U.S. v. RAMIREZ-KROTKY, 407 Fed.Appx. 262 (9th Cir. 2010)
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sandy JohannaRAMIREZKROTKY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 10-50174.United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.Submitted December 14, 2010.[fn*]
Filed January 5, 2011.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.][fn*] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P.34(a)(2).
Stephen M. Tokarz, Assistant U.S., Timothy D. Coughlin, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Michael Emerson Lasater, Esquire, U.S.,Page 263
Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Mahir Tewfik Sherif, Law offices of Mahir T. Sherif, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:04-cr-02943-RTB.
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM[fn**]
[fn**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Sandy Johanna Ramirez-Krotky appeals from the 24-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Ramirez-Krotky contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to: (1) calculate the advisory Guidelines range at the beginning of the sentencing hearing; (2) expressly consider the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553
and 18 U.S.C § 3583(e); and (3) explain the reasons for the sentence imposed. The record reflects that the district court did not procedurally err. See United States v. Carty,520 F.3d 984, 991-95 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Ramirez-Krotky also contends that the district court abused its discretion in considering certain factors not contemplated by section 3583(e) in imposing the sentence upon revocation of supervised release. The record does not reflect that the court considered such factors.
Ramirez-Krotky last contends that her statutory maximum sentence is substantively unreasonable. The sentence was reasonable in light of the court's emphasis on the need for deterrence and RamirezKrotky's continued breach of trust.See U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A(3)(b); see alsoUnited States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[A]t a revocation sentencing, the court may appropriately sanction a violator for his breach of trust[.]") (internal quotations omitted).
AFFIRMED.
Page 1