. DAVIDSON: Yes, your Honor. We contend with regard to their motion for summary judgment that the ordinance that we have now with its background and with regard to the two zones that I think we understand are the ones we think Mount Laurel housing is possible in it. I won't say the numbers because I will just confuse it more, that in those zones that low and moderate income housing can be built and that the owners of the property are obligated to build it.

THE COURT: How can you contend the second thing if the ordinance doesn't say it?

MR. DAVIDSON: Okay.

THE COURT: Do you seriously believe that there is a developer out there who is going to be generous enough to come in here and build any low and moderate housing in Bernards with the density that you have given?

Do you seriously believe that?

MR. DAVIDSON: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Do you seriously believe
that anybody would build low and moderate
housing in Bernards even if you gave them
greater density?

MR. DAVIDSON: We don't know whether gross density has anything to do with it, and the reason we don't think gross density has anything to do with it is land purchased for this type of development by the unit, if you have 5,000 units, the guy would pay 5,000 times the number of units.

If you have 5,000 units with 5,000 acres, the guy would pay five. One is 55 to an acre, one is one to the acre.

THE COURT: Won't he get also what the market will bear in that town? And it isn't going to be \$25,000.

If you give Mr. Hill here the opportunity to build -- Mr. Kerwin the opportunity to build at virtually any density in your town without a mandatory set aside, and you can be sure he is not going to be generous, he is not going to give them away at 25 or 50,000.

MR. DAVIDSON: I think he has a mandatory set aside.

THE COURT: Where?

MR. DAVIDSON: Mr. Kerwin and their predecessor litigated this question in 1980.

That case was brought after Madison Township, not before.

to the certification of Mr. Dunham shows that it was subsequent to Madison Township subsequent to the least-cost housing idea.

As part of that complaint they alleged, among other things, that they have offered to work with the Township to provide fully for fair share regional housing needs for all income levels.

Their demand for judgment is that they should provide -- that they should be allowed to provide for the fair share regional land of all family income levels including low and maderate.

The judgment says that the reason for this judgment, which they arrived at by settlement, is to provide for a greater variety of choice of housing for all income groups, not some income

housing.

1

2 THE COURT: Does that mean he has to build one low 20 or 50 a hundred? MR. DAVIDSON: Twenty. We say 20 and 5 Henry says 20. 6 THE COURT: No. 7 MR. DAVIDSON: Twenty percent. 8 THE COURT: I am not asking what you 9 are saying and what they are willing to do, 10 but I am asking you what, in the law, requires 11 anybody -- Let's forget it. Maybe it was a bad 12 example. Let's forget Hills. Any developer 13 walking into the Township at this point can 14 build at least densities without low and moderate. 15 What in the world would ever motivate 16 them to build low and moderate? 17 MR. DAVIDSON: There are only two 18 zones where we claim low and moderate can go. 19 One of them is subject to the ordinances, the ther one is subject to the order in the Lorencz Lorencz case is almost exactly The 23 the same. All over it talks about Mount Laurel I 24 housing, fair share for low and moderate income

group, but all income groups.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

23

24

25

THE COURT: But do either of these orders say that anybody who builds in those zones must be low and moderate?

MR. DAVIDSON: No. The 20 percent number comes out of what the Supreme Court says is a number you have to supply.

THE COURT: It can't be applied retroactively, number one, and number two, the Supreme Court has never said that it must be mandatorily provided for in the ordinance.

Mount Laurel II -- you know, this should not come as a surprise to anybody Mount Laurel II does not say that you must have a mandatory set aside.

MR. DAVIDSON: That's correct.

THE COURT: So, therefore, you have none in Bernards and, therefore, anyone coming into this town could sue you if you made them set aside, theoretically at least, on the mere bund that they were not setting any aside.

The fact of the matter is that today you would be required to give a building permit to somebody coming in willing to build at these densities. The fact is that the Planning Board apparently indicated to the plaintiff that

they had to build low and moderate income housing.

THE COURT: They might indicate that
they have to, and I have read those minutes
and that was a rather -- it wasn't a strong
indication, let me put it that way, and
secondly, what they were talking about I am not
quite sure. I mean, in terms of low and moderate.

But the fact of the matter remains that putting Hills aside, I get a building permit in Bernards today and these densities would not be low and moderate.

MR. DAVIDSON: One thing: You are hypothesizing a guy coming into town. We don't have any of those. We have the land zoned to permit this stuff. We have the owners involved in all the various litigations who are still there. I don't want to pick some poor guy out of the stand and say, hey, I want to build it.

