WEST POINT-PEPPERELL v. TEXTILE WKRS. U. OF AM, 559 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1977)
WEST POINT-PEPPERELL, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OFAMERICA, AFL-CIO, CLC, AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA, ANDAMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO,DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
No. 76-4517.Summary Calendar.[fn*]United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
September 16, 1977.
[fn*] Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. CitizensCasualty Company of New York, et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.Page 305
Lovic A. Brooks, Jr., Charles A. Edwards, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.
J. R. Goldthwaite, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., Arthur M. Goldberg, Gen. Counsel, Amalgamated Clothing Textile Workers Union, New York City, George Kaufmann, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before COLEMAN, TJOFLAT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
[1] The plaintiff, West Point-Pepperell, Inc., appeals from the district court's order dismissing its complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm the district court on the grounds set out in its order filed on November 22, 1976, and appended to this opinion.
[2] AFFIRMED.
APPENDIX
ORDER
This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought
by West Point-Pepperell, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "West
Point") pursuant to the provisions of Section 301 of the National
Labor Relations Act as amended by the Labor Management Relations
Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 185,
seeking a declaration of its rights and obligations under a
collective bargaining contract with the Textile Workers Union of
America (hereinafter referred to as "TWUA"). Presently pending is
the defendants' motion to dismiss or alternatively to stay.
TWUA was certified by the National Labor Relations Board
(hereinafter referred to as "the NLRB") as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of certain employees at
plants in Lindale, Georgia and
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Biddeford, Maine. West Point entered into successive labor
contracts with TWUA at both plants. The latest of these contracts
was executed in 1975 and included provisions for dues check off
and collective bargaining on behalf of the plaintiff's employees
in the designated units.
On March 18, 1976, TWUA merged with the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, effective June 1, 1976, and the Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union (hereinafter referred to as
"ACTWU") became the surviving union. Thereafter, the defendants
requested that West Point pay the dues to, and bargain
exclusively with ACTWU. The plaintiff refused and brought this
suit for a declaratory judgment on July 21, 1976, maintaining
that TWUA is the only representative of its employees under the
existing contract, not ACTWU. The plaintiff charges that TWUA's
efforts to have it recognize ACTWU as the employees' exclusive
agent is a breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
On August 25, 1976, the union filed a petition with the NLRB
for amendment of certification to reflect the merger and filed a
motion to dismiss West Point's declaratory judgment action or
alternatively to stay the action pending disposition of the
petition for amendment of certification by the NLRB. The
plaintiff responded to the defendants' motion contending that
neither dismissal nor a stay is warranted.
The defendants maintain that the determination of matters of
representation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB,
29 U.S.C. § 159, with a review of the board's decision in the
United States Courts of Appeal. They argue that the plaintiff's
action, ostensibly seeking construction of the contract, is, in
reality, an attempt to have the district court determine ACTWU's
status, a question outside of its jurisdiction, thus bypassing
the NLRB.
West Point claims that the district court has jurisdiction over
this dispute under Section 301 of the Act as an action between an
employer and union for breach of a collective bargaining
contract. The plaintiff specifically alleges that TWUA assigned
its rights under the contract to ACTWU in violation of the
agreement, or tried to substitute the new union as a party to the
contract, and that TWUA's efforts to have the employer make dues
payments to and bargain with ACTWU is a further breach of
contract. West Point also contends that it is unnecessary to
allege violation of the contract to secure a declaratory judgment
of its rights under a collective bargaining agreement.
Noting that the petition for amendment of certification was not
filed until after this suit was brought, West Point charges the
defendants with attempting to cloud the issues. Acknowledging the
board's jurisdiction over representation matters, the plaintiff
characterizes this action as one concerning contract issues and
insists that the district court has concurrent jurisdiction over
collateral questions before the NLRB.
Under Section 301 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, the district
court has jurisdiction over suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce. Jurisdiction under
Section 301 has been extended to actions for a declaratory
judgment respecting rights and duties in a collective bargaining
agreement without requiring allegations of contract violations.
