JOCK v. RANSOM, 07-3162-cv (2nd Cir. 3-20-2009)
CODY MICHAEL JOCK, TANNER RILEY JOCK, JAKE TYLER JOCK, MICHAEL L. JOCK,as parent and legal guardian of Cody Michael Jock, Tanner Riley Jock, andJake Tyler Jock, COLLEEN FARWELL, as parent and legal guardian of CodyMichael Jock, Tanner Riley Jock, and Jake Tyler Jock,Plaintiffs-Appellants, LAYLA WHITE and CHARLES WHITE, as parent and legalguardian of Layla White, Plaintiffs, v.Page 2JAMES RANSOM, individually and as member of the SalmonRiver Central School District Board of Education, KATHLEENLAUZON, individually and as member of the Salmon River CentralSchool District Board of Education, EMILY LAUZON, individuallyand as member of the Salmon River Central School District Boardof Education, BEN KELLY, individually and as member of theSalmon River Central School District Board of Education, STACEYADAMS, individually and as member of the Salmon River CentralSchool District Board of Education, DARLENE BROCKWAY,individually and as member of the Salmon River Central SchoolDistrict Board of Education, ROBERT DURANT, individually and asmember of the Salmon River Central School District Board ofEducation, MARION ELLIOT, individually and as member of theSalmon River Central School District Board of Education, JUDITHSTARK, individually and as member of the Salmon River CentralSchool District Board of Education, CORRINA BERO, individuallyand as member of the Salmon River Central School District Boardof Education, SALMON RIVER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OFEDUCATION, SALMON RIVER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, GLENN R.BELLINGER, Superintendent of the Salmon River Central SchoolDistrict, in his official and individual capacity, IRVINGPAPINEAU, Principal of St. Regis Mohawk School, JOHN SIMMONS,Principal of Salmon River Central School, and JOHN AND JANEDOES 1-10, Defendants-Appellees.[fn1]
No. 07-3162-cv.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
March 20, 2009.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.][fn1] The clerk of the court is directed to amend the official caption to conform with the caption as written.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of appeal No. 07-3162-cv from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.), it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
For Appellants: BONNIE LAU, Sonnenschein Nath Rosenthal LLP, San Francisco, Cal. (Paula M. Yost, Matt M. Marostica, Sonnenschein Nath
Rosenthal LLP, San Francisco, Cal., and Yoav M. Griver, Zeicher Ellman Krause LLP, New York, N.Y., on the brief)
For Appellees: GREGG T. JOHNSON, Girvin Ferlazzo, P.C., Albany, N.Y.
PRESENT: HON. JOHN M. WALKER, JR., HON. GUIDO CALABRESI, HON. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs appeal the District Court's grant of summary judgment. We assume the parties' familiarity as to the facts, procedural history, and issues raised on appeal.Page 3
As a preliminary matter, Defendants raise the issue of constitutional standing, arguing that there is no injury in fact. Because, however, the eldest of the Plaintiffs is now a student in the secondary school and because any challenged school district policies affect all of the district's schools, there is constitutionally sufficient injury-in-fact and Plaintiffs have standing. See Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA),524 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs argue primarily that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' equal protection claim. We review decisions granting summary judgment de novo. Holcomb v. IonaColl., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008). In order to succeed in their equal protection claim, Plaintiffs must show that the challenged policy or decision was made with discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis,426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48-50
(2d Cir. 1999); Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1995). This may be shown either through direct evidence of intent or by drawing an inference of intent from circumstantial evidence showing disparate treatment of persons in similarly situated circumstances. See Neilson v.D'Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled on other groundsby Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008).
Here, there is no direct evidence that Defendants intended to discriminate against Mohawks. Nor is there circumstantial evidence that would lead one to find a discriminatory intent on the part of Defendants. Defendants' policy decisions suggest an intent, not to discriminate, but to promote and respect Mohawk culture. The only decision that can properly be compared to the decision about the Mohawk address is the decision to permit the Pledge of Allegiance to be recited over the school's public address system and at certain school events. The Pledge, however, is different from the Mohawk Address for any number of reasons. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 802(1); 8
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N.Y.C.R.R. § 108.5. It therefore cannot serve as a basis for inferring that the school's policy with regard to the Mohawk address was made with any discriminatory intent.
We have considered all of Appellants' remaining arguments and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.Page 1