THE COURT: First of all, those properties may be sold.

Secondly, you haven't shown to me any order of any court that mandatorily sets aside low and moderate income housing at any level for any parcel in any zone and I don't Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

6

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

23

24

25

believe, unless I missed it, I don't believe that such an order exists.

So, there is no mandatory set aside and Hills development could sell their property tomorrow to someone who is willing to build at the densities permitted in that zone and there would be no low and moderate.

I think you could concede there would be no low and moderate. The realities are that these people are not doing this because they have some altruism. There is not a builder in this court that I feel would do that.

MR. DAVIDSON: That's what they said last time.

THE COURT: They are doing it because they can make money out of Mount Laurel when they get their remedy.

MR. DAVIDSON: That's what they said Give it to us and we will do it last time. and we are saying that obligates them to do it.

THE COURT: Well, I know what you are saying, but I am saying that there is no order of any court that obligates them to do it, and if they turned out to be liars, just for the sake of argument, I mean, or have misled you

Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

or whatever, the fact of the matter is that 1 they could come in today and get a building 2 3 permit and you know as well as I know that 4 if they did, they would make not a single unit 5 of that construction low and moderate. 6 So that really, isn't there an obfuscation here? Doesn't it have the 7 8 appearance of creating something that it 9 doesn't create? MR. DAVIDSON: The ordinance doesn't. 10 have the mandatory set aside. I don't think 11 12 it appears that way at all. 13 THE COURT: No. I am talking about the densities and creating the specter that 14 6,000 units or 4,000 units can be built and 15 that 20 percent of that is low and moderate. 16 Therefore, since, for the sake of argument, 17 the Town's fair share is 800, we comply. 18 19 MR. DAVIDSON: No, respectfully not. THE COURT: You seriously believe that he ordinance, as it is presently postured, could produce 800 units? 22 23 MR. DAVIDSON: Well, you are excluding what I think is a relevant fact. 24 25 THE COURT: All right. And what is that? Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

41

MR. DAVIDSON: The relevant fact is: We think they are obligated to do it.

You just said: No, they are not, and therefore exclude it.

THE COURT: No. I didn't say they are not. I said: Show me what obligates them, and I don't think you have submitted --

MR. DAVIDSON: I give to you the prior litigations and all the attendant facts obligate them to do it.

you have given me, and I would like you to
point me to something in your moving papers
and the responding papers and whatever that
says by an order of any judge that all of the
property owners in these zones are obligated to
mandatorily set aside 20 percent of their
housing for low and moderate income as defined
by Mount Laurel II.

MR. DAVIDSON: It doesn't say that, and I contend it doesn't have to say that.

THE COURT: What does it say and to whom does it apply?

MR. DAVIDSON: The cases were Mount

Laurel -- I am just going to repeat what I said

Judith R. Marinke, C.S.R.

before to you.

that.

THE COURT: Okay. It didn't get through to me.

MR. DAVIDSON: I beg your pardon?

THE COURT: It didn't get through to me.

The cases are Mount Laurel cases, I know

MR. DAVIDSON: That's correct. And all through those cases they indicated exactly what it was they were going to do.

In the judgment it describes what it is they are going to do and that is: Provide housing for all levels of income including low and moderate.

It is a Mount Laurel I case. All

Mount Laurel II does is say that in order to

force Mount Laurel I, we have got to do some

more stuff and you have to put in mandatory

set asides unless there is some other way you

san see that they are going to get built.

We are telling you that we concede that they are going to get built and we told them they have to build them because that's what the whole idea of the first -- of the Allan Deane case was.

1

2 THE COURT: I am really quite familiar with it. 3 MR. DAVIDSON: Again, I won't repeat the facts I said, but what happened is we came 5 6 up this year and it was indicated to Hills that 7 they had to put in Mount Laurel housing. 8 Hills' indication was that if you do 9 that, we are going to sue you, okay. 10 indication of that is if you do not do it, let us alone, we will build our housing. 11 12 It is followed up by a letter from Henr 13 excuse me, from a letter from Mr. Hill dated 14 April 11th. THE COURT: Can I stop you. I don't 15 mean to interrupt, but there are certain things 16 17 that are important to me. 18 MR. DAVIDSON: I am sorry, Judge. 19 THE COURT: You just said that Hills 20 Development, through someone, said that if you don't let us build other than low and 21 22 moderate, we are going to sue you under Mount 23 Laurel. Is that what you said? I think that's what I heard you say. 24

municipality, which I will find the page if I can.