El Paso Building Construction Trades Council v. El Paso
Chapter Associated General Contractors, 376 F.2d 797 (5th Cir.
1967). It is also established that federal courts may entertain
declaratory judgment suits even though a remedy before the NLRB
may be available on an unfair labor practice charge. Heavy
Contractors Association v. International Hod Carriers,
312 F. Supp. 1345 (D.Neb. 1969). However, the board's determination of
a union's representational status is different from resolution of
an unfair labor practice charge. Courts should not decide
questions beyond their jurisdiction under the guise of construing
contracts under Section 301.
There is no controversy about the plaintiff's duty to either
bargain with or pay
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withheld dues to TWUA. But West Point denies its obligation to
recognize or make payments to ACTWU, characterizing this as a
"contract issue." Thus, the pivotal question in this instance is
ACTWU's role as the successor union to TWUA.
The National Labor Relations Act vests exclusive authority in
the NLRB to pass on issues of representation. See NLRB v. Cabot
Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 79 S.Ct. 1015, 3 L.Ed.2d 1175 (1959);
National Association of Women and Children's Apparel Salesmen,
Inc., 479 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1973). Whether or not a merged
union should remain as the bargaining agent of a unit of
employees depends on a factual determination, whether it is a
continuation of the old union under a new name or is a
substantially different organization. NLRB v. Commercial Letter,
Inc., 496 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Hershey Chocolate
Corp., 297 F.2d 286 (3rd Cir. 1961); Carpinteria Lemon
Association v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. den.,
354 U.S. 909, 77 S.Ct. 1295, 1 L.Ed.2d 1427 (1957). This calls
for a resolution of the right to represent, a matter within the
exclusive domain of the NLRB and not compatible with the purpose
of Section 301. NLRB v. Newspapers, Inc., 515 F.2d 334 (5th
Cir. 1975). See also Retail Store Employees Union v. NLRB,
528 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1975).
In arguing that the district court has concurrent jurisdiction
over these questions, the plaintiff relies on cases in which the
district courts decided contests concerning successor employers
under collective bargaining agreements. However, the
determination of the successorship of unions differs
significantly from that of employers. Federal labor laws are
designed to assure and protect the fair representation of
employees in labor disputes, and the selection of the employees'
exclusive bargaining agent is a fundamental step in that process.
Under Section 159 of the Act, Congress vested the NLRB with the
exclusive authority to make the factual finding regarding the
representative status of labor organizations. It is clear that
wherever there is a change in the representation of a union, the
board, and not the courts, is the proper body to reassess the
change. NLRB v. Warrensburg Board Paper Corporation, 340 F.2d 920
at 924 (2nd Cir. 1965). See also, NLRB v. International
Union, Progressive Mine Workers of America, 375 U.S. 396,
84 S.Ct. 453, 11 L.Ed.2d 412 (1964), rev'g, 319 F.2d 428 (7th Cir.
1963). The successor employer is not the bargaining
representative of employees and that determination is not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the board. The cases cited by the
plaintiff support the conclusion that district courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over questions of employer successorship,
but not that there is also concurrent jurisdiction over questions
of union successorship.
Where the only substantial question raised by the complaint is
whether the ACTWU is a party to the contract, the district court
does not have jurisdiction to decide which union represents the
employees.
Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.[fn1]
[fn1] On October 22, 1976, an order staying discovery was entered pending resolution of this motion to dismiss. The plaintiff has since filed a motion for reconsideration of the stay order and a supplemental motion and brief alleging that on October 29, 1976, the Regional Director of the NLRB granted the defendant's petition for amendment of certification. The plaintiff argues that it was denied notice and hearing before the Regional Director, and that the NLRB is not competent to decide the issues presented in this action. This order renders the stay and the motion to reconsider moot. The plaintiff's remedy for reversal of the amendment of certification is through appeal to the NLRB and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 159.Page 308