MORAN v. BEALE, 368 Fed.Appx. 807 (9th Cir. 2010)
Gene MORAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Meagan J. BEALE; et al.,Defendants-Appellees.
No. 08-56005.United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.Submitted February 16, 2010.[fn*]
Filed March 2, 2010.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.][fn*] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, and therefore denies Moran's request. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Gene Moran, Huntington Beach, CA, pro se.
Lise S. Jacobson, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 8:07-cv-01057-MMM-RNB.Page 808
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM[fn**][fn**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Gene Moran, a former California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the defendants failed to correct perjured testimony by government witnesses. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Reyn's PastaBella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Moran's action because he seeks to litigate issues identical to those that were already litigated and decided in his federal habeas case. SeeHawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 323-25 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (precluding a plaintiff from religitating claims in a civil rights action that were already litigated and decided in his federal habeas case); see also Reyn's Pasta Bella,442 F.3d at 746 (listing the elements for issue preclusion). Moreover, Moran's section 1983 claims are Heck-barred. SeeHeck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364,129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (precluding a section 1983 action when a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply invalidity of his sentence); see also Spencer v. Kemna,523 U.S. 1, 7-8, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (explaining that a former prisoner is not proscribed from challenging a conviction in habeas corpus after completing his sentence because a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences).
Moran's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.