MR. DAVIDSON: The young lady said:

1 That's what the minutes say. 2 Our people indicated what she was 3 saying was: If you do that --4 THE COURT: Is this in your moving 5 papers? 6 MR. DAVIDSON: Yes. 7 THE COURT: Would you refer me to 8 what you are now referring to. 9 MR. DAVIDSON: Attached to Mr. Dunham's 10 certification. 11 It's on Dunham's certification. 12 the fourth page from the end and it's the 13 minutes of a meeting held on February 14th, 1984. 14 Granted the minutes themselves are brief, 15 that's an understatement, the second paragraph 16 from the bottom. 17 Mr. Garvin said: The Mount Laurel 18 units will probably have to be included in 19 further applications. Attorney Hirsch said the applicant would appeal this condition in order to protect themselves. 23 MR. HILL: Attorney Hirsch being 24 Guliet Hirsch from our office. 25

If you do that, we are going to appeal.

THE COURT: I had an arrow to that.

I had read that, but it didn't sound like the same thing you just said.

Okay. Go ahead.

MR. DAVIDSON: Now, Mr. Hill, in his letter in April, further describes the various conditions and gives the Town some 28 days to completely revamp their land use, master plan, et cetera, to the way they want it on their plan.

In there he also refers to the two times he had been told that in order to develop their property, they are going to have to be.

Mount Laurel.

He makes reference to that fact that they have been told that, and that being the case, they have decided to go this way.

He then says, and if you don't do that

I am going to go to court and ask for ten units

per acre which is merely consistent with the

whole thrust of what they were trying to do.

We take that to mean that if they left them alone back there in January, we would have never heard from them. They would have built whatever they wanted to build, but that didn't

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

23

24

25

happen.

We said, no, no, you have got to put in the Mount Laurel housing. That's what Mr. Hill says we said.

So, he then sued us. They didn't sue us to adjust their housing. They sued us to put some absolutely enormous number of houses on their hill there.

We think that's indicative of what they are doing, The whole thing is just one threat after another.

Now, we think the Court says that in that circumstance, on page 280, "Mount Laurel shall not be an unintended bargaining chip in a builder's negotiations with the municipality, and that the courts shall not be used as the enforcer for the builder's threat to bring Mount Laurel litigation if municipal approvals for projects containing no lower income housin are not forthcoming."

We contend they wanted housing without Mount

"Proof of such threats shall be sufficient to defeat Mount Laurel litigation by that developer. "

It doesn't say that he doesn't get a builder's The court says: It defeats the remedy. litigation. It is setting

Judith R. Mazinke, C.S.R.

: •

ZU

ZI

up a counter policy to prevent that.

I assume the reason for that counter

policy is so the towns like us, we won't just

fold. We could have folded. Nothing would

have happened presumably, but certainly the

tenor of Mr. Hill's letter is the tenor of

the remarks at the two hearings that are attached

to Mr. Dunham's certification.

MR. HILL: May I?

THE COURT: Just a second. I don't know if he is finished.

It is true that Mr. Hill's letter is a 30-day letter; poses affirmatively to build low and moderate. Assuming that I am suspicious, how do I know that he doesn't mean it? How do I know that he is using Mount Laurel as a threat from that?

The letter--whatever hisletter says
is quite the opposite of a threat. He says,

L'want to build low and moderate. Now, I am

sking you the question hypothetically. I

son't necessarily believe that he means it,

and I have expressed publicly my dissatisfaction

with that letter because I think it is in the

worst spirit of Mount Laurel.

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

24

25

MR. HILL: Slightly different letter, your Honor. . 3⁼ forgetting the Town. 10 11 lawyer. 12 13 14 15 associate of his firm. 16 17 18 19 o do that? MR. DAVIDSON: 23

THE COURT: In its various forms it's in the worst spirit of Mount Laurel, and I take personal offense to it and I think that it is counterproductive to the interest of plaintiff's It is counterproductive to Mount Laurel construction, the interest of low and moderate housing, and I don't like it coming from a All of those things I have said public so, Mr. Hill, he has not heard it for the first time. I have said it in the presence of an If I could, for a moment, dismiss his suit, I would be very happy to. However, how do I equate an offer to build low and moderate income housing into a threat against the Town? has Mr. Hill just been too cute to allow me The offer is the result of the threat that wasn't carried out. That's

always the way it's going to happen.

THE COURT: Where is that threat?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

The threat was: MR. DAVIDSON: sue you for Mount Laurel unless -- we will sue for a lot of Mount Laurel unless you let us build it as it is.

THE COURT: Mr. Davidson, I will dismiss this action if you can produce for me proof that someone on behalf of Hills Development, be it their attorney or anyone else, has ever said to this Township in sufficient act, word or deed that either you give us our relief or we are going to sue you for Mount Laurel.

We do not want to build Mount Laurel but we are going to shove it down your throat unless you give us what we want.

I would be happy to dismiss the lawsuit because that is precisely what the Supreme Court was talking about.

That is precisely what they do not want, and my own suspicion is that what Mr. Hill's etter says, and I find the letter exceedingly effensive, however, my suspicions cannot rise to the level of law until I have something that will support my suspicions.

MR. DAVIDSON: All right.

24

22

23

25

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

. 21

23

24

25

THE COURT: I would not mind being quoted in what I am saying here. Unfortunately, the courtroom is empty.

MR. DAVIDSON: May I say one other thing: We are very concerned with their commitment. They have attached a commitment.

Mr. Hill has referred to the commitment in his reply brief to our motion. We read that commitment to say that we are committed to Mount Laurel housing if we get what we want.

We want them to be committed to build Mount Laurel housing whether or not they get what they want. That's what the commitment ought to be, and if they are willing to build it, then they ought to be willing to stand behind it.

THE COURT: Yes, but now your naivete is probably going to result in your ordinance being found valid just as your argument with espect to Mr. Hill's approach to the Town.

Unless you are going to be able to prove, and you are going to have a tough row to how, I mean, factually, in a mandatory set aside, in the absence of mandatory set aside that you are going to be able to produce housing

in this Town, it seems to me you are going to face a very, very difficult uphill fight.

I think it is going to be rather easy for Mr. Hill to demonstrate that this ordinance will not produce low and moderate housing.

If he cannot demonstrate it as a matter of law on a motion, it's going to be rather easy as a matter of fact if you are going to rely upon the good faith of builders to come into your town and build low and moderate housing.

MR. DAVIDSON: Okay. I hear you?

that follows on that, and I think should be clear to you and should be thought out, and that is, that the plaintiffs barred now in Mount Laurel matters are now bringing these motions for other purposes other than winning, and that is, that they will follow with a motion after they have proven invalidity pursuant to Rule 4:44-6 to demonstrate that the town has defended against the motion for summary judgment knowing that there was palpably no genuine issue of fact which would then entitle them if such a motion was granted to attorney's fees from this day forward.

1 MR. DAVIDSON: May I respectfully 2 say that I am offended by that, Judge. 3 THE COURT: Well, that is what -- you 4 may be offended and I may be offended, but that 5 is their intention. 6 MR. DAVIDSON: Yes. We have presented 7 nothing other than what is written, and we 8 contend that the reason there is an obligation 9 and the reason we say there is an obligation is 10 because that is what they obligated themselves 11 to do in 1980. 12 You are telling me that if they renegt 13 on that obligation and I try to enforce that 14 obligation, that they can hit me for costs and 15 I think that is wrong. 16 THE COURT: Well, I am not saying --17 if you listen to me, I didn't say that that 18 would be my order. I said that would be their 19 position. 20 MR. DAVIDSON: They can make any motion 22 THE COURT: That is right. And if 23 they can prove it, they can also win. 24 The point is that I believe that that 25 is why some of these motions are being brought

because the truth of the matter is that in the absence of their being an established fair share number, that is, (1) that you concede as your fair share, as long as you have sufficient acreage at some even questionably sufficient density, the person bringing the motion cannot prevail and that is why in Franklin Township I denied the motion for summary judgment even though the acreage, the density was approximately 3.5 and that is why I am going to deny it in this case as well.

However, there is some language in the opinion which says that there must, in fact, be a realistic provision for low and moderate housing and that it will not create a real issue of fact if there isn't, and I would be happy to cite you to the language.

So that in defending against this motion, I think that towns do have to weigh that possibility.

You are satisfied and that is fine, and I don't say it as a threat. I am saying the plaintiffs say it as a threat, and I think we will continue to see these kinds of motions for that reason.

21

22

23

24

25

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Your motion raises an issue for the first time that has disturbed me for some time now, and I feel rather certain that there are cases of abuses out there.

If Mr. Hill's letter is not, in fact, an abuse, it gives the impression, if one is suspicious or if one has a background that I had, it gives the impression of potentially being just that. The problem is proving it.

He has come in -- come to you with a letter saying, I want to build low and moderate. How can we call that abuse? Unless you can frame around that letter a sufficient factual background which will then permit me to say, well, the letter may say he wants to go low ar. moderate, but he really doesn't mean it. really doesn't mean it.

Based on the moving pape say that although I must sav as close to making me + Yet, and the first I am going to a

do it in this case

Now, how abou.

protective order? Do you

on that?

MR. HILL: Your Honor, could I be heard, although it is not precisely on this motion?

I have heard reports back on this letter and I would like to respond to the Court on it since the Court has made a lot of statements about the letter in its various forms.

THE COURT: You are entitled to be heard.

MR. HILL: And this letter is not the same letter that you look at in Cranbury.

The only way that it is similar in that it contains a 30-day demand to rezone and promise that a suit will follow, and the undertaking to do low and moderate is included in the letter. The reason you know that, you know, plaintiff's attorneys have long been faced with a problem of looking at some of the language in Mount Laurel which talks about giving notice to a town.

There is what I call -- what some

Attorneys call dicta, what I call public

relations in the beginning of the Mount Laurel

opinion which are said for the reporters to

read, and they are not the heart of the opinion

and they talk about litigation and how the

opinion is not meant to require -- to cause litigation in New Jersey.

And then later on in the opinion they say it is our hope in this opinion that there will be lots of developer's litigation.

So, I assume that they do not mean what they say in the early part of the opinion, however, it's there.

THE COURT: That's an assumption you should not make.

The Chief Justice -- and everything.
he said in the opinion I am sure --

MR. HILL: He says several things -- he says different things, directly contradictory things in different parts of the opinion.

Anyway, we poor attorneys who are not judges are faced with the problem of how do you give a town a notice and how do you make sure that the notice isn't extended over a long pariod of time.

It's easy if you go to Franklin or Bernards or any one of a hundred municipalities and ask them to change the ordinance, and they say, we will think about it, and you can sit there with them thinking about it for weeks or

2

4 5

6

7 8

9

10

11 12

13

CO.. BAYONNE, N.J. 07002 . FORM 2046

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

months or years. The only way we, as attorneys, can fashion a notice with a beginning and an end to it is in the form of an ultimatum and that is the reason for the particular letter.

The letter also in various forms is, you know, serves the purpose of: If we are lucky enough to have the town say, no, very quickly, we can then bring our lawsuit.

In fact, in a case like the Cranbury case, our particular client had come to us before a client who was in the main part of the opinion and we couldn't represent the second client because we gave a notice of 30 days, we filed last and that it turned out had consequences in a multi-development case although we brought the notice first because we filed last.

We somehow find ourselves where, depending on the devel law, we may or we may no

remedy.

that confront us at

with how do we put cas

can survive the kind of a

get our case filed in time so that other
plaintiffs do not come first and the result
is the letter which, in effect, as you know,
I don't agree with, your Honor.

I have heard your Honor's statements and I don't understand why the craftsmanship, you know, is objected to by your Honor.

Although your Honor has made these statements in various forms, it has not resulted in any action, I don't understand the purpose of your Honor's criticism of an attorney's attempt to draft a letter to achieve a certain result and which result is, in fact, being achieved.

Finally, in answer to Mr. Davidson's -THE COURT: Just on the letter, it's
not the same in this case as it is in Cranbury,
and you were not here for the Cranbury case
in which the letter came up.

Do you know anybody else who is sending letter like this when you say "We attorneys"?

Is this a form of letter sent out by you:

"We attorneys throughout the State of New Jersey...

MR. HILL: No. I am saying that we have a problem of -- as a class of advising a way of

noticing towns prior to bringing suit as required by the opinion.

THE COURT: No. My question was: Was
the "we" Brener, Wallack & Hill? Was the
"We" the Bar of the State of New Jersey?

MR. HILL: I have no idea. I do not
speak --

THE COURT: My suspicion is Brener,

Wallack & Hill because I have never seen

another letter like it elsewhere; and secondly,

with respect to what -- the fact that the Court

has done nothing to date doesn't mean that the

Court won't; and thirdly, with respect to the

letter that said that we are experts in the

field of municipal litigation.

MR. HILL: You are not talking about this letter, are you?

THE COURT: I am talking about the

Cranbury letter that we have resulted in many

thousands of multiple-dwelling units being

constructed, and we can assure you that there

is no point in fighting because you are going

to lose, taken in the context of public

statements about municipalities being harp

seals and the firm being -- and yourself being

known for having said that. I can see that causing a municipality being rather offended because of this release and stiffening which can do nothing about being productive to low and moderate housing.

Do you disagree with that? If you feel it is your professional responsibility to conduct a Mount Laurel case in that manner, I say to you: Go ahead and do it until someone tells you it's inappropriate or worse.

MR. HILL: Your Honor, I just have a problem when statements of criticism get back to me and they do not come directly from your Honor, but through various forms and I have tried many cases in front of you.

THE COURT: I wish my statements would not only get back to you, but be publicized.

Unfortunately, you managed -- matters of your successors have been publicized.

I think Mount Laurel is being abused in the press in some instances and I don't know how that happens, you know, I don't know who is putting it there, but it happens and I get letters -- I get letters sent to me anonymously and otherwise.

about comments that attorneys, plaintiff's attorneys have made about it and defendants, you know. I get them from both sides and it seems to me to lend nothing to what the doctrine is about. It does nothing but underline it. It does nothing but destroy a possible voluntary compliance. It does nothing but stiffen the will of those people who don't want this building to occur, and it has to stop at some point.

How it is going to stop, I am not sure.

Maybe it will stop to the detriment of the very people it is intended to help or to the detriment of the builders or whomever. I don't know. But it cannot be helpful, Mr. Hill, to have comments of that nature or the aggressiveness which I perceive in that letter.

It cannot be helpful to people who are really serious about building low and adderate housing and that is a big "if".

MR. HILL: But you are not talking about this letter in this case.

THE COURT: Well, I find this letter to be inappropriate as well, not as offensive

as Cranbury.

MR. HILL: Finally, I would like to

just say for the record there are copies of

minutes of meetings of the planning board which

I am mentioned, but in the process of things

which I said are discussed in the process of

representing another client, namely, Mr. Zirinsky

on the Sage tract in Bernard Township, I assume

that you are not trying to weave a web of

statements that I make for one client and use

them against another client.

THE COURT: The record should indicate that that comment was addressed to Mr. Davidson rather than the Court.

MR. HILL: I just see that -- there are minutes included which are purely discussions of low -- whether Mr. Zirinsky would have to build low and moderate on the Sage tract, and I was there as Mr. Zirinsky's attorney and I den't happen to remember what I said, but -- and I remember very well I have never threatened: I will sue if I have to build low and moderate, but I just want the Court to be clear and I want you to be clear that what I, as an attorney, say for one client in front of

a town, it cannot be tagged on another client.

Just, you know, that they are two different clients and they are two different pieces of property and they are two different situations.

I don't know, and, you know, what the purpose of putting in minutes from a meeting where I was representing another developer on to this application was.

THE COURT: Well, I have already ruled that Mr. Davidson has not reached the level of factual proof which would permit me to dismiss the complaint and to that extent his cross motion for summary judgment is denied.

Do you want to be heard on the protective order?

MR. HILL: Yes, your Honor. We seek simply to — a protective order because of the request for production of documents and because of the request to take the deposition of the request to take the deposition of the Kerwin included very broad information about the financial background of the company, the financial resources of the company, the financial projections of the development, marketing, we simply seek a protective order

4.1

for the reasons set forth in the brief before the Court from the internal financial circumstance of Hills.

Bernards Township as of this day. It has about \$40,000,000 in sales in Bedminster alone since January 1st and we don't think that the financial information relating to Hills is the business of Bedminster or our competitor or Bernards, and we seek a protective order simply to curtail the kind of financial information coming particularly since all financial information as opposed to financial projections will be from Bedminster which we do not think is — has any relevance to this suit.

With respect to the projections, we feel that our projections again are not the business of Bernards' projections from various scenarios as to what density we might get if we were to bring Mount Laurel and how much -- what the Mount Laurel would cost, those kinds of internal documents we do not -- we are seeking be protected from discovery.

Thank you.

On the Moskowitz matter.

25

1

2 MR. SHAW: Howard Shaw for the 3 defendant. 4 If I may respond first to Mr. Hill's 5 argument on the plaintiff's application for 6 a protective order. 7 The plaintiff's application seeks to 8 prevent Bernards Township from getting access 9 to all of the plaintiff's financial records, 10 and essentially what the plaintiff is asking the 11 Court and the defendants to do is take on faith, 12 the plaintiff's contention that they just simply 13 cannot afford to build Mount Laurel housing 14 under the zoning regulations as they presently 15 are. 16 We think that the financial records of 17 the plaintiff are pertinent to several matters. 18 First, they are pertinent to 19 substantive matters, specifically to the eracity of plaintiff's claim that they cannot ford to construct Mount Laurel housing in a cost-effective order despite the 1980 bonuses 23 of more than 200 percent and despite the 24 elimination in 1980 of the cost-generative

provisions in that rezoning.

THE COURT:

. .

Secondly, we submit that the

financial records of the plaintiff are relevant
to the remedial phase, if it comes to a
remedial phase in this case, that if the
ordinance is invalid, we are entitled to seek
cost information to know what provisions must
be changed in the ordinance and to what extent
in order to enable the plaintiff to build
Mount Laurel housing in a financially reasonable
way.

passages makes reference to cost, most noticeably on Page 259 the Court refers to some documentary evidence, some report and says that those will be good guides for the courts in determining the effective cost-generative provisions, but it also says on that page that the Court should take specific cost evidence from the litigants.

The minutes of the Planning Board on January 24 indicates the fact that Mr. Hill mentioned at that meeting that he has a number of clients -- a number of his clients are builders.

"They have figures what it will cost

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

22

23

24

25

builders to build these units." MR. HILL: Who was I representing at that meeting? THE COURT: Excuse me. Interrupt. MR. SHAW: Regardless of who Mr. Hill was representing at that meeting, he indicated that he has a number of clients who are builders and who have cost information.

We are interested in that cost information. We think it is pertinent.

We are interested in information regarding land costs, labor costs, equipment costs, their financing costs, methods of allocating their costs to determine whether, in fact, they are making a fair allocation so that the allocation that they are saying results in Mount Laurel housing being too expensive is a fair estimate, their own internal projections to see if what they are telling the Court about their costs is really

THE COURT: Won't that all become relevant only if they are awarded or may be awarded a builder's remedy?

In other words, won't it become relevant only after the fair share and compliance of the ordinance is determined?

MR. SHAW: Not entirely. No, it is relevant in part to the substance of the case, the fair share -- not the determination of a fair share number certainly --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SHAW: -- but compliance, yes, because the allegation --

your ordinance, compliance -- their building plans has nothing to do with whether the ordinance complies with it.

MR. SHAW: Well, it does in the sense, your Honor, that they are alleging that our ordinance, as it stands, makes it impossible to build the Mount Laurel housing, and we submit that if we have access to their financial information, we will have an opportunity to determine whether, in fact, their allegations are true or they are not true.

If they are not true in alleging that they cannot afford to build Mount Laurel housing, that substantially undercuts their argument that

the ordinance doesn't allow for the building of Mount Laurel housing.

That is a substantive issue before you ever get to the remedial stage.

As regards the remedial stage, also, the projections of cost and profitability determine whether --

if ordinances are going to rise and fall on the financial acumen of the particular developer in the town so that if you have Hovnanian who has a capacity and is much smarter than builder "X", I was going to say Hills -- said in jest -- that your compliance is going to rest on that?

Doesn't it rest on whether anybody under the ordinance as it stands can come in and build at those densities?

MR. SHAW: Well, I think the questions are intertwined because if you are talking about anybody in a vacuum, then all you are talking about are theoretical perceptions of the ordinance that are not related to real numbers.

What we are looking for from the plaintiff is some real numbers --

THE COURT: There are people out there, many of them, who will testify that at "X" density per acre no one can build Mount Laurel housing and that at "Y" density it is possible and at "Z" it is for sure, and it is irrelevant whether Hills can do it because they may not be the plaintiff. They may not be the builder.

I mean, you know, maybe they are packaging this deal and they are going to walk away. That's not the important question.

The question is whether Joe Shmoe can build it. That's what the issue is and that's what the Court was talking about.

Otherwise the ordinance will rise and fall upon how sophisticated the plaintiff is.

That obviously is not the intent of the Court.

MR. SHAW: Well, your Honor, specific allegations in this case are that Hills cannot it. And if, in fact, their figures show that Hills can do it, well, that goes some way at least to showing that Joe Shmoe can do it and there has got to be least common Joe Shmoe.

I don't know whether Hills is it, but in any event, someone has got to be it and if Hills has

5

6 7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

cost information that shows that they can do it, then the statement that nobody can do it is necessarily not correct.

It may be that there are some people who cannot do it, but if Hill's figures show that they can do it, then obviously some people can do it and then that is going to have to be taken into account by him.

THE COURT: You don't see the burden as being upon each of you to prove that it can or cannot be done, that the intrusion into the financial situation of Hills Development is unwarranted and that you can find an economist or one versed in building, come in here and say, look, 5.5 is a reasonable density.

I don't care whether Hills can do it or not. Isn't that the issue?

MR. SHAW: Well, that is issue, but the fact +-

mething, whether

staing directly

discovery both to produce against

Now, I presume

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

23

24

25

going to come in and say, no, and put on a witness and say, no, here is the ordinance. have looked over our books, can't do it. I presume the plaintiff THE COURT: No. is going to come in and say, it's not a question of: We, Hills can't do it. It can't be done. That's what I presume the plaintiff will say. In fact, I would be very surprised if the plaintiff took the approach you have just indicated. MR. SHAW: Well, we submit, your Konor that we are entitled to look at Hill's figur to rebut that very presumption. If there is testimony that it can't be done and Hill's figures will enable us to show that it can't be done --THE COURT: You see, in the builder's remedy aspect it may very well be relevant. Let's suppose that the ordinance was found on-compliant and suppose that Hills was granted a remedy, and suppose that Hill's presents a plan at 20 an acre and you say, no, you know, you are entitled to a bonus now because you have got a builder's remedy, but

this is ridiculous. You can do it in pen and

Hill says, no, we can't.

Now, at that stage I have no problem with proper discovery. What the level of that discovery is we haven't dealt with yet.

Of course, we have not reached that in any case, but I have a great deal of problem with it before it's ever been decided that Hills is even entitled to a builder's remedy.

I don't think you need that to prove the compliance of your ordinance.

The ordinance should stand or fail upon whether it provides a realistic opportunity to any builder to build low or moderate housing, and if that is the case, it should not be relevant that Hills has got more money than anybody else or anything of that sort.

MR. SHAW: Let me turn to one other aspect of this, your Honor, on the substantive

We have raised, and your Honor has

didressed at length, our allegation that Hills

lacks standing to pursue this case. Your Honor

has refused to grant our motion for summary

judgment because we haven't -- on the ground

that we haven't presented sufficient facts in

these documents to show that Hills is lacking in the good faith in wanting to build this housing.

The financial information will show, as well whether Hills is lacking in good faith, in making the allegation that they cannot afford to do it.

that they cannot afford to do it and therefore they need density bonuses and they need striking of what we consider to be legitimate requirements in the ordinance and we are able to show through their cost records that, in fact, they can do it and they are just looking to maximise profits, we think that may go a long way also toward helping to prove the defense that we have raised.

at this point that the request with respect to the disclosures sought from Hills is premature and I will deny that application without prejudice at an appropriate time in the litigation which would most likely be in connection with the builder's remedy.

With respect to Dr. Moskowitz, I think

on that motion we have to kind of fish or cut bait, and I am going to permit the Town to notify Hills within a period of 20 days whether or not Dr. Moskowitz will be utilized as an expert witness for this litigation, and if he will be, then he shall be subject to depositions upon proper notice.

If it is the position of the Township that he will not be, then he is no longer an expert witness. Therefore, the depositions would be inappropriate unless there was some other basis for them.

MR. SHAW: May I have one moment, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Discussion off the record between defense counsel.)

MR. SHAW: Your Honor, with due respect,

May we ask that rather than 20 days from today

be the deadline that it be 20 days from the

date of the release of your Honor's opinion in

the Warren case and I ask that very seriously,

your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, that is okay.

It is coming out on Wednesday.

1 MR. SHAW: That's fine. THE COURT: Sure. No problem. All right. Just so we can summarize, and I would ask that Mr. Davidson submit the 5 order. 6 The motion for summary judgment brought 7 by Hills is denied. 8 The motion for summary judgment 9 brought by the Township is denied. 10 The motion for a protective order brought by Hills is granted. ' 11 12 The motion with respect to a pro-13 order for Dr. Moskowitz is granted subject to 14 the provision that it shall be for only a 15 period of 20 days from the release of the 16 Court's decision in the A.M.G. versus Warren and that within 20 days thereafter the Township 17 18 shall notify the plaintiff whether or not it atends to rely upon Dr. Moskowitz as an expert. If it does, the order will be cated and the plaintiff shall have the right 22 to depose Dr. Moskowitz with proper notice. 23 All other motions are denied without prejudice to be renewed. All right. 24 25 MR. HILL: Your Honor, is the form of

PENGAD CO., BAYONNE, N.J. 07002 . FORM 2046

CERTIFICATE

I, JUDITH R. MARINKE, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New Jersey,
certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate
transcript of the proceedings as taken before me
stenographically on the date hereinbefore mentioned.

--

JUDITH R. MARINKE, C.S.R. License No. XI00392

My Commission expires on:

Sept 18, 1984